
<^^'- 









I 8 






•^^ -o~ 



o ( 



^*~^ 






* 8 












.0^ 



-^b. 












■#v 






\ 



3^-^. 












^*% 









n 






'=?. 






-\.^ 



^ .\^- ^-t;.., 
^"^ ^ 






5,0 O^ = 



^^'^ 



\%^ 









-o. ^-> 










Y * , ^> 




•\ 






A^^' 



^ ./ 



z 



Oc 









^5 -^c^. 









^^. . 






> 



I' 



.o^ 







X'^^'^. 






■\. 



/- "' N 



..s^ \. 













\ I B 




IrO^^/Z/rnlA. 



D.Appleton&iCc. 



GREAT COMMANDERS 
• • • • 

GENERAL McCLELLAN 



General PETER S. MICHIE 




WITH ILLUSTRATIONS AND MAPS 



o » > B o » o . 



» , J J„ > 



NEW YORK 

D. APPLETON AND COMPANY 

1901 



t^ 



u^ 



>.V\' 



THE LIBRARY OF 
CONGRESS, 

Two Copies Received 

SEP. 5 1901 

Copyright entry 

CLASS ^XXc N». 

COPY 3. 



Copyright, 1901, 
By D. APPLETON AND COMPANY. 



A// rights reserved. 



September^ 1901. 



PREFACE. 



The accomplished author of this volume com- 
pleted the work, with the exception of the preface 
md index, in December last. In the following Feb- 
■uary the reading of the proof was interrupted by an 
llness, terminating in his untimely death on the i6th 
Df that month, so that the labor of proof reading de- 
volved upon his friend and assistant professor, Cap- 
ain Cornells De W. Willcox, of the Artillery Corps. 
3r. Otto Plate, librarian of the Academy, prepared the 
elaborate index, and, under the supervision of Pro- 
essor Michie, the maps were made by First Lieu- 
enant William Ruthven Smith, of the Artillery Corps, 
in instructor in the Department of Philosophy. 

Peter Smith Michie was born March 24, 1839, 
it Brechin, Forfarshire, Scotland, and was appointed 
o the United States Military Academy from Ohio, 
graduating second in the class of 1863. He at once 
ought active service in the field, receiving the com- 
nission of first lieutenant in the Corps of Engineers, 
md before the close of the civil war he was chief 
engineer of the Army of the James. For his services 
LS an engineer during the civil war he received three 
)revets, and for meritorious services in the Virginia 
ampaign, terminating at Appomattox Court House, 
le was brevetted a brigadier general of volunteers. In 
Vpril, 1 867, he was ordered to the West Point Academy 
s Assistant Professor of Civil and Military Engineer- 
ng, and four years later was appointed Professor of 
vJatural and Experimental Philosophy, performing his 
luties as such for almost thirty years. 

It may be questioned if any instructor at the Acad- 
:my was ever more beloved and respected than Gen- 
:ral Michie, or if anv member of the educatiojial staff 



vi GENERAL McCLELLAN. 

ever exercised equal influence in aiding and guiding' 
the affairs of the MiHtary Academy. His latest 
thoughts were on the successful continuation of his 
duties there, and his dying wish as to his successor was 
happily gratified. Few men had more friends than the; 
warm-hearted Michie. He desired to live, but was- 
ready to go, although he had not nearly rounded outt 
the allotted threescore years and ten, and had muchi 
literary work in view that he wished to complete after 
his approaching retirement from the Academy. 

Not yet sixty-two when he was called away, but how, 
full and complete was Michie's career! There was noi 
break in his record of service during thirty and eighti 
years, from the time he hastened to the field to de- 
fend his country's flag and then returned to devote.^ 
his life to the best interests of his loved alma mater. 
" He was a scholar, and a ripe and good one," in 
all that related to his profession ; and not having been 
connected with the Army of the Potomac during the 
period when it was commanded by General McClellan^ 
it was believed that no better person than Professor 
Michie could be found to write an unprejudiced biog 
raphy. He was by nature both honest and indepen- 
dent, and it would seem that he was eminently suc- 
cessful in preparing this volume with what Edmund 
Burke describes as " the cold neutrality of an inn 
partial judge.'' This opinion was shared by McClel 
lan's able corps commander. General Fitz-John Porterr 
who, in a letter to the writer, dated from his dying bed 
May 5, 1901, says: "So far as I have been able t( 
judge, I think it is the best work on the subject tha 
has been written." Another accomplished army office: 
who also saw the proof sheets, writes : " In my humbM 
opinion, this Life of McClellan is altogether the bes< 
piece of work done by the author, and, more than thisj 
it is absolutely so impartial and just as to posses>^ », 
almost the quality of finality, so far as McClellan'l 
qualities as a commander are concerned." 

Jas. Grant Wilson 

New York, Jitue, igoi. 



I 



CONTENTS. 



CHAPTER PAGE 

I. — Ancestry. — West Point. — Mexican War . . i 

II. — Exploration. — Crimean War 24 

III. — Preliminary to the Rebellion .... 53 
IV. — Early service in Ohio and West Virginia . 69 
V. — Organization of the Army of the Potomac. — 

Succeeds Scott as General in Chief . . 93 
VI. — Plans of campaigns. — Ball's Bluff . . .120 
VII. — Inactivity of the Army of the Potomac. — Plan 

of Peninsular campaign evolved . . .151 
VIII. — President's War Orders.' — Peninsular plan 

adopted. — Assistance of the navy . . .186 
IX. — Manassas evacuated. — Defense of Washington 221 
X. — Embarkation for Fort Monroe. — Opening of 
Peninsular campaign. — Siege of Yorktown. — 
Battle of Williamsburg. — Adoption of White 

House as base 231 

XL — Jackson's Valley campaign. — Hanover Court 

House. — Battle of Seven Pines.— Fair Oaks . 2S5 
XII. — Lee's plans. — Stuart's raid. — Battle of Beaver 
Dam Creek. — Gaines's Mill.— Retreat to the 
James. — White Oak Bridge. — Glendale . .317 
XIII. — Malvern Hill. — Harrison's Landing. — With- 
drawal of the Army of the Potomac from 
THE Peninsula. — Pope's campaign. — McClel- 



^ 



LAN's restoration to command .... 359 

vii 



viii GENERAL McCLELLAN. 

CHAPTER PAG 

XIV. — McClellan and the Administration. — Lee's 
Maryland campaign. — Battles of South Moun- 
tain Gaps. — Battle of Antietam. — McClel- 

lan's final removal .39^ 

XV. — Candidate for the presidency. — Governor. — 

Military and personal characteristics . .441 
Index 47; 



LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS AND MAPS. 



FACING 
PACK 



Portrait of General McClellan, engraved on steel by 
Girsch from a photograph by Brady . Frontispiece 

Map of the battlefield of Rich Mountain .... 83 

Map of Yorktown to Williamsburg ..... 233 

Map of the battlefield of Williamsburg .... 259 

Map of the battlefield of Fair Oaks and Seven Pines . 303 

Map of the battlefield of Beaver Dam Creek . . . 331 

Field of operations in the Seven Days' fight . . . 337 

Map of the battlefield of Gaines Mill .... 340 
Map of the battlefield of Malvern Hill . . . .361 
Portrait of General McClellan, engraved on wood by 

J. S. Harley from a photograph by Gurney . . 380 
Disposition of Union and Confederate forces, September 

13, 1862 406 

Map of the battlefield of Antietam 412 



GENERAL McCLELLAN. 



CHAPTER I. 

ANCESTRY. WEST POINT. MEXICAN WAR. 

)■ CGeorge Brinton McClellan, the subject of this 
memoir, was born December 3, 1826, in Philadelphia, 
Pa. He was the third child and second son of the emi- 
nent physician, George McClellan, and of Elizabeth 
Brinton, his wife.l His mother, a daughter of John 
Brinton, whose family had its origin in the south of 
England, was a woman of gentle refinement and un- 
selfish disposition. Owing to her husband's peculiarly 
active professional life the training of the children fell 
almost entirely upon her, and for this loving task she 
was admirably adapted. Gentle in her ministrations, 
clear in judgment and wise in discretion, she filled 
home with happiness, and guided the youthful lives of 
her children by that wonderful intuition of a loving 
mother which is beyond expression or analysis. To 
such noble women, the loving and self-sacrificing 
mothers, the country owes an infinite debt of gratitude, 
and to them, therefore, is our first homage due. 
""^ ,' In tracing back the lines of the father's ancestry we 
ar^ brought to the beginning of the thirteenth century. 
The Maclellans were anciently sheriffs of Palloway 
and barons of Bombie, one of whom accompanied Sir 
William Wallace into France after the latter was de- 
feated at Falkirk in i2gS.Pin the turbulent times of 
James H of Scotland, Sir Patrick Maclellan was car- 
ried oi¥ by William, the eighth earl of Douglas, to 



2 GENERAL McCLELLAN. 

Thrieve Castle, where, upon his refusing to join the 
confederacy against his»king, he was treacherously put 
to death by Douglas ; whereupon the Maclellans, mak- 
ing reprisal upon the lands of Douglas in Galloway 
without warrant or authority, the barony and office of 
sheriff became forfeited to the Crown.T'-fTradition as- 
signs the recovery of the barony to the following cir- 
cumstance: In the reign of James II of Scotland, a 
troop of gypsies, coming from Ireland, so infested the 
county of Galloway that a royal proclamation was is- 
sued, offering the barony of Bombie to any person 
who should bring the captain, dead or alive, before the 
king — an exploit which was accomplished by a son of 
the Laird of Bombie, who carried the marauder's head 
upon the point of his sword to his Majesty; from 
whence, to perpetuate the exploit, he assumed that 
figure for his crest, with the motto " Think on." *<^ 'Re- 
cording to another tradition, the famous cannon named 
Mons Meg, now at Edinburgh Castle, was presented 
by the Maclellans to James II, to aid him in battering 
down Thrieve Castle in 1455, and it was probably on 
account of this legend that the family used as a crest 
a mortar piece with the motto " Superba frango." j 

Sir Robert Maclellan, of Bombie, gentleman of the 
bedchamber to the first two British sovereigns of the 
house of Stuart, was created a peer of Scotland with 
the title of Lord Kirkcudbright, granted to him and his 
heirs male bearing the name and arms of Maclellan, 
on the occasion of the coronation of Charles I at Edin- 
burgh, May 25, 1633. The title became extinct April 
19, 1832, on the death of the ninth baron, Camden- 
Grey Maclellan. f 

. From this county of Kirkcudbright, which lies on 
the northern border of the Frith of Solway in Scot- 
land, three brothers McClellan emigrated to America 
early in the eighteenth century and became the pro- 
genitors of the family in this country. The eldest of 

* Burke's Heraldic Dictionary, p. 353. 

f Dictionary of National Biography, vol. xxxv, p. 210. 



ANCESTRY.— WEST POINT.— MEXICAN WAR. 3 

these settled near Worcester, Mass., and here his eldest 
son, Samuel-, was born, January 4, 1730. In keeping 
with the circumstances of the time and place the young 
lad was brought up as a farmer, a life which in those 
early days led to independence of thought as well as 
of action. Born with a martial spirit and a patriot's 
heart, and invigorated by the pure air of freedom, he 
found ample opportunity to cultivate the one and en- 
gage the other in the service of his country before he 
had reached middle age. He served with great credit 
as a lieutenant in the French and Indian war, and later, 
in 1773, he became captain of a troop of horse which 
he had raised in and about Woodstock, Conn., where 
he had made his home. 

When the news of the battle of Lexington reached 
him he immediately set out with his troop, and was for- 
tunate enough to participate in the battle of Bunker 
Hill. The anxiety of his wife was relieved when she 
heard of his safety from the perils of battle, and in her 
gratitude for this favor of Divine Providence she 
planted three elms at Woodstock in commemoration 
thereof, and these now noble and venerable trees have 
been for more than a century loving testimonials of her 
devotion to her patriotic husband. Although he was 
^complimented by Washmgton with an invitation to join 
the Continental ariny, with the promise of a colonel's 
commission, he modestly preferred service with the 
Connecticut militia during the war. Ample testi- 
monials of his sturdy patriotism and soldierly ability 
are to be found in the commissions which the worthy 
Governor, John Trumbull, was pleased to bestow upon 
lim. These are : Major, Eleventh Connecticut, Octo- 
ber 15, 1775; lieutenant colonel, Fourth Battalion, De- 
:ember 2, 1776; lieutenant colonel, Eleventh Connecti- 
:ut, December 7, 1776; colonel, battalion of Connecti- 
cut militia, September 25, 1777; colonel, January 29, 
1779; brigadier general. Fifth Brigade Connecticut 
nilitia, June 10, 1779. After a continuous service dur- 
ing the war he returned to his home at Woodstock 
upon the declaration of peace, hung up his sword, and 



4 GENERAL McCLELLAN. 

quietly resumed the peaceful avocations that had been 
so long interrupted. ♦He represented his friends and 
neighbors in the State Assembly for several terms, and 
finally, after a well-spent life, left as a legacy to his de- 
scendants an unsullied name worthy of emulation. Hq] 
died at Woodstock, October 17, 1807.* 

In the direct line of descent from the Revolutionary j 
soldier comes James, his eldest son, followed by the two 
sons of the latter, George and Samuel, both of whomi 
were born at Woodstock — the elder, George, Decem-j 
ber 2^, 1796, and the younger, Samuel, September 21, 
1800. Both became physicians, and each had two sonss 
who served in the war of the rebellion. It is, however, 
a curious circumstance that the sons of Samuel served 
on opposite sides. Carswell, the elder, after graduatingj 
at Williams College, became a civil engineer, and after- 
ward served with gallantry and distinction in the Army 
of the Potomac. He was severely wounded at the bat- 
tle of Malvern Hill, and afterward was a most efficient 
staff officer of General Humphreys in the Seconc 
Corps. He is also the author of the Personal Memoirr 
and Military History of Grant z's. the Record of th( 
Army of the Potomac. The younger son of Samuel' 
Henry Brainerd, also a graduate of Williams Collega 
served on the Confederate side as adjutant of the Thirc 
Virginia Cavalry, then as assistant adjutant general o 
the cavalry corps of the Army of Northern Virginia 
and as chief of staff to Generals J. E. B. Stuart anc^ 
Wade Hampton. He has also ventured into the fieh 
of military literature, as the author of the Life and Cam ? 
paigns of Major-General J. E. B. Stuart. 

George McClellan, the distinguished physician an< 
surgeon of Philadelphia, was educated at Yale College 
and while there as a student, under the influence of th 
elder Silliman, he developed a taste for natural scienc 
which ultimately directed his studies toward the medi 
cal profession. After graduating from college in 181 
be began the study of medicine at New Haven undc 



ve! 



Appletons' Cyclopaedia of American Biography, vol. iv, p. 84. 



II 



ANCESTRY.— WEST POINT.— MEXICAN WAR. 5 

Dr. Thomas Hubbard, but received his degree from 
the medical department of the University of Pennsyl- 
vania in 1819. But even before he had obtained his 
degree he was elected resident physician of the hospital 
of the Philadelphia almshouse. During his first year 
of practice he performed the most important operations 
in surgery, such as lithotomy, extraction of the lens for 
cataract, and extirpation of the lower jaw. He opened 
a dissecting room, and here his private courses of lec- 
tures were so successful as to necessitate a larger room 
for the accommodation of his constantly increasing 
classes. Encouraged by this gratifying approval of 
his methods of instruction, he conceived the idea of 
founding a medical college, and in 1825 he, with oth- 
ers, obtained from the Legislature of Pennsylvania a 
charter for the Jefferson Medical College. He began 
his lectures in the new college as professor of surgery 
in 1826, and notwithstanding the professional opposi- 
tion which developed and the difficulty of obtaining a 
suitable faculty, the college grew so rapidly that within 
ten years the students numbered three hundred and 
fifty. In 1838 the faculty was reorganized, but with- 
out Dr. McClellan's name, and this led to the incor- 
poration of the medical department of the University 
bf Pennsylvania, mainly through his own personal 
efforts. He began his lectures in the new institution 
in November, 1839, and continued them until the 
spring of 1843. ^^ is credited with being the origina- 
tor of the extended system of medical education as it 
now exists in this country and of the clinical instruc- 
tion in such institutions. His professional practice in- 
creased with his growing reputation, patients coming 
even from the West Indies and South America to avail 
themselves of his skill and attainments. He was espe- 
cially distinguished in ophthalmic surgery, although 
he had undertaken with success almost every capital 
operation then known to the profession. By his mar- 
velous skill in the removal of the parotid gland he did 
more than any other surgeon of his time to establish 
it as a safe and feasible operation. He shares with 



6 GENERAL McCLELLAN. 

Valentine Mott, of New York, and John C. Warren, of 
Boston, the credit of introducing many procedures in 
surgery which were before new to the profession in 
this country. In his earher years he contributed many 
original papers to medical periodicals, and was one of 
the conductors of the American Medical Review and 
Journal. He also edited Eberles's Theory and Practice 
of Physic (Philadelphia, 1840), and left in manuscript 
The Principles and Practice of Surgery, which was 
afterward edited by his son. Dr. J. H. B. McClellan, 
and published in 1848. Like all other successful in- 
structors, he was animated by a controlling devotion 
to his profession and gifted w^ith an enthusiastic love 
for instruction, which aroused the intensest interest in 
the minds of his pupils. He died in Philadelphia, May 
9, 1847, after a life which, though brief w^ien measured 
by years, was full to overflowing in remarkable pro- 
fessional achievements and good deeds done to his fel- 
low-men. 

Two other sons were born, who grew to manhood 
and justified by their honorable lives and distinguished 
careers the expectations of their honored parents. The 
elder, John Hill Brinton, was born in Philadelphia, 
August 13. 1823, and died in Edinburgh, Scotland, 
July 20, 1874. After graduating from the University.] 
of Pennsylvania in 1841 he adopted the profession off 
medicine, in which he attained great distinction bothi 
in surgery and medical practice, for he inherited much 
of his father's skill and quickness of touch. It is said 
that he possessed a wonderful intuition in the diag- 
nosis of disease, and his gentleness of manner made 
him a welcome visitor in the chamber of sickness. 
During the war he contributed his best efforts and 
skill in the hospitals established by the Government 
in Philadelphia, and performed some notable opera-; 
tions which have been found worthy of record in the 
Medical and Surgical History of the War, published 
by the United States Government. He edited and pub- 
lished in 1848 the manuscript on The Principles and 
Practice of Surgery which his father left in 1847. Th€' 



ANCESTRY.— WEST POINT.— MEXICAN WAR. 7 

younger brother, Arthur, served as aid-de-camp on the 
staff of his brother George, during the Peninsular and 
Maryland campaigns, and ended his military service 
when the general was relieved from the command of 
the Army of the Potomac, November 7, 1862. 

Overburdened by the many exactions connected 
with the life of a successful practitioner of medicine, 
and engrossed with the care and anxieties pertaining 
to the establishment of the new medical coUege, Dr. 
McClellan could only give a limited attention to the 
education of his children. Fortunately his wife was 
particularly well fitted to supply this deficiency. Under 
her loving guidance George spent a happy childhood 
and grew to be a healthy and robust lad. Before he 
had reached his teens he was sent for his preliminary 
instruction to a school in Philadelphia, kept by Sears 
Cook Walker, a Harvard graduate, where he remained 
for four years ; then to Dr. Samuel Crawford's prepara- 
tory school of the University of Pennsylvania, receiv- 
ing at the same time some private instruction in Latin 
and Greek from an excellent German teacher named 
SchefTer, with whom he read Virgil and Homer. In 
1840 he entered the university, but continued there 
only two years, because he then received an appoint- 
ment to the United States Military Academy at West 
Point. Up to this time he had not exhibited any un- 
usual talents, although he had attained high class rank ; 
he was neither brilliant nor precocious, but was rated 
rather as a good student making steady progress. His 
habits of mind tended rather to thoroughness of detail 
than to fertility of imagination. 

When this young lad reported himself at West 
Point it was found that he was below the required age 
for admission, he being then only fifteen years and 
seven months old. Owing doubtless to his good 
health, fine physique, and thorough mental prepara- 
tion the regulation as to age was suspended in his case, 
and he was admitted to the Academy in the summer 
of 1842. It is an instructive sight to look upon the 
earnest countenances of these youths, coming together 



I 



8 GENERAL McCLELLAN. 

for the first time from all sections of the country to 
enter upon a military 'career, and who for the time 
being may be taken to be the truest type of the young 
manhood of our country. The dress, appearance, j| 
stature, manners, and dialect of its various sections are ! 
fairly well represented in such a gathering, but after 
they have passed through their setting-up drill and are ,, 
put into their uniforms, the barriers due to differences || 
of previous condition are soon broken down, and those 
human qualities that make for association and friend- 
ship prove stronger than the accidents of birth or the 
influences of wealth or station. The strongest asso- 
ciations are at first those of classmates, but in later 
years these include members of other classes, for the 
deprivations, hardships^ and sacrifices of the military 
service naturally cement these friendly associations into 
the love and affection of a great brotherhood. 

Because of the dominating influence that the West 
Point training had on McClellan's public career it may 
be well to refer briefly to some of its salient features. 
Foreign military visitors have frequently expressed 
great surprise that it has been possible to maintain in 
the military school of a democratic people a regimen 
so exacting and a discipline so rigid as is found at 
West Point. An attentive study of its early history, 
and of the circumstances attending its complete re- 
organization in i8i7,will remove this difficulty, and will 
show, in addition, that the application of sound prin- 
ciples of education, the establishment of wise regula- 
tions for discipline, and the inculcation of a patriotic 
ambition are sufficient reasons for its continued pros- 
perity. 

Major Sylvanus Thayer, the great superintendent, 
to whom the country is mainly indebted for the vitality 
with which his personality revivified the Military Acad- 
emy, was himself a graduate of the class of 1808, and 
an officer of the corps of engineers. Called to assume 
command of the institution in 1817, after a brief in- 
vestici^ation of the military schools of Europe, he was 
enabled by the firm support of the Secretaries of War 



I 



ANCESTRY.— WEST POINT.— MEXICAN WAR. g 

of two administrations to carry into effect his well- 
devised plans for the reformation and reor^^anization 
of the institution. Enjoying the full confidence of the 
War Department for the sixteen years of his adminis- 
tration, he was enabled to select from among the 
graduates of the Academy such officers for its future 
administration as were imbued with a sturdy faith in 
the efffcacy of his ideals, and were capable of improv- 
ing the studies and discipline that had already pro- 
duced such gratifying results. As examples of his 
remarkable perspicacity, it is only necessary to name 
Davies, Mahan, Courtenay, Bartlett, Church, and^ 
Bailey, who became famous professors, distinguished 
for their sound learning, eminent ability, and great 
teaching capacity, and whose labors have bridged the 
intervening period from Thayer's time to the present 
with undoubted success. And of still greater impor- 
tance to the country was the beneficent influence of 
these ideals upon the tone and discipline of the army 
by the influx into its commissioned ranks of the five 
hundred and seventy young officers who as pupils had 
been trained under his guidance. 

" To the discharge of his important functions," says 
one of his former pupils, " he brought eminent personal 
qualifications, uniting decision with courtesy, authority 
with kindness, knowledge with consideration for igno- 
rance, strict discipline with paternal admonition, un- 
faltering integrity to unflinching firmness, fidelity to 
his trust, and loyalty to his country, and with a rest- 
less energy and an untiring industry that never left 
anything unfinished or to chance." * 

This magnificent encomium has been amply justi- 
fied by the records of the graduates of West Point. But 
it would be a grave mistake to imagine that training 
alone can supply deficiencies of inherent possession or 
that institutions can create genius. Schools are estab- 
lished not for the few rare geniuses that flash upon the 
'world, but for the many possessing talent, who through 

* Cullum's Biographical Register, vol. iii, p. 655. 



I 



lO GENERAL McCLELLAN. 

the helping hand of training and education come finally 
to be intrusted with th^ business of the world, so that 
it may be conducted conservatively and civilization pro- 
gress by an orderly evolution. 

The Military Academy experienced a rather pre- 
carious existence for the first fifteen years of its life, 
but at the time of young McClellan's admission it had 
had the benefit of twenty-five years' able management 
of the corps of engineers upon the lines laid down by 
Major Thayer. As a result, it had attained a well-de- 
served reputation among the educational institutions of 
the country, and its high standards in the physical, in- 
tellectual, and moral essentials of education had been 
rigidly maintained. But hidden as it was in the high- 
lands of the Hudson, out of the usual lines of travel, it 
was scarcely known to the general public. No great 
war had arisen to test the efficiency of its methods and 
demonstrate its value to the nation. Many public men, 
with pardonable optimism, foreseeing no possibility of 
future war and thoroughly engrossed in developing the 
wonderful commercial facilities of the country, were 
lukewarm in its support. Indeed, on one occasion, 
just before the Mexican War, the change of a single 
vote in the House of Representatives would, have de- 
feated the bill for its support. Nevertheless Congress 
continued to appropriate annually the modest sum re- 
quired for its maintenance, and its graduates were sent 
to the distant frontier, where the little regular army was 
engaged in a continuous struggle with the hostile In- 
dians. There was another equally important service ' ^. 
to the country that the graduates of West Point were 
able to render. When, in 1827, the railroad mania 
began, there were only a few short and insignificant 
local roads, aggregating in length less than twenty 
miles, and there were but few educated civil engineers 
in the country capable of conducting larger works. 
Under these circumstances the Government adopted 
the wise policy of loaning officers of the army, scien- 
tifically educated at the Academy, to assist railroad 
companies in carrying out more ambitious projects. 



ANCESTRY.— WEST POINT.— MEXICAN WAR. n 

In this way West Point graduates became the pioneers 
in railroad construction, and the educators of an able 
body of civil engineers, who to this day have con- 
tinued the inherited traditions, methods, discipline, 
esprit de corps, and high bearing of their distinguished 
predecessors. It is within the limits of probability that 
the great success of such able engineers as McNeil, 
Wliistler, Tyler, Barney, Swift, and many others who 
followed their example in engaging in civil engineer- 
ing, may have influenced many young men to seek the 
advantages of the West Point education, and who 
would not otherwise have been attracted there by vi- 
sions of military glory. The profession of arms is not, 
in time of peace, especially engaging, and it would be 
an interesting circumstance to ascertain whether young 
McClellan's steps were guided to West Point by his 
inherent military instincts, derived from his revolution- 
ary ancestor, or by the desire of his parents to secure 
for him a good scientific education. 

In the summer of 1842 his class began their student 
life at West Point, and although he was but a young 
lad at the time, he cheerfully complied with all the 
exactions of his new environment, for he was inherently 
a lover of order and of discipline. He had acquired at 
school habits of application and a remarkable facility 
in the use of language for one so young, so that it was 
not long before he was transferred to the upper part 
of his class, and in honest rivalry was able to main- 
tain his position during the whole of his academic 
career. At the dreaded examination in January, when 
the new class comes before the academic board for their 
first arrangement in scholarship, McClellan came out 
second in a class of one hundred and one members, 
being first in mathematics and eighth in French. At 
the end of his first year he was third in the class, which 
was then reduced to eighty-three members ; the second 
year he held his own, then dropped one file the third 
year, but recovering during the last year, he came out 
second in general standing on final graduation, the 
class then numbering but sixty, and having lost in its 



12 GENERAL McCLELLAN. 

four years of struggle forty-eight of its original mem- 
bers. The first honors* of the class fell by just right 
to a brilliant scholar, Charles Seaforth Stewart, who 
had held his position against all competitors during the 
whole four years of his cadet life. In this honorable 
rivalry for scholastic distinction nothing occurred to 
mar the mutual regard of Stewart and McClellan or to 
disturb their friendship. In recalling the memories of 
their cadet days Stewart says of McClellan : " He was 
a noble, generous-hearted, clear-headed enthusiastic, 
able fellow. There w^as not a mean thought in him. 
He was well educated, and, when he chose to be, bril- 
liant. In every point, so far as I can recall, he was true 
and honorable, and our personal relations wxre always 
very pleasant as cadets." In after years, so strange 
are the fortunes of war, Stewart served as major of 
engineers during the Peninsular campaign in the army 
commanded by his classmate, McClellan. 

Among McClellan's comrades there were many 
who afterward gained considerable distinction in their 
profession. In the senior, or first class, were Grant, 
Franklin, Ingalls, and Augur ; in the second, Pleason- 
ton, Buckner, Sackett, and Hancock ; in the third, W. 
F. (Baldy) Smith, Fitz-John Porter, Stone, Wood, 
Clitz, D. A. Russell, and Granger ; and in his own class 
were Foster, Reno, Couch, Seymour, Sturgis, Stone- 
man, Palmer, Gibbs, Gordon, Davis, Pickett, and T. 
J. (Stonewall) Jackson. In the succeeding classes, with 
"the members of which he had more or less intimate 
association during his cadet life, were A. P. Hill, Burn- 
side, Gibbon, Ayres, GrifBn, Heth, Trowbridge, Duane, 
Tidball, Buford, Gillmore, Parke, and Holabird. Little 
did these young cadets then imagine that they would 
be called upon in the near future to lead great hosts 
into battle, and, through the valor of their soldiers, be- 
come famous generals in the war of the rebellion. 

Too much importance can hardly be attached to the 
regular habits of life which are enforced upon these 
young and growing lads by the proper division of the 
twenty-four hours of the day for study, recitation, drill, 



!i 



ANCESTRY.— WEST POINT.— MEXICAN WAR. 13 

recreation, and sleep. McClellan came to the Academy 
an immature boy, and left it a vigorous, sturdy young 
man, of medium stature, with broad shoulders and deep 
chest; he had, however, such a well-proportioned fig- 
ure that it concealed rather than displayed his great 
muscular strength and physical activity. With an ac- 
tive brain, a clear mind, a pure heart, and a body well 
trained in all athletic exercises, it could well be said of 
him that he possessed lucns sana in corporc sano. Upon 
his graduation he was recommended by the academic 
board to the War Department for promotion into any 
corps or arm of the service. 

The cadets at West Point, coming as they do from 
every congressional district in the country, reflect with 
very great fidelity the various shades of political opin- 
ion that for the time being are there prevalent. It is 
true, however, that their views undergo modification 
to some extent through the influences of association 
and education, but, nevertheless, West Point represents 
in miniature the whole country more accurately than 
does any other institution of learning in the land. And 
so when the election of President Polk, in 1844, fore- 
shadowed the war with Mexico, the divided sentiment 
of the country was accurately portrayed among these 
youthful representatives. As the prospects for war be- 
came more certain, the members of McClellan's class, 
then on the eve of graduation, gave themselves up to 
the more thorough study of tactics, strategy, and the 
art of war, for, independently of whatever opinion they 
entertained as to the justice of the war, they knew that 
they would soon be called upon for immediate service. 
And when the news of the successes of Palo Alto and 
Resaca de la Palma, gained by General Taylor's little 
army of regulars on the 8th and 9th of May, 1846, 
reached West Point, every youngster of the graduating 
class was anxious for orders that would carry him to 
the seat of war. 

McClellan, having been commissioned a brevet sec- 
ond lieutenant of engineers upon graduation, was im- 
mediately assigned to the company of sappers and 



H 



GENERAL McCLELLAN. 



miners, which had been authorized by the act of May 
15, 1846, and was then being organized at West Point 
by Captain A. J. Swift, of the corps of engineers, as- 
sisted by Lieutenant G. W. Smith of the same corps. 
This company was the first of its kind in the army, and 
the men and officers, with the exception of the captain, 
who had studied its requirements in Europe, were igno- 
rant of the details of its duties. And as the company 
was under orders to proceed to the seat of war at the 
earhest practicable moment, the officers studied at night 
and drilled their men by day in the preparation of siege 
material and the laying out of batteries and lines of field 
fortification. McClellan soon mastered the details and 
won the respect of his soldiers by the ability with which 
he developed their manual skill and dexterity in the 
construction of gabions, fascines, and other revetments. 
Early in September the company sailed from New 
York, and on October nth it landed at Brazos San- 
tiago with a strength of seventy-two officers and men. 

From this place it was sent to Camargo for a short 
time, and thence to Matamoras ; attached then to Gen- 
eral Patterson's command, it was assigned to Twigg's 
division of regulars, and in January, 1847, marched 
with it in advance to Tampico, two hundred miles dis- 
tant, repairing roads, making bridges, and doing other 
pioneer work while on the march. After a month's 
delay at Tampico it was re-embarked, and with the first 
troops of Scott's army landed, March 9th, to engage 
in the siege of Vera Cruz. 

The duties of an engineer officer in active service, 
which McClellan was now called upon to perform, are 
extra hazardous and of an importance entirely beyond 
the rank which he holds. Required by the functions of 
his office to get as near the enemy's line as possible, 
often without regard to personal safety, he must re- 
connoiter the enemy's front, coolly judge of the 
strength of his defenses, and obtain reliable information 
that will govern the commanding general in his plan of 
battle. To be properly equipped for such delicate and 
responsible duties, he must possess clear perception, 



I ANCESTRY.— WEST POINT.— MEXICAN WAR. jc 

malytical judgment, and personal bravery free from 
-ashness. 

Colon^ljrjillmi*Jii€--abl€--Ghi-ef.Qf,^^^ 
:he plan of the_siegej3l VeraXruz, and the location of 
;lTe"tratfeTres of attack and lines of investment ; and the 
nformation upon which this was based was derived 
Tom the reconnoissances and study of the relations of 
;he ground made by the engineer officers, only ten in 
lumber, then with the army. McClellan, though the 
y^oungest in age and, excepting Foster, the junior in 
-ank, displayed such devotion, ability, and zeal in the 
hazardous duty devolving upon him as to demonstrate 
[lis fitness for membership in this corps (Tclitc of the 
American army. The marvelous success of the siege, 
-esulting in the capitulation of Vera Cruz and the 
Castle of San Juan d'Ulloa, March 29, 1847, brought 
deservedly great credit to the engineers and artillery, 
:he science of the one being ably supplemented by the 
skill of the other. 

In the series of brilliant actions which characterized 
the subsequent campaign McClellan bore an honor- 
able part. As a subaltern officer of the company of 
sappers and miners, he shared with them all the dangers 
to which it was exposed by reason of the advanced 
position which its duties assigned to it, and, in addi- 
tion, he was frequently called upon to engage in the 
hazardous duty of personal reconnoissance. In order 
to escape the poisonous hot winds of the tierra calicntey 
now daily impending, it became a matter of supreme 
importance to the commanding general to hasten the 
advance of the army into the interior as soon as pos- 
sible after the terms of capitulation had been effected. 
But owing to the deficiency of transportation, it was 
not until April 17th that the rear division of the army 
reached Plan del Rio, about sixty miles from Vera 
Cruz. It was at the Cerro Gordo, a few miles beyond, 
that the Mexican General Santa Anna had collected his 
Forces to dispute the farther advance of Scott's army. 
A.fter a careful study of the position, based upon some 
daring reconnoissances of the engineers. General Scott 



1 6 GENERAL McCLELLAN. 

determined to turn the Mexican left, which rested o 
the hill Telegrafo, and was strongly defended by in^ 
fantry and artillery behind artificial defenses. At th 
same time General Pillow was directed to make a tenta^ 
tive front attack against the Mexican right to distrac 
their attention from the movements on their left. Thi 
position of the Mexican right was practically unassail 
able, defended as it was by twenty-three guns in posi 
tion, with strong infantry supports. McClellan, havin 
been detached with ten of his men from the enginee; 
company, was directed by General Pillow to clear ou 
the obstructions and open up the roads for the advanc 
of his brigade. Under the severe artillery and musketr 
fire of the enemy, the tangled undergrowth and felle 
timber formed an impassable abatis, and prevented 3! 
successful assault, but in the meanwhile the Telegrafo 
on the right was gallantly carried and the enemy's line 
of retreat secured. As a result, the enemy in Pillow's 
front was obliged to surrender to the brigade they had 
successfully repulsed but a short time before. In this 
afifair both Tower and McClellan were complimented 
in Pillow's of^cial report for the great zeal and activity 
they displayed in the execution of their duty.**^ Besides^; 
being an active participant, McClellan was also an in-l 
terested student in the operations of the campaign, andil? 
Scott's brilliant tactical maneuver by which he gained jjr 
the pass of Cerro Gordo made such a deep impression! 1( 

it 
ii 
re 
bi 
m 

pf 
at 



on him, that in after years, in the West Virginia cam- 
paign, he attempted it at Rich Mountain with gratify- 
ing success. ^ 

The capture of Cerro Gordo insured the advance 
of the American army into the highlands of the interior 
and escape from the sickly climate of the coast. The 
march was resumed on the morning of the 19th, 
Worth's division leading, and after making camp thai 
night at Encero, it reached Jalapa early the next day 
So disastrous had been the defeat of the Mexicans anc 
so prompt the advance of our army, that several difHcull 
positions which might have been strongly held b} 
the enemy under other circumstances, were left unde- 



ANCESTRY.— WEST POINT.— MEXICAN WAR. 17 

ended and were passed in safety. The town and castle 
f Perote were occupied April 22d, without resistance, 
vhere many guns and other munitions, abandoned by 
he enemy, fell into our hands. As the army advanced 
oward Puebla its progress was delayed only by its 
imited transportation, which was entirely insufficient 
o supply its needs over the long line from its prin- 
cipal depot at Vera Cruz. The enemy, however, offered 
10 serious resistance to its progress. On May 14th, 
,vhile our troops were in bivouac near Amozoc pre- 
paring to make an imposing entrance into Puebla the 
lext day, the Mexicans attempted a surprise, but with- 
Dut success. In this affair McClellan distinguished 
limself by his coolness and daring in the capture of a 
iVIexican cavalry officer, whom he brought in a prisoner 
after a lively chase. 

Puebla was occupied May 15th, and here a long 
delay was obligatory to await the arrival of the neces- 
sary re-enforcements for the prosecution of the cam- 
paign, since the little army was depleted by the dis- 
charge of seven regiments of twelve months' volun- 
teers. May 4th, at Jalapa, their terms of enlistment 
having nearly expired. The Government had been in- 
excusably dilatory in providing re-enforcements for 
Scott's army, which, having fought its way into the 
interior of the enemy's country, had suffered such 
losses by battle, sickness, and expiration of service that 
its position might well have been considered hazardous 
in the extreme. The act providing for ten one-year 
regiments for the regular army was passed in February, 
but it was not until August 6th that the re-enforce- 
ments under General Pierce arrived at Puebla. In this 
precarious interval the strength of the American army 
at Puebla fit for duty, before the arrival of Pillow's 
troops, was only fifty-eight hundred and twenty; and 
with his added, the aggregate fit for duty was a little 
over eight thousand men. Pierce's brigade increased 
this to a little over ten thousand men for the advance to 
the Mexican capital. The story of the subsequent cam- 
paign seems almost incredible. Against an enemy three 



1 8 GENERAL McCLELLAN. 

times its number, fighting in defense of its own capital, 
which was admirably defended by nature and art, a 
single defeat might have proved most disastrous. But 
Scott's army was well officered and disciplined, and his 
engineers were men of distinguished ability, whose 
keen perception and wise counsel were continually 
made of avail in the plans which the matured judgment 
of the commanding general devised. 

Three days after the army moved from Puebla it 
crossed the summit of the Rio Frio Mountains, and 
from thence it could see the City of Mexico and the 
surrounding country. It was soon concentrated at 
Ayotla, a small village on the north shore of Lake 
Chalco, where it was halted until the engineers could 
reconnoiter the most practicable route for the advance. 
The most direct route lay between Lakes Chalco and 
Texcoco, which was, however, strongly defended by 
the batteries erected on the hill El Peiion. Another 
reconnoissance on the 13th, in which McClellan took 
part, and which was characterized by General Scott as 
the boldest of the war, was pushed as far as Mexical- 
cingo, which demonstrated the great difficulty of this 
route and caused the adoption of that to the south of 
Chalco, so as to approach the City of Mexico by way 
of San Augustin. With the engineer company at its 
head, Wortli's division led the way, followed by the res 
of the army. And now began that series of battle 
which gave such renown to our gallant little army in| 
Mexico, and brought it to the gates of the Mexican 
capital : Contreras, August 19th, San Antonio, Churu- ; 
busco, and San Pablo, on the 20th, were such con- 
spicuous feats of gallantry against an enemy three ; 
times their number, in their owm well-chosen and forti- ; 
fied positions, that the Mexicans were thoroughly de- 
moralized, and the city could then have been captured 1 ^ 
had not an armistice intervened. Though but a very k 
junior subaltern officer of the army, McClellan's 
bravery, gallantry, and good conduct were so con- j^ 
spicuous as to merit and receive special commendation, jj 
At Contreras he had two horses shot under him, and 



ANCESTRY.— WEST POINT.— MEXICAN WAR. ig 

while temporarily in command of a section of artillery 
he was struck by a grapeshot, which, however, luckily 
expended its force upon the hilt of his sword. Upon 
being relieved by Jackson, of Magruder's battery, from 
the command of the section, he did effectual service 
with a battery of mountain howitzers, whose officer had 
also been wounded. He was w^ith his company of en- 
gineers when it led Smith's brigade of regulars in its 
attack on the flank of the enemy, and afterw^ard routed 
their cavalry in a charge on the flank of this brigade. 
" Lieutenant G. B. McClellan," says General Twiggs, 
*' after Lieutenant Callender was wounded, took charge 
of and managed the howatzer battery with judgment 
and success, until it became so disabled as to require 
shelter. For Lieutenant McClellan's efficiency and gal- 
lantry in this affair I present his name for the favorable 
consideration of the general in chief." And he says 
further : " To Lieutenant G. W. Smith, of the engineers, 
who commanded the company of sappers and miners, 
I am under many obligations for his services on this 
and many other occasions. Whenever his legitimate 
duties with the pick and spade were performed, he 
always solicited permission to join the advance of the 
storming party with his muskets, in which position his 
gallantry, and that of his officers and men, were con- 
spicuously displayed at Contreras as well as Cerro 
Gordo." 

Similar commendation occurs in General Persifor 
F. Smith's report, who says : '' Lieutenant G. W. Smith, 
in command of the engineer company, and Lieuten- 
ant McClellan, his subaltern, distinguished themselves 
throughout the whole of the three actions. Nothing 
seemed to them too bold to be undertaken or too diffi- 
cult to be executed ; and their services as engineers 
were as valuable as those they rendered in battle at the 
head of their gallant men." 

Summarizing the results accomplished by his army 
in these conflicts, General Scott says : " It has in a 
single day, in many battles, often defeated thirty-two 
thousand men, made about three thousand prisoners. 



20 GENERAL McCLELLAN. 

including eight generals, two of ex-Presidents, and two 
hundred and five othei^ officers ; killed and wounded 
four thousand of all ranks, besides entire corps dis- 
persed and dissolved ; captured thirty-seven pieces of 
ordnance, more than trebling our siege train and field 
batteries, with a large number of small arms, and a full 
supply of ammunition of every kind. These great re- 
sults have overwhelmed the enemy." 

As no satisfactory conclusion could be reached by 
the commissioners in their conference for a definite 
peace. General Scott gave notice of his determination 
to end the armistice on the 7th of September, and hos- 
tilities were accordingly renewed the next day. In the 
afternoon of the 7th orders were issued for the closer 
concentration of the army, and the engineer officers 
were pushed forward in reconnoissance of the defen- 
sive position of the enemy. This consisted of the castle 
of Chapultepec, crowning a hill one hundred and fifty 
feet in height, strongly garrisoned and armed with artil- 
lery ; in front was the battle line of the Mexicans, their 
right resting upon a regular square bastioned fort, in- 
side of which was a large building called the Casa Mata, 
used for storing powder, and their left five hundred 
yards east upon the Molino del Rey, a great pile of 
stone buildings, which with its inclosures was capa- 
ble of strong resistance to attack. This line was ably 
defended by a force greatly in excess of the Americans, 
and was well contested upon its flanks, but after two 
hours of bloody struggle a complete victory was se- 
cured by our troops. This success left Chapultepec as 
the only obstacle yet remaining to be overcome in front 
of the city. Whether to assault it in turn or to direct 
attention to the causeways to the east of it, was now to 
be determined by careful reconnoissance and study. 
It was finally decided to assault it, and make the ap- 
proach to the city by the Belen and San Cosme gates 
after its capture. On the night of the nth positions 
for the batteries were selected, and the construction of 
Battery No. 2 was confided to McClellan ; it was located 
a short distance to the northwest of the village of Tacu- 



ANCESTRY.— WEST POINT.— MEXICAN WAR. 2 I 

baya, and had for its armament one twenty-four- 
pounder gun and one eight-inch howitzer. Exposed as 
it was to the fire of the batteries of the enemy during its 
construction, it afforded him some gratification to know 
that it contributed greatly, by its own weU-directed 
fire, to the successful assault that followed. 

The success attending the assaults of these strong 
outer defenses of the city was very dearly bought at 
the price of the lives of many gallant officers and men, 
but the circumstances were such at this critical period 
that delay meant irretrievable disaster. After the cap- 
ture of Chapultepec the troops were pushed rapidly 
against the Belen and San Cosme garitas, the engineer 
company to which McClellan was attached taking the 
lead of Worth's division on the line of approach to the 
latter. In front of the garifa the enemy's artillery swept 
the causeway, while his infantry, covered by the houses 
that lined both sides, was enabled to pour a destructive 
fire upon the attacking forces. Lieutenants Smith and 
McClellan, the two remaining officers of engineers with 
the company (Stevens having just been wounded), led 
their men on opposite sides of the road to a position 
where they could command the battery and thus open 
the way for the infantry. This they did by breaking 
through the party walls of the adobe houses, driving 
out the Mexican infantry, and by this cover reached the 
desired position. In this hazardous service McClellan 
displayed great coolness and the highest courage, and 
as he led his men in person through scenes of the great- 
est danger he gained their utmost affection and ad- 
miration. It was a fitting close to the events which 
had preceded from the day they landed at Vera Cruz 
until they now entered as conquerors in the capital of 
Mexico. This little company of engineer troops 
formed but a small fragment of Scott's army, but it 
had performed with the highest courage all the dan- 
gerous work intrusted to it, not only of its own peculiar 
service, but on the fighting line as well, and it had good 
reason to be proud of itself and its officers. General 
Scott took possession of the City of INIexico September 



22 GENERAL McCLELLAN. 

14, 1847, ^^is effective forces being then only sixty-five 
hundred men, and this act, with the exception of a few 
minor skirmishes, closed the war. He could well 
afford to say with regard to one of the causes of this 
phenomenal success : '' I give it as my fixed opinion 
that, but for our graduated cadets, the war between the 
United States and Mexico might, and probably would, 
have lasted some four or five years, v/ith, in its first 
half, more defeats than victories falling to our share ; 
whereas, in less than two campaigns, we conquered a 
great country and a peace without the loss of a single 
battle or skirmish." 

The army of occupation entered upon a- well-earned 
period of recuperation pending the negotiations for a 
definite treaty of peace, and, with the exception of a 
few minor skirmishes, active employment of the troops 
in war ceased. In his year of active service McClellan 
had gained much practical information, and, after his 
baptism of fire, had endured the dangers and fatigues 
of the campaign with cool bravery and alert activity. Irt 
common with others, he had suffered some loss of 
bodily vigor, which was destined to make its existence 
known in decreased vitality in the winter of 1861. Uni- 
versal commendation was bestowed upon the engineer 
officers not only by the commanding general, but by 
all the subordinate commanders, for their unremitting 
zeal, bravery, dash, and skill, by means of which the 
defensive positions of the enemy were thoroughly re- 
connoitered, and plans for attack wisely conceived and 
successfully executed. McClellan, though the young- 
est of these, was unremittingly employed and assigned 
to duties that would ordinarily have fallen to an offfcer 
of higher rank ; he thus benefited by the fact that there 
were so few officers of his corps with the army. He 
was too subordinate in position to have the solution of 
the greater problems of the campaign to solve, but he 
possessed that cast of mind which retained the elements 
of each in his memory and subjected them to a con- 
templative study to ascertain whether they had been 
properly solved. The official commendation of his 



ANCESTRY.— WEST POINT.— MEXICAN WAR. 



23 



superior officers brought him in due time the only 
recognition which his Government was in the habit of 
bestowing for brave conduct on the field of battle, that 
of brevets. These were : First lieutenant, August 
20th, " for gallant and meritorious conduct in the bat- 
tles of Contreras and Churubusco " ; and captain, Sep- 
tember 13th, for Chapultepec. - He was also brevetted 
for Alolino del Rey, which he declined on the ground 
that he had not participated in that battle. 

The garrison duty of the engineer company in the 
City of Mexico ended May 28, 1848, and on that day 
McClellan marched with his company to Vera Cruz to 
embark for home. They reached West Point, their 
proper station, June 22d, and here the young graduate 
of less than two years' service was welcomed back to 
his alma mater as a veteran of the war, a dignity well 
sustained by his soldierly bearing and bronzed com- 
plexion, notwithstanding the fact that he had barely 
reached the age of young manhood. 



CHAPTER 11. 

EXPLORATION. CRIMEAN WAR. 

For the next few years McClellan had a pleasant 
station and the agreeable duty of assisting in the in- 
struction of cadets in practical military engineering,, 
being able to demonstrate the importance of his in- 
struction by illustrations drawn from his recent experi- 
ence in Mexico. He became a member of the Na- 
poleon Club, which the officers on duty at West Point 
had organized for the critical study of the campaigns; 
of that master of the art of war. Their meetings were 
held in a large room in the Academic Building, uponi 
the walls of which were painted accurate maps of the 
theater of wars in Spain, Italy, and Germany, drawn i 
to a sufficiently large scale to illustrate the strategical! 
movements of Napoleon's principal campaigns. Prof.. 
D. H. Mahan, the head of the department of civil and I 
military engineering at the Academy, presided at these ' 
meetings and gave the members the benefit of his keen, , 
incisive criticism and instructive analysis in their stud- 
ies of the Napoleonic wars, the fruit of which was 
afterward made manifest in the war of the rebellion. 
McClellan selected the campaign of 1812 for his essay, 
and in accordance with his habit of mind devoted every 
spare moment to its study to the exclusion of every- 
thing else ; and when the paper was read he had demon- 
strated to his comrades that the bent of his mind was 
strategical rather than tactical. He received many 
compHments on the clearness of his style, the purity of 
his diction, and the mastery of his subject. During 
this period, in addition to his professional study, he 
acquired a substantial knowledge of foreign languages 
24 



EXPLORATION.— CRIMEAN WAR. 



25 



and improved his acquaintance with the best hterature. 
He had also much to occupy him in the dry details 
of plans and estimates for public buildings, particu- 
larly that of the new engineer barracks, for which he 
made many finished drawings, fulfilling all the exact 
requirements of the engineering department of that 
day. 

Having succeeded to the command of the engineer 
company, June 18, 1850, McClellan gave a great deal of 
attention to the physical development of his soldiers 
and expertness in handling their arms. This led him 
to translate the excellent work of Gomard on Bayonet 
Exercise, and instruct his noncommissioned officers, 
who in turn taught the men how to handle the musket 
as a weapon of defense against the lance, saber, or 
musket. It proved to be an excellent gymnastic exer- 
cise, a graceful accomplishment, and gave the men 
much additional confidence in themselves and their 
weapons. His adaptation of the French system of 
Gomard to the tactics of the United States Army was 
published in 1852, after it was made, by regulation of 
the War Department, upon the recommendation of 
General Scott, a part of the system of instruction for 
the army. 

McClellan was relieved from duty at West Point, 
June 21, 185 1, and ordered to report to Brevet-Major 
John Saunders, Corps of Engineers, as his assistant in 
the construction of Fort Delaware. The masonry forts, 
which were the main elements in the scheme of the 
permanent seacoast defense of that time, were consid- 
ered of sufficiently great importance to require the 
personal supervision of the chief of engineers at Wash- 
ington in almost all the details of their construction. 
Consequently but little latitude was permitted to the 
senior engineer officer on the site, and he was obliged 
to follow instructions with the minutest care ; and still 
less would the individuality of the junior officers be 
permitted to have any sway. So that it must have been 
a welcome relief to McClellan when, after a few months' 
duty upon this work, he received orders, March 5, 



26 GENERAL McCLELLAN. 

1852, to join Marcy's expedition for the exploration of 
the sources of the Red River of Arkansas. 

Captain Randolph B. Marcy, of the Fifth Infantry, 
had been engaged for three years in exploring the then 
unknown country lying upon the Canadian branch of 
the Arkansas, the head waters of the Tripiity, the Bra- 
zos, and the Colorado of Texas, but at this time a great 
portion of the Upper Red River country was entirely 
unknown. Alany previous attempts had been made, 
but without success, the first of record being by officers 
sent out by the French Government, but who went no 
higher than Natchitoches, La. Sparks's expedition in 
May, 1806, passed above the Great Raft, but was then 
turned back by a large Spanish force, and compelled to 
abandon its further prosecution. In the same year 
Pike's expedition went up the Arkansas intending to 
strike across the country to the Red River, but, after 
many privations and much suffering, it was captured 
by the Governor of New Mexico on the Rio Grande, 
and was sent home by way of Chihuahua and San An- 
tonio. Again Colonel Long, of the Topographical En- 
gineers, attempted this exploration in i8i9-'20, but 
failed to find the sources of the Red River, striking the 
Canadian instead ; and so, to complete the topographical 
knowledge of this portion of our territory, Marcy's ex- 
pedition was organized and started from Fort Belknap 
on the Brazos, May i, 1852. The personnel comprised 
Captain Marcy, Lieutenant Updegraff, Surgeon Shu- 
mard, and fifty-five men of Company D, Fifth United 
States Infantry, with Captain McClellan as engineer 
officer, but who also performed the duties of commis- 
sary and quartermaster to the command. The official 
report of this exploration was published by Congress, 
but an interesting narrative is embodied in Marcy's 
Army Life on the Border, where all the incidents of 
their daily marches and discoveries are related. Suffice 
it to say that the expedition started on its march into 
the unknown territory from the mouth of Cache Creek 
on the Red River on May 9th, and reached its goal on 
the 1 6th of June, meeting with no great difficulties ex- 



EXPLORATION.— CRIMEAN WAR. 



27 



:ept perhaps that of being deprived of palatable water 
^^hile crossing- the great gypsum belt. Turning south, 
June 20th, the expedition followed the border of the 
Staked Plains till it reached the valley of a beautiful 
stream, which Marcy named McClellan Creek, " in 
compliment to my friend Captain McClellan, who I 
believe to be the first white man that ever set eyes 
upon it." The principal branch of the Red River was 
reached on the 27th, over a route which led through 
an almost continuous prairie-dog town, and on the next 
day the expedition arrived at Fort Arbuckle, from 
whence the escort was returned to Fort Belknap. Dur- 
ing their absence rumors had been received that the 
greater part of the personnel had been massacred by 
hostile Indians, and McClellan had the pleasure of 
reading his obituary upon his return to civilization. 

Upon being relieved from duty with Captain Marcy, 
McClellan was ordered to report to General Persifor 
F. Smith as chief engineer on his staff, but this pleas- 
ant detail lasted only for a short time, during which he 
accompanied the general while the latter was making a 
military inspection of his command. This enabled him 
to visit Galveston, Indianola, St. Joseph, Corpus 
Christi, Fort Merrill, San Antonio, and Camp John- 
ston on the Concho River. Arriving at the latter place, 
October 24th, he found orders relieving him from duty 
on General Smith's staff and assigning him to the 
charge of the surveys for the improvement of the 
harbors on the coast of Texas from Indianola to the 
Rio Grande. 

To this new duty he applied himself with his usual 
unremitting assiduity, and with such success that his 
report, submitted April i8th, to the Chief of Engineers, 
General Totten, and afterward published in the Ex- 
ecutive Documents of the first session of the Thirty- 
third Congress, shows that he had then completed the 
surveys of the bars along the coast from Paso Cavallo 
to the mouth of the Rio Grande, the harbors of Brazos 
Santiago, Corpus Christi, Aranzas, and the inland chan- 
nel from Matagorda Bay to Aranzas Bay, and, in addi- 



28 GENERAL McCLELLAN. 

tion, had submitted plans and estimates for their im-" 
provement. A series of low sand islands separate the 
waters of the gulf from the bays and lagoons that lie 
between them and the main shore. Crescent-shaped 
bars, convex outward, which are subject to great and 
irregular changes with every storm, lessen the depth 
of water that can be carried over them and thus mate- 
rially affect the commercial interests of this part of 
the country. McClellan had to solve the problem of 
an economical expenditure of public money that would 
result in increased commercial facilities arising from 
such modifications in the bars and channels as would 
result in improvements of a permanent character. 
After a careful study of all the facts that he could 
gather and the personal observations that he was able 
to make, he formulated a theory of the causes that 
produce these obstructions and their irregular changes, 
from w^iich he deduced conclusions that governed -his 
recommendations. This report furnishes an excellent 
example of the analytical character of his mind as well 
as an illustration of his indefatigable industry. But 
before he could subject the truth of his theory of har- 
bor improvement on the coast of Texas to the test of 
actual trial, he was informed of his assignment by the 
War Department to a new sphere of duty. 

Congress having passed an act providing for such 
explorations and surveys as the War Department 
might deem advisable to ascertain the most practicable 
and economical route for a railroad from the Missis- 
sippi River to the Pacific Ocean, the Secretary of War 
assigned its general direction to Isaac I. Stevens, Gov- 
ernor of the Territory of Washington, and formerly an 
officer of the Corps of Engineers, directing at the same 
time that Brevet-Captain McClellan be placed in charge 
of the western portion of this route. This required 
him thoroughly to explore the Cascade Range from 
the Columbia River to the forty-ninth parallel, to make 
a detailed examination of the passes, and obtain full 
information of the range in general ; and upon the 
completion of the survey he was to proceed eastward! 



EXPLORATION.— CRIMEAN WAR. 20 

as far as the Rocky Mountains to meet the main party 
coming from the east under the immediate direction 
of Governor Stevens. He was authorized to employ 
such guides, hunters, muleteers, and civil assistants 
as were necessary for the performance of the duties in- 
trusted to him. The orders assigning him to this duty 
were dated Washington, D. C, May 9, 1853, ^"<^ ^'^^ 
immediately proceeded to San Francisco to organize 
his command for the expedition, which he finally 
assembled at Fort Vancouver. 

McClellan arrived at Fort Vancouver, June 27th, 
but it was nearly a month before the organization of 
his party was advanced to such a stage that he felt 
that he could venture into an unknown country, with 
the possibility of coming into conflict with hostile In- 
dians and be prepared to rely entirely upon his own 
resources. The expedition, in its first composition, 
was somewhat unwieldy and its progress consequently 
slow ; it comprised three army ofificers, including him- 
self, a surgeon, a geologist, an assistant engineer, an 
interpreter, six other assistants, four noncommissioned 
ofTficers, and twenty-four enlisted men ; these, with 
twenty-two packers and three hunters and herders, 
made an aggregate of sixty-six persons, while his ani- 
mals numbered one hundred and seventy-eight. Tak- 
ing a general northeasterly direction, he crossed the 
dividing ridge south of Mount Adams to the eastern 
slope of the Cascade Range, and reached Cheques, 
ninety-four miles from Vancouver, August 8th, where 
he halted two days to give his animals some grass, 
which they had been without for two days. Camp 
AVenass, eighty-five miles beyond, was reached August 
20th, where a depot was established until an examina- 
tion of the Nachess Pass could be made. 

So far his progress had been exceedingly slow, hav- 
ing made on the average only about six miles a day. 
He excuses this by attributing the many vexatious 
detentions to the miserable quality of the animals and 
pack saddles which he had been forced to take, and 
to the dh^cult nature of the country through which he 



30 



GENERAL McCLELLAN. 



had passed. Fearing to undertake a farther progress 
north with less than a three months' supply of pro- 
visions, he sent Lieutenant Hodges with the pack 
horses to Steilacoom, through the Nachess Pass, with 
directions to exchange them for mules and bring back 
the requisite supplies to prosecute the exploration. 
While awaiting Hodges's return McClellan made a per- 
sonal examination of this pass, and sent other mem- 
bers of his party to the north and east to collect such 
information as would expedite the objects of the ex- 
pedition. But upon his return to camp he received an 
express from Hodges conveying the information that 
no spare mules could be obtained from Steilacoom, 
and that most of his horses had broken down. He at 
once determined to reduce the size of his party by 
sending in his escort and packers, and to undertake 
the remainder of the exploration with a strength of but 
thirty-six men, including himself. This being accom- 
plished, he established his next camp at Ketetas on the 
Yakima River, September 3d, and the next morning 
started for the Snoqualme Pass at the head of the Ya- 
kima Valley, which he reached the second day there- 
after. Unfortunately, his examination was a very cur- 
sory one and extended only three miles across the 
summit, and the information with regard to the depth 
of winter snow, derived from Indians and what he took 
to be the markings on trees, was afterward found to 
be quite erroneous, he reporting it to be as great as 
from twenty to twenty-five feet, whereas it scarcely 
ever exceeds seven. It must be admitted that McClel- 
lan did not accomplish the object of his exploration 
while in this vicinity, for he did not discover the two 
passes which are now in use by the Northern Pacific 
and the Great Northern Railroads to cross the Cascade 
Range. Indeed, the former, known as the Stampede 
Pass, not more than fifteen miles south of the Sno- 
qualme, lies about midway between it and the Nachess 
Pass, where McClellan reported that there certainly 
was no pass ; while the latter, at the head of the 
Wenachee or Pisquoise River, was dismissed from 



EXPLORATION.— CRIMEAN WAR. 31 

consideration with the remark, " It appears certain that 
there can be no pass at its head for a road." 

Lieutenant Hodges arrived from Steilacoom, Sep- 
tember 1 6th, bringing twenty-nine pack horses loaded 
with provisions, and the command, consisting now of 
thirty-six persons, forty-two riding animals, and fifty- 
two pack animals, with seventy days' provisions, began 
on the 20th the passage of the mountains between the 
Yakima and the Columbia. So difficult was this cross- 
ing that more than seven hours were consumed in ad- 
vancing but two miles, while two mules were killed 
and two seriously injured in making this precipitous 
descent. Fort Okinakane was reached September 
27th, and the conclusion was arrived at upon suffi- 
cient investigation that there was no practicable rail- 
road route between Fort Baker and the Hudson Bay 
Company's trail from Okinakane to its trading post at 
Langley. The possibility of such a route by the valley 
of the Methow River was then thoroughly investi- 
gated and its impracticability satisfactorily determined. 
To complete the work assigned to McClellan's party 
there remained now only the valley of the Okinakane, 
and this was carefully examined as far north as latitude 
49° 26', which brought the expedition to within thir- 
teen miles of Lake Okinakane and well within British 
territory. 

Having now completed the reconnoissance of the 
Cascade Range from the Columbia River to the north- 
ern boundary of the United States, McClellan felt that 
the most important part of his duty had been per- 
formed, and, as winter was approaching, he determined 
to move eastward and seek to make junction with Gov- 
ernor Stevens's main party, which was then coming 
westward from the exploration of the Rocky Moun- 
tains. This was happily effected, October 28th, in the 
vicinity of Colville, and, after a conference upon the 
result already achieved, the two divisions, under the 
respective commands of Captain McClellan and Lieu- 
tenant Donelson, were directed to proceed to Colum- 
bia Barracks by way of Walla Walla and the Dalles 



32 



GENERAL McCLELLAN. 



and there await instructions as to the discharge of their 
men and arrangements for office work of the survey. 
At this time Governor Stevens, deriving his informa- 
tion of what McClellan had accompHshed from that 
officer himself, was thoroughly satisfied with what had 
been done, and in this frame of mind issued an order, 
October 29th, containing the following complimentary 
language : '' The chief of the exploration congratulates 
his associates upon the junction of the eastern and 
western divisions on the banks of the Spokane River, 
and for the successful accomplishment of the great 
objects of their joint labors. To Captain McClellan, 
his officers and men, too much credit can not be as- 
cribed for their indefatigable exertions, and the great 
ability of all kinds brought to their division of the 
work. They can point with just pride to the determi- 
nation of two practicable passes in that formidable 
barrier from the Mississippi to the Pacific, of the Cas- 
cade Range, and to a most admirable development of 
the unknown geography of the region eastward to the 
Columbia, as showing the unsurpassed skill and de- 
votion which has characterized the chief of the divi- 
sion and all of his associates." 

But six days later Stevens learned at Walla Walla 
that the snow difficulties at Snoqualme did not exist 
to the extent that McClellan had reported, and finally 
directed Mr. Tinkham to attempt its passage, which the 
latter did, with two Indians, leaving Walla Walla Janu- 
ary 7th, and reaching Seattle January 26th, only seven 
days after leaving the eastern divide. In the meantime 
Stevens had directed McClellan to complete his ex- 
amination of the Snoqualme Pass from the western 
side to connect with his previous advance from the 
east. For this purpose McClellan started with a small 
party in a canoe from Olympia, December 23d, going 
first to Steilacoom, and thence by way of the Sina- 
homish to the Snoqualme Falls, intending to make a 
barometrical survey of the western approaches to the 
pass. But owing to the increasing depth of snow as 
he proceeded inland, and the final refusal of his Indian 



EXPLORATION.— CRIMEAN WAR. 33 

guides to accompany him farther, he felt obHged to 
abandon his purpose after a short progress. This 
failure, contrasted with Mr. Tinkham's success and 
combined with Governor Stevens's lessened opinion of 
what McClellan had really accomplished, served to 
bring about a mutual coolness which did not entirely 
disappear until the spring of 1861. McCleUan had 
certainly failed to solve the most important part of 
the problem committed to him, that of determining 
the existence and character of the passes of the Cas- 
cade Range suitable for railroad crossing, since he re- 
ported that at the Columbia River the only one worth 
considering, and did nothing to locate the two that are 
now used for that purpose. 

McClellan's report, published in the House Execu- 
tive Documents, Second Session, Thirty-third Con- 
gress, written in his usual clear and graphic language, 
is an interesting study not only because of the subject- 
matter with which it deals, but because it exhibits, in 
this his first independent command, those character- 
istic qualities of abundant preparation to the point of 
unwieldiness, capacity for organization, attention to de- 
tail, prudent caution, magnifying of difficulties, and 
lessened fulfillment, which later, as commander of the 
Army of the Potomac, became then so much the more 
prominent since his position was the more exalted. 

Jefferson Davis, the Secretary of War, was very 
complimentary to McClellan, and after the completion 
of the latter's field operations directed him to visit 
various railroads, and to collect such well-established 
facts in the construction and working of existing roads 
as would serve as reliable data in determining the prac- 
ticability of constructing and working roads over the 
several routes explored. The memoranda that he gath- 
ered and submitted to the War Department embodied 
a full description of the existing gradients of the prin- 
cipal railroads of the United States, formulas to de- 
termine the maximum load that could be hauled by 
various engines up different grades with illustrative ex- 
amples, statements of the weights and cost of locomo- 

3 



34 



GENERAL McCLELLAN. 



tives, and other similar data ; statistics relating to water 
and fuel for transportation purposes and their rela- 
tions to the maximum load, derived from the actual 
experience of the most prominent existing roads. 
These, with a brief of the characteristics and cost of 
six of the important eastern railroads, together with 
certain statistics of the more important tunnels already 
constructed in various parts of the world, gave such 
sufficient information as was necessary at that stage 
of the problem for the preliminary study of the feasi- 
bility of the projected Pacific Railroad over the several 
routes surveyed. 

The favorable impression which had already been 
entertained by the Secretary of War, Jefferson Davis, 
with regard to the abilities of Captain McClellan, and 
which had been manifested in selecting him to take 
charge of the western division of the survey for the 
northern route, was confirmed, in the opinion of the 
Secretary, by the manner in which these responsible 
duties were performed. And he now signalized his 
appreciation of the young officer by selecting him to 
proceed to the West Indies and investigate and report 
upon the harbor and peninsula of Samana, in San Do- 
mingo, with respect to its value as a naval station. 
McClellan reached the Bay of Samana, July 25, 1854, 
on board the United States flagship Columbia, Com- 
modore Newton commanding, and, notwithstanding 
the oppressive temperature, proceeded with alacrity to 
carry out his instructions. He submitted two reports 
upon his return : one, dated United States ship Colum- 
bia, Pensacola Harbor, August 27th, giving a brief but 
sufficiently full account of the character of the harbor, 
a description of the peninsula, character of the country, 
soil, timber, roads, etc., in sufficient detail to inform 
the Government of the desirability of its acquisition ; 
the other report, dated Philadelphia, September 30, 
1854, was mainly confined to a description of the po- 
litical and geographical character of the whole island, 
together with an analysis of the defenses of San Do- 
mingo, its troops, navy, and character of its people. 



EXPLORATION.— CRIxMEAN WAR. 35 

These reports were not made public until they were 
called for by the House of Representatives, January 5, 
1 87 1, when the proposed annexation of the Dominican 
portion of the island oi San Domingo was under dis- 
cussion in Congress. This magnificent harbor of Sa- 
mana, thirty miles long by twelve broad, lying directly 
in the track of all vessels making use of the Mona 
passage, was clearly seen by McClellan to be of the 
greatest importance to the United States as the most 
valuable naval station in the Caribbean Sea ; and it is 
interesting to note that the same thought in the mind 
of President Grant caused him to make strenuous 
efforts during his first administration to secure its pos- 
session to the United States, but without success. 

After his return from the West Indies McClellan 
was busily engaged in completing his reports and 
labors in connection with his railroad investigations, 
and while in Washington came intimately in contact 
with the higher officials connected with the army and 
its administration. So that when the four additional 
regiments of the regular army, authorized by the Act 
of March 3, 1855, were organized, McClellan was 
offered and accepted a captain's commission in the 
First Cavalry, and resigned his commission as first 
lieutenant of engineers. In addition to this reward of 
substantial promotion he received still another mark 
of the high estimation in which he was held at the 
War Department, in being selected — it is said by the 
President himself — a member of a military commission 
to study the art of war in Europe. 

The order constituting the Military Commission 
to the theater of war in Europe was issued from the 
War Department, April 2, 1855. The ofhcers com- 
prising this commission were Major Richard Delaiield, 
Major Alfred Mordecai, and Captain George B. Mc- 
Clellan, all men of marked ability in their profession, 
and each chosen for his special fitness for the purpose 
in view. The Secretary of War, himself an educated 
soldier, outlined the objects of their mission as follows : 

" You have been selected to form a commission to 



36 GENERAL McCLELLAN. 

visit Europe for the purpose of obtaining information 
with regard to the mihtary service in general, and 
especially the practical working of the changes which 
have been introduced of late years into the military sys- 
tems of the principal nations of Europe. 

'' Some of the subjects to which it is peculiarly 
desirable to direct your attention may be indicated as 
follows : 

" The organization of armies and of the depart- 
ments for furnishing supplies of all kinds to the troops, 
especially in field service. The manner of distributing 
supplies. 

" The fitting up of vessels for transporting men 
and horses, and the arrangements for embarking and 
disembarking them. 

'' The medical and hospital arrangements, both in 
permanent hospitals and in the field. The kind of am- 
bulances or other means used for transporting the sick 
and wounded. 

" The kind of clothing and camp equipage used for 
service in the field. 

'' The kinds of arms, ammunition, and accouter- 
ments used in equipping troops for the various 
branches of service, and their adaptation to the pur- 
poses intended. In this respect the arms and equip- 
ments of cavalry of all kinds will claim your particular 
attention. 

" The practical advantages and disadvantages at- 
tending the use of the various kinds of rifle arms which 
have been lately introduced extensively in European 
warfare. 

*' The nature and efficiency of ordnance and am- 
munition employed for field and siege operations, and 
the practical effect of the late changes partially made 
in the French field artillery. 

"The construction of permanent fortifications, the 
arraii'gement of new systems of seacoast and land de- 
fenses, and the kinds of ordnance used in the armament 
of them — the Lancaster gun, and other rifle cannon, if 
any are used. 



EXPLORATION.— CRIMEAN WAR. 37 

" The composition of trains for siege operations ; 
the kind and quantity of ordnance; the engineering 
operations of a siege in all its branches, both of attack 
and defense. 

" The composition of bridge trains, kinds of boats, 
wagons, etc. 

" The construction of casemated forts, and the 
effects produced on them in attacks by land and water. 

*' The use of camels for transportation, and their 
adaptation to cold and mountainous countries. 

'* To accomplish the objects of your expedition 
most effectually in the shortest time, it appears to be 
advisable that you should proceed as soon as possible 
to the theater of war in the Crimea, for the purpose of 
observing the active operations in that quarter. You 
will then present yourselves to the commanders of the 
several armies and request from them such authority 
and facilities as they may be pleased to grant for en- 
abling you to make the necessary observations and 
inquiries." 

The commission sailed from Boston, April 11, 
1855, and on their arrival in London were courteously 
received by the British authorities and officials. Every- 
thing possible was done to facilitate the object of their 
mission in the shape of letters and instructions to the 
British military and naval commanders in the Crimea. 
But the contrary was the case in France, for here they 
found that, owing to an imperative rule which pro- 
hibited any foreign military officer from afterward visit- 
ing any Russian post or army in the Crimea after hav- 
ing seen the French camps, they were obliged to de- 
cline this favor with such an obligation attached to it. 
Disappointed in their endeavor to obtain from the 
French Government the facilities which they had rea- 
son to hope would be readily granted, the commis- 
sion left Paris, May 28th, with the determination of 
hastening to the Russian camp in the Crimea, going 
first to Berlin to confer with the Russian minister in 
that city, from whom they hoped to get the necessary 
information as to their proper procedure. While here. 



38 GENERAL McCLELLAN. 

they received assurances that the Prussian Govern- 
ment would afford them every facihty to inspect the 
mihtary works and estabhshments of the kingdom 
upon their return from Russia. New difficulties now 
began to arise, and the commission found it necessary 
to proceed from Warsaw to St. Petersburg, where all 
necessary authority rested and was alone to be ob- 
tained. But the meshes of diplomacy interposed their 
obstructing influence, and the very fact that they rep- 
resented their Government in an offfcial capacity pre- 
vented them from attaining their wishes. The proba- 
bility of witnessing a bombardment of the works of 
Cronstadt by the allied fleet, and other great military 
events in that quarter, together with the fact that their 
instructions required them to make a study and exami- 
nation of those important seacoast defenses, in some 
measure compensated for the disappointment experi- 
enced in not going directly to Sebastopol. 

After some considerable delay which it was not 
within their power to prevent, and during which they 
employed themselves in a careful examination of the 
various military works and establishments of Russia 
and Prussia, the commission finally reached Constan- 
tinople on the 1 6th of September, and through the 
courtesy of the English naval authorities they ob- 
tained passage on the first steamer that left for Bala- 
klava, where they arrived on the morning of the 8th 
of October. Upon their arrival at the headquarters 
of the British forces they found themselves among 
friends with every disposition to accord to them all 
the facilities that they could possibly desire. General 
Simpson, the British commander, on learning of their 
arrival, sent two officers of his staff to conduct them 
to the quarters he had caused to be assigned to them 
in the camp of the Fourth Division on Cathcart's Hill, 
a locality that overlooked a great extent of the field of 
operations. He provided them with rations and for- 
age for their horses during their entire sojourn in 
the Crimea, and it is exceedingly pleasant to note 
that every official and personal facility and kindness 



EXPLORATION.— CRIMEAN WAR. 



39 



were extended to them by the officers of the British 
army. 

Similar courtesies were extended to them by the 
officers of the Sardinian and Turkish armies, and as 
a consequence the commission confined its examina- 
tions to the camps, depots, parks, workshops, etc., of 
these armies, never entering the French camps in the 
Crimea except on visits of courtesy. They took their 
departure from Balaklava on an Enghsh transport, 
November 2d, and after spending some days in Con- 
stantinople and Scutari to inspect the hospitals and 
depots of the allies, they proceeded to Vienna to ex- 
amine the Austrian military establishments. From this 
place they journeyed through the military states of 
Europe, stopping at every important fortified place 
the study of whose defenses would add to their knowl- 
edge and enhance the value of their mission. When 
they returned to France they were able to inspect some 
of the important military works, but were not per- 
mitted the advantage of association with educated offi- 
cers at such times, the practice being of sending as an 
escort a non-commissioned officer. As an agreeable 
contrast, however, when they reached England en 
route for home they were again made to feel the cour- 
tesy and kindness of the military and naval officers, 
who were generous in their efforts to gratify the de- 
sires of the commission. They sailed for home, April 
19, 1856, having been occupied nearly a year in their 
labors, and had gathered a vast fund of information 
to be submitted to the War Department in the form 
of official reports. 

The comprehensive study that had been assigned to 
the commission required that a subdivision of the 
subjects should be apportioned to its members, and that 
each should submit his own report to the War Depart- 
ment. To McClellan was assigned the study of the 
organization, equipment, tactics, and functions of the 
cavalry and engineer troops of the several European 
states, and particularly to report upon the Russian 
army. His familiarity with foreign languages enabled 



40 



GENERAL McCLELLAN. 



him to make use of all the foreign official military lit- 
erature that was colleoted by the commission, and to 
supplement the information derived from this source 
with whatever knowledge of detail he could obtain from 
personal investigation. His reports, which were all 
completed shortly after his return and submitted to 
the War Department between October 7, 1856, and 
January 15, 1857, are models of clear, concise, and yet 
comprehensive military papers. They comprise reports 
upon the Austrian, Prussian, French, English, and Sar- 
dinian cavalry and infantry ; the Russian, Austrian, 
French, and English engineer troops ; and a complete 
report upon the composition and strength of the Rus- 
sian army. From these studies he submitted a report 
upon the United States cavalry, in which he endeavored 
to show what were its immediate pressing needs, and 
what measures should be taken to place it upon a 
proper footing. To do this he also submitted, for the 
consideration of the War Department, a series of Regu- 
lations and Instructions for the Field Service of Cavalry 
in Time of War for the United States Army. These 
he translated from the original Russian, making such 
suitable modifications as would adapt them to our own 
organization. 

When these reports were made public in 1857, 
being one of the Senate Executive Documents of the 
special session of the Thirty-fourth Congress, they were 
eagerly examined by the military student and were 
found to contain much valuable information. The en- 
gineer oiificer could draw from them such detailed in- 
formation as would enable him to reproduce the pon- 
toon boats and construct the military bridges in use in 
the various European services ; to lay out intrench- 
ments, manufacture the necessary siege material, and 
direct siege operations according to the latest develop- 
ments of the art ; and know how to equip, organize, 
and instruct engineer companies in which our own 
service was at that time so deficient. Ofificers of artil- 
lery, cavalry, and infantry learned from these reports 
the latest developments in the organization, equipment, 



EXPLORATION.— CRIMEAN WAR. 4I 

clothing, rations, drill, and tactics of their special arm, 
and the modifications which actual field experience 
would of necessity bring about. There was much 
food for thought, which naturally produced its effect 
on the minds of ofBcers of our service with respect to 
the changes that could with propriety be introduced in 
our small army, hampered as it was with the indiffer- 
ence with which it was regarded in time of peace by 
those public men who were charged with its main- 
tenance, and were at the same time blind to the possi- 
bilities of war. 

The illustrations which accompany these reports are 
numerous, and admirably supplement the text. At a 
glance one can see the existing formations, the accepted 
orders of battle, and the modifications that had then 
been recently introduced, caused by improvements in 
the artillery and infantry arms. Many of the plates 
published in this volume, illustrating tactical forma- 
tions and outpost dispositions, found their way into 
the text-books and lectures on the art of war at the 
Military Academy, and their professional value was 
thus disseminated throughout the army. 

Perceiving also the necessity of some modification 
of our cavalry equipments, McClellan submitted a 
model of a new cavalry saber and saddle-tree, the 
latter being an adaptation of the Hungarian saddle 
then in use by the Prussian cavalry, which he recom- 
mended for adoption in our service. These recom- 
mendations, which he made in October 3, 1856, were 
referred to the Ordnance Department of the army, and, 
after thorough trial of the models, were approved by the 
War Department. The army is thus indebted to him 
for the comfortable McClellan saddle which from that 
time came into use in our service, and had the army 
derived no other benefit from McClellan's member- 
ship on the commission, this alone would have been a 
sufficient recompense. 

Owing to the official difficulties which the com- 
mission met with in every country, except England, to 
obtain the requisite authority to proceed to the seat of 



42 GENERAL McCLELLAN. 

war in the Crimea, it did not finally arrive at its desti- 
nation until a month aftor the fall of the Malakoff, and 
the practical close of active operations. During the 
three weeks of their sojourn McClellan made a study 
of the operations preliminary to the siege, as well as 
the salient points of the siege itself, and embodied them 
in his report for the benefit of his brother officers of 
the army. This report is very instructive in several 
particulars. In the first place, he subjects this cam- 
paign to the test of military criticism, not for the pur- 
pose of fault-finding or instituting comparisons, but 
for the lessons that may be learned from it. Then in 
this, his first strictly military paper, describing events 
and operations so recent, and with the advantage of 
personal intercourse with the participants, he displays 
a confidence in his analysis and conclusions that mark 
the military expert ; and finally he draws from his 
study certain convictions as to our need of fortifica- 
tions, which he seeks to impress upon his countrymen. 
In this comprehensive paper he criticises the allies 
for the dilatoriness of their disembarkation at Old Fort 
and the slow march thence to the Alma ; in the dispo- 
sitions for battle on the banks of that stream, and the 
subsequent advance to the plateau of Sebastopol. 
Neither do the Russians escape his censure, for he 
says : " In considering this march, it is somewhat dif- 
ficult to determine which party committed the greatest 
faults — the allies in so exposing themselves, or the 
Russians in failing to avail themselves of the oppor- 
tunities offered. Thus far the allied generals displayed 
none of the qualities of great commanders ; their meas- 
ures were halfway measures, slow and blundering; 
they failed to keep constantly in view the object of the 
expedition, and to press rapidly and unceasingly to- 
ward it." Proceeding with his analysis from the time 
that the allies reach Balaklava and Kamiesch, he says, 
with reference to the charge of the English Light Bri- 
gade at the battle of Balaklava : " With regard to the 
ground over which the English light cavalry charged, 
that, if the eye were not raised from the soil under foot, 



EXPLORATION.— CRIMEAN WAR. 



43 



no more favorable place could be selected for a charge 
of cavalry — it was on the smooth/ turf of the flat and 
level bottom of a wide valley ; but, upon turning the 
glance to the ground to the north and east, imagining 
the Russians in the positions which they occupied on 
the 25th of October, 1854, it is difficult to divine how 
any officer could direct such a charge to be made ; de- 
struction was inevitable, and nothing could be gained. 
No doubt there are often cases in which one arm of 
service may consistently be required to sacrifice itself 
for the benefit of others, but this was not such a case. 
The most appropriate criticism upon this exhibition of 
insane and useless valor seems to be that, no doubt, 
made by a well-known French general, ' C'est bien 
magnifique, mais ce n'est pas la guerre ! ' " He com- 
pliments the steady and magnificent courage of the 
English at Inkermann, and the just perception of the 
true from the false attack of the Russians by which 
Bosquet saved the English from defeat on that day ; 
and after a description of the ground upon which the 
battle of the Tchernaya was fought, assigns as a suf- 
ficient reason for the Russian defeat the strength of the 
position and the gallantry of its defenders, and not 
any want of courage or impetuosity on the part of 
the Russian troops. 

In describing the topographical features of the har- 
bor of Sebastopol and the peninsula to the south of 
it where the most stubborn and remarkable siege of 
history had just been fought, he exhibits the traits of 
the capable engineer; and then proceeding to the de- 
scription of the most important points in the line of the 
Russian defense in the order of their strength, the 
Flag-staff Bastion, Central Bastion, Malakoff, Redan, 
and Little Redan, he shows how these weak, hastily 
constructed, and imperfect fortifications were enabled, 
under the skill of that remarkably gifted military en- 
gineer Todleben, and the brave Russians, to withstand 
for so long a time the efforts of the allies to dislodge 
them. And while he expresses the conviction that the 
siege of Sebastopol called forth the most magnificent 



44 GENERAL McCLELLAN. 

defense of fortifications that had ever occurred up to 
that time, he shows how httle foundation there was for 
the generally received accounts of the stupendous di- 
mensions of the works and of the new systems of forti- 
fications brought into play. In view of the fact that 
McClellan was himself to be stopped in his advance 
on the Yorktown Peninsula a few years subsequently 
by a determined adversary occupying a line of earthen 
intrenchments, it is well to use his own language in 
estimating the influence of such works. Speaking of 
the Russian defenses of Sebastopol, he says : " The 
plain truth is that these defenses were simple tempo- 
rary fortifications of rather greater dimensions than 
usual, and that not a single new principle of engineer- 
ing was there developed. It is true that there were 
several novel minor details, such as rope mantelets, the 
use of iron tanks, etc. ; but the whole merit consisted 
in the admirable adaptation of well-known principles 
to the peculiar locality and circumstances of the case. 
Neither can it be asserted that the plans of the various 
works were perfect. On the contrary, there is no im- 
propriety in believing that, if Todleben were called 
upon to do the same work over again, he would proba- 
bly introduce better flanking arrangements. These re- 
marks are not intended to, nor can they, detract from 
the reputation of the Russian engineer. His labors 
and their results will be handed dow^n in history as 
the most triumphant and enduring monument of the 
value of fortifications, and his name must ever be placed 
in the first rank of military engineers. But in our ad- 
miration of the talent and energy of the engineer, it 
must not be forgotten that the inert masses which he 
raised would have been useless without the skillful artil- 
lery and heroic infantry who defended them. Much 
stronger places than Sebastopol have often fallen under 
far less obstinate and well-combined attacks than that 
to which it was subjected. There can be no danger 
in expressing the conviction that the siege of Sebas- 
topol called forth the most magnificent defense of forti- 
fications that has ever yet occurred. 



EXPLORATION.— CRIMEAN WAR. 



45 



*' This would seem to be the proper place to notice 
a popular fallacy which, for a time at least, gained ex- 
tensive credence. It was that the siege of Sebastopol 
proved the superiority of temporary fortifications over 
those of a permanent nature. It is easy to show that 
it proved nothing of the kind, but that it only proved 
that temporary works in the hands of a brave and skill- 
ful garrison are susceptible of a longer defense than 
was generally supposed. They were attacked as field 
works never were before, and were defended as field 
works never had been defended." 

He now turns his attention to the works of the 
attack, and enumerates the difTficulties attending the 
beginning of the siege — wretched roads, limited trans- 
portation, deficiency in supplies, and lack of siege ma- 
terial — and with respect to this he says : "If a deficiency 
in men and means is to be assigned as a reason for 
the early operations of the allies, it is but another 
proof that, in undertaking the affair, they neglected 
one of the clearest rules of war — that is, to undertake 
no important operation without full and reliable in- 
formation as to the obstacles to be overcome and 
the means of resistance in the hands of the enemy." 
This criticism was destined to reflect unfavorably 
upon hiG own operations in the Peninsula campaign 
in 1862. 

In concluding his report he draws the following 
just conclusions applicable to our own country : 

" The permanent defenses of the harbor of Sebas- 
topol against an attack by water, although inferior in 
material and the details of construction to our own 
most recent works, proved fully equal to the purpose 
for which they were intended. Indeed, the occurrences 
on the Pacific, the Baltic, and the Black Sea all seem 
to establish beyond controversy the soundness of the 
view so long entertained by all intelligent military men, 
that well-constructed fortifications must always prove 
more than a match for the strongest fleets. 

" It is believed that a calm consideration of events 
so hastily and imperfectly narrated in the preceding 



I 



46 GENERAL McCLELLAN. 

pages must lead all unprejudiced persons among our 
countrymen to a firm conviction on two vital points : 

" I. That our system of permanent coast defenses is 
a wise and proper one, which ought to be completed 
and armed with the least possible delay. 

" 2. That mere individual courage can not suffice 
to overcome the forces that would be brought against 
us were we involved in a European war, but that it 
must be rendered manageable by discipline, and di- 
rected by that consummate and mechanical military 
skill which can only be acquired by a course of educa- 
tion instituted for the special purpose, and by long 
habit. 

" In the day of sailing vessels the successful siege of 
Sebastopol would have been impossible. It is evident 
that the Russians did not appreciate the advantages 
afforded by steamers, and were unprepared to sustain 
a siege. 

'' This same power of steam would enable European 
nations to disembark upon our shores even a larger 
force than that which finally encamped around Sebas- 
topol. To resist such an attack, should it ever be made, 
our cities and harbors must be fortified, and those forti- 
fications must be provided with guns, ammunition, and 
instructed artillerists. To repel the advance of such an 
army into the interior, it is not enough to trust to the 
number of brave but undisciplined men that we can 
bring to bear against it. 

" An invading army of fifteen thousand or twenty 
thousand men could easily be crushed by the unremit- 
ting attack of superior numbers ; but when it comes to 
the case of more than one hundred thousand disciplined 
veterans, the very multitude brought to bear against 
them works its own destruction,, because, if without dis- 
cipline and instruction, they can not be handled and 
are in their own way. We can not afford a Moscow 
campaign. 

'' Our regular army never can, and perhaps never 
ought to, be large enough to provide for all the con- 
tingencies that may arise, but it should be as large as 



EXPLORATION.— CRIMEAN WAR. 47 

its ordinary avocations in the defense of the frontier 
will justify ; the number of officers and noncommis- 
sioned officers should be unusually large to provide 
for a sudden increase, and the greatest possible care 
should be bestowed upon the instruction of the special 
arms of the artillery and engineer troops. 

" The militia and volunteer system should be placed 
upon some tangible and efifective basis, instructors fur- 
nished them from the regular army, and all possible 
means taken to spread sound military information 
among them. 

" In the vicinity of our seacoast fortifications it 
would be well to provide a sufficient number of volun- 
teer companies with the means of instruction in heavy 
artillery ; detailing officers of the regular artillery as 
instructors, who should at the same time be in charge 
of, and responsible for, the guns and material. 

'' In time of war, or when war is imminent, local 
companies of regular artillery might easily be enlisted 
for short terms of service, or for the war, in seacoast 
towns. The same thing might advantageously be car- 
ried into effect on a small scale in time of peace." 

These valuable and judicious comments, emanating 
from an officer scarcely thirty 5^ears of age, serve to 
illustrate one of his distinguishing characteristics — a 
fondness for strategical analysis, which is constantly 
in evidence throughout his military career. 

In January, 1857, McClellan, having been offered 
the position of chief engineer of the Illinois Central 
Railroad, resigned his commission in the army and 
went to Chicago to enter upon his new duties. Early 
in 1858 he was elected vice president of the company, 
which placed him in control of its management in 
Illinois. He readily mastered the main features of the 
problem with which he was charged, and displayed 
sound judgment in dealing with matters that had here- 
tofore been unfamiliar to him. His capacity for con- 
tinuous labor and methodical attention to details soon 
enabled him to understand the possibilities of the situ- 
ation and to direct the organization successfully. His 



48 GENERAL McCLELLAN. 

subordinates were not slow to appreciate his kind and 
courteous treatment, his readiness to acknowledge effi- 
cient service, and his just recognition of merit, and so 
here, as elsewhere, he was enriched and strengthened 
by their love and support. His prominent official posi- 
tion also brought him in close contact with many mer- 
chants, bankers, and public men, whose appreciation of 
his straightforward and honorable conduct in business 
affairs, and his genial courtesy, made his new field of 
duty pleasant and successful. 

Notwithstanding his separation from the army, he 
had lost none of his love for the service, and so when 
he had established his home in Chicago he opened 
wide its portals to his army friends and welcomed 
them with generous hospitality. Every officer passing 
through Chicago was certain of an affectionate greet- 
ing, and many were the guests that enjoyed the free- 
dom of his bachelor home. Among these were not 
only a number who afterward served under him during 
the war, but also old comrades of the Mexican War, 
who afterward became his antagonists in the rebellion, 
among whom were Beauregard, Buckner, G. W. Smith, 
and Joe Johnston. About this time he was able to do 
a kindness to his old friend Burnside — who, having met 
with financial reverses in the manufacture of his rifle, 
Avas greatly in need of a helping hand at the time — by 
securing for him the position of cashier of the land de- 
partment of the Illinois Central Railroad Company, and 
then, with instinctive delicacy, he invited Burnside and 
his wife to make their home with him and share in the 
^oint housekeeping. In the full appreciation of this 
timely and generous act of friendship, Mrs. Burnside 
presided with graceful tact and dignity, and added the 
charm of sweet womanhood to this hospitable home, 
making it so much the sweeter and richer than before. 

The solidity of his acquirements and the thorough- 
ness of his investigations soon enabled him to exhibit! 
gratifying results that promised, and would have se-- 
cured, permanent success, but he was not destined tO) 
remain long upon this duty. Several of his friends who) 



EXPLORATION.— CRIMEAN WAR. 4g 

were financially interested in the eastern division of 
the Ohio and Mississippi Railroad Comjxmy urged 
him to accept the presidency of that company, at a 
salary of ten thousand dollars a year, and as the offer 
was an exceedingly tempting one, he concluded to do 
so. In September, i860, he removed to Cincinnati and 
entered upon his new duties, which were, in the main, 
an expansion of those he had so well learned in Chi- 
cago, but now his experience enabled him to take hold 
with added confidence and increased authority. These 
four years of hard work in railroad operation, involv- 
ing continuous practical study of transportation prob- 
lems, methods, and possibilities by rail and river over 
the entire country between the Gulf and the Great 
Lakes, made him thoroughly familiar with the products 
and people of this region and of the intricacies con- 
nected with the traffic interests of the upper part of the 
Mississippi Valley. He became well versed in the com- 
plex and extended organizations of the great corpora- 
tions he served, and increased his influence by the 
happy and tactful manner with which he met and dealt 
with the governors and other State officials, with mu- 
nicipal authorities, and with merchants and other busi- 
ness men in the conduct of his ofBce. The fruit of all 
this training was rapidly ripening for the ultimate bene- 
fit of the nation. 

While serving in Chicago and Cincinnati he came 
in touch with several men who were destined to have 
an important influence upon his subsequent career. By 
far the most prominent of these was Mr. Lincoln, who 
at that time was counsel for the Illinois Central Rail- 
road Company at Springfield ; but no one then sus- 
pected that a few years would develop this quaint Illi- 
nois lawyer into the great and noble President — the 
grandest figure of American history. Here, too, he 
first employed Allan Pinkerton in detective work for 
the company, who subsequently became chief of the 
secret service of the Army of the Potomac, under the 
cognomen of Major Allen, and whose stupendously 
egregious estimates of the enemy worked such mis- 
4 



50 



GENERAL McCLELLAN. 



chief to his employer. In Cincinnati he was often 
visited by Rosecrans, j:hen in civil life, engaged in 
operating, not very successfully, a small oil refinery, 
with whom he had frequent consultations on the criti- 
cal situation of the times, which undoubtedly opened 
the way for his return to the military service under 
the command of McClellan, though the latter was 
much his junior. Here, too, he first met Judge 
Thomas M. Key, who was then one of the legal ad- 
visers of the Ohio and Mississippi Railroad Company, 
and whom McClellan found so congenial a spirit that 
they soon became the warmest of friends. Both of 
these men were important factors in the military work 
afterward accomplished by McClellan in Western Vir- 
ginia. 

Toward the close of his services in Chicago McClel- 
lan felt that his material prospects were sufficiently en- 
couraging to permit him, with perfect propriety, to 
enter upon new relations and assume new responsi- 
bilities, and accordingly on the 22d of May, i860, he 
married Ellen Mary Marcy, the daughter of Captain 
Randolph B. Marcy, his old commander in the Red 
River exploring expedition. In this new relationship 
he was blessed far beyond the lot of most men, for his 
marriage was an exceedingly happy one. It proved 
to be a union of two minds that were counterparts of 
each other, and of two souls whose mutual love was 
continually strengthened by the powerful influences of 
a Christian faith. Nothing could have been more de- 
lightful than their happiness at this time, nor apparently 
more secure than the prospects for its continuance. He 
was then in the full vigor of manhood, engaged in a 
profession that satisfied his ambition, in the enjoyment 
of a comfortable salary, and with sufficient leisure to 
indulge his literary tastes without detriment to the full 
performance of his official duties. Enjoying the dis- 
tinction of having completed a public career where his 
services had received the special approbation of his 
Government, his status in the social and business world 
was prominent. His charming and accomplished wife, 



EXPLORATION.— CRIMEAN WAR. 



51 



proud of the deeds of her heroic husband, and of his 
standing in intellect and acquirements among his fel- 
lows, poured out the treasures of her love to make her 
home a haven of rest and a sacred refuge from the 
strife of the external world. For too brief a period, 
however, was this ideal existence to continue, for the 
political horizon was becoming most threatening, and 
he was among the first to perceive the necessity that 
would soon arise, in the fast approaching irrepressible 
conflict, of ofifeting to the country his services for war. 
In casting a retrospective glance over the salient 
incidents of McClellan's career down to the completion 
of his service as a member of the Military Commission 
and the submission of his reports to the War Depart- 
ment, one can not help being impressed with the variety 
of his official service, the enhanced reputation which 
his success brought about, and the confidence he enter- 
tained in his own ability to master any difficulty. At 
this time he was but thirty years old, and yet had en- 
joyed some notable service in the Mexican War, served 
with success as an instructor and company commander 
at West Point, been engaged for a time in the con- 
struction of permanent seacoast defenses and in the 
surveys of harbors, then in charge of an important ex- 
ploration where he was practically in immediate com- 
mand, afterward sent on an important secret expe- 
dition to the West Indies, and finally chosen a member 
of an important Military Commission to study the art 
of war in Europe. What are the predominant charac- 
teristics which he displays in these widely different 
fields of his official duty? They are simply the de- 
veloped elements of character that distinguished him 
while he was a student at West Point. A well-bal- 
anced mind, that held decision in abeyance till judg- 
ment was ripe; deliberate and exacting in prepara- 
tion before committing himself to irrevocable execu- 
tion ; an indefatigable student and worker, he rnastered 
the minutest details, and as he was no believer in 
chance he was neither rash nor aggressive. No young 
officer stood hio:her in the estimation of his official su- 



52 



GENERAL McCLELLAN. 



periors, nor in general reputation throughout the army, 
than did this beau ideal of the American officer, for he 
possessed the quahties of mind and heart that called 
forth the respect and affection of all who came in 
contact with him. Certainly the opportunities which 
were granted him to observe and reflect upon the dis- 
cipline and organization of the armies of the foremost 
nations of Europe seem most fortunate in view of the 
responsibilities that were afterward placed upon him 
by the Government after the disaster of Bull Run in 
July, 1861. 



CHAPTER III. 

PRELIMINARY TO THE REBELLION. 

Ever since the human mind threw off the fetters 
of authority and began to investigate independently it 
has perceived that this world of ours is governed by 
law, and not by chance ; and since that epoch many of 
the most complex phenomena of the physical world 
have been shown to be merely the results of those 
extremely simple laws of energy which control the 
changes that take place in matter. A grander general- 
ization has followed this enfranchisement of the human 
mind in the belief that the history of nations is nothing 
more than the logical result of the action of immutable 
moral laws established from the beginning of time for 
the government of humanity. History no longer con- 
cerns itself exclusively with the mere record of events, 
but rather with the changes that gradually affect the 
spirit and sentiment of the body politic, for these are 
the sources from which incidents flow and events have 
their origin. 

What, then, we may inquire, were the poisonous 
germs which the organic law of our country nurtured 
in its bosom, and which in process of time, under the 
fostering protection of constitutional law, attained so 
vigorous a vitality as to threaten the life of the nation ? 
In the midsummer of i860 it seemed almost impossible 
to believe that such a happy, prosperous, and contented 
people, so rich in every material blessing, and in the 
full enjoyment of civil and religious liberty, could pos- 
sibly be divided into two hostile geographical sections, 
and that those who were bound together by the strong- 
est ties of fraternal and national affection could be 

53 



54 



GENERAL McCLELLAN. 



arrayed against each other in deadly conflict. But 
now, after the conflict is over, the historical student, 
free from the emotional influences of the time, clearly 
discerns that great moral laws were operating in the 
evolution of the nation, and that its emancipation illus- 
trates the great truth that every false principle carries 
within its bosom the seeds of its own destruction. 

Von Hoist, in his masterly analysis of the consti- 
tutional history of the United States, shows that the 
great rebellion was the logical conclusion of a struggle 
between two essentially opposing principles, State 
versus National sovereignty, and slave versus free 
labor, both of which ultimately joined forces in an 
attempt to overthrow constitutional government. This 
distinguished writer shows that the thirteen colonies 
up to the Revolutionary War were so divergent in 
their political institutions, religious views, and social 
relations during the whole course of their previous de- 
velopment, that it is easier to find more points of dif- 
ference than of similarity between them, and that their 
combination to resist the usurpations of the mother 
country was forced upon them by reason of their geo- 
graphical situation. Notwithstanding these divergen- 
ces of the colonies, the absolute necessity of united 
action brought into existence the General Congress, 
which met at Philadelphia, September 4, 1774, and 
which from that time became a revolutionary body, 
since it virtually exercised sovereign power in defiance 
to the authority of Great Britain. And as the dele- 
gates to this Congress were nominated by the " good 
people of these colonies," to the extent that this Con- 
gress assumed power to itself and made bold to adopt 
measures national in their nature, to that extent the 
colonists declared themselves prepared henceforth to 
constitute one people, inasmuch as the measures taken 
by Congress could be translated from words to deeds 
only with the consent of the people. The transforma- 
tion of the colonies into States was accomplished in 
the name of the whole people through the revolution- 
ary Congress, and was not therefore the result of their 



PRELIMINARY TO THE REBELLION. 55 

separate and independent action. The Declaration of 
Independence and its successful maintenance by force 
of arms brought one nation, and not thirteen, into the 
family of nations. But it was not long before the 
divergent characteristics of the people of the several 
States began to work confusion in their relations to 
each other and to the General Government. 

The troubles with France toward the close of the 
century gave rise to the alien and sedition laws, and 
these were more or less directly responsible for the 
" Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions," in which the 
principles of State sovereignty and nullification were 
distinctly affirmed. Madison was the author of the Vir- 
ginia resolutions, and Jefferson had written the original 
draft of the Kentucky resolutions, the latter, in sub- 
stance, being : " Resolved, That the several States who 
formed that instrument [the Constitution], being sover- 
eign and independent, have the unquestioned right to 
judge of the infraction ; and that a nullification by these 
sovereignties, of all unauthorized acts done under color 
of that instrument, is the rightful remedy." The false 
principles embodied in these resolutions were now first 
distinctly formulated, and ever after served as potent 
weapons to threaten the destruction of the Union 
whenever their partisans believed the time ripe for 
their execution. Secession was but the corollary to 
nullification, and the fact that the thought of carrying 
it into effect was entertained by some of the States, 
both North and South, during the early history of the 
country is abundant evidence of the fallacious views 
that some of the prominent political leaders then held 
as to the nature of the national union. 

The political struggles that had their foundation in 
the question of slavery began almost immediately after 
the adoption of the Constitution. The first paragraph 
of Section 9, Article I, of the Constitution embodied 
the compromise which offered the hope that the two 
sections of the country might dwell together in har- 
mony. But it was not in the nature of things that 
such was to be the case. Petitions for the ameliora- 



56 GENERAL McCLELLAN. 

tioii of the slave trade by the Quakers, and for the abo- 
Htion of slavery signed 'by Benjamin Franklin as presi- 
dent of an abolition society, gave rise early in 1790 to 
acrimonious debates on the question of committing 
them to a committee of the House of Representatives. . 
This was the beginning of the seventy years' struggle : 
during which these antagonistic principles were advo- 
cated by opposing sides, and which were destined to be 
settled only by bloody war. Sectionalism, due to 
diverse interests in the economic situation, really began ■ 
in 1792, but the active agent that furnished the fuel! 
for the unquenchable fire was slavery. The slave oli- ■ 
garchy was always aggressive and never sufifered de- 
feat. Every victory gave its partisans a more favor- 
able vantage ground for still more exacting demands > 
as the price to be paid for the continuance of national I 
unity. Its adherents saw that unless the balance oft 
power was maintained, in the Senate at least, and the: 
principle of its territorial extension was recognized by ■ 
the law of the land, slavery was doomed ; hence came ? 
the Missouri Compromise, the annexation of Texas, 
the Mexican War, the struggle for Kansas, and the 
demand for territorial extension by legislative enact- 
ment. But the hunger of slavery was insatiable. 
Joint resolutions and compromises soon failed to sat- 
isfy its continually increasing appetite, and served only; 
to transform political parties into sectional parties. 
When these became crystallized, it was but a step to 
contemplate with equanimity the final separation. On 
the part of the slaveholders the basis of the argument 
was that the Union was a compact, terminable at the 
pleasure of a single State, and from this standpoint se- 
cession, and all the logical deductions of State sover- 
eignty, could be marshalled in strongest array to en- 
force the most extravagant demands for the perpetua- 
tion of slavery. The continually reiterated threats of 
disunion did not fail to have their effect upon many of 
the less bold and Independent Northern representa- 
tives, who vielded political power and principle to their 
numerical inferiors, and were content with temporary^ 



PRELIMINARY TO THE REBELLION. ^j 

compromises that served no better purpose than to 
put off the inevitable conflict between free and slave 
labor. 

The phenomenal growth of the United States in 
wealth and population dates from the epoch of rail- 
road construction in 1827, and in consequence of this 
more rapid means of intercommunication vast terri- 
tories were opened up to settlers. But free labor was 
essential to this development, and hence the great num- 
bers of immigrants could only be absorbed by the free 
States of the North and West without disturbing exist- 
ing social conditions. For this reason the North soon 
became a network of railroads ; manufacturing indus- 
tries developed with marvelous rapidity, interstate 
commerce grew to magnificent proportions, and as a 
logical result of the operations of labor, unrestricted 
and unburdened by governmental interference, forests 
were cleared, fertile farms brought forth abundant food 
supplies, and populous cities sprang up as centers of 
distribution. In marked contrast was the condition of 
the South. Its fields were devoted to the cultivation 
of the great agricultural staples, cotton, sugar, tobacco, 
and rice, and its system of labor repelled immigration. 
Its means of internal intercourse were limited, and its 
social system peculiar. The three classes were sepa- 
rated from each other by well-defined lines as mark- 
edly, indeed, as if they belonged to dififerent castes. An 
aristocracy composed of the great planters and mem- 
bers of the learned professions were the favored few, 
entitled to all the prizes of ofificial position and the 
advantages of social distinction and leadership. Next 
in the scale were the small farmers, traders, storekeep- 
ers, artisans, and retainers of the aristocratic planters, 
forming a large middle class, filled with local preju- 
dices, despising the slave, and loyal to their surround- 
ings. And lastly came the slaves, the substratum 
upon which the whole system of labor was supported ; 
necessarily kept in ignorance for the stability of the 
system, impulsive and affectionate in disposition, im- 
provident and wasteful from being debarred from the 



58 GENERAL McCLELLAN. 

restraining influences of proprietorship, it may be said 
to their great -credit that they labored for their masters 
with faithfuhiess unexcelled during a long war without 
any attempt at insurrection. 

But so steadfast had been the faith of the plain peo- 
ple, as Mr. Lincoln called them, both North and South, 
in the efBcacy of the Constitution to provide the bless- 
ings of peace and good government for them and their 
children, that they had no apprehension of serious trou- 
ble. They were concerned mainly with their material 
interests, and as their civil and religious liberty was 
unimpaired they paid but little attention to the impas- 
sioned utterances of their political leaders. In the 
North, political sentiment was healthy, for parties were 
equally divided, and there was free and unlimited dis- 
cussion on all the questions of the day. They recog- 
nized the existence of slavery in the Southern States 
under the guarantees of the Constitution, but they 
wanted none of it for themselves, and were equally 
opposed to the views of the extremists on both sides of 
the question. In the South, discussion upon all pub- 
lic questions, save slavery, was as free as at the North ; 
but upon this there was naturally neither free speech 
nor a free press. Adverse views w^ere tabooed, for to 
express them was a crime. An oligarchy, controlled 
by the slaveholders, administered all offices of public 
trust, both State and national, and, as if by inalienable 
right, firmly established its members in political lead- 
ership. The efifect of such restricted leadership upon 
a people is certain to be disastrous, for as Buckle, in 
his History of Civilization, says : " In the first place, 
by increasing the reputation of the ruling classes, it 
encourages that blind and servile respect which men 
are too apt to feel for those who are above them, and 
which, whenever it has been generally practised, has 
been found fatal to the highest qualities of the citi- 
zen, and therefore to the permanent grandeur of the 
nation. And, in the second place, it multiplies the 
resources of the executive government, and thus ren- 
ders the country unable, as well as unworthy, to 



PRELIMINARY TO THE REBELLION. 



59 



correct the errors of those who are at the head of 
affairs." 

The bold, aggressive, and able political leaders of 
the South had inherited that interpretation of the Con- 
stitution which the State rights theorists of South 
Carolina and Mississippi had advocated for so many 
years, but it derived its strength and sustenance wholly 
from slavery. Without this animating cause it would 
soon have ceased to live, but with it, the supremacy 
of the State became its willing and efificient instrument 
to befog the real issue, to deceive the people, and to 
destroy the nation. Deceived by the acquiescence of 
their political brethren of the North, lulled by the 
apparent apathy of the inhabitants of the free States, 
and misjudging the limits of their concessions, they 
hastened to take the irrevocable step and establish a 
confederacy based on the corner stone of slavery. The 
march of events had indeed been rapid. Men stood 
bewildered as the foundations of government seemed 
to crumble into dust. Many had uttered solemn warn- 
ings, but none had been able to suggest a satisfactory 
remedy. But among the few whose clear vision fore- 
saw the inevitable consequences of the struggle be- 
tween slavery and freedom, Mr. Lincoln stands pre- 
eminent. In his speech in the spring of 1858 he said: 
" In my opinion, this agitation will not cease until a 
crisis shall have been reached and passed. * A house 
divided against itself can not stand.' I believe this 
Government can not endure permanently half slave and 
half free. I do not expect the Union to be dissolved^- 
I do not expect the house to fall — but I do expect it 
will cease to be divided. It will become all one th'mp; 
or all the other. Either the opponents of slavery will 
arrest the further spread of it, and place it where the 
public mind shall rest in the belief that it is in the 
course of ultimate extinction ; or its advocates will 
push it forward till it shall become alike lawful in all 
the States, old as well as new. North as well as South." 

The election of Mr. Lincoln precipitated the crisis 
which had been so long impending. This was fol- 



6o GENERAL McCLELLAN. i 

lowed by the secession of seven of the Southern States: 
and the formation of .the Southern Confederacy. In 
the interregnum that lasted until the first hostile shot 
was fired there was at first no general apprehension of 
war, though the people were bewildered and somewhat 
stupefied by the rapid evolution of events. Efforts 
w^ere made to restore the previous equilibrium, even to 
a partial surrender of their cherished principles on the^ 
part of some of the leaders of the party that had wom 
the victory at the polls, but these were without success, 
Delay was essential for the South to complete its soli- 
darity and prepare for the warlike measures that were 
necessary to establish in the eyes of the world its status 
as an independent nation. But the time came when it 
was absolutely necessary to burn its bridges behinc 
it and to do that deed which should forever cut 
of¥ all possible hope of reconciliation. The political 
drama ended and the tragedy of war began when the 
misguided men of Charleston opened fire upon the 
national flag at Fort Sumter, April 12, 1861. 

This first overt act of rebellion was big with conse-^ 
quences. It burst asunder the overstrained bonds o: 
political expediency, swept away party lines, and crys-? 
tallized at once the people into Unionists and Secess 
sionists. The bewilderment of the North was but moo 
mentary, and then the awakening came with the pierc: 
ing cry of outraged patriotism. And so, too, in th<i 
South the people rose up with complete unanimity tc 
follow their leaders whithersoever they might lead 
And thus were the rnighty hosts gathered together t( 
battle for freedom and for slavery. 

In the war that followed a curious anomaly present' 
itself. Owing to many circumstances the Governmen 
of the United States was forced to conduct its mili 
tary operations as if it had been a confederacy, whil( 
the Confederacy fought with all the advantages of ; 
united nation. Under the entirely erroneous view tha 
a standing army in a republic is a menace to the lib 
erties of its people, the regular army of the Unite( 
States had been so depleted as to be barely sufBcien 



PRELIMINARY TO THE REBELLION. Ol 

:o protect the frontier settlements, and was at this time, 
kvhether by accident or design, scattered by the South- 
ern sympathizers of the previous cabinet into small 
detachments in the far West and South, so that the 
executive arm was practically paralyzed. The Ad- 
ministration was therefore compelled to call upon the 
Governors of the States that remained loyal for militia 
to preserve the Union. These regiments were offi- 
cered by patriots, it is true, but they were uninstructed 
in the art of war, and it is not too much to say that 
the methods employed and results obtained were vastly 
more inefficient and costly than would have been the 
case had the nation constantly maintained a standing 
army of reasonable strength. In the South, on the 
Icontrary, a military despotism quickly grasped every 
source of power and directed the entire resources of 
the Confederacy for military success. With a vast 
servile population to cultivate food supplies and per- 
form other necessary labor, a splendid race of men, 
endowed with fighting instincts, to form the rank and 
file, a daring, aggressive, and educated aristocracy im- 
bued with a sense of their wrongs and believing that 
they were fighting for their liberties, to furnish the 
commissioned officers of high grade, it was scarcely 
possible to conceive of ultimate defeat. No wonder 
that at first success was with the South, and that it re- 
quired four years of desperate fighting to end the war. 
The condition of affairs at the North at this junc- 
ture presents an interesting study. The great mass 
of the people of both political parties, firm in their con- 
viction that the results of the election would be peace- 
fully accepted, continued their daily avocations with- 
out paying much attention to the threatening aspect of 
affairs in the South. But there were many thought- 
ful men who recognized the exceedinglv critical condi- 
tion of the country and were apprehensive. The polit- 
ical leaders of the successful party. East and West, 
were not themselves in such accord as to guarantee har- 
Emonious co-operation. Seward, the recognized leader 
' of the new party, and the undoubted first choice of the 



62 GENERAL McCLELLAN. 

majority of the Republican delegates to the conven- 
tion, had been set aside for Lincoln, on the PTOimds of 
political expediency which demanded certainty of suc- 
cess at the polls. As time progressed the responsible 
leaders of the coming Administration began to enter- 
tain gr^ve doubts as to the attitude of their political 
opponents upon the serious questions that were de- 
manding immediate settlement. The great Demo- 
cratic party in the North had exhibited such popular 
strength at the late presidential election in November 
that the Administration was obliged to adopt tentative 
measures and feel the popular pulse at every step. A 
procedure by the strong arm of the Government 
against the citizens of Charleston in December might 
well have been justified by the good common sense of 
the people ; but to invoke in April the military strength 
of the nation to coerce the return of a vast territory 
covered by seven States into the Union, was an entirely 
different thing. To spill the blood of American citi- 
zens and thus to inaugurate a civil war against a people 
who were simply asserting that the consent of the gov- 
erned was the essence of free government, was so utter- 
ly repellent to a great and influential portion of the 
people of the North as to make such a course utterly 
inadmissible. And so, with what is now universally 
conceded to be the rarest wisdom and soundest judg- 
ment, Mr. Lincoln, in opposition to the counsel of his 
radical advisers, withheld his hand for the time being 
and apparently allowed matters to drift along without 
directive control. But all this time he was endeavor- 
ing, with true statesmanship, to secure the border 
States to the support of the Union, and the ultimate 
gain of Missouri, Kentucky, and West Virginia, even 
with the loss of tide-water Virginia, was an ample justi- 
fication of the wisdom of his then much misunderstood 
temporizing policy. But of immeasurably greater im- 
portance was the necessity of forcing the initiative of 
war upon the South, and thus giving to the Administra- 
tion the justification of entering upon the suppression 
of armed rebellion against the nation. Southern leaders 



PRELIMINARY TO THE REBELLION. 63 

with characteristic boldness feh the dire necessity of 
" spilHng blood " to cement the seething elements of 
their section into a compact and aggressive mass, and 
to force an immediate and irrevocable separation from 
the Union. The firing upon Sumter had far-reaching 
and unexpected consequences. It unified the people of 
the North, sweeping away for the time all party lines, 
and brought its vast population into immediate har- 
mony with the Administration, heretofore the acknowl- 
edged chief of but a part. It crystallized the people of 
the South, giving them a national status in the eyes of 
European powers, a well-grounded hope of success, 
and a definite purpose to attain. 

To the Republican party was now committed the 
administration of the affairs of the nation in this critical 
time of its history. Composed of the heterogeneous 
elements of the older political parties, it needed experi- 
ence in administration to consolidate its ranks and to 
wield its power with confidence. Under its banners 
were radicals demanding pronounced declarations 
against slavery and advocating constitutional amend- 
ments to rid the country of the curse at once ; moder- 
ates in greater number, willing to give the most gener- 
ous guarantees for the perpetual protection of slavery in 
those States where it existed ; and still others ready to 
yield everything asked for, to save the Union and avoid 
civil war. Amid the perplexities and confusion of the 
times the heroic figure of Mr. Lincoln stands pre-emi- 
nent, the best-beloved of the people, who was destined, 
under Divine Providence, to bring the nation out from 
under its terrible burden of affliction and to set it on 
in its career of unexampled prosperity. But at first his 
grand qualities were not generally known and his pol- 
icy not understood. An efficient military force, the 
last resort of law in any nation, was lacking, for the 
regular army was small and scattered. He was de- 
barred from exercising the constitutional provision 
of calling out the militia until an overt act of rebellion 
had been committed, and thus his hands were tied 
while the rebellious leaders were gathering strong 



64 



GENERAL McCLELLAN. 



forces together to destroy the nation. But with in- 
finite patience he bided his time, directing where he 
could not control, and ultimately justified his sagacity 
in the salvation of the nation. 

The slave oligarchy of the South clearly perceived 
that the progress of civilization among the nations of 
Christendom was inimical to their favored institution, 
and that it was irrevocably doomed unless they could 
carve a new nation, based on the corner stone of 
slavery, out of the slave States of the American Union. 
They could see a possible expansion in the direction of 
Cuba and Mexico favorable to the cultivation of their 
great staples, which they considered so essential to the 
markets of the world. They felt, therefore, that if they 
could commit the great body of the white people of 
the Southern States to their scheme of a Southern Con- 
federacy their task was certain of accomplishment, and 
this was more easily effected because State sovereignty 
was a political dogma universally accepted in all the 
Southern States. They differed from the North in 
having a greater relative number of agricultural peo- 
ple, which brought about less intercommunication and 
established more local and State pride than in the com- 
mercial and manufacturing States of the North. An 
appeal to this pride, a harangue as to their rights, and 
a picture of the wrongs intended by the abolition North 
sufficed to unite them into a compact body, ready to 
respond in thought and action to the direction of their 
leaders. It was essential for success that the true 
issues should be hidden and false ones substituted, and 
by preventing a free and calm discussion to violate the 
people's most sacred right of deliberation and choice. 
To accomplish this most unholy project neither the 
most unscrupulous agents nor the most unsavory 
means were lacking, and the people were hurried to 
take the final step under the conviction that their rights 
would be sooner secured outside of the Union than 
w^ithin it. 

In considering the political history of those times 
in these latter days, it seems a mystery of the ages how 



PRELIMINARY TO THE REBELLION. 65 

it was possible for the relatively few Southern leaders 
to bring the mass of their people to such a self-sacrifice 
of their material and moral interests for the establish- 
ment of human bondage under the sanction of explicit 
law. And we now see that the instrumentality by 
means of which this unholy project was to be utterly 
destroyed forever was war, and the continuance of war 
until freedom was proclaimed to the captive over the 
whole length and breadth of the land. 

For a few weeks after the inauguration of Mr. Lin- 
coln there was no apparent change in the policy of the 
Government with regard to the beleaguered forts, al- 
though it was becoming apparent to the most hopeful 
that the tension was rapidly approaching the point of 
rupture. Washington was full of Southern sympathiz- 
ers who had hoped that something would occur to pre- 
vent the new Administration from being inducted into 
office, while the latter was forced to enter upon a wait- 
ing attitude until the march of events would justify 
decided action. And it was only after the firing upon 
Sumter that the Administration felt justified before the 
world in calling out the militia of the United States 
to repress insurrection and to execute the laws of the 
land. For several days thereafter the situation at 
Washington was fraught with extreme peril. The 
hope that the border States would without restraint 
remain loyal was now seen to be futile ; it was even 
problematical whether the seat of Government could 
be securely held against the active efforts of the seces- 
sionists, and, considering the views that had been so 
freely expressed in the newspaper press with regard 
to the crime of coercing sister States, no one could cer- 
tainly predict what would be the response of the people 
to the call of the President. But, fortunately, the peo- 
ple of the Northern States exhibited such a unanimity 
in support of the President that his hands were mar- 
velously strengthened, the capital saved, and the peo- 
ple for the first time became nationalized. This unex- 
pected unanimity startled the secessionists and de- 
stroyed their hope that there would be a divided 
5 



(i^i GENERAL McCLELLAN. 

partisanship in the North, but at the same time it 
welded the Southern people into a homogeneous mass, 
so that the lines between the opposing forces became 
clearly and definitely marked for battle. 

All hope of a peaceful solution had now disap- 
peared, and although many believed that a single battle 
would settle the trouble, the more thoughtful could 
only contemplate the sad prospect of a prolonged 
struggle. It was soon made evident to the Adminis- 
tration that the defiant attitude of a few States had rap- 
idly developed into the rebellion of a vast territory, 
engaging the moral support and entire material re- 
sources of its whole people. The strong Union senti- 
ment which unquestionably existed among the South- 
ern people, especially in Georgia, Tennessee, North 
Carolina, and Virginia, was deceived by a false presen- 
tation of the purposes of the Administration and by 
political chicanery, so that it lost all cohesive power 
to bring the questions at issue to a free and open de- 
termination. The insurrection, guided by experienced 
and aggressive leaders, at a single bound became a 
nation whose liberty and existence were imperilled by 
a foreign foe. It embraced a hardy and vigorous race 
of men, capable of undergoing the severest hardships 
and endowed with those qualities so essential for an 
active military life. Their admirable fighting qualities 
and magnificent courage need no other nor higher 
encomium than that furnished in the records of the re- 
bellion — a story of the remarkable endurance, heroic 
endeavor, and gallant bravery of the American citizen 
soldier. To the great bulk of the people of the South 
slavery had been a great but unrecognized curse, keep- 
ing them in isolation and in ignorance, and unjustly 
stigmatizing honest labor as something degrading to 
men ; it was thus unconsciously enslaving the minds 
of the dominant race, and inflicting upon them greater 
evils than upon the negro. 

The people of the Northern States had no fondness 
for war. Their avocations were decidedly against a 
state of war, but when the issue was presented squarely. 



PRELIMINARY TO THE REBELLION. 



67 



and it became evident that war was necessary to pre- 
serve the Constitution and the Union, then it was that 
this necessity, rather than a love of fighting, made them 
offer their services for the conflict. There had been 
but a very few militia organizations in the Northern 
States, and for this reason, as well as an inborn dis- 
taste for the restrictions of military discipline, the vol- 
unteer regiments that hurried to Washington were 
woefully wanting in everything that was necessary to 
make them efficient save their inherent patriotic spirit. 
But with this spirit everything was possible after a 
requisite period of training and discipline. Every one 
knows that the efficiency of an army depends upon 
that of its units, and hence upon its fundamental tacti- 
cal unit, the company. Here, then, lies the power of 
the army as a fighting machine, and in the character 
of the company officers lies the weakness or strength 
of the whole army. Now in this respect the Confed- 
erates in the beginning of the war had greatly the ad- 
vantage, for their company officers .were better fitted 
by their training and habits than were those of the 
Northern volunteers. Several causes contributed to 
bring about this condition of affairs. In the first place, 
the agricultural South had paid more attention to mili- 
tary instruction in recent years than had the commer- 
cial North. With the exception of Florida and Texas, 
every Southern State had its military academy founded, 
and in part at least supported by the State, officered 
largely by West Point graduates, and superintended by 
choice officers, of whom Sherman, Stonewall Jackson, 
and D. H. Hill are notable examples. From these 
academies many of the best young men of the South 
were graduated annually, thoroughly trained for the 
subordinate positions of military life, and from whom 
were drawn valuable officers for the line and the staff at 
the outbreak of the war. Again, the choice for the 
presidency of the Confederate States had fallen upon 
Jefferson Davis, who. besides being himself an edu- 
cated soldier, had had the sfreat advantage, during his 
official life as Secretary of War under President Pierce, 



68 GENERAL McCLELLAN. 

of a personal acquaintance with many of the officers 
who had gone South, and had a personal knowledge 
of the character, attainments, and ability of every offi- 
cer of rank in the Confederate service. And as his 
power in the new Confederacy was almost autocratic, 
he used this power and this knowledge in the assign- 
ment of commanders for every integral part of the 
Confederate army. 

On the breaking out of the war the North had at its 
disposal a great number of educated officers, who were 
available for employment to the best advantage by 
using them to officer the volunteer levies. Unfortu- 
nately, the great influence of General Scott was directed 
to the support of the plan of keeping intact the regular 
army, in accordance with his experience in the Mexican 
War, and thus these officers were kept as subalterns 
in companies and regiments of the regular forces, and 
were lost to the volunteers at the very time when their 
services would have been most valuable. It is gener- 
ally conceded that this was a grave error; for a long 
time every regular officer who through any influence 
was oflfered a position in the volunteers was refused 
permission to accept, and the command of regiments 
was often given to thoroughly incompetent men, to 
the great detriment of the service. Another cause 
which had a deterring influence was that at first the war 
was much misunderstood at the North, so that politics 
was supposed to have had more influence for military 
preferment than individual merit. Even in the selec- 
tions for the vacancies in the new regular regiments 
many civilians having political influence received com- 
missions giving them rank and command over able 
officers of long service. These were a few among the 
many causes which created in the commanders of our 
first organized forces an unwillingness to risk offen- 
sive battle except under preponderating conditions. 



CHAPTER IV. 

EARLY SERVICE IN OHIO AND WEST VIRGINIA. 

During these anxious and trying times McClel- 
lan was keenly alive to the possibilities and almost cer- 
tainty of war. As he himself says : " My old army asso- 
ciations had placed me in intimate relations with many 
Southern men, and I had traveled much in the South, 
so that I was perhaps better prepared to weigh the 
situation than the majority of Northern men. So 
strongly was I convinced that war would ensue, that 
when, in the autumn of i8#o, I leased a house in Cin- 
cinnati for the term of three years, I insisted upon a 
clause in the lease releasing me from the obligation in 
the event of war." And when the startling news of 
the fall of Sumter bewildered for the moment the men 
of the North, it found him cool, collected, and ready. 
His manly bearing and dignified composure did much 
to allay the existing excitement surrounding him, 
which for a time threatened to be turned into unrea- 
sonable frenzy. Everybody turned to him for advice 
and counsel upon matters military, and his response was 
generous in the highest degree. Telegrams and mes- 
sages seeking his services in this emergency came from 
New York and Pennsylvania, and he immediately set 
his business afifairs in order to be free to accept mili- 
tary service. Replying to his friend Major Fitz-John 
Porter, who was then at Harrisburg organizing forces 
to open communication with Washington, he wrote, 
April i8: "Your welcome note has just reached 
me. I have already received an intimation that I 
have been proposed as the commander of the Penn- 
sylvania forces, and asked if I would accept. Re- 

69 



70 



GENERAL McCLELLAN. 



plied, Yes. If General Scott would say a word to 
Governor Curtin in my -behalf I think the matter would 
be easily arranged. Say to the general that I am ready 
as ever to serve under his command. I trust I need 
not assure him that he can count on my loyalty to him 
and the dear old flag he has so long upheld. I throw 
to one side all questions as to past political parties, etc. ; 
the Government is in danger, our flag insulted, and we 
must stand by it. Though I am told that I can have 
a position with the Ohio troops, I much prefer the 
Pennsylvania service. I hope to hear something defi- 
nite to-day, and will let you hear at once. Help me as 
far as you can." 

A few days afterward he started for Pennsylvania, 
intending to stop for a few hours at Columbus to give 
Governor Dennison, of Ohio, some information about 
the condition of affairs in Cincinnati before continuing 
his journey. But this interview was destined to change 
completely McClellan's pl^s and expectations. The 
governor explained the difficulties under which he 
labored in the present exigencies from the lack of 
officers of military experience, and spoke of his desire 
of securing the services of a capable commander for 
the Ohio quota. Having measured the quiet, self-con- 
tained man that stood before him, and being favorably 
impressed by the evidences of his capacity for the work 
in hand, the governor formally tendered the command 
of the Ohio division to McClellan, and it was at once 
accepted. Within a few hours the Ohio Legislature, at 
the instance of the governor, passed an act which per- 
mitted the appointment of any resident of the State to 
the office of major general commanding the militia, 
and thus it w^as that McClellan abandoned his eastern 
trip and cast his lot with the Ohio State troops. On 
the same day, April 23d, Jacob D. Cox, Newton J. 
Schleich, and Joshua H. Bates were appointed briga- 
dier generals, and without an hour's delay McClellan 
entered upon the performance of his duties. 

Upon the acceptance of his commission, McClellan 
immediately resigned his position as president of the 



EARLY SERVICE IN OHIO AND WEST VIRGINIA. 



71 



Ohio and Mississippi Railroad Company, thereby sac- 
rificing his comfortable salary of ten thousand dollars 
a year, his dearly loved home, and prosperous career 
at the call of his country, and so pressing were the de- 
mands of his new office that he was unable to return 
even for a brief moment to his desk in Cincinnati, 
which he had left so hurriedly to offer his services to 
the Government. 

His first duty was to make an inspection of the arms 
and munitions of the State at the arsenal at Columbus. 
Accompanied by General Cox, who gives a graphic 
account of this visit, he found there a few boxes of 
smooth-bore muskets, which had once been issued to 
militia companies and had been returned rusted and 
damaged ; no belts, cartridge boxes, or other accouter- 
ments ; two or three smooth-bore brass six-pounder 
field guns, which had been honeycombed by firing 
salutes and of which the vents had been worn out, 
bushed, and worn out again. In a heap in one corner 
lay a confused pile of mildewed harness, which had 
once been used for artillery horses, but was now not 
worth carrying away. There had for many years been 
no money appropriated to buy military material, or 
even to protect the little the State had. The Federal 
Government had occasionally distributed arms which 
were in the hands of the uniformed independent com- 
panies, and the arsenal was simply an empty store- 
house. It did not take him long to complete the in- 
spection. At the door, as they were leaving the build- 
ing, McClellan turned and, looking back into its empti- 
ness, remarked, half humorously and half sadly, " A 
fine stock of munitions on which to begin a great 
war." * 

The first problem which demanded McClellan's un- 
divided attention was the preparation of estimates and 
detailed schedules for the equipment of ten thousand 
men, as a unit, for field service. For with such a unit 
as a working basis the State Legislature could under- 

* Century, Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, vol. i, p. 90. 



^2 GENERAL McCLELLAN. 

standingly fix upon the money to be appropriated for 
present necessities and provide for future contingencies. 
At that time no one was better able than McClellan to 
supply the necessary information, for his military 
knowledge was comprehensive, well digested, and thor- 
ough ; he knew not only the necessary munitions for 
equipment and supply, but the probable difficulties of 
procuring them in a land where the art of war had 
been so long neglected. His military education and 
experience were invaluable at that particular juncture, 
for the State officials were woefully ignorant and in- 
experienced in the military business which the exigen- 
cies of the times had so suddenly forced upon them. 

The response of the people in all the loyal States to 
the call of the President was most patriotic and en- 
thusiastic. The time for argument on the causes in 
dispute had forever passed away ; party lines were tem- 
porarily obliterated, and with gratifying unanimity men 
of all shades of political opinion offered their services 
to support the Constitution, to enforce the laws, main- 
tain the Union, and defend the flag. So grand was 
the uprising that more offered than could be accepted 
under the call. But the greater difficulty that con- 
fronted the loyal governors was to obtain arms and 
equipments for their respective quotas. With the ex- 
ception of the munitions at the St. Louis arsenal there 
were no arms in the Western States, and no facilities 
for their manufacture on a scale sufficiently large to 
meet the immediate and pressing necessities. For a 
time all mail communication between Washington and 
the West was interrupted, and for a long period after- 
ward was difficult and uncertain. Under these circum- 
stances the authorities of the Western States were 
obliged, in their efforts to inaugurate the military 
power, to decide grave matters upon their own respon- 
sibility, without much counsel from the Administration 
at Washington. 

In the latter days of April these disheartening con- 
ditions existed in Ohio, as they did elsewhere through- 
out the unprepared North, but McClellan had a great 



EARLY SERVICE IN OHIO AND WEST VIRGINIA. 



73 



capacity for unremitting labor and a genius for organi- 
zation. His isolation from the seat of Government 
forced him to rely on his own counsel, but with the 
painful uncertainty as to whether his action would re- 
ceive censure or commendation. Nevertheless he pre- 
served a calm demeanor and gave no sign of apprehen- 
sion, a course of conduct that inspired all about him 
with confidence. Encouraged by the prompt action of 
the Legislature, which authorized the governor to vise 
the funds and to pledge the credit of the State for the 
purchase of arms, clothing, munitions, and equipments, 
he soon evolved order out of chaos in the organization 
of the new levies. He established his headcj[uarters at 
Cincinnati for the more immediate dispatch of busi- 
ness, and rendezvoused the Ohio contingent at Camp 
Dennison, a station on the Little Miami Railroad about 
nineteen miles east of Cincinnati. Here the various 
regiments were assembled and instructed in drill and 
guard duty as rapidly as possible. The great lack of 
capable officers was a serious drawback affecting 
prompt disciplinary instruction, but under the circum- 
stances it was not long before the fine body of men of 
the Ohio quota began to show their characteristic 
adaptability by their improved military bearing and sol- 
dierly appearance. Of course, at first, as was to be ex- 
pected with new troops, the reaction from the excite- 
ment of enlistment, the unaccustomed restraints of 
camp life, the change of food and habits, combined with 
epidemics of mumps, measles, and diarrhoea, for a time 
depressed their spirits and weakened their patriotic 
resolves. 

On May 13th McClellan received the order, issued 
on May 3d, placing him in command of the Depart- 
ment of the Ohio, which embraced the States of Ohio, 
Indiana, and Illinois. This extensive addition to his 
former command greatly increased his labors of ad- 
ministration and forced him to make long journeys of 
inspection, while at the same time he had no capable 
administrative officers to relieve him of the multifarious 
details that pressed themselves upon his attention for 



74 



GENERAL McCLELLAN. 



prompt decision. He immediately dispatched a special 
messenger to Washington to lay before General Scott 
the condition of his command, with an urgent request 
for the assignment of some regular ofificers to assist 
him. It is natural for any commander to consider the 
immediate field of his own operations as of the first 
importance, and McClellan was no exception to the 
general rule. Consequently he felt aggrieved at the 
apparent neglect of the Washington authorities, who 
at this time, wholly occupied with their own pressing 
danger, had no leisure to pay attention to the passionate' 
entreaties for help from other quarters. Finally, by his 
unceasing importunities, he succeeded in getting a; 
few capable oiBcers for some of the administrative de- 
partments, and others temporarily at least, by detaini 
ing them whenever they came within the limits of hi;! 
command. In his attempts to get some cavalry anci 
artillery he met with obstruction and rebuke from the 
general in chief, and it was only due to the assistance 03 
the authorities of the States belonging to his territor 
that he finally succeeded in organizing a few batteries 
of field artillery and some companies of cavalry, which 
however, were long left unequipped. In this terribH 
state of unpreparedness the Administration at Washi 
ington could do but little, and as a consequence tha 
governors of the loyal States were forced to send agentt 
abroad to secure, often in open rivalry with each otheri 
whatever arms and munitions could be purchased iii 
foreign markets, and thus it was that, instead of a singl 
directive head, the war was at first managed by a multi 
plicity of rival States. 

McClellan, in common with other military me: 
throughout the country, was now experiencing the evil 
arising from the neglect which the nation had paid t 
the military profession. Even those otherwise bette 
informed citizens, members of the learned profession; 
editors, statesmen, and political leaders, acted as if th 
musket and the uniform were the only requisites t 
transform a civilian into a soldier. All our disasters i 
battles on land can be attributed to such an unforti 



EARLY SERVICE IN OHIO AND WEST VIRGINIA. 75 

nate misjudgment, while the honorable and successful 
record of the United States Navy on the seas is due to 
the fact that such an error has not as yet permeated its 
service to the detriment of its efThcient personnel. And 
until the absolute necessity of exacting virtue, intelli- 
gence, and some degree of professional knowledge in 
those who aspire to the higher grades in the military 
service is clearly perceived, the nation will be obliged 
to pay the price of its criminal mistakes by the sacri- 
fice of the lives of its best citizens in exchange for 
the mere political expediency of the passing moment. 
To create an army from raw levies is no simple task 
that any one can perform, nor can it be done in a mo- 
ment. History furnishes repeated examples of its 
futility, but such lessons will avail little, however 
often repeated, in a country situated as is this of ours, 
where war is never anticipated and peace is the normal 
condition. Were it not for the free spirit and wonder- 
ful adaptability of the American people such a mis- 
management of our military problems would have re- 
sulted in much more appalling disasters than we have 
as yet experienced ; but should we come in conflict with 
a European power of even respectable military strength 
in the near future, it would not be difficult to predict 
the first unhappy consequences. 

The amount and importance of the preliminary 
work done by McClellan in April, May, and June, 
1861, in advising and aiding the State authorities of 
Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois concerning enlistments, the 
location and management of camps of instruction, the 
selection of strategic points to be first occupied and 
placed in a state of defense, and in many other matters 
which his trained mind quickly perceived, have never 
been fully appreciated nor adequately recognized, for 
their importance and value have been overshadowed 
by subsequent events. Most opportunely for the na- 
tion he now occupied a position of commanding influ- 
ence in the West, and his undoubted attainments and 
strength of character enabled him to use with great 
eflfect this influence to the best advantage for the in- 



t 



76 



GENERAL McCLELLAN. 



terests of the Government at a most critical period in 
its history. 

The condition of afifairs was something hke this. 
Many of the inhabitants of the southern borders of 
Ohio, Indiana, and IlHnois had close afBliations with 
the South and their loyalty was extremely doubtful. 
The Confederates were gathering forces at Memphis 
and Union City, threatening Columbus, Ky., and 
Cairo, 111. ; the attitude of Kentucky, whether for or 
against the Union, was critical, and affairs in Missouri 
on the western and in West Virginia on the eastern 
border of McClellan's command were very threaten- 
ing. It became a matter of supreme importance to 
save Kentucky to the Union. 

The secessionists had the closest political affiliations 
with the State officials, the governor especially, and 
they were actively endeavoring to force the State into 
secession, although more than two thirds of the people 
of the State were in favor of the Union. General Buck- 
ner, who was at heart a secessionist, commanded the 
State guard and controlled the arms, supplies, and or- 
ganization of the enrolled force, which he was using, as 
the military adviser of the governor, to force the State 
into the arms of the Confederacy. To accomplish this, 
he sought an interview with McClellan and endeavored 
to exact assurances from him that he would respect the 
position of neutrality which the officials of Kentucky 
had endeavored to assume. But McClellan was not 
deceived, and he expressly told Buckner that he had no 
power to guarantee the neutrality of the State, and at 
the same time assured him that he would not tolerate 
the presence of rebel troops in that State ; and that, with 
or without orders, if he learned of their presence there 
he would drive them out without delay. His watchful 
care, firm attitude, and decisive tone gave heart to the 
Union men of the State, while the concentration of the 
Ohio troops at Camp Dennison overawed the disaf- 
fected element, discomfited the secession officials of the 
Kentucky State Government, and thus was the State 
itself saved to the Union. In a short time the Union 



EARLY SERVICE IN OHIO AND WEST VIRGINIA, 



77 



sentiment became sufficiently strengthened to be able 
to assert itself so that its vitality was never again placed 
in jeopardy. 

Notwithstanding the multiplicity of details that the 
administration of his department forced upon his atten- 
tion, his essentially cogitative mind busied itself very 
early wath the grander problems of strategy. Indeed, 
on April 27th, only four days after his assignment to 
command, he submitted two plans to General Scott 
for his consideration. Both were based upon the em- 
ployment of an active army, eighty thousand strong, to 
be raised in the Northwest, provided they could be 
armed and equipped by the General Government. 
With such an army he proposed to cross the Ohio at 
Gallipolis and move up the Great Kanawha on Rich- 
mond with the design of relieving Washington, and 
then, with the co-operation of the eastern army, secure 
the destruction of the Southern army. By the other 
plan, to be followed in the event of Kentucky assum- 
ing a hostile attitude, it was proposed to cross the 
Ohio at Cincinnati or Louisville, with a view of break- 
ing the strength of Kentucky and Tennessee, and then 
march upon Montgomery, in co-operation with a 
movement of the eastern army upon Charleston and 
Augusta, the combined armies having Pensacola, Mo- 
bile, and New Orleans as the ulterior objective. Gen- 
eral Scott, in his indorsement of May 2d submitting 
McClellan's letter to the President, assuming that these 
plans involved the use of the three months' men, whose 
term of service would expire by the time they were 
collected and organized, condemned them, and was 
otherwise not sparing of his adverse criticism. He 
closed by saying : 

" 4. His plan is, to subdue the seceded States by 
piecemeal, instead of enveloping them all (nearly) at 
once by a cordon of posts on the Mississippi, to its 
mouth from its junction with the Ohio, and by block- 
ading ships of war on the seaboard. For the cordon 
a number of men equal to one of the general's columns 
would probably suffice, and the transportation of men 



78 



GENERAL McCLELLAN. 



and all supplies by water is about a fifth of the land 
cost, besides the immense saving of time." * 

This indorsement McClellan never saw, but Gen- 
eral Scott wrote him a letter the next day, May 3d, jit 
outlining his own views in accordance with the plani, 
of a cordon of posts down the Mississippi and a block- ■ 
ade along the seaboard, which was afterward known 1 
as the " Anaconda plan," as follows : ! 

'' I. It is the design of the Government to raises* 
twenty-five thousand additional regular troops and 
sixty thousand volunteers for three years. It will be 
inexpedient either to rely on the three months' volun- 
teers for extensive operations, or to put in their hands 
the best class of arms we have in store. The term of 
service would expire by the commencement of a regu- 
lar campaign, and the arms not lost be returned mostly r 
in a damaged condition. Hence I must strongly urge; 
upon you to confine yourself strictly to the quota oft 
three months' men called for by the War Department. . 
2. We rely greatly on the sure operation of a completed 
blockade of the Atlantic and Gulf ports soon to com--t 
mence. In connection with such a blockade we pro-- 
pose a powerful movement down the Mississippi to the; 
ocean, with a cordon of posts at proper points, and thei 
capture of Forts • Jackson and St. Philip, the object: 
being to clear out and keep open this line of communi-^ 
cation in connection with the strict blockade of the sea-- 
board, so as to envelop the insurgent States, and bring: 
them to terms with less bloodshed than by any other 
plan. For this end I suppose there will be needed from it 
twelve to twenty steam gunboats, and a sufficient num- 
ber of steam transports to carry all the personnel and 
materiel of the expedition ; most of the gunboats to be 
in advance to open the way, and the remainder to follow 
and protect the rear of the expedition. This army, in 
which it is not improbable you may be invited to take 
an important part, should be composed of our best 
regulars for the advance, of three years' volunteers, all 

* Official War Records, vol. cvii, p. 339. 



EARLY SERVICE IN OHIO AND WEST VIRGINIA. 79 

^e\l officered, and with four and a half months of in- 
truction in camps prior to November loth. In the 
)rogress down the river, all the enemy's batteries on 
ts banks we of course would turn and capture, leav- 
ng a sufficient number of posts with competent gar- 
isons to keep the river open behind the expedition. 
Finally, it will be necessary that New Orleans should 
)e strongly occupied and securely held until the pres- 
nt difficulties are composed. 3. A word now as to 
he greatest obstacle in the way of this plan— the great 
langer now pressing upon us — the impatience of our 
patriotic and loyal Union friends. They will urge in- 
stant and vigorous action, regardless, I fear, of con- 
equences ; that is, unwilling to wait for the slow in- 
struction of twelve or fifteen camps, for the rise of 
■ivers and the return of frosts to kill the virus of malig- 
lant fevers below Memphis. I fear this, but impress 
•ight views, on every proper occasion, upon the brave 
nen who are hastening to the support of the Govern- 
nent. Lose no time, while necessary preparations for 
he great expedition are in progress, in organizing, 
Irilling, and disciplining your three months' men, many 
■)i whom, it is hoped, will be ultimately found enrolled 
inder the call for three years' volunteers. Should an 
urgent and immediate occasion arise meantime for their 
lervices they will be more effective. I commend these 
news to your consideration, and shall be happy to hear 
he result." * 

Events were now occurring in Western Virginia 
:hat caused McClellan's attention to be particularly 
lirected to that region as of the most pressing impor- 
ance. Governor Dennison had long felt the necessity 
3f aiding the pronounced Union sentiment that per- 
vaded the western counties of that State, and had 
uggested that McClellan should send some of the 
Dhio troops across the river as a measure of encourage- 
Tient and support. But as the election was to be held 
irery soon, McClellan thought it better to wait until 

* Official War Records, vol. cvii, p. 369. 



8o GENERAL McCLELLAN. 

after this event, so that the people could express their 
convictions at the polls free from the presence of mili- 
tary force. But he saw no reason why he should not 
establish some of these regiments in near proximity to 
the important crossings of the Ohio to be available in 
case of necessity. Accordingly he posted the Sixteenth 
Ohio militia at Bellaire near Wheeling, the Fourteenth 
at Marietta, and the Eighteenth at Athens, both of the 
latter within reach of Parkersburg. These were some 
of the nine militia regiments that had been raised by 
Ohio, in addition to its quota of thirteen regiments; 
under the call of the President. 

It can scarcely be doubted that had the people of 
Virginia been permitted freely to exercise their will 
in regard to the question of secession, the popular votet 
would have been decidedly in the negative. But tliet 
records clearly show that the people were betrayed and 
that the State was dragooned into disloyalty. Oncei 
committed, however, to this action and under the pres- 
sure of an active military despotism, the greater bulk 
of the people at first acquiesced in the doctrine of the 
supremacy of State allegiance, and finally gave an ac-' 
tive support to its necessary consequences. In that 
part of the State lying to the west of the Alleghanies- 
however, there dwelt a loyal population who were 
not blinded by the sophistries of States rights, anc 
who, at the election held May 23d, pronounced mos^ 
emphatically against secession. To overcome this de 
fection Governor Letcher sent troops from the east tc 
overawe them, and authorized the establishment of re 
cruiting stations to antagonize the growing Uniot 
sentiment. This was soon found to be a most difii 
cult task, and the practical application of the principh 
of secession to a part of the State was not relished b} 
the State authorities. Under able leaders the friend: 
of the Union soon gathered strength in Wheeling 
Parkersburg, and in the counties bordering on th( 
Ohio River. A regiment of Union volunteers wa; 
enlisted, under the command of Colonel B. F. Kelly 
and a second regiment was soon in process of forma 



EARLY SERVICE IN OHIO AND WEST VIRGINIA, gi 

tion. In the meantime, however, a force of secession- 
ists under Colonel Porterfickl moved to Grafton, the 
junction of the two branches of the Baltimore and Ohio 
Railroad, burned the bridges at Fairmount, and thus 
blocked this essential line of communication from the 
west to the east. 

McClellan, then at Cincinnati, was notified by Gen- 
eral Scott on the 24th of May : '' We have certain in- 
telligence that at least two companies of Virginia 
troops have reached Grafton, evidently with the pur- 
pose of overawing the friends of the Union in Western 
Virginia. Can you counteract the influence of that 
detachment? Act promptly." McClellan, hearing on 
the 26th of the destruction of the railroad bridges, im- 
mediately ordered Colonel Kelly to move from Wheel- 
ing to Grafton, and, the next day, the Ohio State troops 
to cross the Ohio and advance to the support of Kelly 
by the lines of railway from Wheeling and Parkers- 
burg. He also directed General Morris, at Indianapo- 
lis, to move with two Indiana regiments to Wheeling or 
Parkersburg, selecting the most speedy and convenient 
route. This prompt action, seconded by the excellent 
behavior of the new troops, forced the enemy under 
Colonel Porterfield to retire from the railroad to Phi- 
lippi, about twenty miles to the south. 

General Morris reached Grafton with his troops 
June 1st and assumed command. Kelly had organized 
a force of fifteen companies to attack the enemy at 
Philippi that night, but Morris, to make the enterprise 
more successful, deferred the movement until the next 
night, and formed two columns, one of twenty-one com- 
panies under Colonel Kelly to take the left, and the 
other of nineteen companies and two field guns under 
Colonel Dumont to move from Webster by the right- 
hand road, both to reach the enemy's camp at four 
o'clock in the morning. Porterfield's strength was 
about six hundred effective infantry and one hundred 
and seventy-five cavalry, but owing to the inefiiciency 
of his pickets and outpost service he was completely 
surprised, and had the two Union columns met at the 
6 



82 GENERAL McCLELLAN. 

appointed time the whole garrison would have been 
captured. As it was, however, his loss was trifling, 
although he was obligetl to abandon the greater por- j 
tion of his baggage and equipments in his precipitate 
retreat beyond the mountains. 

This dispersion of the only organized force of seces- 
sionists in the State west of the AUeghanies was very 
disheartening to the Virginia military authorities, and 
means were sought to regain their prestige in this 
region. To accomplish this, two columns were organ- 
ized, one, under General H. A. Wise, to operate on the 
Kanawha line, and the other, under General R. S. Gar- 
nett, on the Cheat River line, the orders for which were 
issued June 6th and 8th, respectively. At this latter 
date Governor Letcher had, by proclamation, trans- 
ferred the Virginia forces to the Confederate authori- 
ties, and some little delay necessarily occurred before 
the troops could be assembled and equipped for these 
two expeditions. Although the Virginia convention 
had passed in secret session the ordinance of secession, 
April 17th, it was not until June 25th that the result 
of the popular vote on the question of its ratification 
was announced. General Robert E. Lee, who had been 
appointed to command the military forces of the State 
immediately after he had resigned from the United 
States Army, April 20th, still retained general charge 
of affairs in West Virginia after the State forces had 
been transferred to the Confederacy, and he was espe- 
cially anxious to strengthen Garnett to enable him to 
gain possession of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad at 
the Cheat River Bridge, the rupture of which at that 
point, as he expressed it, " would be worth to us an 
army." 

The theater of operations of Garnett's column, with 
which this campaign is alone concerned, was the west- 
ern flank of the broken and difficult country formed by 
the series of parallel ridges of the AUeghanies tliat 
separate West Virginia from the Shenandoah Valley 
just south of the Potomac River. Many mountain 
streams, tributary to the Monongahela, flowing in a 



EARLY SERVICE IN OHIO AND WEST VIRGINIA. 83 

general northerly direction through the intervening 
valleys, add to the difficulties of the terrain and neces- 
sitate the construction of many substantial bridges for 
crossing the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad over them. 
The principal of these streams are the Tygart Valley 
and Cheat Rivers ; the former, passing by Beverly, 
breaks through the gap separating Rich and Laurel 
Mountains, flows thence on to Philippi and Grafton, 
while the latter, flowing through the valley east of 
Cheat Mountain, crosses the railroad near Rowlesburg. 
The possession of the railroad at Cheat River and the 
destruction of this bridge were among the principal ob- 
jects of Garnett's expedition. 

The main avenue of communication between north- 
western Virginia and Staunton in the Shenandoah Val- 
ley was the Staunton and Parkersburg turnpike, 
which, leaving Staunton, passes through Monterey, 
over Cheat Mountain to Huttonsville, and thence to 
Beverly ; here the road forks, the Parkersburg branch 
crossing by a gap in Rich Mountain to Buckhannon 
and thence to the Ohio, while the Grafton branch 
turns the southern extremity of Laurel Hill near Leads- 
ville and follows the valley of the Tygart River. 

These two gaps at Laurel Hill and Rich Mountain 
were therefore the gates through which communication 
could be had between the east and the west, and to 
secure them to his possession Garnett strongly de- 
fended them by intrenchments, abatis, and wood slash- 
ings, while he was gathering his forces together in an- 
ticipation of a forward movement. 

McClellan had all along believed that the true line 
of operations in West Virginia was by the line of the 
Kanawha River, having for his objective the Virginia 
and East Tennessee Railroad, whose possession would 
enable him to strengthen the loyalists of the moun- 
tainous region of the three nearby States, and at the 
same time threaten the left flank of the Confederate 
forces gathering at Manassas. But the concentration of 
^ Garnett's force at Beverly compelled him to abandon for 
the present the Kanawha plan, and to direct his atten- 



84 GENERAL McCLELLAN. 

tion to the frustration of the enemy's design against the 
Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. He had been detained 
at his headquarters at Cincinnati until the 21st of June 
attending to the multifarious duties of his extensive 
department, and to the reorganization of the volunteers 
into three years' regiments under the second call of the 
President. Reaching Parkersburg on the 22d, he 
hastened his troops forward in every possible way, and 
the next day proceeded to Grafton, where he made a 
study of the situation and formulated the general plan 
of his intended campaign. This he communicated to 
the War Department on the 23d ; in general outline, it 
was briefly as follows : To secure his left flank on 
the Cheat River line first, then to move with the re- 
mainder of his " available force from Clarksburg on 
Buckhannon, then on Beverly, to turn entirely the 
detachment at the Laurel Mountain. The troops at 
Philippi will advance in time to follow up the retreat 
of the rebels in their front. After occupying Beverly 
I shall move on Huttonsville and endeavor to drive 
them into the mountains, whither I do not propose to 
follow them, unless under such circumstances as to 
make success certain. Having driven out the mass of 
their troops, and having occupied the pass by which 
they might return, I propose moving small columns 
through the country to reassure the Union men and 
break up any scattered parties of armed rebels. As 
soon as practicable, I intend to clean out the valley of 
the Kanawha." 

To carry on his campaign, McClellan had collected 
twenty-seven regiments of infantry, four batteries of 
artillery of six guns each, two troops of cavalry, and a 
company of rifles, or, in all, a force of about twenty 
thousand men. . This force was divided into three com- 
mands : one, of about five thousand men, under General 
C. W. Hill, was assigned to guard the Cheat River line 
and the railroad west from Grafton ; another, of about 
the same strength, under General Morris, formed a 
strong brigade at Philippi, intended to be sent on the 
road to Leadsville to hold the enemy in check at Laurel 



EARLY SERVICE IN OHIO AND WEST VIRGINIA. 



85 



Hill ; while the remainder, comprising three brigades, 
commanded by Generals Rosecrans, Schleich, and R. 
L. McCook, under McClellan's personal supervision, 
was to move from Buckhannon on the Beverly road 
to turn the enemy's position at Rich Mountain. 

To resist this considerable force General R. S. Gar- 
nett had about forty-five hundred men, of which he 
placed about thirteen hundred at Rich Mountain, under 
Lieutenant-Colonel Pegram, and with the remainder 
he himself occupied the pass at Laurel Hill. Other 
troops were on their way from Staunton to strengthen 
him, but only one regiment, the Forty-fourth Virginia, 
had reached Beverly before the action took place, and 
this, owing to its tardy arrival, could not be utilized, 
except to be placed on the right of the Beverly road 
to protect Pegram's right from being turned by the 
wood- road that came into the Beverly road near the 
village. Though both of these positions were rudely 
intrenched, each had four guns, and these, with infantry 
supports, were capable of offering strong resistance to 
a front attack by inexperienced troops. Their main 
weakness lay in the fact of their isolation from each 
other, that at Laurel Hill being sixteen miles from 
Beverly, and that at Rich Mountain five, so that neither 
commander could rely upon the other for assistance in 
case of attack. 

Before leaving Grafton McClellan issued a timely 
proclamation to the inhabitants of Western Virginia 
defining his purpose, and assuring them of his inten- 
tion religiously to respect all their rights of person and 
property, and a manly address to his troops urging 
them '' to the performance of the highest and noblest 
qualities of soldiers — discipline, courage, and mercy." 
In Napoleonic style he closes his address : '' Soldiers, I 
have heard that there was danger here. I have come to 
place myself at your head and to share it with you. I 
fear now but one thing : that you will not find foemen 
worthy of your steel. I know that I can rely upon you." 

He had at first hoped to reach Buckhannon June 
25th, but with new troops entering for the first time 



86 GENERAL McCLELLAN. 

upon an active campaign, and directed by an inexperi- 
enced staff, he found majiy unexpected difficulties, and 
it was not until July 2d that his headquarters were 
established there. Here he was obliged to remain five 
days, fully occupied in clearing the vicinity of roving 
bands of secessionists, closing up his command, and 
arranging the details for the contemplated expedition 
of General Cox on the line of the Great Kanawha 
in co-operation with his own campaign. Everything 
being in readiness by the evening of July 6th, Mor- 
ris was directed to move from Philippi early the next 
morning by the road leading to Garnett's position 
and occupy a position within two miles of the enemy's 
defenses. From this position he was to push out 
strong infantry reconnoissances, to hold Garnett in his 
front, and convey the impression that the main at- 
tack was to be made at Laurel Hill. McClellan, with 
the main body, moved out from Buckhannon the same 
morning, following the Beverly road, intending to turn 
the position at Rich Mountain, gain the rear of the 
enemy at Beverly, and thus cut Garnett off from his 
line of retreat. 

McClellan's column reached Roaring Fork, about 
two miles in front of Pegram's intrenchments, on the 
afternoon of the 9th, and there went into bivouac until 
a reconnoissance could be made to ascertain the diffi- 
culties in its front. This was accomplished the next 
morning, and McClellan became convinced that the 
position was too strong to hazard a frontal attack with 
his inexperienced troops, and concluded to delay until 
he could establish some batteries in a position that his 
engineer officer. Captain Foe, had found on his right, 
and which commanded Pegram's intrenchments. But 
about ten o'clock that night Rosecrans reported to him 
that he had found a guide acquainted with a wood path, 
by which a body of infantry could move around Pe- 
gram's left flank and come out at Hart's farm on the 
top of Rich Mountain, and thus interpose itself between 
Beverly and Pegram's camp. After a careful study of 
the project McClellan adopted it, and confided its exe- 



EARLY SERVICE IN OHIO AND WEST VIRGINIA. 



87 



cution to a selected body of infantry and a company of 
cavalry aggregating nineteen hundred men, under the 
immediate command of General Rosecrans. It was 
arranged between them that Rosecrans was to send 
back hourly messengers to McClellan to give an ac- 
count of progress, and that McClellan should keep a 
careful watch on Pegram's camp and be ready to assail 
it when he heard the sound of Rosecrans's attack in its 
rear. 

Pegram had arranged to guard his right flank from 
a possible turning movement, but was entirely igno- 
rant of this obscure path on his left, the country being 
exceedingly rough and well wooded. But in the course 
of the day one of Rosecrans's messengers was captured 
by the enemy's pickets, and Pegram immediately de- 
tached about three hundred men and one gun to Hart's 
farm to oppose Rosecrans. The latter, after a very 
toilsome journey in the rain, did not reach his objective 
until after one o'clock, and it was not until after four 
o'clock that he succeeded in driving the enemy from 
the position. The sound of the conflict reached McClel- 
lan later than he had expected, and while watching the 
commotion in Pegram's camp he interpreted it as indi- 
cating success on their part and the defeat of Rosecrans. 
Under this uncertainty, and not having heard from the 
latter, he did not deem it wise to order an attack upon 
Pegram's front, and therefore, as dusk approached and 
the contest seemed to be over, he withdrew his forces 
to their camps at Roaring Fork, expecting to continue 
the next day the construction of his artillery work. 
Early the next morning, however, Rosecrans's men 
coming down the road found Pegram's camp aban- 
doned, and McClellan then for the first time learned 
of the success of the turning movement. 

Garnett, having heard of the disaster at Rich Moun- 
tain, abandoned his position at Laurel Hill early the 
next morning and endeavored to effect his retreat by 
way of Beverly, and had indeed arrived within five 
miles of this place when he was erroneously informed 
that it was in possession of the Union troops. His 



88 GENERAL McCLELLAN. 

only chance, then, of escape was to retrace his steps 
to Leadsville and attempt the difficult route by way of 
Saint George up the Cheat River Valley. General Mor- 
ris, in command of the Union forces in Garnett's front, * 
did not learn of the latter's retreat until late in the 
morning of the I2th, and when he did hear of it his 
troops were not ready for an immediate advance, and 
thus Garnett had some hours the start. 

McClellan's advance did not occupy Beverly until 
about noon, half an hour too late to capture some 
fifty of Pegram's men that had made their way over 
the mountain during the night from Pegram's camp. 
The remainder of Pegram's command, after vainly en- 
deavoring to reach Garnett, and suffering much from 
fatigue and hunger, surrendered themselves to McClel- 
lan ; they numbered thirty officers and five hundred 
and sixty men. The Forty-fourth Virginia Regiment, 
which had been stationed on the eastern slope of Rich 
Mountain, near Beverly, and had not therefore partici- 
pated in the action, together with those that had es- 
caped from the garrison, retreated from Beverly toward 
Huttonsville before McClellan occupied the village. 
But it was now important to take such steps as would 
result in capturing, if possible, the main force of the 
enemy, which was then endeavoring to make its way 
north and escape by way of Saint George. 

It was evident that if General Hill could have had 
ample time to collect his forces along the line of the 
railroad he could interpose a sufficient force to block 
the mouth of the valley by which Garnett was retreat- 
ing, and at the same time the latter could be followed 
by the troops under General Morris. Unfortunately, 
McClellan was not in possession of the actual facts of 
the case until after midday of the 12th, and his line of 
telegraph terminated at his former camp at Roaring 
Creek, distant seven miles from Beverly. Hill, at Graf- 
ton, did not receive telegraphic information from 
McClellan until about noon of the 13th, and then started 
with twenty-five hundred men for West Union to head 
off Garnett's command. He reached this position with 



EARLY SERVICE IN OHIO AND WEST VIRGINIA. 



89 



hree companies of his advanced guard on the morn- 
ng of the 14th, only to learn that the enemy, taking ad- 
/antage of a road bordering Horse Shoe Run, had 
massed Red House, eight miles to the east, at five 
)'clock that morning and had made good his escape. 

After some delay in getting together provisions, a 
pursuing force was organized from General Morris's 
:ommand, comprising a strength of about eighteen 
lundred men, under the direction of Captain Benham, 
o follow after Garnett on the road he took after leaving 
Leadsville. The weather was stormy, the roads very 
iifhcult, and Garnett had some hours the start. But 
Benham succeeded in harassing Garnett's rear guard 
md forcing the latter to halt from time to time in 
Drder to give his wagons a chance to make good their 
escape. At Carrick's Ford, however, Garnett was 
.billed in a skirmish while endeavoring to bring off his 
ear guard, and shortly after the pursuit was aban- 
doned. In this retreat Garnett lost some killed, 
vvounded, and prisoners, besides a portion of his 
A^agons and baggage, but his main forces effected 
heir escape, though much impaired in morale and 
discipline. 

After having thus provided for the pursuit of Gar- 
lett's force, McClellan followed the road to Huttons- 
^ille to overtake, if possible, that portion of the enemy 
:hat had retreated in that direction. But fear lent them 
*vings, and they did not stop until they met re-enforce- 
ments in the vicinity of Monterey ; meanwhile the 
Union troops occupied Huttonsville after a brief skir- 
mish with a small cavalry force, and then hastened to 
Dccupy Cheat Mountain Pass, which, being gained, 
3-ave McClellan control of the main line of communica- 
ion between the upper Shenandoah Valley and north- 
western Virginia. All the Confederate organized force 
having been thus defeated or dispersed and the avenues 
effectually blocked, the campaign on the northerly line 
of operations was ended, and McClellan directed his 
attention to that of the Kanawha River line. 

This, it will be remembered, was inaugurated by the 



90 



GENERAL McCLELLAN. 



orders of McClellan, dated July 2d, at Buckhannon, 
directing General Cox,, then at Camp Dennison, Ohio, 
to assume command of the First and Second Kentucky 
and Twelfth Ohio Regiments and move to the Ka- 
nawha. His instructions confined him to a defensive 
attitude and a cautious advance until McClellan's oper- 
ations had cut off the enemy's retreat from Charlestown 
by the route through Beverly. But before Cox's troops 
could be concentrated on the Ohio and the movement 
up the Kanawha begun, the action at Rich Mountain 
had occurred and McClellan was able to turn his atten- 
tion to a plan of giving Cox material assistance in the 
latter's operations against General Wise. This was, to 
move with six regiments by way of Huttonsville, Sum- 
merville,and Dogwood Ridge, to cut off whatever force 
of the enemy there might be in the lower valley of the 
Kanawha, and with Cox's force turn upon Wise and 
drive him from the State. But while he was in the 
midst of the preparations for this enterprise he received 
orders to turn over his command to General Rosecrans v 
and to proceed at once to Washington. 

The success of McClellan's West Virginia cam- 
paign was unduly magnified by the newspaper press 
throughout the North, and it was the immediate cause 
of his being called to Washington to receive that sub- 
stantial promotion that his talents as an army com- 
mander seemed to justify. A careful analysis of its 
main incidents and their influence upon his mental pro-^i, 
cesses is, however, exceedingly instructive in givin 
a just estimate of his characteristic qualities of leader- \^ 
ship, which, being peculiarly his own, must ever be in 
evidence throughout his whole career. 

The strategic bent of his mind is shown in the ad- jjj 
mirable plan of campaign submitted June 23d, immedi- 
ately upon his arrival at Grafton from Ohio. It was 
admirable because it could have been carried out to 
its successful issue by any subordinate commander with 
the greatly preponderating strength that was available. 
His movements were slow, for his cautiousness grew 
as he approached the field of battle. " Assure the gen- 



EARLY SERVICE IN OHIO AND WEST VIRGINIA, qi 

•al," says he in his letter of July 5th, " that no pros- 

^ct of a brilliant victory shall induce me to depart from 

y intention of gaining success by maneuvering rather 

lan by fighting. I will not throw these raw men of 

ine into the teeth of artillery and intrenchments if it 

possible to avoid it. Say to the general, too, that I 

11 trying to follow a lesson long ago learned from 

im — i. e., not to move until I know that everything 

ready, and then to move with the utmost rapidity and 

lergy. The delays that I have met with have been 

ksome to me in the extreme, but I felt it would be 

jcceedingly foolish to give way to impatience, and ad- 

ance before everything was prepared." And his anx- 

ty expressed in the concluding paragraph of his letter 

f July loth — '' Please send me more regular officers ; 

Dme old regiments, if possible. I want those moun- 

lin guns at once. I have great difficulties to meet, 

ut have gone into them knowing that the general will 

ive me support as I need it, and that he will appre- 

iate my position " — is indicative of the fact that his 

onstitutional timidity was in full possession of his 

lind. though he had just expressed himself as " sure 

f success in any event." 

This apprehen;^ive anxiety on the eve of battle that 
etrayed his lack of aggressiveness at the supreme mo- 
aent is also exhibited when, hearing the sound of 
losecrans's guns at Rich Mountain and interpreting 
he actions of the enemy unfavorably, he withdrew his 
ommand at the time when a bold leader would have 
2d his troops to the assault. And thus it happened 
hat he was never personally tested in battle as a com- 
lander in the whole of the campaign, since the only 
ghting was done by Rosecrans's command of nine- 
een hundred men at the top of Rich Mountain, and by 
i>enham's eighteen hundred in pursuit of Garnett on 
he Leadsville road. 

In addition, when we consider that Garnett should 
lot have been allowed to escape, by a timely instruction 
o General Hill to guard the only possible route left, 
ifter the capture of Beverly, the well-defined objective 



92 



GENERAL McCLELLAN. 



of McClellan's expedition, and that he nevertheless did 
so escape, it is beyond any satisfactory explanation to 
justify the extravagant language McClellan employed 
in his congratulatory order to his soldiers on the termi- 
nation of the campaign : 

Soldiers of the Army of the West : 

I am more than satisfied with you. You have annihilated! 
two- armies, commanded by educated and experienced sol-j 
diers, intrenched in mountain fastnesses fortified at theinj*^ 
leisure. You have taken five guns, twelve colors, fifteen 
hundred stand of arms, one thousand prisoners, including-j 
more than forty officers — one of the two commanders of theij 
rebels is a prisoner, the other lost his life on the field of 
battle. You have killed more than two hundred and fifty of 
the enemy, who has lost all his baggage and camp equipage.? 
All this has been accomplished with the loss of twenty braves 
men killed and sixty wounded on your part. 

You have proved that Union men, fighting for the preser- 
vation of our Government, are more than a match for oun 
misguided and erring brethren ; more than this, you havetj''^ 
shown mercy to the vanquished. You have made long andpl 
arduous marches, often with insufficient food, frequently ex- 
posed to the inclemency of the weather. I have not hesi- 
tated to demand this of you, feeling that I could rely oni- 
your endurance, patriotism, and courage. 

In the future I may have still greater demands to makec 
upon you, still greater sacrifices for you to offer. It shall' 
be my care to provide for you to the extent of my ability;; 
but I know now that by your valor and endurance you wilL 
accomplish all that is asked. 

Soldiers, I have confidence in you, and I trust you havet 
learned to confide in me. Remember that discipline and 
subordination are qualities of equal value with courage. I! 
am proud to say that you have gained the highest reward 
that American troops can receive — the thanks of Congress 
and the applause of your fellow-citizens. 

S 



CHAPTER V. 

ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. SUC- 
CEEDS SCOTT AS GENERAL IN CHIEF. 



We now turn to the events that had occurred in 
:he vicinity of Washington just after the temporary 
solation of the city from the North had been removed 
3y the prompt arrival of the Massachusetts, New York, 
md Pennsylvania militia regiments. Virginia had 
massed the ordinance of secession in secret session, 
April 17th, and the posture of Maryland was not only 
darming, but critical. The capital of the nation was 
uirrounded on every side by a people hostile in senti- 
ment, while those within were permeated with the 
poison of treachery. Its unfortunate situation made 
its tenure precarious, while it was a matter of the first 
mportance that it should be securely held ; and when 
this was made certain for the present emergency by the 
increasing numbers of three months' volunteers pour- 
ing in from the nearby Northern States, the crushing- 
burden of anxiety was lifted from the minds of those 
who had reason to be gravely apprehensive. The 
safety of the capital being assured, it was next in order 
to determine what use should be made of the troops — 
which to the uninstructed public mind of that day 
seemed a great and invincible army — before their term 
of service should expire. The vulnerability of the city 
to attack by artillery from the Virginia side of the 
Potomac justified the invasion of the " sacred soil," 
and accordingly on the night of May 23d some regi- 
ments were moved across Long Bridge and occupied 
Arlington Heights, and others, by water, under the 
protection of the navy, took possession of Alexandria. 

93 



g^ GENERAL McCLELLAN. 

This procedure was clearly in accord with the viewj 
of General Scott, upon whom the Administration relieci 
for advice, but his military instincts were decidedh* 
opposed to the employment of the three months' levieij 
for an offensive campaign, as his letter to McClellani 
already quoted, clearly shows. General Irwin Mc.i 
Dowell, a major of the regular army, was appointed t(' 
the immediate command of the troops, and unde i 
great difficulties was endeavoring to organize then; 
into some semblance of an army. General Patterson 
was also collecting a considerable number of equally 
raw troops in the near vicinity of Harper's Ferry. Ii> 
the meanwhile the Confederate forces had seize<« 
Manassas Junction, thus controlling the communicai 
tions to Richmond and the Shenandoah Valley, and* 
were preparing, under General Beauregard, to advanc:i 
upon Washington, while General Johnston was com 
centrating forces at Winchester to oppose Pattersorn 
Such was the situation late in June, when in obediencq 
to the constantly increasing but intemperate demani 
of the public press an immediate advance of tin 
Union army toward Richmond was, by the unanimoui 
vote of the President and his Cabinet, decided upo) 
at a Cabinet meeting held June 29th. This action 
though in complete accord with the optimistic temper 
of the people, could hardly be justified even by tHi 
undoubted pressing political considerations of tlii; 
time, and only then when certainty of success was as^ 
sured. ' However, the more prudent military judge 
ment of the general in chief was overborne, a plan c 
campaign was called for and submitted, and prepare 
tions for its prosecution immediately inaugurated. 

In general outline the plan decided upon was fc 
Patte-rson to hold Johnston at Winchester to prever 
the latter re-enforcing Beauregard, while McDowe 
was to move by way of Fairfax Court House, cross tl' ■ 
Occoquan below its junction with Bull Run, and b 
an attack on the right flank gain the enemy's railwa 
communications. Information derived from recor: 
noissances led to a change of plan, so that it was dete: f 



ORGANIZATION OF ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 



95 



nined to attack the enemy's left. For this purpose 
Iiinter's and Heintzelman's divisions, aj^grci^atini^ 
bout twelve thousand men, were directed to march 
t early daylight on the 21st, and by a flank movement 
ross Bull Run at Sudley Spring Ford so as to take 
he defenses of the Stone Bridge in the flank and rear, 
yler's division was directed to move by the Warren- 
Dn turnpike, threaten the enemy's forces at the 
5tone Bridge, and at the proper time carry it, join 
he turning column, and with it deliver battle on the 
nemy's left flank. The remaining division of the 
rmy under Miles was held in reserve at Centreville, 
me of its brigades to make a false attack on Black- 
burn's Ford. It so happened that Beauregard, having 
een re-enforced by some of Johnston's troops from 
he Valley, had intended to attack that morning by his 
ight flank, directing himself upon Centreville, and 
rain possession of McDowell's line of retreat, and for 
his purpose the brigades of his army were awaiting 
trders at the fords of Bull Run, which they held from 
he Stone Bridge to Union Mills. Notwithstanding 
he difliculties that delayed the march of McDowell's 
urning column, by which the flank attack began some 
lours later than was intended, the advantage was at 
irst greatly with the Union forces. But at about three 
clock in the afternoon the tide of battle turned, when 
he right of the Union line gave way under a severe 
nusketry fire from some of Johnston's troops, just then 
rriving on the field. The retreat began in good order, 
oktt the disorganization caused at first by the conges- 
ion of the lines of retreat, and afterward by the loss of 
ontrol of the troops by their officers, overwhelmed 
ohem in a panic that ended in a disgraceful flight to- 
livard Washington. General Patterson was severely 
;ensured for his failure to hold Johnston's army at 
Vinchester, and in public opinion he was held respon- 
bfible for this disaster. For a long time he was com- 
)elled to bear the odium of this censure, and it was 
Aot till long after that he found an opportunity to pub- 
Eifish, in justification of his conduct, an exposition of the 



^6 GENERAL McCLELLAN. 

difficulties of his position, the orders he had received 
and the measures hQ had employed. Taking every- 
thing into consideration, McDowell deserved success 
and it is now generally conceded that had his flanl 
attack been made at the hour intended, or even a fev 
hours before it was, as was possible, the Confederat* 
army would likely have paralleled toward Richmon( 
the flight of the Union army toward Washington 
The behavior of the troops in action, considering thei 
rawness, was admirable, but they were not sufficiently 
trained for an offensive campaign. The componen 
parts of the brigades and divisions had been brough 
together only a few days before, and both troops an* 
commanders were alike unacquainted with each other 
The company and regimental units were commander 
by inexperienced offixers, who generally were ignoranr 
of their duties, and had not acquired that confidenc: 
of their men so essential to hold them up to their worr 
at the critical moment. It is true that the Confedeii 
ates were equally raw, but they had the advantage o: 
fighting a defensive battle under less fatigue, and thei 
company and subaltern officers were better fitted fo 
command by reason of a longer experience at a tim^ 
when a few months' length of service gave a prepori 
derating advantage. 

In view of the long and bloody struggle that was tt 
follow, this disaster, humiliating and distressful as 
was, had its compensations. It demonstrated to till 
people of the North that the war was not to be ende 
by any single summer campaign of militia, but was t 
be fought out to the death between trained forces ma: 
shaled in support of principles so antagonistic th: 
compromise was absolutely impossible. After the fir 
brief moment of despair and dismay the Administr.- 
tion, as a first step to inspire confidence, turned to tl 
one general who up to this time had achieved the rept 
tation of being able to handle troops in the field wit 
success, and ordered him at once to Washington. Ar 
Congress, relying upon the characteristic grim dete 
mination of the loyal people of the North, speedi' 



ORGANIZATION OF ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 



97 



voted five hundred thousand men and five hundred 
milHon dollars as an evidence that the war was to be 
vigorously prosecuted. 

The selection of General McClellan to command the 
Division of the Potomac gave general satisfaction. 
Success in war is everything, and his brilliant cam- 
paign in West Virginia was contrasted with the disaster 
at Bull Run to enhance his military reputation and 
prepare the way for his most flattering welcome by the 
President and other high dignitaries of the nation. 
Unfortunately for his own sake, he was placed upon 
too high a pedestal in the beginning of his active career, 
and in truth it must be said that he was in a measure 
responsible for this undue elevation. His glowing dis- 
patches gave a coloring entirely too brilliant to the 
exploits of his army in West Virginia, and though they 
heartened the nation at the time of its disaster and 
Iwere pardonable in the early period of the war, yet it 
would have been better for him to have been content 
with a more modest recital of his operations. The 
intemperate hero worship to which he was immediately 
subjected was bound to be followed by an equally un- 
just adverse criticism at the very time when he needed 
strength and united support. Any just estimate of 
McClellan's character and attainments at this time 
must be drawn from the story of his previous record 
lin correlation with the testimony of personal friends, 
and that which he himself has given in his unguarded 
moments. From all these sources it is abundantly 
manifest that he was ever actuated by the most devoted 
patriotism and thorough loyalty to his country. With 
a heart single and free from all ulterior purpose of per- 
sonal benefit, he was ready for any sacrifice at the call 
of duty. He had no distrust of his own ability, for his 
successful academic career at West Point, his experi- 
ence in the Mexican War, and indeed all the honorable 
attention that he had received from the Government in 
various positions of trust and responsibility, in all 
I of which he felt that he had creditably acquitted him- 
1 self, combined to strengthen his own favorable esti- 



98 



GENERAL McCLELLAN. 



mate of himself. And, indeed, he had good reason to 
be proud of his achievements. Called suddenly to the 
command of one of tfie most important military de- 
partments of the country — that of the Ohio — and prac- 
tically left to the guidance of his own counsels, his 
administration was admirable, and justly commended. 
He strengthened the hands of the governors of the 
Western States at a time of vital importance, when the 
General Government was in the midst of immediate 
and pressing peril. His strong character, personal dig- 
nity, and incorruptible honesty were admirably adapted . 
to give tone and direction to the first levies that has- 
tened to the support of the Government — characteris- 
tics which remained with them all through their service. . 
The nation need never despair so long as it can retain i 
such men as McClellan in its official service. But 
now that he had come to Washington with the prestige 
of the victorious general, and was everywhere received I 
with such flattering marks of appreciation, he fell intoi 
the grave error that the safety of the capital and the 
success of the cause depended alone upon his skill andl 
efforts. It may well be imagined that his advent att 
Washington restored hope to the despairing, for he.' 
possessed a dignity of demeanor, a soldierly bearing,, 
and composure of manner well calculated to strengtheni 
a situation so depressing and so precarious. But ex- 
cessive adulation is dangerous to any man, and Mc- 
Clellan could not escape its insidious effects upon him- 
self nor its reflex action upon the public mind, thatt 
expected results wholly incommensurate with his as 
yet undeveloped- military capacity to command a 
great army. 

The Division of the Potomac, to which McClellan 
had been assigned, comprised the forces in the De- 
partment of Northeastern Virginia under McDowell 
and those of the Department of Washington under 
Mansfield, and, in obedience to the orders of the War 
Department, he assumed command July 27th. With 
commendable promptness he proceeded to make him- 
self acquainted with the condition of the troops, and to 



ORGANIZATION OF ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 



99 



learn what he could with regard to his surroundings. 
He found the defenses of the city exceedingly weak, 
consisting only of Forts Runyon and Allan covering 
the approach to the Long Bridge, Fort Corcoran, one 
at the Aqueduct Bridge, and Fort Ellsworth in front of 
Alexandria. A few small batteries adjacent to these 
forts, and one on the Maryland side of the river at the 
Chain Bridge, comprised the then existing works of 
defense. The condition of affairs, as it then appeared 
to him, '' was one of extreme difficulty and fraught 
with great danger. The defeated army of McDowell 
could not properly be called an army — it was only a 
collection of undisciplined, ill-officered, and unin- 
structed men, who, as a rule, were much demoralized 
by defeat and ready to run at the first shot. Positions 
from which the city could be commanded by the ene- 
my's guns were open for their occupation. The troops 
were insufficient in numbers as in quality. The period 
of service of many regiments had expired or would do 
so in a very few days. There was so little discipline 
that officers and men left their camps at their own will, 
and, as I have already stated, the city was full of 
drunken men in uniform. The executive was demor- 
alized ; an attack was expected from hour to hour ; ma- 
terial of war did not exist in anything like sufficient 
quantities ; and, lastly, I was not supreme and unham- 
pered, but often thwarted by the lieutenant general." * 
The army at that time consisted of about fifty thou- 
sand infantry, less than one thousand cavalry, and six 
hundred and fifty artillery, with nine imperfect field bat- 
teries comprising thirty pieces ; and while it is true that 
the troops were temporarily demoralized, it is but just 
to say that this had not resulted from lack of courage 
or of the manly virtues in the rank and file, but rather 
from a distrust in the capacity of their officers to lead 
them — more especiallv of their regimental and com- 
pany commanders. The best troops in the world, offi- 
cered as these were by the vicious system of election, 

* McClellan's Own Story, p. 68. 

l.ofC. 



100 GENERAL McCLELLAN. 

would fail the best general ; but these men of the rank 
and file, when afterwg^d they came under the com- 
mand of officers of spirit, educated for their profession 
or trained by war, were never surpassed. With the ex- 
ception of two regiments at the Chain Bridge on the 
Maryland side, the army was distributed in and near 
the forts from Long Bridge to Alexandria in unhealthy 
camps, whose locality was unsuited for a proper de- 
fense of the city. 

It was not long before the influence of McClellan's 
personality became evident. A provost guard of regu- 
lar troops, under the command of Colonel Andrew Por- 
ter, very quickly established order in the city, officers 
and men were forbidden to leave their camps with- 
out written authority, better sites for regimental 
camps were chosen, and immediate measures were 
taken for the daily drill, instruction, and discipline of 
the troops. Inefficient and worthless officers were 
eliminated from the army upon the recommendations 
of boards of officers established for that purpose, the 
lazy and indififerent were cautioned, the eager and zeal- 
ous heartened, and a new spirit very quickly pervaded 
the whole army. Under the deep conviction that the 
army as it was then organized could not respond to 
the demands soon to be made upon it, McClellan deter- 
mined to reorganize it as speedily as possible. 

To this congenial task of reorganization McClellan 
brought the love of order and system, a thorough 
knowledge of detail, and an insistent habit of mind that 
nothing could deflect from its purpose. But in such 
a process difficulties continually arise, often seemingly 
insuperable, that test the temper, weaken the efforts, 
and discourage the ablest of men. Especially is this 
so in a government by the people, where newspaper 
editors and other self-constituted exponents of public 
opinion are first in the field with their impatient sug- 
gestions ; then personal influence, exerted through 
potent political leaders, for rank and command can not 
always be ignored ; financial considerations become 
pressing, foreign relations threatening, and haste is^ 



ORGANIZATION OF ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. iqI 

urgently demanded. Fortunately for McClellan, some 
of these disturbing elements were, for the moment, 
silenced by the appalling disaster of Bull Run and the 
immediate necessity for the security of Washington. 
And so gradually the historic Army of the Potomac 
began to assume the form and imbibe the spirit that 
enabled it to withstand through so many bloody bat- 
tles the strenuous efforts of its worthy rival, the Army 
of Northern Virginia, to overthrow it. 

McClellan had a well-settled conviction in his own 
mind in regard to wdiat he wished to accomplish, for 
he had studied to some purpose the organization of 
the principal armies of Europe. He knew the function 
of each arm of the service, the details of its equipment 
and organization, and its relative value in combination 
with others ; and in adjusting the line or fighting force 
of the army he wished to bring the several arms into 
such numerical relation with each other as would best 
conform to the experience of war ; and then to perfect 
by constant drill and discipline the various tactical 
units, and finally to consolidate them into brigades and 
divisions, and, when the time was ripe, into army corps 
under competent commanders. He clearly perceived 
the great importance of a competent stafif to direct, in- 
spect, and supply the fighting force, and therefore de- 
voted much anxious thought to the selection of the 
chiefs to administer its several departments and insure 
life and mobility to the army. He was therefore work- 
ing under a systematic plan, which under the most 
favorable circumstances would have required a consid- 
erable time for its development. But, as it was, he en- 
countered the greatest difiBculty from the scarcity of 
instructed officers, particularly in stafif duties, to aid 
him, because in our military peace establishment there 
had been no general staff corps to train such officers. 
The general may be likened, in the organization of an 
army, to the brain that plans, the staff to the nerves 
that see, hear, and obey, and the fighting force to the 
members that march and strike ; and when these are 
in harmonious adjustment success is assured and vie- 



I02 GENERAL McCLELLAN. 

torics are won. With a keen perception of this rela- 
tionship McClellan selegted, with rare discernment, his 
chiefs of the various staff departments from the small 
number of educated officers that were then available, 1 
and in this he was aided by the hearty co-operation of 
the Administration. To relieve himself of many details 
connected with the administration of the army and to 
supervise the various staff departments, he saw the ne- 
cessity of a chief of staff, an office hitherto unknown to 
our service, and Avhich demanded of the incumbent 
the most delicate and confidential personal and official 
relations with the commander of the army. It was 
therefore quite natural that his choice for this position 
should fall upon his old commander in the Red River 
Exploring Expedition, Colonel Randolph B. Marcy, 
who had recently become his father-in-law. That 
adverse criticism should attend this selection on the 
ground of relationship was to be expected, but it does 
not appear that McClellan ever regretted his choice 
or was conscious of committing an error in this selec- 
tion. Nevertheless it was a weak spot in his armor, 
for it was not by any means conceded by those in a 
position to know, that Marcy was gifted with those rare 
and varied attainments that such an officer should 
possess so as to particularly distinguish him for selec- 
tion to this office. He certainly did not belong to the 
same class wath Berthier, Napoleon's admirable chief 
of staff. 

In the meanwhile the new levies of infantry were 
rapidly arriving in Washington and being formed into 
provisional brigades in camps on the Maryland side of 
the river for equipment, instruction, and discipline. 
This duty was first intrusted to General Fitz-John Por- 
ter, then to General Burnside, and finally to General 
Silas Casey, an able drill master, who was peculiarly 
adapted to work of this nature. The new artillery 
troops reported to General Barry, chief of artillery, and 
the cavalry to the chief of cavalry. General Stoneman, 
and when the new troops were sufficiently instructed 
under these able officers they were transferred across 



ORGANIZATION OF ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 103 

the Potomac and assigned to the brigades serving 
there. And now, under the inspiring influence of 
McClellan's directing mind and vigorous personal ac- 
tivity, the morale of the troops visibly improved ; offi- 
cers and men tried to do their best to make ready 
for the day of inspection, and to be found worthy 
of commendation; and to develop and maintain an 
esprit de corps among them, McClellan succeeded in 
having his command called " The Army of the Po- 
tomac." 

This period of preparation and development needed 
just such a man as McClellan, and the fortuitous con- 
currence of time and circumstance to evolve that great 
Army of the Potomac from the heterogeneous ele- 
ments that were then coming from every part of the 
North. Whatever may be the judgment of history in 
regard to the merits of McClellan in the domain of 
grand tactics and strategy, there is no question about 
his ability in organization. Having a clear perception 
of the framework of his contemplated structure, he pos- 
sessed all those characteristics of mind and manner 
which compelled the active support of the powerful 
to supply the means, and brought out the reciprocal 
love and afifection of his troops to vivify the structure 
with the spirit of devotion to the country. All honor, 
then, to him who implanted in the grand old Army 
of the Potomac during its infancy such ideals of disci- 
pline, devotion, and duty, that throughout all the try- 
ing years of its existence it never lost its spirit nor 
faltered in its purpose. 

McClellan's life at this time was a very busy one. 
He devoted the greater portion of the day to riding 
the lines of his army in order to see for himself the 
location, distribution, and character of the troops, and 
was frequently from twelve to fourteen hours in the 
saddle at a time. In the early morning and late at 
night he was engaged upon the necessary details that 
demanded immediate attention ; in granting audiences 
to officials of every degree from the highest to the low- 
est, for he had now become a power among the power- 



I04 GENERAL McCLELLAN. 

ful in the land. The excessive mental and physical \\t 
labor that his exalted and prominent position de- il 
manded of him was sufficient to break down the most i It 
vigorous of men ; and although he possessed unusual m 
stamina, he could not escape the consequences of the.^ji 
unceasing drafts of vitality upon his constitution, espe--|( 
cially since he paid but little attention to regularity inijt 
his physical demands for rest and refreshment. Thch 
effects of these overdrafts upon the capital stock of ' 
his vitality are visible in the morbidness that is some- • 
times exhibited in his home letters, and especially ati 
the times when his bodily and mental fatigue happen i 
to be more than ordinarily excessive. At such times 5 
he is cast down in spirit, fears that the task set for him i 
to accomplish is too great, says harsh things about: 
the general in chief, the President, the Cabinet, andl 
politicians in general ; but as all these things are said I 
in home letters written in utter weariness of both mind I 
and body, they ought not to be given undue weight, 
in arriving at a just estimate of the man. It would 1 
have been a comparatively easy problem for any one: 
having a talent for organization to do what McClel-- 
Ian was obliged to do, provided he was furnished 1 
with all the appliances : such as an efficient and I 
experienced staf¥; competent regimental, brigade, andl 
division commanders, who had themselves passed! 
through the subaltern grades ; arms and munitions ; 
trustworthy and ready ; food and forage ; transporta- • 
tion, and the thousand and one other things that are 
requisite to make the army an efficient fighting ma- 
chine. But when all these things have to be created 
ah initio, with manifest incompetency everywhere, then 
does the task become one that but few can successfully 
undertake ; and therefore, in view of McClellan's mag- 
nificent success, he deserves the undying thanks of the 
nation, as he has earned the love and affection of his 
soldiers. 

He very early saw the absolute necessity of secur- 
ing Washington by a system of artificial defenses, since 
its security was of the very first importance in the pres- 



ORGANIZATION OF ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 



105 



mt war, and he therefore committed this problem to 
lis talented chief engineer, General Barnard. Upon 
;his question the latter, in justification of the elaborate 
Dlan adopted for these defenses, says : " In a war of the 
lation — united and patriotic — with a foreign power, 
:onquest by the enemy of the seat of government, 
:hough it might be a disgrace, would have little influ- 
ence upon the issues of the contest. In the recent 
:ivil war, on the contrary, the rebel flag flying from 
;he dome of the Capitol would have been the signal of 
•ecognition by those foreign powers whose open influ- 
ence and active agency would be too willingly thrown, 
vvith whatever plausible pretext, into the scale of dis- 
Tiemberment to become almost decisive of the event. 
That the preservation of the national cause should have 
been thus identified with the continuous tenure of a 
:ity situated as is Washington, upon the very boundary 
oi the most powerful and energetic of the rebellious 
States, and surrounded by the territory of another State 
Dnly restrained from open rebellion by the heavy pres- 
sure of armed force, was one of the chief embarrass- 
ments of the Government in the prosecution of the 
war. A point so vital and yet so vulnerable furnished 
to the enemy ready means of relieving himself, througli 
demonstrations more or less serious, from dangerous 
pressure, while excessive anxiety for its safety partially 
paralyzed most of our own operations on this 
theater." * 

The rules and regulations for the government of the 
army, as well as the customs of service, have provided 
certain well-known means for the transaction of busi- 
ness and the preservation of military subordination. 
In this country the President is the commander in chief 
of the army and navy, and therefore the head of the 
military hierarchy. He controls the army, as part of 
the executive branch of the Government, through the 
War Department, of which the Secretary of War is 
the responsible head. He may also designate an ofli- 



* Barnard's Defenses of Washington, p. 5. 



I06 GENERAL McCLELLAN. i 

cer, usually the senior in rank, to command the army, 
but who, nevertheless,.is always under the orders of the 
War Department. Hence the control which a gen- 
eral in chief may exercise in purely military matters, 
such as the movement and concentration of troops, 
assignment of officers to special commands, and simi- 
lar matters connected with its personnel, subject as this- 
control is to the discretion of the Secretary of War and 
not fixed by law, has widely varied from time to time. 
The efifect upon the whole has been to minimize the 
authority of the general in chief within the limits of his,; 
legitimate command, and to strengthen the influence of; 
those chiefs of bureaus who, being in daily contact? 
with the Secretary of War, can seize the opportuneti 
moment to strengthen their own power. The position; 
of general in chief, while one of dignity and honor, is- 
not always one of personal military control even wheri) 
the incumbent is an experienced soldier of the highesB; 
distinction. I 

Shortly after McClellan assumed command of thdl 
Division of the Potomac his relations with Generaai 
Scott, the veteran commander of the army, becamfl^ 
strained, and their separation widened day by dayq 
The latter had not been infected with the prevailingii 
demoralization attending the disaster of Bull Run, anct 
had no fears for the immediate safety of Washingtonii 
However, he had acquiesced in the order of the Waai 
Department which brought McClellan to Washingtom 
although earlier on the same day he had directed him 
to remain with his command in West Virginia instead 
of moving into the Shenandoah Valley, which McCleh 
Ian had suggested as a proper movement to relieve th 
existing situation. He therefore welcomed him witl, 
marked appreciation, but expected from him that defer; 
ence and subordination to which he was accustomed) 
The aged veteran, then in his seventy-sixth year, wa; 
physically unfit to command the army. He had born 
with unflinching courage the severest bodily and men 
tal strain through all the gloomy days when the foun 
dations of our national existence seemed to be threat 



ORGANIZATION OF ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 



107 



ned with destruction. He was often betrayed by his 
hysical condition into irascibility of temper, was dog- 
latic in assertion, and could ill brook any neglect of 
lose courtesies which were due to his official position 
n the part of his subordinates ; but much could be for- 
iven to the glorious old veteran of two wars, whose 
erling loyalty was in striking contrast to the conduct 
If many younger officers of the army. McClellan was, 
owever, very soon placed in an exceedingly embar- 
issing situation. It was early made apparent to him 
lat the Administration relied upon his ability and 
fiforts to improve the condition of things, which, in its 
pinion, could scarcely be much worse. His exalted 
putation as a successful general, his manly bearing, 
Dol composure, manifest intelligence, and sturdy fig- 
re made the deepest impression upon every one, re- 
eved the prevailing apprehension, and implanted the 
erms of confidence in the minds of all. He became 
t once the central military figure. Wherever he went 
e was the object of admiration. The adulation to 
diich he was subjected, the deference shown him by 
le President and Cabinet ministers, and the eager- 
ess of senators and representatives to meet his wishes 
y legislation, could scarcely fail to disturb his balance 
nd turn his head, self-reliant as he was. All this was 
all and bitterness to the commanding general of the 
rniy, who felt that he was being passed by for a gen- 
ral forty years his junior in age and experience. He 
esented the conferences McClellan had with the Presi- 
ent and members of the Cabinet, although assured 
lat they were unsought. 

These conferences really grew out of the great 
nxiety that consumed the President at that critical 
ime, and who sought information and support from 
le most direct source without concerning himself 
bout the usual military etiquette. Certain correspond- 
nce, which began less than a fortnight after McClellan 
ad assumed command, showing not only the immedi- 
te points upon which these two eminent soldiers dif- 
ered, but the first expression of McClellan's over- 



i08 GENERAL McCLELLAN. 

estimate of the enemy opposed to him, is sufficientl}i 
characteristic to warrant insertion. f 



Headquarters Division of the Potomac, 
Washington, August 8, 1861. 

Lieut.-Gen, Winfield Scott, Commanding U. S. Army. 

General: Information from various sources reaching mi|i 
to-day, through spies, letters, and telegrams, confirms m 
impressions, derived from previous advices, that the enem 
intend attacking our positions on the other side of the riveijf 
as well as to cross the Potomac north of us. I have als*; 
received a telegram from a reliable agent just from Knox>i 
ville, Tenn., that large re-enforcements are still passinjif 
through there to Richmond. I am induced to believe thaij 
the enemy has at least one hundred thousand men in froiiL 
of us. Lj 

Were I in Beauregard's place, with that force at my disf 
posal, I would attack the positions on the other side of thi|), 
Potomac, and at the same time cross the river above thiiL 
city in force. I feel confident that our present army, in thiij 
vicinity is entirely insufficient for the emergency, and it i | 
deficient in all the arms of the service — infantry, artillery^ ^ 
and cavalry. I therefore respectfully and most earnestl 
urge that the garrisons of all places in our rear be reducec^ 
at once to the minimum absolutely necessary to hold them,;, 
and that all the troops thus made available be forthwith foij,, 
warded to this city; that every company of regular artillerinj 
within reach be immediately ordered here to be mountedtj 
that every possible means be used to expedite the forward 
ing of new regiments of volunteers to this capital withon,.; 
one hour's delay. I urge that nothing be left undone t\^ 
bring up our force for the defense of this city to one huri(|j 
dred thousand men before attending to any other point. |„ 
advise that at least eight or ten good Ohio and Indiana reg 
ments may be telegraphed for from Western Virginia, the: 
places to be filled at once by the new troops from the sam 
States, who will be at least reliable to fight behind the it 
trenchments which have been constructed there. 

The vital importance of rendering Washington at one 
perfectly secure and its imminent danger impel me to urg 
these requests with the utmost earnestness, and that not a 
hour be lost in carrying them into execution. 

A sense of duty which I can not resist compels me t 
state that, in my opinion, military necessity demands th; 
the Departments of Northeastern Virginia, Washington, tl: 
Shenandoah, Pennsylvania, including Baltimore and the or 
including Fort Monroe, should be merged into one depar 



ORGANIZATION OF ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 109 

ent, under the immediate control of the commander of the 
ain army of operations, and which should be known and 
;signated as such. 

Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

Geo. B. McClellan, Major General Commanding.'^ 

This letter elicited from General Scott the follow- 

Headquarters of the Army, 
• Washington, August 9, 1861. 

the Hon. the Secretary of War: 

Sir: I received yesterday from Major-General McClellan 
letter of that date, to which I design this as my only reply. 

Had Major-General McClellan presented the same views 
i person, they would have been freely entertained and dis- 
jssed. All my military views and opinions had been so pre- 
nted to him, without eliciting much remark in our few meet- 
igs, which I have in vain sought to multiply. He has stood 
n his guard, and now places himself on record. Let him 
ake the most of his unenvied advantages. 

Major-General McClellan has propagated in high quarters 
le idea expressed in the letter before me, that Washington 
as not only " insecure," but in " imminent danger." 

Relying on our numbers, our forts, and the Potomac 
iver. I am confident in the opposite opinion; and consider- 
ig the stream of new regiments that is pouring in upon 
3 (before this alarm could have reached their homes), I 
ave not the slightest apprehension for the safety of the Gov- 
-nment here. 

Having now been long unable to mount a horse, or to 

Ik more than a few paces at a time, and consequently 
eing unable to review troops, much less to direct them in 
attle — in short, being broken down by many particular 
urts, besides the general infirmities of age— I feel that I 
ave become an incumbrance to the army as well as to my- 
elf, and that I ought, giving way to a younger commander, 
) seek the palliatives of physical pain and exhaustion. 

Accordingly, I must beg the President, at the earliest 
loment, to allow me to be placed on the officers' retired 
St, and then quietly to. lay myself up — probably forever — 
r?3mewhere in or about New York. But, wherever I may 
pend my little remainder of life, my frequent and latest 
rayer will be, " God save the Union ! " 

I have the honor to be, sir, with high respect, your obe- 
ient servant, Winfield Scott.* 



Official War Records, vol. xi, pt. 3, p. 3. t Ibid, p. 4. 



no GENERAL McCLELLAN. 

This difference between the Heutenant general anc 
the commander of the active army was of too grave i 
character to be quietly ignored, and the Presiden 
undertook to smooth away all resentful feeling. Ac 
cordingly he prevailed upon McClellan to withdraw 
his letter to Scott, and requested Scott to withdrav 
his to the Secretary of War. This brought ou 
the following letters from the participants, whicl 
become of great interest in view of the events tha 
followed : 

Washington, August lo, 1861. 
His Excellency the President: 

Sir: The letter addressed by me under date of the 8tl 
instant to Lieutenant-General Scott, commanding the Unite* 
States Army, was designed to be a plain and respectful ex\ 
pression of my views of the measures demanded for the safetl 
of the Government in the imminent peril that besets it a: 
the present hour. Every moment's reflection and everj 
fact transpiring convinced me of the urgent necessity of thi 
measures there indicated, and I felt it my duty to him au' 
to the country to communicate them frankly. It is thereforr 
with great pain that I have learned from you this mornin:i 
that my views do not meet with the approbation of thi 
lieutenant general, and that my letter is unfavorably regardee 
by him. 

The command with which I am intrusted was not sougH 
by me, and has only been accepted from an earnest ani 
humble desire to serve my country in the moment of mo&! 
extreme peril. With these views I am willing to do am 
suffer whatever may be required for that service. Nothini 
could be further from my wishes than to seek any commani 
or urge any measures not required for the exigency of th 
occasion, and, above all, I would abstain from any conduc 
that could give offense to General Scott or embarrass th 
President or any department of the Government. Influence 
by these considerations, I yield to your request and wit! 
draw the letter referred to. 

The Government and my superior officer being apprise 
of what I consider to be necessary and proper for the d( 
fense of the national capital, I shall strive faithfully an 
zealously to employ the means that may be placed in m 
power for that purpose, dismissing every personal feeling c 
consideration, and praying only the blessing of Divine Prov 
dence on my efforts. 

I will only add that, as you requested my authority t 



ORGANIZATION OF ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, m 

withdraw the letter, that authority is hereby given, with the 
most profound assurance for General Scott and yourself. 
Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

Geo. B. McClellan.* 

Headquarters of the Army, 

Washington, August 12, 1861. 

The Hon. the Secretary of War: 

Sir: On the loth instant I was kindly requested by the 
President to withdraw my letter to you of the 9th, in reply 
to one I had received from Major-General McClellan of the 
day before; the President, at the same time, showing me a 
letter to him from General McClellan, in which, at the in- 
stance of the President, he offered to withdraw the original 
letter on which I had animadverted. 

While the President was yet with me on that occasion a 

servant handed me a letter, which proved to be an unau- 

thenticated copy, under a blank cover, of the same letter 

from General McC. to the President. This slight was not 

, without its influence on my mind. 

The President's visit, however, was for the patriotic pur- 
pose of healing differences, and so much did I honor his mo- 
tive that I deemed it due to him to hold his proposition under 
consideration for some little time. 

' I deeply regret that, notwithstanding my respect for the 
; opinions and wishes of the President, I can not withdraw 
the letter in question, for the following reasons : 

1. The original offense given to me by Major-General 
McClellan (see his letter of the 8th instant) seems to have 
been the result of deliberation between him and some mem- 
bers of the Cabinet, by whom all the greater war questions 
are to be settled, without resort to or consultation v/ith me, 
the nominal general in chief of the army. In further proof 

- of this neglect — although it is unofficially known that in the 
last week (or six days) many regiments have arrived and 
others have changed their positions, some to a considerable 
distance — not one of these movements has been reported to 
me (or anythmg else) by Major-General McClellan ; while 
it is believed, and I may add known, that he is in frequent 
communication with portions of the Cabinet and on matters 
appertaining to me. That freedom of access and consulta- 
tion have, very naturally, deluded the junior general into a 
feeling of indifference toward his senior. 

2. With such supports on his part, it would be as idle for 
me as it would be against the dignity of my years, to be filing 
daily complaints against an ambitious junior, who, independ- 

* Official War Records, vol. xi, pt. 3, p. 4. 



112 GENERAL McCLELLAN. 

ent of the extrinsic advantages alluded to, has unquestion- 
ably very high qualifications for military command. I trust 
they may achieve crowning victories in behalf of the Union. 

3. I have in my letter to you of the 9th instant already 
said enough on the — to others — disgusting subject of my 
many physical infirmities. I will here add only that, borne 
down as I am by them, T should unavoidably be in the way 
at headquarters, even if my abilities for war were now greater 
than when I was young. 

I have the honor to be^ sir, with high respect, your most 
obedient servant, Winfield Scott.* 

With regard to their difference of views upon the 
proper organization McClellan says : f " A few days 
after reaching Washington General Scott asked me 
what I intended to do in the way of organization. I 
replied that I wished the force under my command to 
be organized as and denominated an army instead of 
a geographical division ; that I should first form bri- 
gades, then divisions, and, when in the field, army 
corps. My reason for postponing the latter was that 
with untried general officers it would be too dangerous 
an experiment to appoint any to such high and im- 
portant commands without first proving them in actual 
campaign and in battle. 

" He objected to all I proposed, save the brigade 
formation, saying that under our system and regula- 
tions it would be impossible to administer the affairs 
of an army, and that the retention of the system and 
nomenclature of geographical divisions and depart- 
ments was an absolute necessity; he also objected to 
the formation of divisions as unnecessary, for the rea- 
son that in Mexico he had only brigades. 

'' I called to his attention the fact that, all the world 
over, fighting forces were organized as armies ; that I 
had done so in West Virginia ; and that his force in 
Mexico was a very small affair in comparison with 
that soon to be collected in front of Washington. He 
did not change his views. So I quietly went to work 

* Official War Records, vol. xi, pt. 3, p. 4. 
f McClellan's Own Story, p. 113. 



ORGANIZATION OF ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 113 

in my own way. The result was that on the 20th of 
August the order constituting- the Army of the Poto- 
mac was issued ; and in addition to the two depart- 
ments originally under my command, the troops in 
the Shenandoah, Maryland, and Delaware were also 
included in the Army of the Potomac, the old depart- 
ments being broken up and merged in the newly 
created army. Thus I had command of all the troops 
on the line of the Potomac, and as far to the rear as 
Baltimore and Fort Delaware." 

In view of these serious differences and the impos- 
sibility of reconciling them, General Scott's application 
for retirement of August 9th should have received 
the approval of the President. He was practically 
relieved from responsibility from the very moment 
McClellan was assigned to command the Army of 
the Potomac, and the latter's expectation of complete 
support of the Administration was entitled to the 
amplest justification. But instead of this the status 
quo was maintained, and the irritation on the one 
hand and increasing embarrassment on the other re- 
sulted, until Scott could no longer remain silent, 
and submitted the following vigorous communica- 
tion * to the Secretary of War : 

Headquarters of the Army, 

Washington, October 4, 1861. 

Hon. S. Cameron, Secretary of War: 

Sir: You are, I believe, aware that I hailed the arrival 
here of Major-General McClellan as an event of happy con- 
sequence to the country and to the army. Indeed, if I did 
not call for him, I heartily approved of the suggestion, and 
gave it the most cordial support. He, however, had hardly 
entered upon his new duties, when, encouraged to communi- 
cate directly with the President and certain members of the 
Cabinet, he in a few days forgot that he had any intermediate 
commander, and has now long prided himself in treating 
me with uniform neglect, running into disobedience of orders 
of the smaller matters — neglects, though, in themselves, grave 
military offenses. I read and speak in the face of the follow- 
ing facts: 

* Official War Records, voL cvii, p. 491 et. seq. 



114 



GENERAL McCLELLAN. 



First. To suppress irregularity, more conspicuous in Major- 
General McClellan than in any other officer, I publish the fol- 
lowing facts: 

Headquarters of the Army, 

Washington, Septetnber i6, 1861. 
General Orders, No. 17. 

There are irregularities in the correspondence of the army 
which need prompt correction. It is highly important that 
junior officers on duty be not permitted to correspond with 
the general in chief, or other commander, on current official 
business, except through intermediate commanders ; and the 
same rule applies to correspondence with the President di- 
rect, or with him through the Secretary of War, unless it 
be by the special invitation or request of the President. 
By command of Lieutenant-General Scott, 

E. D. TowNSEND, Assistant Adjutant General. 

With this order fresh in his memory, Major-General 
McClellan addressed two important communications to the 
Secretary of War, on respectively the 19th and 20th of the 
same month, over my head, and how many since to the 
Secretary, and even to the President direct, I have not in- 
quired, but many, I have no doubt, besides daily oral com- 
munications with the same high functionaries — all without 
my knowledge. 

Second. To correct another class of grave neglects, I 
the same day caused to be addressed to Major-General 
McClellan the following order: 

Headquarters of the Army, 
Washington, September 16, 1861. 

The commanding general of the Army of the Potomac 
will cause the position, state, and number of troops under 
him to be reported at once to general headquarters, by divi- 
sions, brigades, and independent regiments or detachments, 
which general report will be followed by reports of new 
troops as they arrive, with the dispositions made of them, 
together with all the material changes which may take place 
in said army. 

By command of Lieutenant-General Scott, 

E. D. TowNSEND, Assistant Adjutant General. 

Eighteen days have now elapsed, and not the slightest 
response has been shown to either of these orders by Major- 
General McClellan. Perhaps he will say, in respect to the 
latter, it has been difficult for him to procure the exact re- 
turns of divisions and brigades. But why not have given 
me proximate returns, such as he so eagerly furnished the 



ORGANIZATION OF ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 115 

President and certain secretaries? Has, then, a senior no cor- 
rective power over a junior officer in case of such persistent 
neglect and disobedience? 

The remedy by arrest and trial before a court-martial 
would probably soon cure the evil. But it has been feared 
that a conflict of authority near the head of the army would 
be highly encouraging to the enemies and depressing to the 
friends of the Union. Hence my long forbearance; and con- 
tinuing, though but nominally, on duty, I shall try to hold 
out till the arrival of Major-General Halleck, when, as his 
presence will give me increased confidence in the safety of 
the Union — and being, as I am, unable to ride in the saddle, 
or to walk, by reason of dropsy in my feet and legs and 
paralysis in the small of my back — I shall definitely retire 
from command of the army. 

I have the honor to remain, with high respect, your most 
obedient servant, Winfield Scott.* 



On November ist General Scott was retired, and 
McClellan succeeded him by direction of the President. 
Upon assuming command of the army the same day, 
General McClellan, in General Orders, No. 19, pays a 
graceful and just tribute to the retiring veteran, which 
did much to heal his wounded spirit. In this he says : 

'' The army will unite with me in the feeling of 
regret that the weight of many years, and the effect 
of increasing infirmities, contracted and intensified in 
his country's service, should just now remove from 
our head the greatest soldier of our nation — the hero 
who in his youth raised high the reputation of his 
country on the fields of Canada, which he hallowed 
with his blood ; who in more mature years proved to 
the world that American skill and valor could repeat, 
if not eclipse, the exploits of Cortez in the land of the 
Montezumas ; whose life has been devoted to the serv- 
ice of his country ; whose whole efforts have been di- 
rected to uphold our honor at the smallest sacrifice 
of life — a warrior who scorned the selfish glories of 
the battlefield when his great abilities as a statesman 
could be employed more profitably for his country ; a 
citizen who in his declining years has given to the 
world the most shining instance of loyalty in disre- 
garding all ties of birth, and clinging still to the cause 



Il6 GENERAL McCLELLAN. 

of truth and honor. Such has been the career, such 
the character, of Winfield Scott, whom it has long 
been the dehght of the nation to honor, both as a man 
and a soldier. While we regret his loss, there is one 
thing we can not regret — the bright example he has 
left for our emulation. Let us all hope and pray that 
his declining years may be passed in peace and hap- 
piness, and that they may be cheered by the success 
of the country and the cause he has fought for and 
loved so well. Beyond all that, let us do nothing that 
can cause him to blush for us ; let no defeat of the 
army he has so long commanded embitter his last 
years, but let our victories illuminate the close of a 
life so grand." * 

From the foregoing exhibit it is manifest that the 
actual responsibility was placed upon McClellan by the 
informal methods of procedure adopted by the Presi- 
dent, and while Scott, so long as he was general in 
chief, could do no more than make ineiTfectual pro- 
tests, the Government was aiding McClellan to the full 
extent of its power. That he felt that this responsi- 
bility was solely his own, is made evident in his home 
letters, which also display his irritation against General 
Scott, whose position hampered him, and even against 
the President, who could not see the condition of afifairs 
as McClellan saw it. His anxiety lest the enemy 
should make an aggressive movement before he was 
ready to resist it, while it might be justified by the in- 
experience of his new troops and the incomplete state 
of the defenses, was aggravated by the mental worry 
engendered by the controversies referred to above. 
Firmly impressed with the conviction that the enemy 
were in great strength in his front and would speedily 
attack him, every day that he failed to do so was a day 
of respite for which he was duly thankful. Thus he 
says, August i8th: f '' If Beauregard does not attack 
within two days he has lost every chance of success." 

* Official War Records, Series III, vol. i, p. 614. 
f McClellan's Own Story, p. 88. 



ORGANIZATION OF ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 117 

On the 25th : * " Friend Beauregard has allowed the 
chance to escape him. I have now some sixty-five 
thousand effective men ; will have seventy-five thou- 
sand by the end of week. Last week he certainly had 
double our force. I feel sure that the dangerous mo- 
ment has passed." And September 6th : f " I feel now 
perfectly sure against an attack ; the next thing will be 
to attack him." Again Secretary of War Cameron, 
sharing McClellan's apprehensions, writes him, Sep- 
tember 7th : l " General : It is evident that we are on 
the eve of a great battle — one that may decide the fate 
of the country. Its success must depend on you and 
the means that may be placed at your disposal. Im- 
pressed with this belief, and anxious to aid you with 
all the power of my department, I will be glad if you 
will inform me how I can do so." 
To which McClellan replied : 

Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 

Washington, September 8, 1861. 

Hon. Simon Cameron, Secretary of War: 

Sir: Your note of yesterday is received. I concur in 
your views as to the exigency of the present occasion. I 
appreciate and cordially thank you for your offers of sup- 
port, and will avail myself of them to the fullest extent de- 
manded by the interests of the country. The force of all 
our arms within the immediate vicinity of Washington is 
nearly eighty-five thousand men. The effective portion of 
this force is more than sufficient to resist with certain suc- 
cess any attack on our works upon the other side of the 
river. By calling in the commands of Generals Banks and 
Stone, it will probably be sufficient to defend the city of 
Washington from whatever direction it may be assailed. It 
is well understood that, although the ultimate design of the 
enemy is to possess himself of the city of Washington, his 
first efforts will be directed toward Baltimore, with the in- 
tention of cutting our lines of communication and supplies, 
as well as to arouse an insurrection in Maryland. To accom- 
plish this he will no doubt show a certain portion of his 
force in front of our positions on the other side of the Poto- 
mac, in order to engage our attention there and induce us 
to leave a large portion of our force for the defense of those 
positions. He will probably also make demonstrations in 

* McClellan's Own Story, p. 89. f Ibid., p. 90. ^: Ibid., p. 105. 



Il8 GENERAL McCLELLAN. 

the vicinity of Aquia Creek, Mathias Point, and the Occo- 
quan, in order still further to induce us to disseminate our 
forces. His main and real movement will doubtless be to 
cross the Potomac between Washington and Point of Rocks, 
probably not far from Seneca Mills, and most likely at more 
points than one. His hope will be so to engage our atten- 
tion by the diversions already named as to enable him to 
move with a larger force direct and unopposed on Baltimore, 
I see no reason to doubt the possibility of his attempting 
this with a column of at least one hundred thousand effective 
troops. If he has only one hundred and thirty thousand 
under arms, he can make all the diversions I have mentioned 
with his raw and badly organized troops, leaving one hun- 
dred thousand effective men for his real movement. As I 
am now situated I can by no possibility bring to bear against 
this column more than seventy thousand, and probably not 
over sixty thousand, efifective troops. 

In regard to the composition of our active army, it must 
be borne in mind that the very important arms of cavalry 
and artillery had been almost entirely neglected until I as- 
sumed command of this army, and that consequently the 
troops of these arms, although greatly increased in numbers, 
are comparatively raw and inexperienced, most of the cavalry 
not being yet armed or equipped. 

In making the foregoing estimate of numbers I have re- 
duced the enemy's force below what is regarded by the War 
Department and other official circles as its real strength, 
and have taken the reverse course as to our own. Our situ- 
ation, then, is simply this: If the commander in chief of the 
enemy follows the simplest dictates of the military art, we 
must meet him with greatly inferior forces. To render suc- 
cess possible, the divisions of our army must be more ably 
led and commanded than those of the enemy. The fate of 
the nation and the success of the cause in which we are en- 
gaged must be mainly decided by the issue of the next battle 
to be fought by the army now under my command. I there- 
fore feel that the interests of the nation demand that the 
ablest soldiers in the service should be on duty with the 
Army of the Potomac, and that, contenting ourselves with 
remaining on the defensive for the present at all other points, 
this army should at once be re-enforced by all the effective 
troops that the East and West and North can furnish. 

To insure present success, the portion of this army avail- 
able for active operations should be at least equal to any 
force which it may be called to encounter. To accomplish 
this, it is necessary that it should be at once very largely re- 
enforced. For ulterior results and to bring this war to a 
speedy close, it will be necessary that our, active army shall 
be much superior to the enemy in numbers, so as to make 



ORGANIZATION OF ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, uq 

it reasonably certain that we shall win every battle which wc 
fight, and at the same time be able to cover our communica- 
tions as we advance. 

I would also urgently recommend that the whole of the 
regular army, old and new, be at once ordered to report here, 
excepting the mounted batteries actually serving in other de- 
partments, and the minimum numbers of companies of artil- 
lery actually necessary to form the nucleus of the garrisons 
of our most important permanent works. There should be 
no delay in carrying out this measure. Scattered as the regu- 
lars now are, they are nowhere strong enough to produce a 
marked effect. United in one body they will insure the suc- 
cess of this army. 

In organizing the Army of the Potomac I have selected 
general and staff officers with distinct reference to their fit- 
ness for the important duties that may devolve upon them. 
Any change or disposition of such officers without consult- 
ing the commanding general may fatally impair the efficiency 
of this army and the success of its operations. I therefore 
earnestly request that in future every general officer ap- 
pointed upon my recommendation shall be assigned to this 
army; that I shall have full control of the officers and troops 
in this department, and that no orders shall be given re- 
specting my command without my being first consulted. It 
is evident that I can not otherwise be responsible for the 
success of our arms. In this connection I respectfully in- 
sist that Brigadier-Generals Don Carlos Buell and J. F. Rey- 
nolds, both appointed upon my recommendation and for the 
purpose of serving with me, be at once so assigned. In 
obedience to your request I have thus frankly stated in 
what manner you can at present aid me in the performance 
of the great duty committed to my charge, and I shall con- 
tinue to communicate with you in the same spirit. 

Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

Geo. B. McClellan, Major General Commanding.^ 

This remarkable communication, submitted only six 
weeks after he had assumed command, exhibits the 
conclusions which he had arrived at with regard to the 
strength and purposes of the Confederate forces in his 
front, his inadequate means of resistance, and his ap- 
peal for the complete control of his army. With re- 
spect to the first of these he was greatly in error, as a 
brief reference to the state of afifairs on the Confederate 
side will show. 

* Official War Records, vol. v, p. 5S7. See also McClellan's 
Own Story, p. 106. 



CHAPTER VI. 

PLANS OF CAMPAIGNS. BALL's BLUFF. 

The victory of the Confederates at Manassas gave 
them unbounded confidence in their miHtary superior- 
ity, and was regarded throughout the South as the sure 
harbinger of ultimate success ; and had they known 
with certainty of the demorahzed condition of the 
Union forces, and been able to make a prompt move- 
ment forward, it is very possible that Washington 
would have been in danger of capture. With many 
commands overcome by the unaccustomed fatigue of 
battle and the severe trials of the day, disorganized by 
their heavy loss in killed and wounded, and somewhat 
demoralized by their unexpected victory at the close 
of the action, they were in no condition to gather the 
legitirhate fruits of this, their greatest, opportunity. 
Within a few days Fairfax Court House was occupied 
by the Confederate cavalry, and the main body occu- 
pied a line from Union Mills on Bull Run to Centre- 
ville. About the loth of August Evans's brigade occu- 
pied Leesburg as an outpost, while the main body was 
advanced to the line from Flint Hill through Fairfax 
Court House, Fairfax Station to Mitchell's Ford cover- 
ing Centreville, with the cavalry under Colonel J. E. B. 
Stuart in close touch with the Union forces on the 
front and flanks. Upton's, Munson's, and Mason's 
Hills were speedily occupied as advance posts by the 
Confederates, giving them the advantage of favorable 
points of observation on the Union army and of com- 
munication by signal with their spies in Washington. 
This disposition of the Confederate army confined Mc- 
Clellan's forces to a narrow strip bordering the Vir- 

120 



PLANS OF CAMPAIGNS.— BALL'S BLUFF. 121 

ginia side of the Potomac from Alexandria to the 
Chain bridge, and, besides being a bold menace to their 
safety, enabled the Confederates to draw supplies from 
the fertile valley of the Shenandoah and the interven- 
ing territory. This bold push forward and the threat- 
ening attitude of the enemy deceived McClellan in re- 
gard to their actual strength and intended purpose. 
But General Johnston was not unmindful of his own 
danger from an attack on his flanks, becoming more 
possible every day with the increasing strength and im- 
proved discipline of the Union army, and believing 
that his outposts were too far advanced, he withdrew 
them to Mason's and Munson's Hills about the last 
of September. In the meantime he had selected the 
line of the Rappahannock as a defensive line in case 
he should be forced back, and had prepared it for de- 
fense by his engineers to meet such a contingency. 
The right flank of the Confederate army under Major- 
General Holmes covered the line of the Occoquan, 
and he had erected batteries at Evanston to close the 
Potomac as a line of supply to the Union forces. On 
the 19th of October the Confederate army was with- 
drawn from its advanced position at Fairfax Court 
House to Centreville, which position was strongly forti- 
fied and formed a salient whose flanks, resting on Bull 
Run at Union Mills on the right and along the War- 
renton turnpike on the left, were securely protected 
from a turning movement by a proper disposition of 
their forces. The strength of the Confederate army 
at the end of October is given by General Johnston as 
forty-one thousand of all arms capable of going into 
battle, which he calls the effective total, but which does 
not represent the total present for duty. These were 
distributed as follows : Twenty-seven thousand infantry 
and artillery at and in front of Centreville, twenty-two 
hundred at Manassas Junction, sixty-seven hundred 
between Dumfries and the Occoquan, and twenty- 
seven hundred at Leesburg. This was far from the 
estimate made by McClellan in his letter of September 
8th, and there is no evidence that it had been dimin- 



122 GENERAL McCLELLAN. 

ished in the meantime, but rather the contrary was 
true. 

With respect to the purpose that the Confederate 
leaders had in view after the battle of Manassas, and 
why it was not carried mto effect, these were the sub- 
jects of a conference held at Fairfax Court House be- 
tween President Davis and Generals Johnston, Beaure- 
gard, and G. W. Smith about the last of September, 
1861. On January 31, 1862, General Smith submitted 
his written recollections of this conference to his asso- 
ciates, Generals Johnston and Beauregard, who like- 
wise signed them, fully agreeing in General Smith's 
statement as a correct record of the conference. This 
paper, taken in connection with McClellan's letter of 
September 8th, is of sufficient importance to warrant 
its insertion here : '^ 

" On the 26th of September, 1861, General Joseph 
E. Johnston addressed a letter to the Secretary of War 
in regard to the importance of putting this army in 
condition to assume the offensive, and suggested that 
his Excellency the President, or the Secretary of War, 
or some one representing them, should at an early day 
come to the headquarters of the army, then at or near 
Fairfax Court House, for the purpose of deciding 
whether the army could be re-enforced to the extent 
that the commanding general deemed necessary for an 
offensive campaign. 

'* His Excellency the President arrived at Fairfax 
Court House a few days thereafter, late in the after- 
noon, and proceeded to the quarters of General Beau- 
regard. 

" On the same evening General Johnston and I 
called to pay our respects. No official subjects of im- 
portance were alluded to in that interview. At eight 
o'clock the next evening, by appointment of the Presi- 
dent, a conference was had between himself. General 
Johnston, General Beauregard, and myself. Various 
matters of detail were introduced by the President, and 



* Confederate War Papers, G. W. Smith, p. 14. 



PLANS OF CAMPAIGNS.— BALL'S BLUFF. 



123 



talked over between himself and the two senior gen- 
erals. Finally, with perhaps some abruptness, I said, 
Mr. President, is it not possible to put this army in 
ondition to assume the active offensive ? ' adding, that 
this was a question of vital importance, upon which the 
success or failure of our cause might depend. This 
question brought on discussion. The precise conversa- 
tion which followed I do not propose to give; it was 
not an argument ; there seemed to be little difference 
of opinion between us in regard to general views and 
principles. It was clearly stated, and agreed to, that 
the military force of the Confederate States was at the 
highest point it could attain without arms from abroad ; 
that the portion of this particular army present for 
duty was in the finest fighting condition ; that, if kept 
inactive, it must retrograde immensely in every respect 
during the winter, the effect of which was foreseen and 
dreaded by us all. The enemy were daily increasing 
in numbers, arms, discipline, and efficiency ; we looked 
forward to a sad state of things at the opening of a 
spring campaign. These and other points being agreed 
upon without argument, it was again asked, ' Mr. Presi- 
dent, is it not possible to increase the effective strength 
of this army, and put us in condition to cross the Poto- 
mac and carry the war into the enemy's country ? Can 
you not, by stripping other points to the last they will 
bear, and even risking defeat at all other places, put us 
in condition to move forward? Success here at this 
time saves everything, defeat here loses all.' In ex- 
planation, and as an illustration of this, the unqualified 
opinion was advanced that if, for want of adequate 
strength on our part in Kentucky, the Federal forces 
should take military possession of that whole State, 
and even enter and occupy a portion of Tennessee, a 
victory gained by this army beyond the Potomac 
would, by threatening the heart of the Northern States, 
compel their armies to fall back, free Kentucky, and 
give us the line of the Ohio within ten days thereafter. 
On the other hand, should our forces in Tennessee and 
Southern Kentucky be strengthened, so as to enable us 



124 GENERAL McCLELLAN. 

to take and to hold the Ohio River as a boundary, a dis- 
astrous defeat of this .army would at once be followed 
by an overwhelming wave of Northern invaders that 
would sweep over Kentucky and Tennessee, extending 
to the northern part of the cotton States, if not to New 
Orleans. Similar views were expressed in regard to 
ultimate results in northwestern Virginia being de- 
pendent upon the success or failure of this army, anc 
various other special illustrations were offered — show- 
ing, in short, that success here was success everywhere] 
defeat here, defeat everywhere, and that this was the 
point upon which all the available forces of the Confed-1 
crate States should be concentrated. 

" It seemed to be conceded by all that our forcd 
at that time here was not sufficient for assuming the 
offensive beyond the Potomac, and that even with i; 
much larger force an attack upon their army undet 
the guns of their fortifications on this side of the rivet 
was out of the question. 

" The President asked me what number of met 
were necessary, in my opinion, to warrant an offensive 
campaign, to cross the Potomac, cut off the comi 
munications of the enemy with their fortified capital 
and carry the war into their country. I answered 
' Fifty thousand effective, seasoned soldiers,' explaini 
ing that by seasoned soldiers I meant such men a;i 
we had here present for duty, and added that the; 
would have to be drawn from the Peninsula, abou 
Yorktown, Norfolk, from Western Virginia, Pensa 
cola, or wherever might be most expedient. 

'' General Johnston and General Beauregard botl 
said that a force of sixty thousand such men woul( 
be necessary, and that this force would require larg 
additional transportation and munitions of war, th 
supplies here being entirely inadequate for an activ 
campaign in the enemy's country even with our pres 
ent force. In this connection there was some discus 
sion of the difficulties to be overcome and the proba 
bilities of success, but no one questioned the disastrou 
results of remaining inactive throughout the wintei 



PLANS OF CAMPAIGNS.— BALL'S BLUFF. 



125 



Notwithstanding the beHef that many in the North- 
ern army were opposed on principle to invading the 
Southern States, and that they would fight better in 
defending their own homes than in attacking ours, it 
was believed that the best, if not the only, plan to in- 
sure success was to concentrate our forces and attack 
the enemy in their own country. The President, I 
think, gave no definite opinion in regard to the number 
of men necessary for that purpose, and I am sure that 
no one present considered this a question to be finally 
decided by any other person than the commanding 
S^eneral of the army. 

'' Returning to the question that had been twice 
asked, the President expressed surprise and regret that 
the number of surplus arms here was so small, and, I 
thought, spoke bitterly of this disappointment. He 
then stated that at that time no re-enforcements could 
be furnished to this army of the character asked for, 
and that the most that could be done would be to fur- 
nish recruits to take the surplus arms in store here 
(say twenty-five hundred stand) ; that the whole coun- 
try was demanding protection at his hands and praying 
for arms and troops for defense. He had long been 
expecting arms from abroad, but had been disap- 
pointed ; he still hoped to get them, but had no posi- 
tive assurance that they would be received at all. The 
manufacture of arms in the Confederate States was as 
yet undeveloped to any considerable extent. Want of 
arms was the great difficulty ; he could not take any 
troops from the points named, and without arms from 
abroad could not re-enforce this army. He expressed 
regret, and seemed to feel deeply, as did every one 
present. 

" When the President had thus clearly and posi- 
tively stated his inability to put this army in the con- 
dition deemed by the generals necessary before enter- 
ing upon an active offensive campaign, it was felt that 
it might be better to run the risk of almost certain 
destruction fighting upon the other side of the Poto- 
mac, rather than see the gradual dying out and deteri- 



126 GENERAL McCLELLAN. 

oration of this army during a winter at the end of^ 
which the term of enlistment of half the force would il 
expire. The prospect of a spring campaign to be com- i 
menced under such discouraging circumstances was^ 
rendered all the more gloomy by the daily increasing; 
strength of an enemy already more superior in num- 
bers. 

" On the other hand was the hope and expectation 
that before the end of winter arms would be intro- 
duced into the country, and all were confident that we 
could then not only protect our own country, but suc- 
cessfully invade that of the enemy. 

" General Johnston said that he did not feel at lib- 
erty to express an opinion as to the practicability of 
reducing the strength of our forces at points not withini 
the limits of his command, and with but few furtherr 
remarks from any one the answer of the President was: 
accepted as final, and it was felt that there was no otheri 
course left but to take a defensive position and awaitt 
the enemy. If they did not advance, we had but to: 
await the winter and its results. 

" After the main question was dropped, the Presi- 
dent proposed that, instead of an active offensive cam- 
paign, we should attempt certain partial operations — 
a sudden blow against Sickles or Banks, or to breal4 
the bridge over the Monocacy. This, he thought, be- 
sides injuring the enemy, would exert a good influ- 
ence over our troops and encourage the people of the 
Confederate States generally. In regard to attacking 
Sickles, it was stated in reply that, as the enemy con 
trolled the river with their ships of war, it would be 
necessary for us to occupy two points on the river, one 
above and another below the point of crossing, that we 
might by our batteries prevent their armed vessels fron 
interfering with the passage of troops. In any case, the 
difficulty of crossing large bodies over wide rivers ir 
the vicinity of an enemy and then recrossing made sue! 
expeditions hazardous. It was agreed, however, tha' 
if any opportunity should occur offering reasonable 
chances of success the attempt would be made. 



PLANS OF CAMPAIGNS.— BALL'S BLUFF. 



127 



" During this conference, or council, which lasted 
perhaps two hours, all was earnest, serious, deliberate ; 
the impression made upon me was deep and lasting, 
and I am convinced that the foregoing statement is 
not only correct, as far as it goes, but, in my opinion, 
it gives a fair idea of all that occurred at the time in 
regard to the question of our crossing the Potomac." 

From this it is evident that McClellan was right in 
judging that the enemy would probably attack his right 
and rear in case they should undertake an offensive 
campaign. He was greatly in error in regard to their 
effective strength or battle force, for, as Johnston states, 
it was only forty-one thousand at the end of October, 
[and that it was increased to forty-seven thousand two 
hundred by the end of November, and to fifty-seven 
thousand two hundred by the end of December. What 
were the sources whence McClellan derived his in- 
formation as to the strength of the enemy? To this 
we shall now refer. 

On the very next day after he had been appointed 
major general of the Ohio militia he invited Mr. Allan 
Pinkerton, the well-known detective of Chicago, to 
meet him for a conference on important matters. He 
had previously employed Mr. Pinkerton on detective 
service and entertained a high opinion of his ability. 
The result of this conference was the establishment of 
a bureau of secret service under the management of 
Mr. Pinkerton, composed mainly of the members of 
he latter's detective force, for the purpose of gather- 
ing such information within the lines of the Confed- 
eracy as would be of military value. This bureau was 
ransferred to Washington when McClellan was called 
here, and Mr. Pinkerton, under the cognomen of 
Major E. J. Allen, remained in control until after the 
cattle of Antietam, reporting the results of his informa- 
tion directly to General McClellan while in the field, 
and to the provost marshal general and the Secretary 
3f War while in Washington. From this source, then, 
^he highly erroneous and grossly exaggerated esti- 
nates of the enemy's strength was derived. It is, in- 



128 GENERAL McCLELLAN. 

deed, difficult to account for the almost absolute reli- 
ance which both thQ Administration and General 
McClellan placed upon these estimates, now known to 
have been so untrustworthy. Even Mr. Pinkerton 
himself, so late as 1883, says: 

'' Self-constituted critics, whose avenues of informa- 
tion were limited and unreliable, have attempted to i 
prove that the force opposed to General McClellan was 
much less than was really the case ; and upon this 
hypothesis have been led into unjust and undeserved 
censure of the commanding general. From my own j 
experience I know to the contrary. My system of | 
obtaining knowledge upon this point was so thorough 
and complete, my sources of information were so 
varied, that there could be no serious mistake in the 
estimates which I then made and reported to General 
McClellan. From every available field the facts were 
gleaned. From prisoners of war, contrabands, loyal 
Southerners, deserters, blockade runners, and from ac- 
tual observations by trustworthy scouts, my estimates 
were made, and to-day I affirm as strongly as I did 
then, that the force opposed to General McClellan be- 
fore Richmond approximated nearer two hundred thou- 
sand men than they did to the numerous estimates of 
irresponsible historians who have placed the strength 
of the rebel forces at that time below one hundred 
thousand men." 

Since the publication of the records of the war of 
the rebellion the actual strength of the Confederate 
forces is known to a close approximation, and the glar- 
ing discrepancy between this and the supposed strength 
at the time is made manifest. In later years, when the 
service of information was intrusted to officers of 
ability who could weigh with judgment information 
derived from prisoners, deserters, scouts, and other 
sources, the estimates were much more reliable and 
correspondingly more valuable. But it is also to be 
said in this connection that these estimates of Major 
Allen ought to have been mistrusted by the keen, en- 
lightened judgment of such a soldier as was McClel- 



PLANS OF CAMPAIGNS.— BALL'S BLUFF. 120 

Ian. The number of arms in the possession of the 
South at the breaking- out of the rebelHon was well 
known, and the possible additions by importation and 
manufacture were not difficult to estimate within rea- 
sonable probability. Taking this into consideration 
with respect to what had been accomplished at the 
North, where with unlimited credit and abundant facil- 
ities the Administration had strained every effort to 
arm and equip the volunteers that offered themselves 
so generously, it should have been apparent that the 
Confederate army in Virginia could not possibly have 
reached the enormous aggregate of one hundred thou- 
sand effectives that McClellan had estimated as the 
strength in front of him as early as September 8th. 
The fact that he firmly believed it must therefore be 
taken into consideration in judging of his conduct of 
affairs during the fall of 1861, when he resisted the 
enormous pressure brought to bear upon him to make 
an offensive campaign. 

There is, however, another point of sufficient im- 
portance to which it is now necessary to refer, and 
that is the deep-seated convictions, both political and 
military, that controlled his purposes and guided his 
actions. First, in regard to his political convictions, 
he was a Douglas Democrat, but, like other army offi- 
cers, he had never taken any part in practical politics. 
He believed that the great object of the war was the 
restoration of the Union and the preservation of the 
national life, and did not regard the continued exist- 
ence of slavery as an obstacle to the accomplishment 
of these ends. He looked for the restoration of the 
Union as it was, and therefore held it to be a matter 
of sound policy to do nothing likely to render ulti- 
mate reconciliation and harmony impossible, unless it 
became a matter of imperative military necessity. He 
was not in accord with the political views of the Ad- 
ministration, and was decidedly opposed to the aggres- 
sive radicals, who, believing slavery the sole cause of 
the war, demanded an immediate proclamation of free- 
dom to the slaves. McClellan regarded slavery as a 
9 



I30 



GENERAL McCLELLAN. 



great evil, especially to the whites of the South, but 
believed that no sweeping measure of emancipation 
could be carried out, unless accompanied by arrange- 
ments providing for new relations between employers 
and employed, carefully guarding the rights and in- 
terests of both ; and this difference of opinion and 
method of procedure soon caused a breach in the 
friendly regard that had been manifested by some of 
the strongest of the political leaders in the early days 
of McClellan's supremacy. A difference in political 
views paved the way for a distrust of his military 
ability, especially when there seemed to be an unprece- 
dented delay of the army to advance, and it was not 
long before the seeds of distrust were sown in a con- 
genial soil for their propagation. 

Second, the direction given to the military policy of 
the Government was mainly fixed, if not entirely con- 
trolled, by the predominating influence that McClellan 
exercised from the time he assumed command of the 
Army of the Potomac all through the summer and 
fall of 1 86 1. This policy, outlined in the memoran- 
dum * of August 2d, which he submitted to the Presi- 
dent at the latter's request, he held with singular 
tenacity, and it deserves, therefore, a critical examina- 
tion in order to understand the events that followed. 
In it he says : 

" The object of the present war differs from those 
in which nations are usually engaged, mainly in this : 
that the purpose of ordinary war is to conquer a peace 
and make a treaty on advantageous terms ; in this 
contest it has become necessary to crush a population 
sufficiently numerous, intelligent, and warlike to con- 
stitute a nation. We have not only to defeat their 
armed and organized forces in the field, but to display 
such an overwhelming strength as will convince all our 
antagonists, especially those of the governing, aristo- 
cratic class, of the utter impossibility of resistance. 
Our late reverses make this course imperative. Had 

* Official War Records, vol. v, p. 6. 



PLANS OF CAMPAIGNS.— BALL'S PLUFF. 131 

we been successful in the recent battle [Manassas] it 
is possible that we might have been spared the labor 
and expense of a great effort ; now we have no alterna- 
tive. Their success will enable the political leaders of 
the rebels to convince the mass of their people that 
we are inferior to them in force and courage, and to 
command all their resources. The contest began with 
a class, now it is with a people ; our military success 
can alone restore the former issue. 

'' By thoroughly defeating their armies, taking their 
strong places, and pursuing a rigidly protective policy 
as to private property and unarmed persons, and a 
lenient course as to private soldiers, we may well hope 
for a permanent restoration of a peaceful Union. But 
in the first instance the authority of the Government 
must be supported by overwhelming physical force. 

'' Our foreign relations and financial credit also im- 
peratively demand that the military action of the Gov- 
ernment should be prompt and irresistible. 

" The rebels have chosen Virginia as their battle- 
field, and it seems proper for us to make the first 
great struggle there. But while thus directing our 
main efforts, it is necessary to diminish the resist- 
ance there offered us by movements on other points 
both by land and water. 

'' Without entering at present into details, I would 
advise that a strong movement be made on the Mis- 
sissippi, and that the rebels be driven out of Missouri. 

*' As soon as it becomes perfectly clear that Ken- 
tucky is cordially united with us, I would advise a 
movement through that State into Eastern Tennessee 
for the purpose of assisting the Union men of that 
region and of seizing the railroads leading from Mem- 
phis to the East. 

" The possession of those roads by us, in connec- 
tion with the movement on the Mississippi, would 
go far toward determining the evacuation of Virginia 
by the rebels. In the meantime all the passes into 
Western Virginia from the East should be securely 
guarded, but I would advise no movement from that 



132 



GENERAL McCLELLAN. 



quarter toward Richmond, unless the poHtical con- 
dition of Kentucky renders it impossible or inexpedient 
for us to make the movement upon Eastern Tennessee 
through that State. Every effort should, however, be 
made to organize, equip, and arm as many troops as 
possible in Western Virginia, in order to render the 
Ohio and Indiana regiments available for other opera- 
tions. 

" At as early a day as practicable it would be well 
to protect and reopen the Baltimore and Ohio Rail- 
road. Baltimore and Fort Monroe should be occu- 
pied by garrisons sufficient to retain them in our pos- 
session. 

" The importance of Harper's Ferry and the line 
of the Potomac in the direction of Leesburg will be 
very materially diminished as soon as our force in 
this vicinity becomes organized, strong, and efficient, 
because no capable general will cross the river north 
of this city when we have a strong army here ready 
to cut ofif his retreat. 

" To revert to the West, it is probable that no very 
large additions to the troops now in Missouri will be 
necessary to secure that State. 

'' I presume that the force required for the move- 
ment down the Mississippi will be determined by its 
commander and the President. If Kentucky assumes 
the right position, not more than twenty thousand will 
be needed, together with those that can be raised in 
that State, and Eastern Tennessee to secure the latter 
region and its railroads, as well as ultimately to occupy 
Nashville. 

" The Western Virginia troops, with not more than 
five to ten thousand from Ohio and Indiana, should, 
under proper management, suffice for its protection. 

" When we have reorganized our main army here, 
ten thousand men ought to be enough to protect the 
Baltimore and Ohio Railroad and the Potomac ; five 
thousand will garrison Baltimore, three thousand Fort 
Monroe, and not more than twenty thousand will be 
necessary at the utmost for the defense of Washington. 



PLANS OF CAMPAIGNvS.— BALL'S BLUFF. 



133 



" For the main army of operations I urge the fol- 
lowing composition : 

250 regiments of infantry, say 225,000 men. 

100 field batteries, 600 guns 15,000 *' 

28 regiments cavalry 25,500 " 

5 regiments engineer troops 7, 500 " 

Total 273,000 " 

*' The force must be supplied with the necessary 
engineer and pontoon trains, and with transportation 
for everything save tents. Its general line of opera- 
tions should be so directed that water transportatio^ 
can be availed of, from point to point, by means of 
the ocean and the rivers emptying into it. An essen- 
tial feature of the plan of operations will be the em- 
ployment of a strong naval force to protect the move- 
ments of a fleet of transports intended to convey a 
considerable body of troops from point to point of the 
enemy's seacoast, thus either creating diversions and 
rendering it necessary to detach largely from their 
main body, in order to protect such of their cities as 
may be threatened, or else landing and forming estab- 
lishments on their coasts at any favorable places that 
opportunity might offer. This naval force should also 
co-operate with the main army in its efforts to seize the 
important seaboard towns of the rebels. 

" It can not be ignored that the construction of 
railroads has introduced a new and very important ele- 
ment into war, by the great facilities thus given for 
concentrating at particular positions large masses of 
troops from remote sections, and by creating new 
strategic points and lines of operations. 

" It is intended to overcome this difificulty by the 
partial operations suggested, and by such other as the 
particular case may require. We must endeavor to 
seize places on the railways in rear of the enemy's 
points of concentration, and we must threaten their 
seaboard cities, in order that each State may be forced, 
by the necessity of its own defense, to diminish its 
contingent to the Confederate army. 



134 



GENERAL McCLELLAN. 



'' The proposed movement down the Mississippi 
will produce important results in this connection. 
That advance and the progress of the main army at 
the East will materially assist each other by diminish- 
ing the resistance to be encountered by each. 

'' The tendency of the Mississippi movement upon 
all questions connected with cotton is too well under- 
stood by the President and Cabinet to need any illus- 
tration from me. 

'* There is another independent movement that has 
often been suggested and which has always recom- 
mended itself to my judgment. I refer to a movement 
from Kansas and Nebraska through the Indian Terri- 
tory upon Red River and western Texas, for the pur- 
pose of protecting and developing the latent Union and 
free-State sentiment well known to predominate in 
western Texas, and which, like a similar sentiment 
in Western Virginia, will, if protected, ultimately or- 
ganize that section into a free State. How far it will 
be possible to support this movement by an advance 
through New Mexico from California is a matter 
which I have not sufficiently examined to be able 
to express a decided opinion. If at all practicable, it 
is eminently desirable, as bringing into play the re- 
sources and warlike qualities of the Pacific States, as 
well as identifying them with our cause and cement- 
ing the bond of union between them and the General 
Government. 

" If it is not departing too far from my province, 
I will venture to suggest the policy of an ultimate 
alliance and cordial understanding with Mexico ; their 
sympathies and interests are with us, their antipathies 
exclusively against our enemies and their institutions. 
I think it would not be difficult to obtain from the 
Mexican Government the right to use, at least dur- 
ing the present contest, the road from Guaymas to 
New Mexico ; this concession would very materially 
reduce the obstacles of the column moving from the 
Pacific. A similar permission to use their territory 
for the passage of troops between the Panuco and 



PLANS OF CAMPAIGNS.— BALL'S BLUFF. 135 

the Rio Grande would enable us to throw a column 
of troops by a good road from Tampico, or some of 
the small harbors north of it, upon and across the 
Rio Grande, without risk and scarcely firing a shot. 

" To what extent, if any, it would be desirable to 
take into service and employ Mexican soldiers is a 
question entirely political, on which I do not venture 
to offer an opinion. 

*' The force I have recommended is large, the ex- 
pense is great. It is possible that a smaller force 
might accomplish the object in view ; but I understand 
it to be the purpose of this great nation to re-establish 
the power of its Government and to restore peace to 
its citizens in the shortest possible time. The question 
to be decided is simply this : Shall we crush the re- 
bellion at one blow, terminate the war in one cam- 
paign, or shall we leave it for a legacy to our de- 
scendants ? 

''When the extent of the possible line of operations 
is considered, the force asked for for the main army 
under my command can not be regarded as unduly 
large; every mile we advance carries us farther from 
our base of operations and renders detachments neces- 
sary to cover our communications, while the enemy 
will be constantly concentrating as he falls back. I 
propose, with the force which I have requested, not 
only to drive the enemy out of Virginia and occupy 
Richmond, but to occupy Charleston, Savannah, 
Montgomery, Pensacola, Mobile, and New Orleans; 
in other words, to move into the heart of the enemy's 
country and crush the rebellion in its very heart. 

" By seizing and repairing the railroads as we ad- 
vance the difftculties of transportation will be ma- 
terially diminished. It is perhaps unnecessary to state 
that, in addition to the forces named in this memo- 
randum, strong reserves should be formed, ready to 
supply any losses that may occur. 

" In conclusion, I would submit that the exigencies 
of the treasury may be lessened by making only partial 
payments to our troops while in the enemy's country, 



136 



GENERAL McCLELLAN. 



and by giving the obligations of the United States for 
such suppHes as may tliere be obtained." 

It will be remembered that when he submitted 
this memorandum McClellan was a subordinate com- 
mander under the general in chief, a position scarcely 
justifying him in discussing the general military situ- 
ation and conduct of the war unless by the direct re- 
quest of the President. The few days that had elapsed 
since his advent in Washington could not have suf- 
ficed for the preparation of so comprehensive a 
scheme had he not given considerable study to the 
general conduct of the war long before he was assigned 
to his present command, and this exhibits the strate- 
gical bent of his mind. Furthermore, it is evident that 
he foresaw that logically he would soon be called to 
supersede General Scott as general in chief, and be- 
come the military adviser of the President and re- 
sponsible for the conduct of military operations. 
Whether he had such assurances from those entitled 
to give them or not, does not appear, but his conduct 
with regard to his superior officer can only be ac- 
counted for under the supposition that he was directed 
by competent authority to regard the problem as his 
own, with the reasonable probability that he would 
in the near future be charged with its execution. 
Years afterward, in writing of this plan, he says : " In 
the light of the experience of the twenty-two years 
which have elapsed since this memorandum was so 
hastily prepared, and after full consideration of all 
the events of the long and bloody war Avhich fol- 
lowed it, I still hold to the soundness of the views it 
expressed. Had the measures recommended been car- 
ried into efifect, the war would have been closed in 
less than one half the time and with infinite saving 
of blood and treasure. So far as I know, it was the 
first general plan of operations proposed upon a 
scale adequate to the case. It recognized the im- 
portance of railways as a new element in strategy ; 
it emphasized the vital importance of the railway 
system leading from Memphis to the East ; it marked 



PLANS OF CAMPAIGNS.— BALL'S BLUFF. 13^ 

out the advantages to be derived from coast expe- 
ditions ; it stated the part to be played upon the Miss- 
issippi ; it foreshadowed the marches upon Atlanta 
and the seacoast ; it called for a force which the 
future proved to be fully within our means, and 
which would have crushed the rebellion in one or 
two campaigns." '^ 

Unquestionably, had it been possible, under our 
system of political responsibility and governmental 
administration, to organize, equip, train, and disci- 
pline such an army within a reasonable time noth- 
ing could have withstood its triumphal march from 
the Potomac to the Gulf under a competent and 
aggressive leader. " Overwhelming physical force 
with prompt and irresistible action " would have de- 
stroyed the Confederate army in Virginia, disheart- 
ened the Western Confederate States, and speedily 
brought an end to the war. This was the purely theo- 
retical aspect of the problem, but McClellan had then 
been too short a time in Washington fully to appre- 
ciate the almost insuperable obstacles that political 
considerations would offer to the accomplishment of 
so comprehensive a scheme. The public mind had 
not then been educated to accept with patience the 
time element in the organization of armies. In the 
eyes of the people a patriot armed with a musket and 
clothed in uniform was a soldier, a collection of such 
soldiers an army, and mere excess in numbers a con- 
vincing fact of superiority. 

Considering the general ignorance existing in the 
body politic with reference to the necessities and com- 
plexities of a sound military system, the forbearance 
of the people while the Army of the Potomac was in 
process of formation was both remarkable and com- 
mendable. McClellan did not regard the time con- 
sumed as unnecessarily long or in any degree wasted. 
He was striving " to bring about such a condition 
of discipline and instruction that the army could be 



* McClellan's Own Story, p. 105. 



138 



GENERAL McCLELLAN. 



handled on the march and on the field of battle and 
that orders could be carried out." * He held frequent 
reviews of the several portions of his command " to 
accustom the regiments to move together and see 
each other, to give the troops an idea of their own 
strength, to infuse esprit dc corps and mutual emula- 
tion, and to acquaint myself with the capacity of the 
general officers." f 

Meanwhile the army was growing in strength. In- 
cluding the command of General Dix at Baltimore, 
the forces on the Maryland shore of the Potomac 
from below Washington as far north as Cumberland 
and the garrisons of Washington and Alexandria, the 
successive returns show that its numbers were as 
follows : X 



Date. 


On the rolls. 


Sick. 


Absent. 


In confine- 
ment. 


Present 
for duty. 


Effective. 


Oct. 15th. . . 

Dec. ist 

Jan. ist 

Feb. 1st.... 
March ist. . 


152,051 

198,313 
220,237 
222,196 
221,987 


9,290 
11,470 
11,707 
14,110 
13.570 


8,240 
15,102 
14.790 
14.363 
13,167 


1,156 
2,189 
2,260 
2,917 
2,I0S 


133,201 
169,452 
191,480 
190,806 
193.142 


111,000 
141,210 
159.567 
159.205 
160,952 



The numbers in the last column being derived! 
from those " present for duty " by diminishing themi 
by one sixth, which has been shown in practice to be; 
a general rule ; but it also sometimes happens that 
some of these effectives may temporarily lack equip- 
ments. Of course the older regiments, having had a 
longer training, were generally better disciplined than 
the more recent arrivals. 

In the organization for field service, four regiments 
constituted a brigade and three brigades a division, 
The divisions were formed as rapidly as possible, the 
first being that of McDowell, August 24th; ther 



* McClellan's Own Story, p. 98. 

+ Ibid., p. 98. 

X Official War Records, vol. v, p. 12. 



PLANS OF CAMPAIGNS.— BALL'S BLUFF. 130 

Franklin's, August 28th ; Fitz-John Porter's, August 
30th; Stone's, September 12th; Buell's, September 
14th ; McCall's, September i6th ; W. F. Smith's, Sep- 
tember 28th ; Heintzelman's, October 5th ; Hooker's, 
October nth; Blenker's, October 12th; Sumner's, 
November 25th ; and Casey's, December 6th. Early 
in November seven of these divisions were posted on 
the Virginia side of the Potomac so as to cover every 
avenue of approach to the defensive line, two were 
placed north of Washington supported by Casey's 
provisional brigade. Hooker's south of the city in the 
vicinity of Budd's Ferry, while Banks's forces, also in 
division organization, were located in the vicinity of 
Harper's Ferry. These division commanders were, 
with a single exception, educated soldiers, as were 
also the majority of the brigade commanders, and their 
after memorable careers justified McClellan's excel- 
lent judgment in selecting them for their earlier com- 
mands. 

It was not until after the first week of September 
that McClellan's apprehension of an attack by the 
enemy had been sufficiently allayed to make him enter- 
tain the idea of becoming the aggressor. But day 
after day passed without any indication of a gen- 
eral movement of the army. A month afterward he 
says : '' Preparations are slow, and I have an infinite 
deal to do before my army is really ready to fight a 
great battle. Washington may now be looked upon 
as quite safe. They can not attack it in front. My 
flanks are also safe, or soon will be. Then I shall 
take my own time to make an army that will be sure 
of success. ... I do not expect to fight a battle near 
Washington ; probably none will be fought until I 
advance, and that I will not do until I am fully ready. 
My plans depend upon circumstances. So soon as 
I feel that my army is well organized and well dis- 
ciplined and strong enough, I will advance and force 
the rebels to a battle in a field of my own selection. 
A long time must yet elapse before Lean do this, and I 
expect all the newspapers to abuse me for delay ; but 



I40 



GENERAL McCLELLAN. 



I will not mind that." * This letter, written October 
6th, is eminently characteristic and in complete accord 
with his early determination not to fight an inde- 
cisive battle. But until the question of General Scott's 
retirement was settled he was debarred from deciding 
upon a comprehensive plan, and, in the opinion of his 
friends and advisers, he felt himself justified in adopt- 
ing a waiting policy. 

But in the meantime, and for long afterward, his 
service of information was wretchedly inefficient and 
his knowledge of the enemy's purpose and strength 
correspondingly erroneous. The only efficient means- 
by which such information can be secured is by strongs 
reconnoissances, and nothing of this kind was under- 
taken by McClellan's orders. It is true that there, 
were several minor affairs or skirmishes between small! 
detachments not exceeding a few hundred men oni 
each side, in which the advantage remained with thei 
Confederates owing to their greater familiarity with 
the ground and their better leadership and outposti 
service. In none of these did the troops move fan 
from their camps, and in none, except those of Dranes 
ville and Lewinsville, was the exposure to fire sufficient 
to test the behavior of troops in battle or to give them 
that confidence in themselves and in their command^ 
ers which is of essential importance as a preliminary 
to operations of a more extensive character. But the^ 
affair at Ball's Blufif resulted in a serious disaster to 
the Union forces, and as it was the occasion of mucll 
animadversion on the part of Congress and reflecteC' 
in a measurable degree upon McClellan's reputation 
it is necessary to give it some attention. 

On the morning of October 20th General McClel 
Ian received information from General Banks's head 
quarters at Darnestown that the enemy had withdraw! 
from their advanced post at Leesburg. On the previ 
ous day General McCall, whose division was statione( 
on the Virginia side, marched from his camp nea 



* McClellan's Own Story, p. 168. 



PLANS OF CAMPAIGNS.— BALL'S BLUFF. 



141 



Langlcy to make a close survey and reconnoissance 
of the country in his front beyond Dranesvillc, and 
doubtless McClellan connected the withdrawal of the 
enemy from Leesburg with this movement of McCall's. 
He caused to be sent to General Stone, whose head- 
quarters were at Poolesville and hence nearest Lees- 
burg, this dispatch : '* General McClellan desires me 
to inform you that General McCall occupied Dranes- 
villc yesterday and is still there. Will send out heavy 
reconnoissances to-day in all directions from that 
point. The general desires that you will keep a good 
lookout upon Leesburg to see if this movement has 
the effect to drive them away. Perhaps a slight dem- 
onstration on your part would have the effect to move 
them." * Stone, properly interpreting these instruc- 
tions, made an open display of his troops at Edwards's 
Ferry as if to make a crossing, and a subsequent move- 
ment toward Leesburg. Four miles above, at Harri- 
son's Island and Conrad's Ferry, a small outpost was 
established consisting of a company of infantry and a 
section of artillery, and Stone had directed that a small 
party be sent from the island to the Virginia side to 
make a reconnoissance toward Leesburg. This party 
of about twenty men crossed about dusk, and after 
climbing the blufT moved toward Leesburg without 
challenge until, mistaking some openings in a grove of 
maples for an encampment of the enemy, they returned 
to the island about ten o'clock. Upon receiving the 
report of this scout, Stone, who was at Edwards's 
Ferry, directed Colonel Devens to attack the supposed 
encampment at early dawn with four companies of 
his regiment. Colonel Lee to protect Devens's retreat 
with a force of a hundred men posted on the Virginia 
Bluff near the place of landing. Devens was directed 
1 in case of success to return to the Maryland side, un- 
less he should see a position on the Virginia side near 
I the river which he could undoubtedly hold successfully 
against largely superior numbers until re-enforced ; 

* Official War Records, vol. v, p. 32. 



142 



GENERAL McCLELLAN. 



in such case he was to hold on and report. Devens 
found, of course, no eijcampment, but proceeding until 
he had a full view of Leesburg, and being under cover 
of the woods and having no reason to suspect that his 
presence was known to the enemy, determined to hold, 
his position and report his observations to Stone.. 
While waiting the return of his messenger he had a, 
slight skirmish with a small body of the enemy. The' 
messenger, Lieutenant Howe, returned to Devens at^ 
about eight o'clock with the information that the re- 
maining five companies of Devens's regiment had beeni 
ordered to cross and occupy Smart's Mill, a strongs 
position, and that a detachment of cavalry was ordered 1 
to report to Devens for scouting duty to ascertain! 
what was in his front. Lieutenant Howe was directed! 
to return to Stone and report the skirmish, and while? 
on his way he met Colonel Baker returning from am 
interview with General Stone, and at his request statedl 
the message which he was charged to deliver to Stone. 
So far everything had been done properly and withi; 
excellent judgment. 

When Stone had determined to send Devens's littlee 
force across the river he gave orders for Baker to) 
send a regiment of his brigade to the vicinity of Con- 
rad's Ferry at daybreak of the 21st, and to hold thee 
rest of his brigade in readiness to move from his en- 
campment. Baker carried out his instructions withli 
commendable promptness, and then rode down to 
Stone's headquarters to report in person. At this^ 
interview Stone explained to Baker the situation and 
his purposes, and then determined to intrust Baker' 
with the control of afifairs at Harrison's Island, as it 
was too far distant for him to manage from his own 
headquarters, giving him discretionary power to with- 
draw the troops already crossed over or to advance 
more. Baker, after leaving Stone, evidently immedi- 
ately made up his mind to push over the main portior 
of his brigade and fight a battle. He assumed com- 
mand of the right at about ten o'clock in the morn- 
ing, but instead of proceeding at once to the position 



PLANS OF CAMPAIGNS.— BALL'S BLUFF. 



143 



)cciipicd by Dcvens and studying his ground, wasted 
lis time in the endeavor to provide greater facihties 
or crossing troops, a matter which properly could 
lave been left to some subaltern officer. It was not 
ill a quarter past two o'clock that he came into per- 
;onal contact with Colonel Devens, who had been 
vvithout instructions for over five hours, and with no 
3ther information than that Baker was in command. 
The enemy in the meanwhile had discovered that no 
real attack was intended from the direction of Ed- 
wards's Ferry, and they therefore concentrated their 
trength at Ball's BlufT. Colonel Baker's dispositions 
to repel this attack were faulty to a degree. Per- 
sonally a man of great courage, he was, however, so 
destitute of military knowledge and ability, and had 
50 neglected every important duty incumbent upon 
liim as commander of the forces, that it may be said 
that his conduct of affairs invited the disaster that 
resulted in spite of the fine behavior of his troops en- 
gaged. Fighting with their backs to the river blufif 
in an open field, the tactics of the battle were faulty 
in the extreme ; the left flank was soon turned and the 
Union troops driven over the blufif into the river, where 
many were captured. Baker was killed about five 
o'clock, and thus paid with his own life the penalty of 
his ignorance and rashness. The Union troops lost 
forty-nine killed, one hundred and fifty-eight wounded, 
and seven hundred and fourteen missing, the greater 
portion of these having been captured, while the Con- 
federates lost in all but one hundred and fifty-five from 
their four regiments engaged. 

This disaster had a widespread influence upon mili- 
jtary afifairs. At first it was believed that a single 
{brigade of the enemy had held in check a greatly su- 
fperior force of Union troops at Edwards's Ferry, and 
operating on interior lines had also overwhelmingly 
defeated an equal force at Ball's Blufif; as a conse- 
quence it was supposed to be demonstrated that the 
fConfederates would always prove superior in valor 
fand tactics, and that the victories of Manassas and 



144 



GENERAL McCLELLAN. 



Ball's Bluff were types of what was certain to happen i 
in every conflict. The Confederates were correspond- 
ingly elated, while the Union troops were depressed I 
and disheartened. Colonel Baker, who had given up 
his life upon the field of battle, was regarded as a hero 
sacrificed to the pusillanimity of General Stone. In 
addition to this, he was a senator from Oregon, a dis- 
tinguished orator, a personal friend of the President, 
a patriot who had made the supreme sacrifice to the 
cause he loved so well. There could be but one re-\ 
suit : Baker became the sacrificed martyr. Stone the 
dishonored traitor. Shortly after Congress convened 
in the December following, resolutions were intro- 
duced for the appointment of committees to investi- 
gate and determine the responsibility for the disaster! 
of Ball's Bluff. This resulted, however, in the creation 
of a joint committee, consisting of three representa-r 
tives and two senators, to inquire into the conduct 
of the war, thus extending very greatly the scope ol) 
its investigations. More than three months after tlu( 
battle Stone was suddenly arrested at midnight, placea 
in close custody, and confined for one hundred anci 
eighty-nine days, then released without having beer 
granted a trial or any opportunity to meet the accusa- 
tions which prompted his arrest. It is now knowr 
that the testimony brought before the Committee or 
the Conduct of the War, which, however honestl) 
submitted by the witnesses, was not subjected to the 
test of cross-examination or examination by the ac 
cused officer, satisfactorily established in their mind: 
the proof of his disloyalty, and the Secretary of Wa: 
ordered his arrest. General McClellan held the orde 
for eleven days before executing it, but in a letter t( 
General Stone in explanation of his action he says 
" On the evening when you were arrested I submittec 
to the Secretary the written result of the examinatioi 
of a refugee from Leesburg. This information, to ; 
certain extent, agreed with the evidence stated to hav' 
been taken by the committee, and upon its being im 
parted to the Secretary he again instructed me to cans- 



PLANS OF CAMPAIGNS.— BALL'S BLUFF. 145 

you to be arrested, which I at once did." Injustice 
must needs be done in times of excitement because of 
the imperfection of human judgment under the influ- 
ence of emotional impulse, but there was no sufficient 
reason why Stone should not have had that protec- 
tion which the law extends to the meanest criminal, 
and he was entitled to a speedy trial by his peers. It 
was indeed a great pity that McClellan, who was then 
powerful enough, did not insist upon having this right 
of an officer to a trial granted to Stone, though it is 
said that he did several times call the attention of the 
Secretary to the case, but without avail. 

The immediate effect of this disaster was to quicken 
the efforts of McClellan's powerful friends — Mont- 
gomery Blair, Senators Wade, Trumbull, and Chand- 
ler — to expedite the retirement of General Scott and 
the advancement of McClellan to the position of gen- 
eral in chief; and shortly afterward he received a pri- 
vate note from Mr. Lincoln, dated November ist, say- 
ing : *' Lieutenant-General Scott having been, upon his 
own application, placed on the list of retired officers, 
with his advice, and the concurrence of the entire 
cabinet, I have designated you to command the 
whole army. You will therefore assume this en- 
larged duty at once, conferring with me so far as ne- 
cessary." * 

The anxiety of the President for the immediate em- 
ployment of the army had led to frequent conferences 
with General McClellan, and toward the end of Octo- 
ber he desired the general to submit a paper upon the 
condition of his forces and the immediate measures 
to be taken to increase their efficiency. The letter 
which he addressed to the Secretary of War in obedi- 
ence to this request embodies his views and sugges- 
tions, which are so wholly conformable to those 
expressed in his memorandum of August 2d as to indi- 
cate that he had not departed from his earlier convic- 
tions. The following extracts will confirm this deduc- 

* McClellan's Own Story, p. 200. 
10 



146 GENERAL McCLELLAN. 

tion. After referring to his previous communications 
in August and September, in which he had stated the 
force which he regarded as necessary to advance, he 
proceeds : ■ 

'' So much time has passed and the winter is ap- ( 
proaching so rapidly that but two courses are left 
to the Government : viz., either to go into winter 
quarters, or to assume the offensive with forces greatly 
inferior in numbers to the army I regarded as desir- 
able and necessary. If political considerations render 
the first course unadvisable, the second alone remains. 
While I regret that it has not been deemed expedient, 
or perhaps possible, to concentrate the forces of the" 
nation in this vicinity (remaining on the defensive 
elsewhere), keeping the attention and efforts of the 
Government fixed upon this as the vital point where 
the issue of the great contest is to be decided, it may 
still be that, by introducing unity of action and design 
among the various armies of the land, by determining ■ 
the courses to be pursued by the various commanders i 
under one general plan, transferring from the other- 
armies the superfluous strength not required for the: 
purpose in view, and thus re-enforcing this main army, , 
whose destiny it is to decide the controversy, we may 
yet be able to move with a reasonable prospect before? 
the winter is fairly upon us. 

" The nation feels, and I share that feeling, that the^ 
Army of the Potomac holds the fate of the country ini 
its hands. The stake is so vast, the issue so moment- - 
ous, and the effect of the next battle will be so im- 
portant throughout the future as well as the present, 
that I continue to urge, as I have ever done since I 
entered upon the command of this army, upon the 
Government to devote its energies and its available 
resources toward increasing the numbers and effi- 
ciency of the army on which its salvation de- 
pends. . . . 

" As you are aware, all the information we have 
from spies, prisoners, etc., agrees in showing that the 
enemy have a force on the Potomac not less than one 



PLANS OF CAMPAIGNS.— BALL'S BLUFF. 



147 



hundred and fifty thousand strong, well drilled and 
equipped, ably commanded, and strongly intrenched. 
It is plain, therefore, that to insure success, or to 
render it reasonably certain, the active army should 
not number less than one hundred and fifty thousand 
efficient troops, with four hundred guns, unless some 
material change occurs in front of us. 

" The requisite force for an advance movement by 
the Army of the Potomac may be thus estimated : 





Men. 


Guns. 


Column of active operations 


150,000 

35,000 

5,000 

8,000 

10,000 


400 
40 
12 
24 
12 




To guard the Potomac to Harper's Ferry 

To guard the lower Potomac 


Garrison for Baltimore and Annapolis 

Total effective force required 


208,000 


488 





or an aggregate, present and absent, of about two hun- 
dred and forty thousand men, should the losses by 
sickness, etc., not rise to a higher percentage than at 
present. 

" Having stated what I regard as the requisite force 
to enable this army to advance, I now proceed to give 
the actual strength of the Army of the Potomac. The 
aggregate strength of the Army of the Potomac, by 
the official report on the morning of the 27th instant, 
was one hundred and sixty-eight thousand three hun- 
dred and eighteen officers and men of all grades and 
arms. This includes the troops at Baltimore and An- 
napolis, on the upper and lower Potomac, the sick, 
absent, etc. The force present for duty was one hun- 
dred and forty-seven thousand six hundred and ninety- 
five. Of this number forty-two hundred and sixty- 
eight cavalry were completely unarmed, thirty-one 
hundred and sixty-three cavalry only partially armed, 
fifty-nine hundred and seventy-nine infantry un- 
equipped, making thirteen thousand four hundred and 
ten unfit for the field (irrespective of those not yet 
sufficiently drilled), and reducing the effective force 



148 



GENERAL McCLELLAN. 



to one hundred and thirty-four thousand two hundred 
and eighty-five, and the number disposable for an 
advance to seventy-six thousand two hundred and 
eighty-five. The infantry regiments are, to a con- 
siderable extent, armed with unserviceable weapons. 
Quite a large number of good arms, which had been 
intended for this army, were ordered elsewhere, leav- 
ing the Army of the Potomac insufficiently and, in 
some cases, badly armed. On the 30th of September 
there were with this army two hundred and twenty- 
eight field guns ready for the field. So far as arms 
and equipments are concerned, some of the batteries 
are still quite raw and unfit to go into action. I have 
intelligence that eight New York batteries are en route 
hither ; two others are ready for the field. I will still 
(if the New York batteries have six guns each) be one 
hundred and twelve guns short of the number required 
for the active column, saying nothing for the present 
of those necessary for the garrisons and corps on the 
Potomac, which would make a total deficiency of two 
hundred guns. 

" I have thus briefly stated our present condition 
and wants. It remains to suggest the means of supply- 
ing the deficiencies : 

" First. That all the cavalry and infantry arms, as 
fast as procured, whether manufactured in this country 
or purchased abroad, be sent to this army until it is 
fully prepared for the field. 

" Second. That the two companies of the Fourth 
Artillery, now understood to be en route from Fort 
Randall to Fort Monroe, be ordered to this army, to 
be mounted at once ; also that the companies of the 
Third Artillery, en route from California, be sent here. 
Had not the order for Smead's battery to come here 
from Harrisburg to replace the battery I gave General ! 
Sherman been so often countermanded, I would again 
ask for it. 

" Third. That a more effective regulation may be 
made authorizing the transfer of men from the volun- 
teers to the regular batteries, infantry, and cavalry, 



PLANS OF CAMPAIGNS.— BALL'S BLUFF. 



149 



that we may make the best possible use of the invalu- 
able regular ' skeletons.' 

" Fourth. I have no official information as to the 
United States forces elsewhere, but from the best in- 
formation I can obtain from the War Department and 
other sources I am led to believe that the United States 
troops are : 

In Western Virginia about 30,000 

In Kentucky 40,000 

In Missouri 80,000 

In Fortress Monroe 11,000 

Total 161,000 

" Besides these, I am informed that more than one 
hundred thousand are in progress of organization in 
other Northern and Western States. 

" I would therefore recommend that, not inter- 
fering with Kentucky, there should be retained in 
Western Virginia and Missouri a sufficient force for 
defensive purposes, and that the surplus troops be sent 
to the Army of the Potomac to enable it to assume 
the offensive ; that the same course be pursued in re- 
spect to Fortress Monroe, and that no further out- 
side expeditions be attempted until we have fought 
the great battle in front of us. 

'' Fifth. That every nerve be strained to hasten the 
enrollment, organization, and armament of new bat- 
teries and regiments of infantry. 

" Sixth. That all the battalions now raised for new 
regiments of regular infantry be at once ordered to 
this army, and that the old infantry and cavalry en 
route from California be ordered to this army immedi- 
ately on their arrival in New York. 

" I have thus indicated in a general manner the 
objects to be accomplished and the means by which 
we may gain our ends. A vigorous employment of 
these means will, in my opinion, enable the Army of 
the Potomac to assume successfully this season the 
offensive operations which, ever since entering upon 
the command, it has been my anxious desire and clili- 



150 GENERAL McCLELLAN. 

gent effort to prepare for and prosecute. The advance 
should not be postported beyond the 25th of Novem- 
ber, if possible to avoid it. 

'' Unity in councils, the utmost vigor and energy 
in action, are indispensable. The entire military field 
should be grasped as a whole and not in detached 
parts. One plan should be agreed upon and pursued ; 
a single will should direct and carry out these plans. 

'' The great object to be accomplished, the crush- 
ing defeat of the rebel army now at Manassas, should 
never for one instant be lost sight of, but all the in- 
tellect and means and men of the Government poured 
upon that point. The loyal States possess ample force 
to effect all this and more. The rebels have displayed 
energy, unanimity, and wisdom worthy of the most 
desperate days of the French Revolution. Should we 
do less? 

" The unity of this nation, the preservation of our 
institutions, are so dear to me that I have willingly 
sacrificed my private happiness with the single object ; 
of doing my duty to my country. When the task is ; 
accomplished I shall be glad to return to the obscurity 
from which events have drawn me. Whatever the de- 
termination of the Government may be, I will do the; 
best I can with the Army of the Potomac, and will' 
share its fate, whatever may be the task imposed 
upon me. 

" Permit me to add on this occasion, as hereto- 
fore, it has been my aim neither to exaggerate nor 
underrate the power of the enemy, nor fail to express 
clearly the means by which, in my judgment, that 
power may be broken. 

" Urging the energy of preparation and action, 
which has ever been my choice, but with the fixed 
purpose by no act of mine to expose the Government 
to hazard by premature movement, and requesting 
that this communication may be laid before the Presi- 
dent, I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your 
obedient servant." * 

* Official War Records, vol. v, p. 9 et seq. 



CHAPTER VII. 

INACTIVITY OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. PLAN 

OF PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN EVOLVED. 

Up to the time when McClellan had been placed 
in command of all the armies his position had been 
practically unassailable. He had secured the safety 
of Washington by surrounding it with a strong line 
of fortifications and organized a powerful army for its 
defence ; its security was therefore assured. But 
neither the army, Administration, nor people would 
be content with merely passive resistance, and the 
minds of all were troubled as to what McClellan 
would do, now that he was practically in supreme 
control of the military forces of the nation under 
the President who had the utmost confidence in his 
ability. All men of position have their critics and 
detractors, and McClellan had his. Many of his 
subordinate generals felt aggrieved that they were 
kept outside of the circle of intimate relations with 
him and in ignorance of his general plan ; they resented 
the establishment of his headquarters in the city, where 
he could learn nothing of the temper and condition of 
his troops, and complained among themselves that he 
was surrounded by an impenetrable military cordon 
of flatterers and sycophants. He had encouraged the 
idea that he desired an active movement of the army, 
but was restrained and hampered by the opposition of 
the general in chief. Here, now, was his golden oppor- 
tunity ; a bold stride forward in the early days of No- 
vember, with an army tired of the monotony of camp 
life and devoted to him, would have silenced his critics 
and justified his previous inaction. Any aggressive 

151 



152 



GENERAL McCLELLAN. 



action at that time would have strengthened the Ad- 
ministration and receiyed its heartiest support ; and, 
as we know now, it would have met with such sufficient 
success as to have heartened the people, depressed the 
enemy, and vitalized the army with its necessary bap- 
tism of fire. There is every reason to suppose that his 
inactivity up to this time may be accounted for by con- 
sidering the cumulative effect of the following causes : 
A settled belief in the superior strength and discipline 
of the enemy in his immediate front ; an apprehension 
lest the enemy should attack before his organization 
had been effectively completed and the fortifications 
of the city sufficiently developed to insure its safety ; 
a constitutional lack of aggressiveness which debarred 
him from taking the initiative ; and the constantly 
elusive hope that the question of the command of the 
army would be speedily settled so that he could formu- 
late a plan that would embrace all the armies and 
bring about a decisive result. Considering all these 
things it is a reasonable inference that he never really 
intended to assume the initiative until he became gen- 
eral in chief, and this inference is perfectly consistent 
with the views expressed by him as to the conduct of 
the war, in his memorandum of August 2d, to the 
President. Throughout the whole period of his sub- 
ordinate command, from July 27th to November ist, 
his attitude is entirely consistent with his determina- 
tion to create an army of such a character in organi- 
zation, discipline, and strength that when it was com- 
pletely ready its forward movement would be irre- 
sistible. That stage of its development had just been 
reached when he felt that he could safely employ his 
divisions in making armed reconnoissances in their 
immediate front with some success, when the disaster 
of Ball's Bluff came with its deterring influence to 
cause him to resume his inactive policy. 

And now that he was installed in his office as gen- 
eral in chief he gave himself up to consider the more 
extended problems committed to his charge, and this 
necessitated a still greater delay. He soon ascertained 



INACTIVITV of the army of the rOTOMAC. 153 

that no general plan of operations looking to the 
simultaneous employment of all the armies existed, 
and that the state of preparation and organization of 
the armies in the West were such as to preclude, in 
his opinion, any movement of the Army of the Poto- 
mac until this condition of things was remedied. 
For this purpose he issued, November 9th, Orders 
No. 97, creating four departments out of the three 
existing departments of the West, the Cumberland, 
and the Ohio ; these were the Department of New 
Mexico, to which Colonel E. R. S. Canby was as- 
signed as commander ; the Department of Kansas, 
Major-General Hunter commanding; the Department 
of Missouri, embracing the States of Missouri, Iowa, 
Minnesota, Wisconsin, Illinois, Arkansas, and that 
portion of Kentucky west of the Cumberland River, 
Major-General Halleck commanding; and the De- 
partment of Ohio, comprising the States of Ohio, 
Michigan, Indiana, Tennessee, and that portion of 
Kentucky east of the Cumberland P.iver, Major- 
General Buell commanding. McClellan had now the 
whole theater of war under his personal supervision 
and direction, and relying upon the ability and charac- 
ter of the generals whom he had selected as his lieu- 
tenants to command the western departments, he 
spared no pains to impress upon them the purposes 
he had in view. With regard to the commanders of 
the two important Departments of the Missouri and 
the Ohio, covering the whole Mississippi Valley, Hal- 
leck had a wide reputation as a military writer, and 
Buell had, under McClellan's own eye, developed a 
capacity for organization and discipline of the great- 
est promise. In addition to full oral instructions he 
sent them written communications for their guidance 
which exhibit substantially the parts of the general 
plan that he expected them to execute. It is neces- 
sary here to refer only to the military aspects of their 
instructions. To Buell he wrote : *' The military 
problem would be a simple one could it be entirely 
separated from political influences. Such is not the 



154 GENERAL McCLELLAN. 

case. Were the population among which you are to 
operate wholly or generally hostile, it is probable that 
Nashville should be your first and principal objective 
point. It so happens that a large majority of the in- 
habitants of Eastern Tennessee are in favor of the 
Union. It therefore seems proper that you should 
remain on the defensive on the line from Louisville 
to Nashville, while you throw the mass of your forces 
by rapid marches, by Cumberland Gap or Walker's 
Gap, on Knoxville, in order to occupy the railroad 
at that point, and thus enable the loyal citizens of 
Eastern Tennessee to rise, while you at the same time 
cut off the railway communication between Eastern 
Virginia and the Mississippi. It wiU be prudent to 
fortify the pass before leaving it in your rear." "^ 

And again on November 12th he writes: "The 
main point to w^hich I desire to call your attention 
is the necessity of entering Eastern Tennessee as soon 
as it can be done with reasonable chances of success, 
and I hope that you will, with the least possible delay, 
organize a column for that purpose, sufficiently guard- 
ing at the same time the main avenues by which the 
rebels may invade Kentucky." f 

To Halleck he writes : " With respect to military 
operations, it is probable, from the best information 
in my possession, that the interests of the Government 
will be best served by fortifying and holding in con- 
siderable strength Rolla, Sedalia, and other interior 
points, keeping strong patrols constantly moving from 
the terminal stations, and concentrating the mass of 
the troops on or near the Mississippi, prepared for 
such ulterior operations as the public interests may 
demand." X 

In these letters he also expressed particular anxiety 
that they should bear in mind " the precise issue for 
which we are fighting. That issue is the preservation 

* Official War Records, vol. v, p. 38. 

f Ibid. 

i Ibid., p. 37. 



INACTIVITY OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 



155 



of the Union and the restoration of the full authority 
of the General Government over all the portions of our 
territory," and that this could best be accomplished 
" by religiously respecting the constitutional rights of 
all." There was nothing to show that he expected 
that military operations were to be immediately under- 
taken, and it seems certain that McClellan did not him- 
self entertain the idea for either the eastern or western 
armies ; it was evident that the remainder of the fall 
and the winter were to be utilized for preparation. 

From this time on McClellan's almost imperial 
direction of military affairs was checked, and he began 
to experience the undermining influences of interroga- 
tion. The fine weather was passing and the magnifi- 
cently appointed army was inert. " All quiet on the 
Potomac," formerly calming apprehension and heard 
with abiding comfort, now began to excite ridicule and 
became a jesting byword. And now, too, the political 
considerations began to assert themselves in anticipa- 
tion of the approaching meeting of Congress. The 
increasing difficulty of meeting financial obligations, 
the alarming heaping up of the public debt, the im- 
minent danger of foreign recognition of the Confed- 
eracy and possible armed intervention of European 
powers necessarily demanded speedy military success 
somewhere to insure the stability of the Administra- 
tion, which had not as yet firmly established itself in 
the confidence of the ablest political leaders and in- 
fluential editorial exponents of public opinion. In the 
midst of all this seething turmoil McCleflan held him- 
self with unbending dignity and impenetrable reserve. 
Fearing betrayal in a city full of the enemy's spies 
and sympathizers, he had but few intimates and gave 
his fuH confidence to no one. A brilliant and numer- 
ous staff surounded his headquarters in the city, where 
he held a daily levee, at which men of aU grades pre- 
sented themselves, from the President to the humblest 
seeker of his favor. Overburdened as he was he could 
not possibly give an audience to even a fraction of 
his callers, and it frequently happened that powerful 



156 GENERAL McCL .LLAN. I 

and influential men in public service were obliged to 
cool their heels while, waiting an opportunity to be 
admitted into his presence, and it is even alleged that 
the President was subjected to some unintentional dis- 
courtesy which had for its consequence a sensible dimi- 
nution of his friendly regard. ^ 

And now it began to be commented upon that 
McClellan's adherents were men who were politically 
opposed to the Administration, and that they were 
continually sounding his praises and magnifying his 
importance. On the other hand, the radical leaders 
who desired speedy action found that other generals 
were not in accord with the commanding general's 
policy of inaction, so that suspicion of his motives for 
this delay was engendered which gradually grew into 
enlarging distrust of his ability and his ptirposes. The 
most criminal of ambitions was attributed 'to him, 
while, on the other hand, his friends similarly enter- 
tained the belief that the war was to be prolonged by 
the Administration in the interest of the abolition of 
slavery. Both were grievously in error. But the con- 
ditions were favorable to such an increase of the dis- 
trust felt by each for the other as to make the separa- 
tion wider day by day. The President remained 
through it all the stanch supporter of McClellan and 
had to suffer vicariously for his alleged shortcomings, , 
and shared with him the vituperations that were heaped 1 
upon the head of his general in chief. There are sev- - 
eral incidents to which some attention should be paid' 
which' tended to affect adversely the relations of Mc- 
Clellan with the President and the men of influence 
associated with him. 

I. The blockade of the Potomac by the Confed- 
erates, which commenced in August, and soon grew to 
be so effective as to deprive the Union forces of this 
line of supply. The importance of keeping the Poto- 
mac River open for navigation to Washington was 
obvious, and it naturally fell upon the navy to see to 
it. For this purpose it was deemed essential that 
Mathias Point should be occupied by a strong force of 



INACTIVITY OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 



157 



Union troops, and that the river should be patrolled 
by an armed flotilla of navy vessels. The left bank 
was securely held, but there were several points on 
the Virginia side at which batteries could be securely 
erected by the Confederates to close the river, or at 
least to make its navigation precarious. Early in May 
sites for such batteries at the mouth of Acquia Creek 
were selected, and soon after guns were mounted. 
Captain Craven, of the United States Navy, who was 
assigned to the command of the Potomac flotilla after 
the death of Commander Ward, killed (June 28th) in 
an attack on Mathias Point, was untiring in his en- 
deavors to keep open the navigation of the river, but 
the rifled guns of the Confederates, placed in well-pro- 
tected batteries at Freestone Point, Cockpit Point, and 
Evansport during the months of August, September, 
and October, effectually closed the river by the latter 
part of October. The importance of Mathias Point 
was recognized by every one, and although the Con- 
federates never succeeded in erecting a battery of heavy 
guns there, it was considered by the Secretary of the 
Navy and his subordinates of such essential impor- 
tance to the control of the river that a force of four 
thousand troops was asked for from the army to secure 
its occupation. The President earnestly desired it, and 
in expectation that an expedition for this purpose had 
received the assent of General McClellan the navy was 
ready to assist in the landing on two designated nights. 
But the troops did not come, and in the opinion of 
the Navy Department McClellan treated the matter 
rather cavalierly, and the President was himself some- 
what chagrined. McClellan had satisfied himself of the 
uselessness of the proposed expedition, fearing that it 
would bring on a general engagement at an unsuitable 
i time, and was confirmed in this opinion by the views 
of his chief engineer, General Barnard. He did not 
regard the line of the Potomac as a vital one, and be- 
lieved its importance to be more a moral than a phys- 
ical one. Captain Craven became disheartened at this 
lack of co-operation, and, feeling that his reputation 



158 



GENERAL McCLELLAN. 



was at Stake, applied for sea service October 23d, and 
the important vessels oi the naval flotilla were ordered 
on other service. Practically, this line ceased to be 
an open one after October 25th, and thereafter vessels 
were obliged to assume their own risk in going up 
or down the river. 

2. The relief of the Union people in East Tennes- 
see. This was a subject which the President had very 
much at heart and was anxious from both political 
and sympathetic reasons to undertake without delay. 
That McClellan was in full accord with the President 
is manifest from the prominence which he gave to 
it in his letter of instructions to Buell immediately 
after assigning him to the command of the Depart- 
ment of the Ohio, and his persistency in urging it 
again and again. He expected that a strong movement 
immediately undertaken against Cumberland Gap 
would cut the Confederate communication between 
the Mississippi Valley and Eastern Virginia, protect 
the Unionists in Tennessee, and re-establish the Gov- 
ernment of the Union in the eastern portion of that 
State, and he was fully impressed with the great neces- 
sity of making the movement with the least possible 
delay. Buell answers these instructions of McClellan 
November 27th, in a letter giving a full exposition of 
the condition of his command and the situation of its 
different parts, and says : " And now for a plan of cam- 
paign. Up to the organization of columns behind Salt 
River all the plans I have in view at present concur. 
Beyond that they diverge, and may be stated briefly 
and candidly thus : First, to establish a sufficient force 
before Bowling Green to hold Buckner there, while 
a column moves into East Tennessee by Somerset 
and the route we had in view; second, to hold him 
in check while a column moves rapidly past him on 
Nashville by the turnpike via Gallatin ; and, third, hold- 
ing him in check at Bowling Green and throwing in 
columns on both Somerset and Nashville routes.'' * In 

* Official War Records, vol. vii, p. 450. 



INACTIVITY OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 



159 



answer to this McClellan expresses himself as com- 
pletely satisfied with Buell's letter, and, while agreeing 
with his views, suggests '■' that a column of fifteen thou- 
sand men might be sent to East Tennessee, while a 
strong attack of fifty thousand men should be made 
against Nashville, and, in closing, says : *' I think we 
owe it to our Union friends in Eastern Tennessee to 
protect them at all hazards. First, secure that ; then, 
if you possess the means, carry Nashville." Again, 
early in December, in forwarding two letters that had 
been written by the loyal Colonel S. P. Carter to the 
Hon. Horace Maynard, and by the latter sent to the 
President, he writes Buell : *' I inclose two letters, 
which were referred to me by the President and were 
intended for your eye. I do so, feeling sure that you 
sympathize with me in my intense regard for the 
noble Union men of Eastern Tennessee ; that you 
will overlook all mere matters of form, and that you 
will devote all your energies toward the salvation 
of men so eminently deserving our protection. I 
understand your movements and fully concur in 
their propriety, but I must still urge the occupation 
of Eastern Tennessee as a duty we owe our gallant 
friends there who have not hesitated to espouse our 
cause. 

*' Please send, then, with the least possible delay, 
troops enough to protect these men. I still feel sure 
that the best strategical move in this case will be that 
dictated by the simple feelings of humanity. We must 
preserve these noble fellows from harm ; everything 
urges us to do that — faith, interest, loyalty. For the 
sake of these Eastern Tennesseeans who have taken 
part with us I would gladly sacrifice mere military 
advantages ; they deserve our protection, and at all 
hazards they must have it. You may fully rely on my 
full support in the movement -I have so much at heart 
— the liberation of Eastern Tennessee. ... If you 
gain and retain possession of Eastern Tennessee you 

* Official War Records, vol. vii, p. 457. 



l6o GENERAL McCLELLAN. 

will have won brighter laurels than any I hope to 
gain." * 

This attitude in favor of immediate help to the loyal 
people of East Tennessee McClellan never abandoned, 
and he never ceased to urge upon Buell in terms that 
almost amounted to a positive order to undertake 
such a campaign. In the meantime McClellan was 
suffering from a serious illness, and from his sick-bed 
dispatched to Buell, December 29th : " Johnson, May- 
nard, etc., are again becoming frantic, and have Presi- 
dent Lincoln's sympathy excited. Political considera- 
tions would make it advisable to get the arms and 
troops into Eastern Tennessee at a very early day; 
you are, however, the best judge. Can you tell me 
about when and in what force you will be in Eastern 
Tennessee ? " f To which Buell replied : " I intend 
a column of twelve thousand men and three batteries 
for East Tennessee; but, as I have telegraphed you, 
it is impossible to fix a time for it to be there, so 
much depends on the circumstances which may arise 
in the meantime," J And now the President in his 
anxiety telegraphs Buell, McClellan being sick : 
'' Have arms gone forward for East Tennessee? 
Please tell me the progress and condition of the move- 
ment in that direction." * To which Buell answers : 
" Arms can only go forward for East Tennessee under 
the protection of an army. My organization of the 
troops has had in view two columns with reference to 
that movement : a division to move from Lebanon and 
a brigade to operate offensively or defensively, accord- 
ing to circumstances, on the Cumberland Gap route; 
but it was necessary also to have regard to contin- 
gencies which, before the transportation, arms, etc., 
could be ready, might require a modification of the 
plan. The time and manner of the movement must 
still be subject to such contingencies, though I hope to 
inaugurate it very soon. Our transportation and other 

* Official War Records, vol. vii, p. 468. 

f Ibid., p. 926. X Ibid., p. 521. * Ibid., p. 530. 



INACTIVITY OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. i6l 

preparations have been delayed far beyond my ex- 
pectations, and are still incomplete. The arms — for- 
eign ones, requiring repairs — arrived a week or more 
ago, and are now being put in order by the ordnance 
officer. 

'* While my preparations have had this movement 
constantly in view, I will confess to your Excellency 
that I have been bound to it more by my sympathy 
for the people of East Tennessee and the anxiety with 
which you and the general in chief have desired it 
than by my opinion of its wisdom as an unconditional 
measure. As earnestly as I wish to accomplish it, my 
judgment has from the first been decidedly against 
it, if it should render at all doubtful the success of a 
movement against the great power of the rebellion in 
the West, which is mainly arrayed on the line from 
Columbus to Bowling Green, and can speedily be con- 
centrated at any point of that line which is attacked 
singly." * 

Mr. Lincoln's answer is pathetic. He says, Janu- 
ary 6th : " Your dispatch of yesterday has been re- 
ceived, and it disappoints and distresses me. I have 
shown it to General McClellan, who says he will write 
you to-day. I am not competent to criticise your 
views, and therefore what I offer is merely in justifi- 
cation of myself. Of the two, I would rather have a 
point on the railroad south of Cumberland Gap than 
Nashville — first, because it cuts a great artery of the 
enemy's communication, which Nashville does not; 
and, secondly, because it is in the midst of loyal people 
who w^ould rally round it, while Nashville is not. 
Again, I can not see why the movement on East Ten- 
nessee would not be a diversion in your favor rather 
than a disadvantage, assuming that a movement toward 
Nashville is the main object. But my distress is that 
our friends in East Tennessee are being hanged and 
driven to despair, and even now, I fear, are thinking 
of taking rebel arms for the sake of personal protec- 

* Official War Records, vol. vii, p. 530. 
II 



1 62 GENERAL McCLELLAN. 

tion. In this we lose the most valuable stake we have 
in the South. My dispatch, to which yours is an an- 
swer, was sent with the* knowledge of Senator Johnson ; 
and Representative Maynard, of East Tennessee, and i 
they will be upon me to know the answer, which I 
can not safely show them. They would despair, pos- 
sibly resign, to go and save their families somehow or 
die with them. I do not intend this to be an order in 
any sense, but merely, as intimated before, to show 
you the grounds of my anxiety." * I 

McClellan's letter of the same date shows his full • 
accord with the President's views. He says : " There 
are few things I have more at heart than the prompt, 
movement of a strong column into Eastern Tennessee. \ 
The political consequences of the delay of this move- 
ment will be much more serious than you seem to ; 
anticipate. If relief is not soon afforded those people 
we shall lose them entirely, and with them the power 
of inflicting the most severe blow upon the secession 
cause. I was extremely sorry to learn from your tele- 
gram to the President that you had from the beginning 
attached little or no importance to a movement in East 
Tennessee. I had not so understood your views, and 
it develops a radical difference between your views 
and my own, which I deeply regret. My own general 
plans for the prosecution of the war make the speedy 
occupation of East Tennessee and its lines of railway 
matters of absolute necessity. Bowling Green and 
Nashville are in that connection of very secondary im- 
portance at the present moment. My own advance 
can not, according to my present views, be made until 
your troops are solidly established in the eastern por- 
tion of Tennessee. If that is not possible, a complete 
and prejudicial change in my own plans at once be- 
comes necessary. Interesting as Nashville may be to 
the Louisville interests, it strikes me that its posses- 
sion is of very secondary importance in comparison 
with the immense results that w^ould arise from the 

* Official War Records, vol. vii, p. 927. 



INACTIVITY OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 163 

adherence to our cause of the masses in East Tennes- 
see, West North CaroHna, South CaroHna, North 
Georgia, and Alabama, resuUs that I feel assured would 
ere long flow from the movement I allude to. Halleck, 
from his own account, will not soon be in a condition 
to support properly a movement up the Cumberland. 
Why not make the movement independently of and 
without waiting for that? I regret that I have not 
strength enough to write a fuller and more intelligible 
letter, but this is my very first effort at writing for 
somewhat more than two weeks." * 

In his convalescence McClellan again recurs to this 
movement as of essential importance, saying, January 
13th : '' You have no idea of the pressure brought to 
bear here upon the Government for a forward move- 
ment. It is so strong that it seems absolutely neces- 
sary to make the advance on Eastern Tennessee at 
once. I incline to this as a first step for many reasons. 
Your possession of the railroad there will surely pre- 
vent the main army in my front from being re-enforced, 
and may force Johnston to detach. Its political effect 
will be very great." f But nothing finally came of it. 
Buell was unable from lack of transportation to put 
the expedition to East Tennessee upon a successful 
basis, and in the meantime General Thomas's defeat 
of the Confederates under General Zollicoffer at 
Logan's Crossroads, January 19th, followed by Gen- 
eral Grant's capture of Fort Henry, February 6th, and 
his investment of Fort Donelson ten days afterward, 
put an end to every immediate endeavor to carry out 
the campaign that the President and general in chief 
had so set their hearts upon. But this failure was not 
without its influence in weakening the support that 
McClellan had heretofore received from the political 
element surrounding the President. 

3. The creation of the Committee on the Conduct 
of the War. This committee, as has been before stated, 
was appointed in December, 1861, and consisted of 



* Official War Records, vol. vii, p. 531. f Ibid., p. 547. 



164 GENERAL McCLELLAN. 

three members of the Senate and four members of the 
House of Representatives. The senators were Benja- 
min F. Wade, Zachary Chandler, and Andrew John- 
son ; the representatives were D. W. Gooch, John 
Covode, G. W. Juhan, and M. F. Odell. This com- 
mittee held its first meeting December 20th, the day 
after the committee was completed by the action of 
the House, and Senator Wade was selected as its chair- 
man. They were all men of strong character, and al- 
though none of them had had any military education, 
it was not long before they felt sufficient confidence in 
their military perception to be able to subject military 
operations to the crucial test of their own convictions. 
This is indicated in the following extract which occurs 
in their first report : *' Your committee therefore con- 
cluded that they would best perform their duty by en- 
deavoring to obtain such information in respect to the 
conduct of the war as would best enable them to advise 
what mistakes had been made in the past and the 
proper course to be pursued in the future; to obtain 
such information as the many and laborious duties off 
the President and his Cabinet prevented them fromi 
acquiring, and to lay it before them with such recom-- 
mendations and suggestions as seemed to be most im-- 
peratively demanded; and the journal of the proceed- - 
ings of your committee shows that for a long time 2 
they were in constant communication with the Presi-- 
dent and his Cabinet, and neglected no opportunity 
of at once laying before them the information acquired! 
by them in the course of their investigation. ... It 
was apparent from the first that your committee 
would be compelled to confine their attention to a 
few of the more prominent subjects of inquiry: 
to those the investigation of which would best enable 
them to comprehend the causes and necessity, if any, 
for the delay and inaction characterizing the opera- 
tions of our armies in the field. 

'* And while each of those subjects has received 
from them the attention which its importance merited, 
so far as they were able to give it, the attention of your 



INACTIVITY OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 165 

committee has been turned more particularly to the 
history of the Army of the Potomac. In the history 
of that army is to be found all that is necessary to en- 
able your committee to report upon ' the conduct of 
the war.' Had that army fulfilled all that a generous 
and confiding people were justified in expecting from 
it, this rebellion had long since been crushed and the 
blessings of peace restored to this nation. The failure 
of that army to fulfill those expectations has pro- 
longed this contest to the present time, with all its ex- 
penditure of life and treasure, for it has to a great ex- 
tent neutralized, if not entirely destroyed, the legitimate 
fruits which would otherwise have been reaped from 
our glorious victories in the West." * 

A study of the report submitted by this committee 
shows that it exercised a most potent political influ- 
ence upon the military situation. Composed of men 
not only ignorant of the military art but unconscious 
of their ignorance, they soon evolved their own 
individual plans of campaign, which they endeavored 
to fortify by testimony from witnesses brought 
before them. These witnesses, whose testimony was 
not subjected to the crucial tests of cross-examina- 
tion, were interrogated upon every point that entered 
the minds of their questioners, not excluding the 
confidential information imparted to them in regard 
to the plans of the general in chief. Never before 
had such a tribunal been brought into existence. Ex- 
ercising enormous influence in Congress as a com- 
mittee, the individual members being men of restless 
activity and radical views and of the strongest patriot- 
ism, they powerfully affected not only the action of 
the War Department, but the judgment of the Presi- 
dent himself. They never seriously entertained any 
other conviction than that acts of Congress could 
create disciplined armies out of patriotic volunteers 
without having recourse to the time requisite to organ- 
ize, drill, and discipline them. 

* Report of Committee on Conduct of the War, vol. i, p. 4. 



1 66 GENERAL McCLELLAN. 

Immediately after the committee was organized 
McClellan was invited to appear at his convenience for 
an interview before proceeding in their official duties. 
He replied that he would do himself the honor to 
appear before them on the morning of December 23d, 
but before the designated time he was stricken with 
typhoid fever and was prevented by the serious char- 
acter of his illness from attending until January 15th, 
when there was a full and free conference between him 
and the committee in relation to various matters con- 
nected with the conduct of the war, but which, how- 
ever, does not appear in their published report. The 
tenor of the investigation conducted by the committee 
previous to this interview indicated that the immobility 
of the Army of the Potomac, the Potomac blockade, 
the reduction of the cavalry force, the failure of Mc- 
Clellan to call his generals of divisions together for 
consultation in councils of war, were among the most 
prominent subjects touched upon. As the chairman. 
Senator Wade, expressed it, '* We must run some risk ; 
we can not keep such an army as this without doing 
something; we must get money for the army, and to 
get that we must do something, and do it as soon as 
it can be done ; we must run a little hazard." '^ General 
McClellan was, of course, aware of the general char- 
acter of the committee's investigations, and that it was 
certainly tending to weaken his influence with the 
Secretary of War and the President ; and while it was 
not a war council composed of military men whose 
judgments were entitled to acceptance and control, its 
influence was to be feared from the star-chamber char- 
acter of its proceedings, and its connection with the 
legislative branch of the Government. 

4. The appointment of Edwin M. Stanton to suc- 
ceed Simon Cameron as Secretary of War. During 
Mr. Cameron's term of office McClellan was practically 
unhampered in his direction of military afifairs, and he 
had reason to suppose that the same condition of 

* Report of Committee on Conduct of the War, vol. i, p. 128. 



INACTIVITY OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 167 

things would prevail with the new Secretary, as the 
latter, up to the time of his appointment, had given to 
McClellan such evidence of friendly regard and per- 
sonal confidence that it was generally believed that the 
determining cause of his selection was the fact of this 
intimacy. But it was not long after Mr. Stanton had 
entered upon the duties of his office before McClellan 
found that the atmosphere of the War Department had 
measurably lowered in temperature so far as he was 
concerned. Instead of the confidential and appreci- 
ative reception to which he had been accustomed, he 
was soon made to feel the chilling and repelling atti- 
tude of official superiority, and then the loss of con- 
fidence and professional distrust. Given McClellan's 
dignity and natural reserve, this unexpected treat- 
ment kept him away as much as possible from the 
War Department and closed all the avenues of friendly 
intercourse that had heretofore existed between the 
two men. To McClellan this too sudden change was 
inexplicable, and notwithstanding the several instances 
of attempted reconciliation that afterward occurred, 
it is certain that this mutual distrust, thus early en- 
gendered, was always a potent factor in the conduct 
of military operations. 

Like all men of strong individuality, this remark- 
able war secretary possessed many contradictory 
traits of character. His judgments of men and meas- 
ures, often necessarily hastily formed from inadequate 
knowledge of facts, were frequently harsh and unjust. 
But the armor of his intense patriotism and sterling 
integrity was absolutely without spot or blemish. 
Anxious for immediate results, he was masterful in de- 
nouncing all delay as procrastination. He ignored the 
routine of the War Department bureaucracy whenever 
he chose, and terrorized its officials by his dominating 
methods of procedure. Capable of indefatigable and 
continuous labor, he spared neither himself nor his 
subordinates in the transaction of public business. 
Urgent in his efforts to end the state of immobility 
that he found in the army and unable to understand 



l68 GENERAL McCLELLAN, 

the cause of McClellan's inactivity, he soon became an 
active ally of the Conxmittee on the Conduct of the 
War to remedy this state of affairs. Actuated by this 
antagonism, he opposed, though not always openly, 
McClellan's plan of campaign, and sometimes indulged 
in contemptuous expressions reflecting upon the lat- 
ter's military ability and purposes, which, being re- 
peated to McClellan, could not but widen the separa- 
tion between these two men. 

In addition to these more prominent causes of 
lessened influence with the Administration, the ill-ad- 
vised laudations of many of McClellan's partisan ad- 
mirers, the reserve in which, with few exceptions, he 
held himself toward his general ofhcers, the seeming 
indifference to criticism, the love of display as exhibited 
in the frequent reviews, each added its effect to the 
growing disaffection, and gave the general public the 
impression that he was unable to utilize the magnifi- 
cent army under his command. After Mr. Stanton's 
advent McClellan was not able to confer so freely with 
the President as before, and he was forced into an 
attitude where he was obliged to defend his policy and 
justify his apparent apathy. All this time he had in 
reality been deeply pondering upon a plan of cam- 
paign just as soon as the methodical nature of his 
mind permitted the necessary leisure after he had 
attended to the demands that the western departments 
made upon his time and attention. There were also 
several expeditions which had been undertaken, and he 
had been compelled to give much time and thought 
to their organization and equipment. To these we 
shall now briefly refer. 

Early in September General McClellan had recom- 
mended to the Secretary of War the formation of two 
brigades of five regiments each, of New England men 
particularly adapted to coast service, desiring to use 
them for operations in the inlets of Chesapeake Bay 
and the Potomac upon vessels of light draught which 
were to follow on the flank of the main army when it 
made its advanced movement. Much delay ensued 



INACTIVITY OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 



1G9 



before this organization was effected, and as the army 
did not then move the original purpose of this organi- 
zation was abandoned. During November and De- 
cember these troops were utihzed for an expedition 
which was being fitted out under General Burnside for 
a descent upon the North Carolina coast, similar to 
that which in the following January, under General 
T. W. Sherman and Commodore Dupont, captured 
Hilton Head in Port Royal Harbor on the South 
Carolina coast. Burnside's expedition sailed from 
Hampton Roads January nth, under specific instruc- 
tions from General McClellan, and was convoyed by 
a strong naval force commanded by Commodore 
Goldsborough. After a stormy passage it crossed 
the bar at Hatteras Inlet, assaulted and captured 
Roanoke Island, Beaufort, and Newbern in North 
Carolina. The general in chief, while in the midst of 
the troubles attending the birth of the plan finally 
adopted for the movement of the Army of the Poto- 
mac, sent instructions to General T. W. Sherman look- 
ing to the reduction of Fort Pulaski, February 14th, 
and to General B. F. Butler in command of the land 
forces in the New Orleans expedition, February 23d. 
The objects contemplated in the several expeditions 
were eventually carried out : Fort Pulaski capitulated 
April II, 1862, and New Orleans was surrendered 
May 25th to the navy, and was almost immediately 
occupied by the forces under General Butler. McClel- 
lan's connection with these operations was confined 
to the general instructions which his position as gen- 
eral in chief required of him, and which are found em- 
bodied in his letters of instruction already referred to. 
From the time of McClellan's assignment to the 
command of the Division of the Potomac he devoted 
all his efforts, influence, and ability to the formation 
of a great army on the lines laid down in his memo- 
randum of August 2d. Everything goes to show that 
he did not intend to be diverted from this fixed pur- 
pose, and, considering his inherent characteristics, his 
conduct of affairs is consistent with this point of view 



I JO GENERAL McCLELLAN. 

and with this alone. There was one important factor, 
however, which had a. preponderating influence and 
for which he is to be held entirely responsible, that, 
had it been eliminated, would have changed the whole 
complexion of the problem. It was the entirely erro- 
neous estimate of the strength of the Confederate 
forces in front of the Army of the Potomac. Trusting 
to his service of information, a trust that should have 
been shaken by the manifest improbability of its re- 
ports, McClellan was forced to adopt for a reason- 
able time a defensive attitude and a waiting policy. 
But had he known, even approximately, Johnston's 
strength, he could not have justified beyond the mid- 
dle of October the delay of an aggressive movement 
against the long line of the Confederate position. 
And even granting his belief in this erroneous esti- 
mate, the unmolested occupation of Mason's and Mun- 
son's Hills by the Confederate outposts for so long 
a time, his acquiescence in the blockade of the Poto- 
mac, and his failure to employ strong reconnoissances 
to get reliable information are difficult to compre- 
hend. It is not a sufficient answer to say that this 
erroneous belief in the enemy's strength was uni- 
versal, for of all men McClellan alone had the means 
within his own control to arrive at the truth, and these 
means were not advantageously employed. 

Firmly believing that he was overmatched by the 
enemy, he felt apprehensive all through August and 
the greater part of September lest he should be at- 
tacked, and every day that passed without such an 
attack was to him a day gained. During October he 
felt secure in his defensive position and would have 
welcomed an aggressive movement on the part of the 
enemy. But there is no satisfactory evidence that he 
contemplated any advance of his army except as a 
remote possibility. Awaiting Scott's retirement, he 
seemed to be content with frequent reviews and in- 
spections, and intrenching himself behind an impene- 
trable reserve, and breathing an atmosphere of flattery 
and adulation, he practically became an isolated mill- 



INACTIVITY OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 



171 



tary autocrat whose designs were unknown save to 
one or two of his intimate personal friends. Even 
after McClellan had attained to the command as gen- 
eral in chief the situation remained practically un- 
changed, for he found himself overwhelmed with the 
responsibilities of his increased command, and Novem- 
ber passed without any sign of activity in the ranks of 
that army upon which the hopes of the nation rested. 
The President, harassed and anxious, while publicly 
defending and sustaining him, felt constrained pri- 
vately to impress upon him the immediate necessity of 
doing something, and about the ist of December 
himself conceived a plan which, with characteristic 
thoughtfulness, he privately submitted in an autograph 
memorandum for McClellan's consideration: 

'' If it were determined to make a forward move- 
ment of the Army of the Potomac, without awaiting 
further increase of numbers or better drill and disci- 
pline, how long would it require to actually get in 
motion ? " 

Answer by McClellan : *' If bridge-trains ready, 
by December 15th — probably 25th." 

'' After leaving all that would be necessary, how 
many troops could join the movement from south- 
, west of the river ? " 

Answer : '* Seventy-one thousand." 

** How many from northeast of it ? " 

Answer: ''Thirty-three thousand." 

" Suppose, then, that of those southwest of the 

i river, fifty thousand [inserted by McClellan] move 

forward and menace the enemy at Centreville, the 

remainder of the movable force on that side move 

; rapidly to the crossing of the Occoquan by the road 

from Alexandria toward Richmond, there to be joined 

by the whole movable force from northeast of the 

river, having landed from the Potomac just below the 

' mouth of the Occoquan, moved by land up the south 

side of that stream to the crossing-point named ; then 

the whole move together, by the road thence to Brent- 

ville and beyond, to the railroad just south of its cross- 



172 



GENERAL McCLELLAN. 



ing of Broad Run, a strong detachment of cavalry 
having gone rapidly ahead to destroy the railroad 
bridges south and north of the point. 

" If the crossing of the Occoquan by those from 
above be resisted, those landing from the Potomac 
below to take the resisting force of the enemy in rear ; 
or, if the landing from the Potomac be resisted, those 
crossing the Occoquan from above to take that resist- 
ing force in rear. Both points will probably not be 
successfully resisted at the same time. The force in 
front of Centreville, if pressed too hardly, should fight 
back slowly into the intrenchments behind them. 
Armed vessels and transportation should remain at 
the Potomac landing to cover a possible retreat." * 

McClellan's reply to this suggested plan was rather 
more curt and tardy than the distinguished position 
of its author as well as its own intrinsic merit war- 
ranted. *' I inclose," he writes in reply, " the paper 
you left with me, filled as you requested. In arriving 
at the numbers given I have left the minimum num- 
ber in garrison and observation. 

" Information received recently leads me to believe 
that the enemy could meet us in front with equal forces 
nearly, and I have now my mind actively turned toward 
another plan of campaign that I do not think at all 
anticipated by the enemy, nor by many of our own 
people." t 

This is certainly the first definite reference that is 
to be found in any of the published records of the war 
indicating that any definite plan had been formulated 
by him, and, as appears from the statement of his 
chief engineer, General Barnard, this plan is in reality 
that of the lower Chesapeake. " On one of the last 
days of November," says General Barnard, " I was at 
General McClellan's headquarters, and found myself 
alone with him. Casually, apparently, he mentioned 
the plan he had recently conceived of moving the army, 
by water, to the Rappahannock. The features of the 

* Official War Records, vol. xi, part iii, p. 6. f Ibid. 



INACTIVITY OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 173 

plan, as I now recollect, were principally these : to 
carry the whole, or at least the greater part, of the army 
to Urbana by water, and by a rapid march to cut oft 
and ' bag ' Mag-ruder's force on the Peninsula — seize 
Richmond, all before Johnston's force from Manassas 
could arrive to succor it. To prevent or at least delay 
the arrival of that army, the railroad bridges of the 
different roads between Richmond and Manassas were 
at the proper moment to be destroyed. The general 
intimated that he had agents to do this work upon 
whom he could rely." * 

The results of General Barnard's reflections upon 
this plan are entitled to the highest consideration, for 
he was an officer of experience, well qualified by his 
scientific attainments and the analytical powers of his 
mind to express an opinion upon any question of 
strategy ; they are embodied in two memoranda dated 
December 5th and 6th. In the first, Barnard says : 

" The idea of shifting the theater of operations to 
the James, York, or Rappahannock has often occurred. 
The great difficulty I have found in this matter is that 
of moving a body as large as necessary rapidly, and 
of making the necessary preparations for such a move- 
ment so that they should not, in themselves, give in- 
dications of the whereabouts of the intended opera- 
tions in time to meet them. 

" The first thing to be considered is the old danger 
attending all similar operations. In cutting the ene- 
my's line of operations you expose yourself; and a 
bold and desperate enemy, seeing himself anticipated 
at Richmond, might attempt to retrieve the disaster by 
a desperate effort upon Washington. Leaving, then, 
as we should do, the great mass of the enemy in front 
of Washington, it would not be safe to leave it guarded 
by less than one hundred thousand men — that is, until 
we became certain that he had withdrawn from our 
front so far as to render his return upon it imprac- 
ticable. It seems to me, too, that the full garrisoning 

* Barnard's Peninsular Campaign, p. 51. 



74 



GENERAL McCLELLAN. 



of the works up to the standard fixed upon should be 
completed without delay. These works will but im- 
perfectly serve their purpose if they are not defended 
by troops who have some familiarity with their posi- 
tion. . . . 

" I dwell upon this matter somewhat, since if the 
army moves — particularly if it makes a flank move- 
ment leaving the enemy in front — the measures for 
defence of the city can not be too carefully taken. 

" Now as to the expedition. Considering the great 
difficulty of transporting, at one time, large numbers — 
the confusion which will attend the landing, and con- 
sequent difficulty of getting the columns into prompt 
marching order after landing, with our new troops, if 
the numbers are great — I should be disposed to make 
the first descent with a comparatively small but select 
corps — not over twenty, at outside thirty thousand 
men." * 

In the memorandum of December 6th he says : 

" When you suggested to me a Southern move- 
ment I told you that my ideas had turned toward Nor- 
folk. Its capture would not be so great an operation 
as the successful execution of the project you pro- 
pose, still it seems to me worthy of consideration 
as attended with less risk. To execute successfully 
the operation you propose with a moderate army 
(say twenty or thirty thousand men), to be after- 
ward re-enforced, depends upon auxiliary aids which 
may fail. 

" If the railroad bridges are not destroyed, or but 
imperfectly, the enemy may overwhelm our expedi- 
tionary army ; while to execute the difficult operation 
of transferring at once a large army — say one hundred 
thousand men — to that line, I look upon as imprac- 
ticable, if not otherwise imprudent. 

" There is one very important consideration in this 
matter of changing the line of operations. The Army 
of the Potomac has an object of immense importance 

* Official War Records, vol. v, p. 671. 



INACTIVITY OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 



175 



to defend — the capital, to lose which would be almost 
to lose everything. 

'' We can not withdraw the bulk of the army from 
Washington with the enemy in our front ; I would 
not trust enough to its fortifications for that. 

'' On the other hand, the enemy in front has noth- 
ing to defend. If we throw thirty thousand or fifty 
thousand men on to the Rappahannock, he can aban- 
don entirely his position at Manassas, and have object 
enough to do so in the hope of overwhelming our 
force ; and I think it is too great a hazard to risk, upon 
the expectation of his railroad bridges being destroyed. 

'' There is another operation which I should think 
well worthy of weighing. To throw an army of thirty 
thousand men on to Norfolk, landing between the 
Elizabeth and Nansemond. The enemy's army at 
Norfolk would be cut of¥. The Nansemond and 
Dismal Swamp would, I should judge by the map, 
give us a defensive line against the enemy's re-enforce- 
ments (breaking the railroad as far as possible), and 
the capture of Norfolk would be, if not so brilliant and 
decisive as what you propose, yet a great blow, par- 
ticularly if, at the same time, we captured its army. 
At the same time a demonstration in force on the 
enemy in our front would either prevent his making 
detachments, or compel him to abandon his position 
and his batteries on the Potomac." * 

It does not appear that Barnard's criticism had suf- 
ficient influence upon the mind of the general in chief 
to cause him to modify his plan or to undertake a 
separate movement for the capture of Norfolk, for 
there is plenty of evidence that the grand plan of trans- 
porting the bulk of his immense army to the Peninsula 
constantly grew in his mind and thrust aside every 
other conception. The only indication that the Presi- 
dent was aware of his general plan appears in his state- 
ment of the interview at the White House, January 
13th, to be noted hereafter. But McClellan, of his own 

* Barnard's Peninsular Campaign, p. 54. 



iy6 GENERAL McCLELLAN. 

volition, confidentially laid his plans before the Secre- 
tary of the Treasury at an interview December 12th, 
as a measure of relief to the latter, who was then seri- 
ously troubled in his financial administration by the 
uncertainty as to military operations. Mr. Chase was 
delighted, said it was a most brilliant conception, and 
thanked McClellan most cordially for the confidence 
he had thus reposed in him. So that at this time the 
plan had been sufTficiently matured to be determined 
upon by the general in chief. Very unfortunately 
McClellan was shortly afterward prostrated by a severe 
attack of typhoid fever, and for three weeks was unable 
to see the President and confer with him in regard to 
army affairs. Mr. Lincoln, who had called to see him 1 
on January loth but was unsuccessful, became appre- 
hensive lest McClellan's illness would prove fatal and 
the army be left without a directing head at this critical 1 
juncture. Congress was in session and embarrassing 
questions were being asked; the severest criticisms oni 
the immobility of the army were being indulged in ; 
the Committee on the Conduct of the War was formed, 
and the utmost dissatisfaction universally prevailed.. 
The President was in danger of becoming the vicarious 
sacrifice unless something were speedily done. Under 
these circumstances Mr. Lincoln, upon the advice off 
General Meigs, Quartermaster General of the Army, 
sent for Generals McDowell and Franklin, on the loth 
of January, to take counsel with them as to the pos- 
sibility of beginning active operations with the Army 
of the Potomac at an early day. 

General McDowell committed to writing the sub- 
stance of what occurred at the interviews that followed, 
and his account, taken in connection with McClel- 
lan's statement of the incidents of the last inter- 
view, gives an insight into the causes that led to a 
wider divergence between the general in chief and the 
President. From McDowell's memorandum we learn 
that the first interview was held at the White House 
at eight o'clock, January loth, at which were present 
the President, Secretaries Seward and Chase, Assistant 



INACTIVITY OF THE ARMY OF THE TOTOMAC. 



177 



Secretary of War Scott, and Generals McDowell and 
Franklin, 

" The President was greatly disturbed at the state 
of affairs; spoke of the exhausted condition of the 
treasury ; of the loss of public credit ; of the Jacobinism 
of Congress ; of the delicate condition of our foreign 
relations ; of the bad news he had received from the 
West, particularly as contained in a letter from General 
Halleck on the state of affairs in Missouri ; of the want 
of co-operation between Generals Halleck and Buell ; 
but, more than all, the sickness of General McClellan. 

'' The President said that he was in great distress, 
and as he had been to General McClellan's house and 
the general did not ask to see him, and as he must talk 
to somebody, he had sent for General Franklin and 
myself to obtain our opinion as to the possibility of 
soon commencing active operations with the Army of 
the Potomac. 

" To use his own expression, ' If something was 
not soon done, the bottom would be out of the whole 
affair ; and if General McClellan did not want to use 
the army, he would like to borrow it, provided he could 
see how it could be made to do something.' " * 

General McDowell, in answer to the President's 
question as to what could be done with the army, 
outlined the plan which seemed to him best at this 
time. Substantially it was to organize the army into 
four corps, place three of these at the front — the right 
in the vicinity of Vienna, the center beyond Fairfax 
Court House, and the left beyond Fairfax Station ; the 
fourth corps, in connection with a force of heavy guns 
afloat, and supported by the corps on the left of the 
army, to operate on the enemy's right flank beyond 
the Occoquan, get behind the Potomac batteries, take 
Aquia, and then move against the railroad between 
Manassas and the Rappahannock. General Franklin, 
upon being asked if he had ever thought what he 
would do with this army if he had it, replied that, in 



* Svvinton, Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac, p. 80. 
12 



1^8 GENERAL McCLELLAN. 

his judgment, what could be spared from the duty of 
protecting the capital should be taken to the York 
River to operate on Richmond. Thereupon the ques- 
tion of transportation by water for a. large part of the 
army was discussed, the Assistant Secretary of War 
saying that the means had been fully taxed to provide 
transportation for twelve thousand men. After some 
further conversation the President expressed a wish 
that the two generals would come again on the follow- 
ing night, and in the meanwhile obtain all the neces- 
sary information from the staff officers of the army in 
regard to its actual condition-r-they having confessed 
their ignorance in this respect. 

The next morning the two generals met at the 
Treasury building and discussed the question of the 
operations which seemed to them best under existing 
circumstances. McDow^ell argued strongly against the 
York River project, urging the pressing necessity of 
time, and insisting that the war was now one of posi- 
tions until they could penetrate the line of the enemy. 
'' The first thing to be done," he said, *' was to over- 
come this army in our front, which is beleaguering our 
capital, blockading the river, and covering us day by 
day with the reproach of impotence, and lowering us 
in the eyes of foreign nations and our people both 
North and South ; and that nothing but what is neces- 
sary for this purpose should go elsewhere." General 
Franklin, on the other hand, leaned toward the York 
River plan, and it seems to be evident that the main 
features of this plan had been confided to him by Gen- 
eral McClellan. He suggested, in view of the impor- 
tance of their investigation, that Secretary Chase might 
be at liberty to tell them the destination of Burnside's 
expedition, then on the eve of departure. McDowell 
went and asked him. The Secretary said that under 
the circumstances he felt that he ought to tell them, 
and said : " It was destined for Newbern, N. C., by way 
of Hatteras Inlet and Pamlico Sound, to operate on 
Raleigh or Beaufort, or either of them. That General 
McClellan had, by direction of the President, ac- 



INACTIVITY OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 



79 



qiiainted him with his own plan, which was to go with 
a large force of this Army of the Potomac to Ur1)ana 
or Tappahannock, on the Rappahannock, and then 
with his bridge train move directly to Richmond." 

Franklin also raised the question as to whether, in 
deference to General McClellan, the latter should not 
be informed of the duty they were ordered to per- 
form ; but McDowell held that, as the order under 
which they were working was marked private and con- 
fidential and came directly from the President, their 
Commander in Chief, it was for the President to do 
this, and not for them ; and in this opinion he was sup- 
ported by Secretary Chase, whom he consulted as to 
the rule of the Cabinet in such cases. 

Having obtained all the information desired from 
the chiefs of the Ordnance, Commissary, and Quarter- 
master Departments of the Army of the Potomac, the 
two generals prepared a paper containing their views, 
both agreeing, " in view of time, etc., required to 
take this army to another base, that operations could 
best now be undertaken from the present base sub- 
stantially as proposed." This paper was read to the 
same high officials as were present at the previous 
meeting, with the addition of Postmaster-General Blair, 
w^ho came in after the discussion had commenced. The 
latter was a strong friend of McClellan and immedi- 
ately opposed the plan presented in the paper, Mr. 
Chase defending it, and Mr. Seward expressing his 
belief that a victory anywhere would answer. After 
considerable discussion the meeting was adjourned by 
the President ; after directing the two generals to con- 
sult with Quartermaster-General Meigs on the ques- 
tion of providing water transportation, it was under- 
stood that another meeting would be held the next 
day at three o'clock. But on this Sunday morning 
General McClellan had mustered strength enough to 
be driven to the White House, and took advantage of 
the occasion to explain to the President in a general 
and casual way what his intentions were. He made no 
allusion to show that he was acquainted with what had 



/ 



l8o GENERAL McCLELLAN. 

occurred nor was anything- said to him on the subject, 
but before he left he v^as informed that there was to 
be a meeting at the White House the next day, and 
was invited to be present. At the Sunday afternoon 
meeting General Meigs attended with McDowell and 
Franklin, and stated that water transportation for thirty 
thousand men could be assembled in a month or six 
weeks. The general subject of operations from the 
present base was again discussed, and the drift of the 
conversation that ensued touched upon the propriety 
of moving the army farther south, with a suggestion to 
the President that Burnside's expedition be recalled and 
brought up to Aquia ; but the latter declined to inter- 
fere, as it was on the point of striking. Nothing was 
done at this meeting, as the President stated that Gen- 
eral McClellan had been out to see him, that he seemed 
to be able to assume charge of the army, and that all 
further proceedings on the part of the two generals 
would be dropped. A meeting was arranged for the 
next day, when General McClellan was to be present 
and again discuss the question of the movement of 
the army. 

The next day there were present all the elements 
necessary to make the situation exceedingly dramatic. 
The convalescent general, who had been warned by 
Mr. Stanton : " They are counting on your death, and 
are already dividing among themselves your military 
goods and chattels " ; the harassed President, anx- 
iously and honestly seeking a solution of the perplex- 
ing military problem ; two generals, junior to the gen- 
eral in chief and subject to his command, practically 
on the defensive, presenting a plan of campaign in 
opposition to his own ; Secretaries Seward, Chase, and 
Blair, the former nonpartisan and imperturbable, and 
the other two on opposite sides ; these with the Assist- 
ant Secretary of War and General Meigs constituted 
the actors and audience. McDowell's account of this 
meeting naturally displays less personal feeling than 
does that of McClellan. The former says : 

" The President, pointing to a map, asked me to go 



INACTIVITY OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. iSl 

over the plan I had before spoken to him of. He at the 
same time made a brief explanation of how he came to 
bring General Franklin and General McDowell before 
him. I mentioned in as brief terms as possible what 
General Franklin and I had done under the President's 
order, what our investigations had been directed upon, 
and what were our conclusions as to going to the 
front from our present base, in the way I have here- 
tofore stated, referring also to a transfer of a part of 
the army to another base farther south. That we had 
been informed that the latter movement could not be 
commenced under a month to six weeks, and that a 
movement to the front could be undertaken in all of 
three weeks. General Franklin dissented only as to 
the time I mentioned for beginning operations in the 
front, not thinking we could get the roads in order by 
that time. I added, commence operations in all of three 
weeks, to which he assented. I concluded my remarks 
by saying something apologetic in explanation of the 
position in which we were ; to which General McClel- 
lan replied, somewhat coldly if not curtly, ' You are 
entitled to have any opinion you please.' No discus- 
sion was entered into by him whatever, the above being 
the only remark he made. General Franklin said that, 
in giving his opinion as to York River, he did it 
knowing that it was in the direction of General McClel- 
lan's plan. I said that I acted entirely in the dark. 
General Meigs spoke of his agency in having us called 
in by the President. The President then asked what 
and when anything could be done, again going over 
somewhat the same ground he had done with General 
Franklin and myself. General McClellan said the case 
was so clear a blind man could see it, and then spoke 
of the difficulty of ascertaining what force he could 
count upon ; that he did not know whether he could 
let General Butler go to Ship Island, or whether he 
could re-enforce Burnside. Much conversation en- 
sued, of rather a general character, as to the discrep- 
ancy between the number of men paid for and the 
number effective. The Secretary of the Treasury then 



l82 GENERAL McCLELLAN. 

put a direct question to General McClellan to the 
effect as to what he interrded doing with his army, and 
when he intended doing it ? After a long silence, Gen- 
eral McClellan answered that the movement in Ken- 
tucky was to precede any one from this place, and that 
that movement might now be forced ; that he had 
directed General Buell if he could not hire wagons for 
his transportation, that he must take them. After an- 
other pause he said he must say he was very unwilling 
to develop his plans, always believing that in military 
matters the fewer persons who were knowing to them 
the better ; that he would tell them if he was ordered 
to do so. The President then asked him if he counted 
upon any particular time ; he did not ask what that 
time was, but had he in his own mind any particular 
time fixed when a movement could be commenced? 
He replied he had. Then, rejoined the President, I 
will adjourn this meeting." 

A part of McClellan's narrative of what occurred 
at this meeting suffices to complete the picture. He 
says : 

" I sat by Secretary Blair and General Meigs, 
and entered into conversation with them upon topics 
of general interest having no possible bearing upon 
any subject that could be brought before the meeting. 
Meanwhile there was a good deal of whispering among 
the others, in which I do not think Franklin took any 
special part. Finally McDowell said he wished to 
explain to me the part he had in the examination, 
which had commenced, into the state of the army. 

" Exactly what he said has escaped my memory, 
except that he disclaimed any purpose hostile to me, 
and based what had been done on the ground of the 
supposed critical nature of my illness. I stopped the 
explanation by saying that as I was now again restored 
to health the case had changed, and that, as the exami- 
nation must now cease, further explanations were un- 
necessary. Franklin then said a few words clearing 
himself of any improper njotives, which was needless, 
as I could not suspect him of anything wrong. I 



INACTIVITY OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 183 

then quietly resumed my conversation with JJlair and 
Meigs, awaiting further developments. 

" The whispering then recommenced, especially be- 
tween the President and Secretary Chase ; when at 
length the latter [Chase] spoke aloud, for the benefit 
of all assembled, in a very excited tone and manner, 
saying that he understood the purpose of the meet- 
ing to be that General McClellan should then and there 
explain his military plans in detail, that they might 
be submitted to the approval or disapproval of the 
gentlemen present. The uncalled-for violence of his 
manner surprised me, but I determined to avail myself 
of it by keeping perfectly cool myself, and contented 
myself with remarking — what was entirely true — that 
the purpose he expressed was entirely new to me ; that 
I did not recognize the Secretary of the Treasury as 
in any manner my official superior, and that I denied 
his right to question me upon the military affairs com- 
mitted to my charge ; that in the President and Secre- 
tary of War alone did I recognize the right to inter- 
rogate me. I then quietly resumed my conversation 
with Blair and Meigs, taking no further notice of Mr. 
Chase. 

" After I had thus disposed of the Secretary of the 
Treasury he resumed his whispering with the Presi- 
dent, who, after the lapse of some minutes, said : ' Well, 
General McClellan, I think you had better tell us what 
your plans are,' or words to that effect. 

" To this I replied in substance, that if the Presi- 
dent had confidence in me it was not right or neces- 
sary to intrust my designs to the judgment of others, 
but that if his confidence was so slight as to require 
my opinions to be fortified by those of other persons, 
it would be wiser to replace me by some one fully 
possessing his confidence ; that no general command- 
ing an army would willingly submit his plans to the 
judgment of such an assembly, in which some were 
incompetent to form a valuable opinion, and others 
incapable of keeping a secret, so that anything made 
known to them would soon spread over Washington 



1 84 



GENERAL McCLELLAN. 



and become known to the enemy. I also reminded 
the President that he and^the Secretary of the Treasury 
knew in general terms what my designs were. Finally, 
I declined giving any further information to the meet- 
ing unless the President gave me the order in writing 
and assumed the responsibility of the results. 

" This was probably an unexpected denouement. 
The President was not willing to assume the responsi- 
bility, and after a little more whispering between him 
and Mr. Chase, Mr. Seward arose, buttoned his coat, 
and laughingly said, ' Well, Mr. President, I think the 
meeting had better break up. I don't see that we 
are likely to make much out of General McClellan.' 
With that the meeting adjourned. I do not think that 
Mr. Seward took any special part in the affair, and be- 
lieve that he was on my side. Mr. Chase still con- 
tinued his whispered conversation with the President. 
I waited until that ceased, then walked up to the Presi- 
dent, begged him not to allow himself to be acted 
upon by improper influences, but still trust me, and 
said that if he would leave military affairs to me 
I would be responsible; that I would bring matters 
to a successful issue and free him from all his 
troubles." * 

It must be confessed that McClellan's position was 
not strengthened by what had occurred at this inter- 
view. He had not re-established himself in the full 
confidence of the Executive; Mr. Seward was non- 
committal and diplomatic ; Mr. Chase was decidedly 
in opposition, and Mr. Blair was alone actively his 
supporter. His own demeanor in treating with scant 
courtesy the project of the two generals, which he knew 
was practically the President's plan, was *an act of 
temerity that could be justified only by an unimpaired 
confidence in the strength of his position or a determi- 
nation to face the issue of his responsibility as gen- 
eral in chief. From this time on the lines were clearly 
drawn between those who defended and those who 

* McClellan's Own Story, p. 156 et seq. 



INACTIVITY OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 



85 



Opposed him. Many men of influence in the councils 
of the nation pubhcly assailed him, vigorously de- 
nounced his lethargy and incapacity, and some even 
went so far as to question the purity of his motives 
by expressing doubts of his loyalty. 



CHAPTER VIIL 

president's war orders. PENINSULAR PLAN 

ADOPTED. ASSISTANCE OF THE NAVY. 

On the very day of this conference the new Secre- . 
tary of War, Mr. Stanton, entered upon the adminis- 
tration of the War Department, and it was not long 
before its organization exhibited a new spirit and a 
more active vitaHty. McClellan's hitherto predomi- ' 
nating influence at the War Department perceptibly 
waned, and he was soon made to experience in his per- 
sonal and official intercourse that the tone had changed 
from the hearty welcome of the personal friend to the 
masterful accentuation of the official superior. Very 
soon after Secretary Stanton had entered upon the 
duties of his office General McClellan orally laid 
before him his plan of campaign by the lower Chesa- 
peake, and was thereupon directed to submit it to the 
President. The latter at once disapproved it, and 
shortly afterward, of his own volition, and, it is said, 
without consulting either his Cabinet or the general 
in chief, issued, January 27th, General War Order No. 
I , as follows : 

" Ordered, that the 226. day of February, 1862, be 
the day for a general movement of the land and naval 
forces of the United States against the insurgent forces. 
That especially the army at and about Fortress Mon- 
roe, the Army of the Potomac, the Army of Western 
Virginia, the army near Munfordville, Ky., the army 
and flotilla at Cairo, and the naval force in the Gulf of 1 
Mexico, be ready to move on that day. 

" That all other forces, both land and naval, with 
their respective commanders, obey existing orders for 
186 



PRESIDENT'S WAR ORDERS. 



187 



the time, and be ready to obey additional orders when 
duly given. 

" That the heads of departments, and especially the 
Secretaries of War and of the Navy, with all their 
subordinates, and the general in chief with all other 
commanders and subordinates of land and naval 
forces, will severally be held to their strict and 
full responsibilities for prompt execution of this 
order." * 

This was followed by the President's Special War 
Order No. i, January 31st, outlining the plan of cam- 
paign that he had adopted for the Army of the 
Potomac : 

** Ordered, That all the disposable force of the 
Army of the Potomac, after providing safely for the 
defense of Washington, be formed into an expedition 
for the immediate object of seizing and occupying a 
point upon the railroad southwestward of what is 
known as Manassas Junction, all details to be in the 
discretion of the commander in chief, and the expe- 
dition to move before or on the 22d day of February 
next." t 

Notwithstanding the explicit language of these 
orders and the high authority which promulgated 
them, McClellan inquired of the President whether the 
special order relating to the Army of the Potomac was 
to be regarded as final, or whether he might be per- 
mitted to submit in writing his objections to the plan 
proposed and his reasons for preferring his own. Per- 
mission having been granted, McClellan submitted to 
the Secretary of War, February 3d, a long letter, 
which, while it did not convince the President, had a 
most important influence upon the events that fol- 
lowed in practically nullifying the special war order 
of the President. 

He begins his letter with a review of the critical 
condition of the army and the capital when he took 
command, July 27th, and the measures he adopted for 

* Official War Records, vol. v, p. 41. f Ibid. 



1 88 GENERAL McCLELLAN. 

the security of the latter and for the organization, drill, 
and discipline of the trQops. He contrasts the present 
security with the past dangers, and asserts that he now 
has a well-drilled and reliable army, animated by the 
highest spirit and capable of great deeds. He displays 
his insistent habit of mind by referring to his earlier 
papers wherein he had asked for an efifective and mov- 
able force far exceeding that now on the banks of the 
Potomac, and calls attention to the fact that he has 
not now the force he asked for. He confesses that he 
had always looked beyond the operations of the single 
Army of the Potomac, even when in a subordinate 
position, for the prospects of a barren victory had 
never been satisfactory to him (and in this we see the 
same traits that impelled him to submit plans of cam- 
paign to General Scott very soon after he had been 
assigned to the command of the Ohio militia). So 
that when he was placed in command of all the armies 
of the United States he immediately turned his atten- 
tion to the whole field of operations, and not till then 
was he aware of the absence of any general plan nor • 
of the utter disorganization and want of preparation i 
that he found to pervade the Western armies, and in 
this respect he acknowledges he made a great mistake. 
To remedy this grave defect he sent, with the approval 
of the Executive, competent generals to command in 
Kentucky and Missouri, with instructions looking to 
a prompt forward movement, but time was required 
to create and organize these armies and supply them 
with arms, clothing, artillery, and transportation. He 
had then hoped that a general advance could have been 
made during the good weather of December, but not- 
withstanding the commendable work of his generals • 
this was found not to be possible, and he acknowledges 
that he was disappointed in his hope. Defining the 
true policy of the war to be to make full preparation, 
and then by striking at the heart to seek the most 
decisive results, he says that it was his wish to 
gain possession of the East Tennessee Railroad as 
a preliminary movement, and to follow it up by 



PRESIDENT'S WAR ORDERS. 



89 



a nearly simultaneous attack on Nashville and Rich- 
mond.* 

So far his letter may be regarded as an apologetic 
vindication of the six months' delay of the armies of 
the Union, submitted as a necessary prelude to an 
analysis of the two plans of campaign — the principal 
purpose of his letter. Of these he says : 

" Two bases of operation seem to present them- 
selves for the advance of the Army of the Potomac : 

" I. That of Washington — its present position — in- 
volving a direct attack upon the intrenched positions 
of the enemy at Centreville, Manassas, etc., or else a 
movement to turn one or both flanks of those posi- 
tions, or a combination of the two plans. 

" The relative force of the two armies will not justify 
an attack on both flanks ; an attack on his left flank 
alone involves a long line of wagon communication, 
and can not prevent him from collecting for the de- 
cisive battle all the detachments now on his extreme 
right and left. 

*' Should we attack his right flank by the line of 
the Occoquan, and a crossing of the Potomac below 
that river and near his batteries, we could, perhaps, 
prevent the junction of the enemy's right with his 
center (we might destroy the former) ; we would re- 
move the obstructions to the navigation of the Poto- 
mac, reduce the length of wagon transportation by 
establishing new depots at the nearest points of the 
Potomac, and strike more directly his main railway 
communications." f 

Having thus eliminated the attacks upon the right 
and center, he then proceeds to point out the difficulties 
attending the movement against the enemy's left flank. 
These are in substance that the fords of the Occoquan 
are watched, batteries placed in their rear, and troops 
arranged to oppose a considerable resistance to a pas- 
sage of that stream ; that the enemy, he is informed, is 
intrenching a line from Union Mills toward Evans- 

* Official War Records, vol. v, p. 42 et seq. \ Ibid., p. 43. 



190 



GENERAL McCLELLAN. 



port ; Spriggs's Ford held by thirty-six hundred men 
and eight guns, and Davis's Ford reported occupied. 
That, while our columris can reach the Accotink with- 
out danger, our right thence to the Occoquan would 
be exposed to an attack from Fairfax Station, Sang- 
ster's, and Union Mills, which, however, could be met 
by occupying with some force the junction of the roads 
leading from these points and held so long as supplies 
are drawn from Washington or until a battle is won. 
Having gained the Occoquan, a column must be 
thrown on Dumfries to force the enemy to abandon 
the Potomac batteries, and to cover our left from a 
possible attack from Aquia and to establish our com- 
munications with the river. By this time, he thinks, 
the enemy would occupy the line of the Occoquan 
above Bull Run, holding Brentsville in force and 
perhaps extending southward. Then, to prevent the 
enemy from crossing the Occoquan between Broad 
and Bull Runs to attack our right, we might either 
occupy Bacon Race Church, or more effectually 
by moving to the fords themselves. Having secured 
our right flank it would become necessary to carry 
Brentsville at any cost, and the final movement on 
the railroad must then depend on existing circum- 
stances. 

This brief sketch of the possible progress of an 
attack on the enemy's left flank brings out in bold 
relief, he thinks, the great advantage possessed by the 
enemy in occupying a strong central position of de- 
fense, having roads radiating in all directions, and thus 
enabling him to concentrate for a decisive action while 
maintaining the defensive at either flank with a small 
force. He regards it as next to impossible to surprise 
the enemy or take him at a disadvantage by rapid 
maneuvers, owing to the uncertainty of the weather 
and consequent badness of the roads, and that our 
slow progress will enable him to divine our purpose 
and take precautionary measures. His information 
leads him to believe that the enemy has improved the 
roads leading to his lines of defense, while we will have 



PRESIDENT'S WAR ORDERS. I9I 

to work as we advance. Summarizing his objections, 
he says : 

'* Bearing in mind what has been said, and the pres- 
ent unprecedented and impassable condition of the 
roads, it will be evident that no precise period can be 
fixed upon for the movement on this line, nor can its 
duration be closely calculated; it seems certain that 
many weeks may elapse before it is possible to com- 
mence the march. Assuming the success of this opera- 
tion, and the defeat of the enemy as certain, the ques- 
tion at once arises as to the importance of the results 
gained. I think these results would be confined to the 
possession of the field of battle, the evacuation of the 
line of the upper Potomac by the enemy, and the 
moral effect of the victory — important results, it is 
true, but not decisive of the war nor securing the de- 
struction of the enemy's main army ; for he could fall 
back upon other positions and fight us again and again, 
should the condition of his troops permit. If he is in 
no condition to fight us again out of the range of the 
intrenchments at Richmond, we would find it a very 
difficult and tedious matter to follow him up there, 
for he would destroy his railroad bridges and other- 
wise impede our progress through a region where 
the roads are as bad as they well can be, and we would 
probably find ourselves forced at last to change the 
whole theater of war, or to seek a shorter land route 
to Richmond, with a smaller available force, and at 
an expenditure of much more time than were we to 
adopt the short line at once. We would also have 
forced the enemy to concentrate his force and perfect 
his defensive measures at the very points where it is 
desirable to strike him when least prepared. 

" II. The second base of operations available for 
the Army, of the Potomac is that of the lower Chesa- 
peake Bay, which affords the shortest possible land 
route to Richmond, and strikes directly at the heart of 
the enemy's power in the East. 

" The roads in that region are passable at all sea- 
sons of the year. The country now alluded to is much 



192 



GENERAL McCLELLAN. 



more favorable for ofifensive operations than that in 
front of Washington (which is very unfavorable), much 
more level, more cleared land, the woods less dense, 
the soil more sandy, and the spring some two or three [ 
weeks earlier. A movement in force on that line : 
obliges the enemy to abandon his intrenched position 
at Manassas, in order to hasten to cover Richmond 
and Norfolk. He must do this ; for should he permit 
us to occupy Richmond, his destruction can be averted 
only by entirely defeating us in battle, in which he 
must be the assailant. This movement, if successful, , 
gives us the capital, the communications, the supplies ; 
of the rebels, Norfolk would fall, all the waters of the : 
Chesapeake would be ours, all Virginia would be in . 
our power, and the enemy forced to abandon Tennessee : 
and North Carolina. The alternative presented to the ■ 
enemy would be to beat us in a position selected by 
ourselves, disperse, or pass beneath the Caudine Forks. . 

" Should we be beaten in battle, we have a perfectly ' 
secure retreat down the Peninsula upon Fort Monroe, , 
with our flanks perfectly covered by the fleet. During 
the whole movement our left flank is covered by water. 
Our right is secure, for the reason that the enemy is 
too distant to reach us in time. He can only oppose 
us in front. We bring our fleet into full play. 

" After a successful battle our position would be : 
Burnside forming our left, Norfolk held securely ; our ' 
center connecting Burnside with Buell, both by Ra-- 
leigh and Lynchburg ; Buell in Eastern Tennessee and 1 
North Alabama; Halleck at Nashville and Memphis..! 
The next movement would be to connect with Sher- 
man on the left, by reducing Wilmington and Charles- 
ton ; to advance our center into South Carolina and 
Georgia ; to push Buell either toward Montgomery or 
to unite with the main army in Georgia ; to throw Hal- 
leck southward to meet the naval expediiion from New 
Orleans. We should then be in a condition to reduce 
at our leisure all the Southern seaports ; to occupy all 
the avenues of communication ; to use the great outlet 
of the Mississippi ; to re-establish our Government and 



PRESIDENT'S WAR. ORDERS. IQ3 

arms in Arkansas, Louisiana, and Texas ; to force the 
slaves to labor for our subsistence instead of that of 
the rebels ; to bid defiance to all foreign interference. 
Such is the object I have ever had in view ; this is the 
general plan which I hope to accomplish. 

" For many long months I have labored to prepare 
the Army of the Potomac to play its part in the pro- 
gramme. From the day when I was placed in com- 
mand of all our armies I have exerted myself to place 
all the other armies in such a condition that they, too, 
could perform their allotted duties. 

" Should it be determined to operate from the 
lower Chesapeake, the point of landing which prom- 
ises the most brilliant result is Urbana, on the lower 
Rappahannock. This point is easily reached by vessels 
of heavy draught; it is neither occupied nor observed 
by the enemy ; it is but one march from West Point, 
the key of that region, and thence but two marches 
to Richmond. A rapid movement from Urbana would 
probably cut ofif Magruder in the Peninsula, and enable 
us to occupy Richmond before it could be strongly 
re-enforced. Should we fail in that, we could, with 
the co-operation of the navy, cross the James and 
throw ourselves in the rear of Richmond, thus forcing 
the enemy to come out and attack us, for his position 
would be untenable with us on the southern bank of 
the river. Should circumstances render it not ad- 
visable to land at Urbana, we can use Mob Jack Bay ; 
or, the worst coming to the worst, we can take Fort 
Monroe as a base, and operate with complete security, 
although with less celerity and brilliancy of results, 
up the Peninsula. 

*' To reach whatever point may be selected as a 
base a large amount of cheap water transportation 
must be collected, consisting mainly of canal boats, 
barges, wood boats, schooners, etc., towed by small 
steamers, all of a very different character from those 
required for all previous expeditions. This can cer- 
tainly be- accomplished within thirty days from the 
time the order is given. I propose, as the best possible 
13 



194 



GENERAL McCLELLAN. 



plan that can, in my judgment, be adopted, to select 
Urbana as a landing glace for the first detachments ; 
to transport by water four divisions of infantry with 
their batteries, the regular infantry, a few wagons, one 
bridge train, and a few squadrons of cavalry, making 
the vicinity of Hooker's position the place of embarka- 
tion for as many as possible ; to move the regular cav- 
alry and reserve' artillery, the remaining bridge trains 
and wagons, to a point somewhere near Cape Look- 
out ; then ferry them over the river by means of North 
River ferryboats, march them over to the Rappahan- 
nock (covering the movement by an infantry force near 
Heathsville), and to cross the Rappahannock in a simi- 
lar way. The expense and difficulty of the movement 
will then be very much diminished (a saving of trans- 
portation of about ten thousand horses), and the result 
none the less certain. 

'' The concentration of the cavalry, etc., on the 
lower counties of Maryland can be effected without 
exciting suspicion, and the movement made without 
delay from that cause. 

" This movement, if adopted, will not at all expose 
the city of Washington to danger. 

" The total force to be thrown upon the new line 
would be, according to circumstances, from one hun- 
dred and ten thousand to one hundred and forty thou- 
sand. I hope to use the latter number by bringing 
fresh troops into Washington, and still leaving it quite; 
safe. I fully realize that in all projects offered time 
will probably be the most valuable consideration. It 
is my decided opinion that, in th?t point of view, the 
second plan should be adopted. It is possible — nay, 
highly probable — that the weather and state of the roads 
may be such as to delay the direct movement from 
Washington, with its unsatisfactory results and great 
risks, far beyond the time required to complete the 
second plan. In the first case we can fix no definite 
time for an advance. The roads have gone from bad 
to worse. Nothing like their present condition was 
ever known here before ; they are impassable at pres- 



PRESIDENT'S WAR ORDERS. 



195 



ent. We are entirely at the mercy of the weather. It 
is by no means certain that we can beat them at Ma- 
nassas. On the other Hne I regard success as certain 
by all the chances of war. We demoralize the enemy 
by forcing him to abandon his prepared position for 
one which we have chosen, in which all is in our favor, 
and where success must produce immense results. 

" My judgment as a general is clearly in favor of 
this project. Nothing is certain in war, but all the 
chances are in favor of this movement. So much am 
I in favor of the southern line of operations, that I 
would prefer the move from Fortress Monroe as a 
base as a certain though less brilliant movement than 
that from Urbana to an attack upon Manassas. 

" I know that his Excellency the President, you, 
and I, all agree in our wishes, and that these wishes 
are to bring this war to a close as promptly as the 
means in our possession will permit. I believe that the 
mass of the people have entire confidence in us. I am 
sure of it. Let us then look only to the great result 
to be accomplished and disregard everything else." "^ 

On the same date as this letter the President had 
also sent to General McClellan the following note : 

My Dear Sir: You and I have distinct and different plans 
for a movement of the Army of the Potomac — yours to be 
down the Chesapeake, up the Rappahannock to Urbana, and 
across land to the terminus of the railroad on York River; 
mine to move directly to a point on the railroads southwest 
of Manassas. 

If you will give me satisfactory answers to the following 
questions I shall gladly yield my plan to yours: 

1. Does not your plan involve a greatly larger expendi- 
ture of time and money than mine? 

2. Wherein is a victory more certain by your plan than 
mine? 

3. Wherein is a victory more valuable by your plan than 
mine? 

4. In fact, would it not be less valuable in this,^ that it 
would break no great line of the enemy's communications, 
while mine would? 

* Official War Records, vol. v, p. 44 ef seq. 



196 



GENERAL McCLELLAN. 



5. In case of disaster, would not a retreat be more diffi- 
cult by your plan than mine?* 

That the answers to these questions which were em- 
bodied in General McClellan's letter were not satisfac-' 
tory to the President is apparent from the fact that 
he did not formally suspend his order nor willingly 
yield his preference. Many conferences ensued, and 
the President found the situation exceedingly embar- 
rassing. Whether it were better to supersede McClel- 
lan and to confide the execution of his own plan 0I1 
campaign to an unknown and untried general, ot 
to insist that McClellan, however unwilling and dis- 
trustful of its results, should conduct it, or, against^ 
the strongest influences of his political advisers anci 
his own innate convictions, yield his own plan to thaii 
of McClellan, were the momentous questions that over- 
burdened him with their tremendous importance. Sub-* 
jected at this time to much distress of mind, there wero 
many causes in operation that served to weaken his 
determination and undermine his judgment, until h«' 
finally felt himself compelled to commit his adminis- 
tration to the adoption of McClellan's plan of cami 
paign by the lower Chesapeake. 

While no definite decision was reached with regaro 
to the line of operations, investigations were beinc; 
carried on with reference to the possibility of transport-t 
ing a large force by water. General McClellan be. 
lieved that an army of fifty thousand troops, ten thoui 
sand horses, one thousand wagons, thirteen batterie; 
of artillery, together with the necessary impediment; 
of such an army, could be transported on smooth wate 
at one time, although acknowledged experts in logistic 
believed it impracticable with the means then avail 
able to the Government. Unless this could be doni 
the plan advocated by McClellan would have to b' 
abandoned even by himself. As early as January i7t] 
the problem was submitted to Mr. John Tucker, wh( 

* Official War Records, vol. v, p. 41. 



PENINSULAR PLAN ADOPTED. 



197 



after a few days' study confirmed McClellan's opinion, 
and shortly afterward demonstrated its feasibility to 
the President, but stated that it would require thirty 
days' preparation before such an expedition could start. 
With characteristic persistency McClellan, with this 
showing as an ajly, labored to overcome the Presi- 
dent's objections to his plan, and finally succeeded on 
February 14th in having the War Department, by 
public advertisement, authorize proposals for furnish- 
ing the necessary transports, and eventually the 
movement by the lower Chesapeake was decided upon, 
February 27th ; the Assistant Secretary of War, Mr. 
Tucker, was thereupon directed to collect the neces- 
sary water transportation with all possible dispatch. 

McClellan had gained his point, but at a great cost. 
'He had almost bankrupted the confidence of those 
upon whom he must needs rely for material assistance 
in a critical emergency at a time when no real emer- 
gency existed. Had he yielded to the strongly ex- 
pressed desire of the Executive and hurled his army 
against the enemy's left flank on the Occoquan, we 
now know that victory would have been certain and 
decisive ; and whatever the result might have been on 
the field of battle, he would have strengthened the Ad- 
ministration at a most opportune time, gained its sup- 
port for his own plan afterward, and destroyed all the 
discordant elements that were then gathering strength 
in Washington to overthrow him. 

When great events are happening that excite the 
passions of the people it is scarcely possible to form 
'a just judgment of the great leaders whom the circum- 
stances of the times have forced to the front. The 
period of hero-worship must needs pass away in order 
that the critical spirit of inquiry may search without 
•bias the fullest records of history, and thus arrive at 
a conclusion that satisfies the reason and compels the 
assent of the judgment. During his active career Mc- 
Clellan was subjected, in a greater degree than any 
[other of the more prominent commanders, to un- 
merited abuse and undeserved encomium, which may 



igS GENERAL McCLELLAN. 

with propriety be accredited to his rapid advancement 
and the unfamiharity .of the people with the military 
necessities of actual war. One of his most prominent 
claims for generalship is based upon the strategical 
conception of the Urbana plan of campaign as out- 
lined in the letter already quoted. 

The essence of every strategical operation is to 
reach the strategic point sooner and with stronger ef- 
fective force than the enemy ; or, as General Forrest has 
pithily put it, " To get there first with the most men." 
In considering McClellan's plan it is exceedingly 
difficult to ascertain with certainty what he actually be- 
lieved the strength of the enemy in his front to be. In 
his letter to the Secretary of War, written in the latter 
part of October, he says : " As you are aware, all the 
information we have from spies, prisoners, etc., agrees 
in showing that the enemy have a force on the Poto- 
mac not less than one hundred and fifty thousand 
strong, well driUed and equipped, ably commanded, 
and strongly intrenched." But the Comte de Paris, 
one of his stafif, specially charged with these matters, 
submitted, February 21st, as his estimate, seventy thou- 
sand on the Potomac and twelve thousand to eighteen 1 
thousand in the valley under Jackson. Later, oni 
March 8th, McClellan's chief of the secret-service corpse 
submits an estimate of one hundred and two thousand! 
and five hundred Confederate troops on the Potomac,, 
to which McClellan adds that they also had three hun-- 
dred field guns and from twenty to thirty-six guns ini 
front of Washington. A still wider discrepancy occurs ^ 
in the estimate furnished March 2d to a council of war 
called together to propose and prepare the details of a 
plan for opening the lower Potomac. On the map fur- 
nished to this council from the Headquarters of the 
Army the probable positions and numerical strength of 
the Confederate forces were laid down, showing an 
aggregate strength on the Potomac of fifty thousand 
and five hundred men. Assuming that he accepted the 
greater estimate of one hundred and fifty thousand, the. 
Urbana plan was certainly untenable, for by withdraw- 



PENINSULAR PLAN ADOPTED. 



199 



ing the bulk of his army from in front of Washington 
he at once gave the Confederates an immense strate- 
D^ical advantage. If he beheved the smallest estimate 
to be true, he had already a splendid strategical position 
with Washington as a base, without the necessity of 
seeking another more difficult to attain and with regard 
to which his information was neither specific nor reli- 
able. A careful study of his letter gives the strong im- 
pression that his imagination and hopeful anticipations 
were having full sway in his mind, for the essential facts 
with which the reason deals nowhere appear to be pre- 
sented. Upon the soundness of his strategy there has 
been a wide difference of opinion, but the military 
student in reaching a conclusion upon this point must 
take into consideration not the facts as they were, but 
as McClellan conceived them to be. He must also 
remember that Congress was then in session, many of 
whose master minds were in full accord with the Presi- 
dent, and who, in addition, were embittered against 
the general in chief for his long inactivity, and now 
feared lest he should leave the capital an easy prey to 
the watchful enemy ; that some of the most influential 
members of the Cabinet had lost confidence in the 
head of the army and were seeking to supplant him ; 
that the Committee on the Conduct of the War was 
casting discredit upon him and undermining his influ- 
ence in the suggestions and doubts promulgated during 
the examination of his subordinates ; and that he had 
as yet done nothing to warrant a belief that he could 
handle with success so great an army actively in the 
field. In addition to these not more than two of his 
division commanders had been informed of his con- 
templated movement, and the others felt themselves 
aggrieved in being excluded from his confidence ; all 
were, however, loyal to his leadership and ready to 
do their very best whenever the order from their com- 
mander should set them in motion. 

Meanwhile the President was decided in his purpose 
to clear the Potomac from the control of the Confed- 
erate batteries as a necessary preliminary before he 



200 



GENERAL McCLELLAN. 



would give his consent to the transfer of the bulk of 
the Army of the Potomac from in front of Washing- 
ton. General Hooker, whose division was stationed on 
the eastern shore of Maryland, submitted a plan to the 
general in chief, January 27th, to destroy these batteries 
by embarking a force of four thousand men, supported 
by the flotilla from Liverpool Point, and suggested 
making the assault in two columns. Matters had in- 
deed progressed so far that the barges had been col- 
lected and preparations were sufBciently completed by 
the 23d of February, so that he was awaiting a favor- 
able day and final instructions. But General Barnard 
strongly advised against such an enterprise, in view of 
the great risk of failure and as involving preparations 
for the forcing of a very strong line of the enemy's 
defensive position equivalent to those for a general 
movement of the army, and McClellan, February 27th, 
very wisely revoked Hooker's authority to proceed 
with the movement. It was seen shortly after the 
evacuation that had Hooker been- permitted to attempt 
this enterprise with so small a force he would have had 
scarcely any chance of success, as " the defensive works 
of the rebels in and around the batteries were stu- 
pendous." 

Washington was, indeed, at this time almost in the 
condition of a beleaguered city, for in addition to the 
blockade of the Potomac, the important line of the 
Baltimore and Ohio Railroad was still interrupted. 
The Administration felt this condition very keenly, and 
considerable pressure was brought to bear upon 
McClellan to do something to remedy it. While he 
regarded the opening of the railway as exceedingly 
desirable, he did not deem it of such vital importance 
as to undertake it until he felt prepared to fight a 
battle that would give him possession of Winchester 
and Strasburg as a necessary cover for its secure pro- 
tection. By the middle of February, however, matters 
had reached such a condition that he felt that he could 
assure the President that he might look forward to a 
brilliant and successful movement, so certain was he 



PENINSULAR PLAN ADOPTED. 201 

that nothing could happen to disappoint him. He 
referred to the opening of this hne of railway. Early 
in December Lieutenant Babcock, of the Engineers, in 
submitting a report upon the facilities of crossing 
troops at Harper's Ferry, had suggested the construc- 
tion of a bridge supported upon canal boats, stating 
that '' the boats can be locked into the river and 
anchored in their places immediately." This officer re- 
peated his recommendation December 26th, and said : 
' The lift-lock at Sandy Hook is in good order. . . . 
Such a bridge can be constructed in a short time, and 
be made very stable and serviceable for all purposes." 
McClellan saw at once that with the rapid construction 
of what would be practically a semi-permanent bridge, 
together with several pontoon bridges as adjuncts, he 
would be able to throw over into Virginia at that place 
a considerable force much superior to that which the 
enemy could bring against him and be certain of his 
line of supply. He therefore directed Keyes's division 
to be held in readiness to march at a moment's notice, 
and this, with Sedgwick's and two brigades of Banks's 
division, would enable him to occupy Winchester with 
certainty. But it happened that this plan was destined 
to fail because one very minute precaution had not 
been taken. When McClellan had arranged this move- 
ment it was to be presumed that his engineer had pre- 
pared for every contingency ; but when it was attempted 
to pass the boats into the lift-lock to lower them into 
the river it was found that the lock was too narrow 
by some four to six inches, it having been constructed 
for the boats used on the Shenandoah, and not for the 
wider boats of the Potomac canal. The difference in 
size was too small to be detected by the eye and no 
one had thought of making exact measurements. As 
it would be too hazardous to rely upon the ordinary 
pontoon bridges, subject as they were to sudden de- 
struction by freshets, for the supply of a large force, 
the movement of Keyes's troops was countermanded 
and the contemplated plan had to be abandoned. 

The failure of this movement came very near pro- 



202 GENERAL McCLELLAN. 

ducing a fatal rupture between the President and his 
general in chief. Up to this time, while Mr. Lincoln 
had defended him in public, he had in private con- 
stantly urged him to speedy action, to do something 
to relieve the public tension which the long inactivity 
of the Army of the Potomac had stretched almost to 
the breaking point. And now that the movement, 
which McClellan had so confidently assured him was 
certain to be successful, had failed so lamentably, he 
seemed to have lost all confidence not only in his prom- 
ises but in his capacity as well. The adverse criticisms 
against him increased daily in volume and in virulence 
and the President was forced to give ear to much that 
was said by prominent men who undoubtedly believed 
that they were doing the country a service in endeavor- 
ing to have McClellan superseded by a more aggres- 
sive leader. Early on the morning of the 8th of March 
the President sent for him, and after referring to his 
great disappointment with regard to the outcome of 
the Harper's Ferry affair, he manifested his displeasure 
that the general had vouchsafed no explanation to him 
in respect to the causes of the failure. McClellan was 
astonished, and said that he had submitted a memo- 
randum to the Secretary of War immediately upon his 
return to Washington, in which he had given a full 
explanation of the causes why the expedition, on the 
scale upon which he had originally planned it, had 
not succeeded, and that he had in addition made a full 
oral report to the Secretary of all the circumstances 
connected with it ; that he had also at the same time 
expressed his desire to make his explanation per- 
sonally to the President, but that the Secretary had 
replied that the President now understood the whole 
affair and a personal interview was unnecessary, and 
that he would himself hand McClellan's memorandum 
to the President. Upon this presentation of the matter 
the President expressed great surprise, and repeated 
that he had never heard of any explanation as coming 
from General McClellan, nor had he seen the memo- 
randum referred to, but was now perfectly satisfied. 



PENINSULAR PLAN ADOPTED. 



203 



This difference having been adjusted, the President 
then said that there was a very " ugly matter " to which 
he must refer. He said that it had been represented 
to him that McClellan's plan of campaign was con- 
ceived with the traitorous intent of removing its de- 
fenders from Washington, and thus giving over to the 
enemy the capital and the Government by leaving them 
defenseless. He concluded with the remark that it did 
look to him much like treason. McClellan was justly 
indignant and demanded an immediate retraction of 
the offensive expression, telling the President that '' he 
could permit no one to couple the word treason with 
his name." The latter displayed much agitation and at 
once disclaimed any idea of regarding McClellan as 
a traitor, and said that he had merely repeated what 
others had said. '' I suggested caution in the use of 
language," says McClellan, whose account of the inter- 
view is here quoted, *' and again said that 1 would 
permit no doubt to be thrown upon my intentions; 
whereupon he again apologized, and disclaimed any 
purpose of impugning my motives." * The interview 
was terminated by the acceptance of the general's sug- 
gestion that he should lay his plan of campaign before 
a council of war appointed to meet that day at army 
headquarters, and which had been called by General 
McClellan to consider a proposed attack on the ene- 
my's Potomac batteries. 

The condition of things as revealed by this inter- 
view was exceedingly unsatisfactory. McClellan felt 
that he was discredited in the mind of the Executive 
at a time when he needed not only all the support that 
the Government could give, but the full faith and per- 
sonal confidence of the President himself. It was in- 
cumbent upon him to do something speedily, and he 
looked with hope to the action of the council of war 
to restore the harmony between himself and the Ad-, 
ministration by the recommendation of a plan of cam- 
paign supported by the ablest of his military com- 

* McClellan's Own Story, p. 195. 



204 



GENERAL McCLELLAN. 



manders. From this state of affairs the Peninsular 
campaign was eventually evolved, and the steps of its 
evolution were substantially as follows. 

The council of war convened at McClellan's head- 
quarters, March 8th, consisted of Generals Blenker, 
Casey, Heintzelman, Keyes, McCall, McDowell, An- 
drew Porter, Fitz-John Porter, W. F. Smith, and 
Sumner, generals commanding divisions of the army ; 
Naglee, commanding a brigade in Hooker's division, 
representing the latter, who was sick ; and Barnard, 
the chief engineer of the army. By a majority vote 
of eight to four the council voted for the plan that 
McClellan had advocated in his letter to the Secretary, 
February 3d — that is, a movement by the lower Chesa- 
peake from Urbana as a base of operations. Those 
who voted in opposition were McDowell, Sumner, 
Heintzelman, and Barnard. There appears to be no 
official record of the proceedings of this council, but 
we may reasonably infer from the testimony of Gen- 
eral Barnard that no matured plan, but merely the gen- 
eral features of the movement to the lower Chesa- 
peake, was presented to the council, and that this was 
decided upon without deliberation or discussion. Bar- 
nard says : " I had no other intimation of a serious 
intention to make such a movement [that is, to the 
lower Chesapeake] than the casual mention of it to 
me by General McClellan, in the latter part of Novem- 
ber. Not having any reason to suppose that any offi- 
cer of the council had any more intimate knowledge 
of the intention than myself, and knowing how much 
thought the slight intimation I had received had cost 
me, I naturally expected deliberation and discussion. 
To my great surprise, eight of the twelve officers pres- 
ent voted off-hand for the measure zvithont discussion ; 
nor was any argument on my part available to obtain 
a reconsideration." * With regard to the question 
whether an attempt should first be made to destroy 
the enemy's batteries on the Potomac, the council de- 



* Barnard's Peninsular Campaign, p. 52. 



PENINSULAR PLAN ADOPTED, 



205 



cided that this was not indispensable as it was under- 
stood to be a part of General McClellan's plan to 
make no movement likely to alarm the enemy in his 
present position in order that the Army of the Poto- 
mac might possess the advantage of the initiative and 
be able to reach Richmond from the Lower Rappa- 
hannock before the enemy could get there from Ma- 
nassas. 

On the same day, March 8th, the President issued 
General War Orders 2 and 3. The first of these di- 
rected the " major general commanding the Army of 
the Potomac to proceed forthwith to organize that 
part of the said army destined to enter upon active 
operations [including the reserve, but excluding the 
troops to be left in the fortifications about Washing- 
ton] into four army corps, to be commanded accord- 
ing to seniority of rank," by Generals McDowell, Sum- 
ner, Heintzelman, and Keyes ; a fifth corps to be com- 
manded by General Banks ; the forces left for the de- 
fenses of Washington to be commanded by General 
Wadsworth ; and '' that this order be executed with 
such order and dispatch as not to delay the commence- 
ment of the operations already directed to be under- 
taken by the Army of the Potomac." This order indi- 
cated that the Administration had determined upon a 
plan of operations, and this was outlined in General 
War Order No. 3, March 8th, as follows : 

'' Ordered, That no change in the ^base of opera- 
tions of the Army of the Potomac shall be made with- 
out leaving in and about Washington such a force as, 
in the opinion of the general in chief and the com- 
manders of army corps, shall leave said city entirely 
secure. 

*' That no more than two army corps [about fifty 
thousand troops] of said Army of the Potomac shall 
be moved en route for a new base of operations until 
the navigation of the Potomac from Washington to 
the Chesapeake Bay shall be freed from the enemy's 
batteries and other obstructions, or until the President 
shall hereafter give express permission. 



2o6 GENERAL McCLELLAN. 

" That any movement as aforesaid, en route for a 
new base of operations^ which may be ordered by the 
general in chief, and which may be intended to move 
upon the Chesapeake Bay, shall begin to move upon 
the bay as early as the i8th of March instant, and the 
general in chief shall be responsible that it moves as 
early as that day. 

'* Ordered, That the army and navy co-operate in 
an immediate effort to capture the enemy's batteries,, 
upon the Potomac between Washington and the^i 
Chesapeake Bay." * 

This order definitely committed the Administration 
to the plan of operations by the Lower Chesapeake 
and an abandonment of the overland route, which hadl 
been practically decided upon by the orders of Feb 
ruary 27th, directing the collection of water transpor-- 
tation. The next day, while McClellan was in confer- - 
ence with the President and the Secretary, the astound- 
ing news was received that the Confederates had aban- 
doned their lines in front of the Army of the Potomac, , 
and had retired to the Rappahannock line. McClellam 
immediately hastened across the river to General Fitz-- 
John Porter's headquarters to direct the movements 
of the army in this unforeseen emergency. While it is 
probable that there might have been some interchanges 
of opinion in regard to the Urbana plan of campaign 
in the conference above referred to, there is no offi- 
cial or other record to show that any change was made 
in its general plan, and it is reasonable to assume, 
in view of the short time that had elapsed since the pro- 
mulgation of the order, that no change of base from 
Urbana to any other was then contemplated. 

This conference was doubtless engaged in discuss- 
ing the disaster wrought by the Merrimac at Hampton 
Roads, the news of which had reached Washington 
early on the morning of the 9th of March, for as early 
as eleven o'clock in the morning of that day McClel- 
lan was telegraphing to General Dix at Baltimore to 

* Official War Records, vol. v, p. 50. 



PENINSULAR PLAN ADOPTED. 



207 



take certain precautionary measures in case the Mcr- 
rimac should run by Fort Monroe. So that up to the 
time of his departure from Washington on the 9th, 
Urbana was the base agreed upon in the contemplated 
movement of the army. But when the result of the 
engagement between the Monitor and Merrimac, and 
the fact of the latter's withdrawal to Norfolk were 
made known to McClellan, he began to entertain the 
thought of taking Fort Monroe as his base of opera- 
tions. This is evident from his dispatch of the 12th 
of March to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Mr. 
Fox : *' Can I rely on the Monitor to keep the Mer- 
rimac in check, so that I can take Fortress Monroe as 
a base of operations?" Mr. Fox replied, '' I can not 
advise so great dependence to be placed upon her." * 
But McClellan had more confidence in the superiority 
of the Monitor, and having experienced a change of 
mind with respect to the advantages of the rival bases 
he did not hesitate to throw the weight of his influ- 
ence to settle the choice upon Fort Monroe. 

This point of view is negatived by but one state- 
ment occurring in his Own Story, where he says : 
" The fears of the administration and their inability 
to comprehend the merits of the scheme, or else the 
determination that I should not succeed in the ap- 
proaching campaign, induced them to prohibit me from 
carrying out the Urbana movement. They gave me 
the choice between the direct overland route via Ma- 
nassas, and the route w^th Fort Monroe as a base. Of 
course I selected the latter. My report gives all the 
most important correspondence on this subject, and 
the arguments I used in support of the plan of cam- 
paign which commended itself to my judgment." * But 
an examination of his report furnishes no sufftcient 
warrant for the use of so strong a term as " prohibit " 
in this connection, while there is abundant evidence to 



* McClellan's Own Story, pp. 248, 249 ; and Official War 
Records, vol. v, p. 753. 

f McClellan's Own Story, p. 227. 



2o8 GENERAL McCLELLAN. 

show that he was subjected to no restrictions in select- 
ing a base after the President had so reluctantly aban- 
doned his own plan by the overland route. 

Turning now to his report we find : *' Meanwhile 
important events were occurring which materially 
modified the designs for the subsequent campaign,) 
The appearance of the Merrimac off Old Point Com- 
fort, and the encounter with the United States squad- 
ron on the 8th of March, threatened serious derange- 
ment of the plan for the Peninsular movement. But 
the engagement between the Monitor and MerrimaC' 
on the 9th of March demonstrated so satisfactorily tht' 
power of the former, and the other naval preparations 
were so extensive and formidable that the security oi) 
Fort Monroe as a base of operations was placed be-' 
yond a doubt, and although the James River was closeo 
to us, the York River with its tributaries was still open 
as a line of water communication with the fortress? 
The general plan, therefore, remained undisturbed, al-l 
though less promising in its details than when the 
James River was in our control." * Again, in a letter 
written about the 20th of April to Secretary Stanton, he 
says : " Circumstances, among which I will now onl) 
mention the uncertainty as to the power of the Merri- 
mac, have compelled me to adopt the present line aa 
probably safer, though far less brilliant, than that b) 
Urbana." f 

The next step was taken when he convened a couni 
cil of war to consider the military situation under th(i 
provisions of the President's General War Order No 
3, of March 8th, and as afifected by the changed con 
dition of affairs that the startling events of the last fev 
days had brought about. It consisted of General; 
McDowell, Sumner, Heintzelman, and Keyes, the com 
manders of the four corps then with the army in th< 
vicinity of Fairfax Court House. Its proceedings an 
given in the following memorandum : 



* Official War Records, vol. v, p. 50. 
f Note to Mr. Fox, March 14. 



PENINSULAR TLAN ADOPTED. 



209 



Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 

Fairfax Court House, March 13, 1862. 

A council of the generals commanding army corps at the 
headquarters of the Army of the Potomac were of the 
opinion: 

I. That the enemy having retreated from Manassas to 
Gordonsville, behind the Rappahannock and Rapidan, it is 
the opinion of the generals commanding army corps that the 
operations to be carried on will best be undertaken from Old 
Point Comfort, between the York and James Rivers, pro- 
vided 

1. That the enemy's vessel Merrimac can be neutralized; 

2. That the means of transportation sufficient for an im- 
mediate transfer of the force to its new base can be ready at 
Washington and Alexandria to move down the Potomac; and 

3. That a naval auxiliary force can be had to silence, or 
aid in silencing, the enemy's batteries on the York River. 

4. That the force to be left to cover Washington shall be 
such as to give an entire feeling of security for its safety 
from menace. (Unanimous.) 

II. If the foregoing can not be, the army should then be 
moved against the enemy, behind the Rappahannock, at the 
earliest possible moment, and the means for reconstructing 
bridges, repairing railroads, and stocking them with ma- 
terials sufficient for supplying the army should at once be 
collected for both the Orange and Alexandria and Aquia 
and Richmond Railroads. (Unanimous.) 

N. B. — That with the forts on the right bank of the 
Potomac fully garrisoned and those on the left bank occu- 
pied, a covering force in front of the Virginia line of twenty- 
five thousand men would suffice. (Keyes, Heintzelman, and 
McDowell.) A total of forty thousand men for the defense 
of the city would suffice. (Sumner.)* 

Immediately upon the adjournment of the council 
General McClellan telegraphed to Secretary Stanton : 
" The commanders of army corps have unanimously 
agreed upon a plan of operations. General McDowell 
will proceed with it to Washington and lay it before 
you." To this Stanton replied immediately : '* What- 
ever plan has been agreed upon, proceed at once to 
execute, without losing an hour for any approval." 
But after the memorandum had been received and con- 
sidered by the President, the Secretary, on the same 
day, sent this reply : 

* Official War Records, vol. v, p. 55. 
14 



2IO GENERAL McCLELLAN. 

" The President having considered the plan of op- 
erations agreed upon by yourself and the command- 
ers of army corps, makes no objection to the same, 
but gives the following directions as to its execution : 

'* I. Leave such force at Manassas Junction as shall 
make it entirely certain that the enemy shall not re- 
possess himself of that position and line of communi- 
cation. 

'' 2. Leave Washington entirely secure. 

'' 3. Move the remainder of the force down the 
Potomac, choosing a new base at Fortress Monroe, 
or anywhere between here and there, or, at all events, 
move such remainder of the army at once in pursuit 
of the enemy by some route." * 

In the meanwhile the following order had been 
promulgated which practically assigned the duties of 
general in chief to the Secretary of War, and thus 
made Mr. Stanton responsible for the general con- 
duct of military operations : 

Executive Mansion, Washington, March 11, 1862. 

President's War Order No. 3. 

Major-General McClellan having personally taken the 
field at the head of the Army of the Potomac, until otherwise 
ordered, he is relieved from the command of the- other mili- 
tary departments, he retaining command of tho Department 
of the PoL'omac. 

Ordered further, That the departments now under the re- 
spective commands of Generals Halleck and Hunter, together 
with so much of that under General Buell as lies west of a 
north and south line indefinitely drawn through Knoxville, 
Tenn., be consolidated and designated the Department of the 
Mississippi, and that, until otherwise ordered, Major-Gen- 
eral Halleck have command of said department. 

Ordered also, That the country west of the Department of 
the Potomac and east of the Department of the Mississippi 
be a military department, to be called the Mountain Depart- 
ment, and that the same be commanded by Major-General 
Fremont. 

That all the commanders of departments, after the receipt 
of this order by them, respectively report severally and di- 

* Official War Records, vol. v, p. 56. 



PENINSULAR PLAN ADOPTED. 211 

rectly to the Secretary of War, and that prompt, full, and fre- 
quent reports will be expected of all and each of them. 

Abraham Lincoln.* 

There appears to be no doubt that the Administra- 
tion had decided to relieve McClellan from his posi- 
tion as general in chief at an early opportune moment, 
and the language of the first paragraph was employed 
as a palpable excuse. In fact, as early as March 7th, 
Stanton had telegraphed Halleck : '' Please send to me 
the limits of a military department that would place 
all the Western operations you deem expedient under 
your command." 

McClellan's first information of the promulgation 
of this order was derived from the Washington news- 
papers, and, although he could not but feel the loss 
of confidence, he received the order with becoming 
dignity and wrote to the President : " You will find, 
under present circumstances, I shall work as cheerfully 
as before, and that no consideration of self will in any 
manner interfere with the discharge of my public 
duties." t 

The final stage in the evolution of the Peninsular 
campaign had now been reached by the President's 
making no objection to it, and giving certain directions 
regarding us execution. By this act the Administra- 
tion became jointly responsible with McClellan, if in- 
deed not wholly so, for the adoption of a plan of cam- 
paign which had not been recommended by the coun- 
cil of war, unless certain specific provisions could first 
be complied with. As a consequence an ill-digested 
plan was undertaken which became a fruitful source 
of unpleasant recrimination, misunderstanding, and 
disaster. 

To these provisions we must now briefly refer. 
First, with regard to the neutralization of the Merri- 
mac, it was the opinion of every naval expert consulted 
that this could not positively be asserted from the re- 

* Official War Records, vol. v, p. 54. f Ibid., p. 55. 



212 GENERAL McCLELLAN. 

suits of the first day's fight, although there was a gen- 
erally hopeful anticipation that in another contest she 
might be destroyed. But the risks were then too great 
to proceed upon this hope as upon a certainty. Sec- 
ond, as to the sufficiency of means for the immediate 
transfer of the great army to the new base, since this 
was in the hands of Assistant Secretary of War Tucker, 
and outside of the control of General McClellan, it 
was particularly the duty of the War Department to 
give an explicit answer to this proviso. It was, how- 
ever, well known then that this transfer would require 
several expeditions before it could be completed, and 
hence a delay of at least two weeks must ensue from 
the time of the first embarkation. Third, as the pro- 
vision with respect to the naval auxiliary force to 
silence the enemy's batteries at Yorktown was abso- 
lutely a question for the Executive alone to decide, 
it should not have been left undetermined nor indefi- 
nite. It is true that McClellan, on March 13th, sug- 
gested to Secretary Stanton, " that the Secretary of the 
Navy be requested to order to Fort Monroe whatever 
force DuPont can spare, as well as any available force 
that Goldsborough can send up, as soon as his present 
operations are completed." To this Secretary Welles 
replied : '' If a movement is to be made upon Norfolk 
— always a favorite measure of this Department — in- 
stant measures will be taken to advise and strengthen 
Flag-Officer Goldsborough ; but unless such be the 
case, I should be extremely reluctant to take any meas- 
ure that would even temporarily weaken the efficacy 
of the blockade, especially at the points under the com- 
mand of Flag-Officer DuPont. The importance of 
capturing Norfolk is, I know, deemed almost indis- 
pensable by Flag-Officer Goldsborough, who will be 
happy to co-operate in a movement in that direction, 
and will, I need not assure you, have the active and 
earnest efforts of this department to aid him with all 
the force that can be placed at his disposal." All of 
which meant that no assistance could be expected from 
the navy unless Norfolk were the objective. Fourth, 



PENINSULAR PLAN ADOPTED. 



213 



the proviso with regard to the security of Washington 
could hardly be left to the decision of the commander 
of the active army alone, and this, therefore, required 
the consideration of the Administration quite as much 
as the other three to determine what force might be 
regarded as sufficient to give an " entire feeling of 
security." 

Had Mr. Stanton, as Secretary of War, or in his 
capacity as general in chief, to which position he had 
now practically succeeded, openly stated to General 
McClellan that the Merrimac is not certainly neutral- 
ized ; that there is not sufficient water transportation 
within the control of the Government, nor likely to be, 
for the immediate transfer of the bulk of the army; 
that no certain provision can be made, under existing 
circumstances at Fort Monroe, to detach an auxiliary 
naval force for the reduction of the Yorktown bat- 
teries, and had he then returned the proceedings to the 
council of war for its further consideration and opinion, 
it seems certain that the Peninsular plan of campaign 
would have failed to receive the assent of the council 
of war. But Stanton's intemperate haste to have the 
army move somehow and somewhere, as evinced in 
his first dispatch to McClellan, gave the latter the 
opportunity to get his army away from the politicians 
at Washington, which his controlling desire too 
eagerly embraced at the sacrifice of his usual prudence 
and cool judgment. 

It is very difficult to ascertain satisfactorily what 
were the determining influences that operated upon 
General McClellan's mind to lead him to yield the 
Urbana plan, which he had so ardently advocated in 
his letter of February 3d, and to adopt the Peninsular 
plan which, of the three then presented, he recom- 
mended only in case of the "worst coming to the 
worst." The enemy's withdrawal to the Rappahan- 
nock line has been suggested as the controlling cause 
under the supposition that it diminished the advantage 
that the line of operations from Urbana to Richmond 
in point of celerity possessed over that from the ene- 



214 



GENERAL McCLELLAN. 



my's position at Manassas. But while this might have 
had a determining infliaence had Hanover Junction 
been McClellan's first objective, it could not have 
affected the choice of Urbana with regard to West 
Point, the selected objective. In this connection it 
may be well to quote the testimony of General Sum- 
ner before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, 
which either indicates a remarkable lapse of memory 
on the part of this gallant old soldier, or that the de- 
liberations of the council of the corps commanders 
were not as thorough and exhaustive, and therefore 
impressive, as the importance of the problem de- 
manded. He says : " The first proposition was to go 
to Annapolis and embark from there, but the Presi- 
dent disapproved of that entirely, and that was given 
up. Then, as I understood it, the decision was that 
the army should descend the Potomac and land at 
Urbana on the Rappahannock, only thirty miles from 
Richmond ; not to go down to Fort Monroe at all. 
I did not dream then that there was any idea of going 
down to the Peninsula. When the army returned to 
Fairfax Court House, in March last — my command 
being still in the advance — another council was con- 
vened there, consisting of the four commanders, Mc- 
Dowell, Heintzelman, Keyes, and myself, and the 
proposition was submitted to us in this form : whether, 
as the enemy was then rapidly retreating through the 
country, and the roads were in a very bad condition, 
it would not be better to turn them by a movement 
by w^ater, as my understanding was, to descend the 
Potomac and land at Urbana. With this understand- 
ing, that the army was to land at Urbana, I yielded to 
the proposition ; and I will add, that I was never more 
surprised in my life than when I embarked at Alex- 
andria to learn that the whole army was going down 
to Fort Monroe. I had not myself dreamed of any 
such movement, and would not have voted for it." 
It is also quite remarkable that Keyes was the only 
one of the four generals composing the council that 
was originally in favor of the Urbana plan on the 8th 



PENINSULAR PLAN ADOPTED. 21 5 

of March, the other three voting for the overland 
route, and it is reasonable to suppose they voted for 
the Peninsular plan on the 13th only under the neces- 
sity of immediate action and the conviction that it 
would not be approved unless the qualifying provi- 
sions attached to the plan were amply guaranteed. 

But these provisions being entirely ignored and 
others substituted in their place, the modified plan 
became that of the Administration. It was a found- 
ling for which they had no natural affection, but which 
from the force of circumstances" they were obliged to 
adopt and nourish. In the meanwhile the water trans- 
portation was being collected at Alexandria and the 
fractions of the army moved to its near vicinity to be 
ready for embarkation. On the 19th of March Mc- 
Clellan, in obedience to the request of the Secretary, 
submitted the following outline of the campaign which 
he proposed to undertake : 

Sir: I have the honor to submit the following notes on 
the proposed operations of the active portion of the Army 
of the Potomac. 

The proposed plan of campaign is to assume Fort Mon- 
roe as the first base of operations, taking the line of York- 
town and West Point upon Richmond as the line of opera- 
tions, Richmond being the objective point. It is assumed 
that the fall of Richmond involves that of Norfolk and the 
whole of Virginia; also that we shall fight a decisive battle 
between West Point and Richmond, to give which battle the 
rebels will concentrate all their available forces, understand- 
ing, as they will, that it involves the fate of their cause. It 
therefore follows: 

1st. That we should collect all our available forces and 
operate upon adjacent lines, maintaining perfect communica- 
tion between our columns. 

2d. That no time should be lost in reaching the field of 
baUle. 

The advantages of the Peninsula between York and 
James Rivers are too obvious to need explanation. It is also 
clear that West Point should as soon as possible be reached 
and used as our main depot, that we may have the shortest 
line of land transportation for our supplies and the use of the 
York River. 

There are two methods of reaching this point: 

1st. By moving directly from Fort Monroe as a base. 



2i6 GENERAL McCLELLAN. 

and trusting to the roads for our supplies, at the same time 
landing a strong corps as near Yorktown as possible, in 
order to turn the rebel lilies of defense south of Yorktown; 
thence to reduce Yorktown and Gloucester by a siege, in all 
probability involving a delay of weeks, perhaps. 

2d. To make a combined naval and land attack upon 
Yorktown the first object of the campaign. This leads to the 
most rapid and decisive results. To accomplish this, the 
navy should at once concentrate upon the York River all 
their available and most powerful batteries. Its reduction 
should not in that case require many hours. A strong corps 
would be pushed up the York, under cover of the navy, direct- 
ly upon West Point, immediately upon the fall of Yorktown, 
and we could at once establish our new base of operations 
at a distance of some twenty-live miles from Richmond, with 
every facility for developing and bringing into play the whole 
of our available force on either or both banks of the James. 

It is impossible to urge too strongly the absolute neces- 
sity of the full co-operation of the navy as a part of this pro- 
gramme. Without it the operations may be prolonged for 
many weeks, and we may be forced to carry in front several 
strong positions, which by their aid could be turned without 
serious loss of either time or men. 

It is also of first importance to bear in mind the fact, 
already alluded to, that the capture of Richmond necessarily 
involves the prompt fall of Norfolk, while an operation 
against Norfolk, if successful at the beginning of the cam- 
paign, facilitates the reduction of Richmond merely by the 
demoralization of the rebel troops involved, and that after 
the fall of Norfolk we should be obliged to underta-ke the 
capture of Richmond by the same means which would have 
accomplished it in the beginning, having meanwhile afforded 
the rebels ample time to perfect their defensive arrange- 
ments ; for they would well know, from the moment the 
Army of the Potomac changed its base to Fort Monroe, that 
Richmond must be its ultimate object. 

It may be summed up in few words, that for prompt 
success of this campaign it is absolutely necessary that the 
navy should at once throw its whole available force, its most 
powerful vessels, against Yorktown. There is the most im- 
portant point — there the knot to be cut. An immediate deci- 
sion upon the subject-matter of this communication is highly 
desirable, and seems called for by the exigencies of the occa- 
sion.* 

In this letter McClellan clearly outlines two meth- 
ods to reach West Point, his first objective : one by a 

* Official War Records, vol. v, p. 57 et seq. 



ASSISTANCE OF THE NAVY. 217 

direct movement upon Yorktown without the aid of 
the navy, but which foreshadows a siege and a delay 
of several weeks, and the other a flank movement sus- 
tained by the co-operation of the navy, which would 
insure an immediate success. He states that it is essen- 
tial to have a decision upon this question at the earliest 
moment, and he subsequently exhibits the urgent ne- 
cessity of a prompt decision by importuning the War 
Department for an answer. On the 20th he telegraphs 
the Secretary : '' Have you received my letter in regard 
to co-operation of the navy? If so, please see the 
President at once and telegraph the reply. On your 
reply much depends, for, as you will see from my 
letter, I have now to choose at once between the two 
methods of accomplishing our object." McDowell 
telegraphs from Washington on the same day to Mc- 
Clellan : " Nothing decisive at the President's. The 
plan seemed to find favor with all who spoke. The 
only question seemed to be as to the ability of the 
navy to do their part. I am to go again in the morn- 
ing when Barnard returns. Whether the navy can, 
or not, do anything I think it evident they can not 
before you can ship another division of Heintzelman's 
to Old Point. I spoke to the President and he 
thought this would be best, so as not to keep the 
means of transportation idle. I would therefore send 
Heintzelman's second division at once or as soon as 
you can. His first arrived safe and was landing. The 
Secretary says you should have no difficulty with 
Wool." Stanton's reply came on the 22d, saying: 
' We have been waiting for Barnard to conclude ar- 
rangements with navy. He was expected yesterday 
morning." 

General Barnard's inquiries at Fort Monroe 
brought out the following information, which he tele- 
graphed to McClellan on^March 20th: 

" Goldsborough can not spare from here anything 
except the following: 

" Victoria, two eight-inch guns and one thirty- 
pound Parrott. 



2i8 GENERAL McCLELLAN. 

" Anacostia, Freeborn, Island Belle (Potomac 
fleet). 

" Octoroon, not yef arrived ; Fox calls her a regu- 
lar gunboat of four guns. 

" Currituck and Daylight, merchant steamers, like 
the Potomac gunboats, I suppose. 

'' The Chocorua, not yet arrived, and the Penob- 
scot, here ; each, two eleven-inch guns. He says he 
can't furnish vessels to attack Yorktown simultane- 
ously, but he thinks what you propose is easily done ; 
that the vessels he mentions are fully adequate to cover 
a landing, and that with a landing and an advance 
from here Yorktown will fall." 

The testimony of Assistant Secretary of the Navy 
G. V. Fox and of Commodore Goldsborough, before • 
the Committee on the Conduct of the War, completes; 
the evidence with regard to the navy's co-operation.. 
Mr. Fox says : *' Then I got a private note from Gen-- 
eral McClellan, dated Fairfax Court House, March i 
14th, in which he says: 'From all accounts received 1 
I have such a living faith in the gallant little Monitorr 
that I feel that we can trust her ; so I have determined] 
on the Fort Monroe movement.' 

'* That is all the correspondence there was with thee 
Navy Department upon that subject. It shows thatt 
this plan of General McClellan was changed betweenn 
the time I arrived at Old Point Comfort, which was 
on the morning of the 9th of March, and the time II 
got back to Washington, which, I think, was on the( 
1 2th. It was determined that the army should go by\ 
way of Fort Monroe. The Navy Department never' 
was consulted at all, to my knowledge, in regard to 
anything connected with the matter. No statement 
was ever made to us why they were going there be- 
yond this. All that we were told about it is what 1 
have read here. Admiral Goldsborough was put ir 
communication with General McClellan and directec 
to co-operate with him ; and all the force we had avail- 
able was placed at the disposal of the admiral. I hav( 
no knowledge that anything that General McClellari 



ASSISTANCE OF THE NAVY. 2IQ 

/anted in the way of attack or defense was ever neg- 
^cted by our people. No complaint was ever made 
D the Navy Department. There was never any plan 
:evised by the War Department that I know of that 
equired the navy to operate. The Secretary simply 
rdered the ships there to do what they could as the 
xigencies arose. In the private letter from which I 
lave read General McClellan speaks of operations 
gainst Yorktown and Gloucester. But I do not think 
ny of the army officers expected those places to be 
ttacked by ships. Yorktown is sixty or seventy feet 
bove the water ; the vessels could not reach the bat- 
eries on the crest of the hill, and therefore they would 
e exposed to destruction without being able to return 
he fire. Admiral Goldsborough was in constant com- 
nunication with General McClellan, and they were 
ery well disposed toward each other to the last mo- 
nent so far as I ever knew. 

" Question. — It has been said that one reason for 
he failure of the Peninsular campaign was the deten- 
ion of the army before the lines of Yorktown a whole 
nonth in consequence of the navy not being able to 
:o-operate and secure to us the free navigation of the 
^ork and James Rivers. Will you state what you 
enow in relation to that matter? 

" Anszvcr. — So far as I know all the vessels that 
General McClellan required in his operations against 
Yorktown were placed at his disposal by Admiral 
Goldsborough. I am not aware that he ever required 
that we should attack Yorktown, or that it was ever 
expected that we should do so. All the avenues of 
supply to the army there were free and open as far as 
the army had possession. General McClellan expected 
[the navy to neutralize the Merrimac, and I promised 
that it should be done, and that she should never pass 
Hampton Roads." 

Commodore Goldsborough's testimony was to the 
same efifect, and we are forced to conclude that no 
definite co-operation of the navy was distinctly prom- 
ised by the Secretary of the Navy, or any other official 



220 



GENERAL McCLELLAN. 



who was in a position to carry out the requisite provi- 
sions for such a co-operation as McClellan had in 
view. Under these circumstances he could well point 
to the distinct and explicit language of his letter of 
March 19th, where he was obliged by the necessity 
of the case to adopt the first method of advance and 
be subjected to a delay of weeks in the siege of York- 
town. But it must also be said that all along he hoped 
for a more favorable outcome of his movements in 
the advance of his army owing to a misconception of 
the topographical features of the Peninsula, especially 
with regard to the character and location of the War- 
wick River, to which we shall refer hereafter. 



CHAPTER IX. 

MANASSAS EVACUATED. DEFENSE OF WASHINGTON. 

To revert now to the position of the Confederate 
forces in Virginia which had so long held the Army 
of the Potomac confined to the defensive lines snr- 
rounding Washington. This Confederate Army of 
the Potomac, which, according to the statement of 
General Johnston, its commander, never exceeded fifty 
thousand effectives, was stretched in observation from 
Aquia Creek along the Potomac batteries and at the 
principal fords of the Occoquan and Bull Run, in 
close touch with the outposts of the Union army as 
far as Leesburg, while its main body and reserves 
were in a strong defensive position at Centreville and 
Manassas. Colonel Stuart, the renowned and accom- 
plished cavalry commander, kept General Johnston 
well informed of the growing strength of the Union 
army, so that the latter was well aware from this and 
other reliable sources that he would not long be able 
to maintain his position whenever McClellan should 
begin to advance against him. Called to a conference 
with the Confederate President, Mr. Davis, at Rich- 
mond, about the 20th of February, the depressing con- 
dition of the Confederate military status was consid- 
ered, and it was then determined to make immediate 
preparations to withdraw the army from its danger- 
ous advanced position to the safer defensive position 
behind the Rappahannock River as soon as the con- 
dition of the roads would permit. The successes of 
the^ Union forces in February at Forts Henry and 
Donelson, resulting in the occupation of Nashville, 



222 GENERAL McCLELLAN. 

were indeed so depressing to the Confederate cause 
in the early part of 1862 that even a partial success on 
the part of the Union forces in Virgina would probably 
have been fatal to their hope of success. " Recent 
events," said Mr. Davis to General Johnston, '' have 
cast on our arms and our hopes the gloomiest 
shadows, and at such a time we must show redoubled- 
energy and resolution." Under these circumstances 
and considering the enormous preponderance oli 
strength in McClellan's favor, it was Johnston's pur- 
pose to effect his withdrawal at the very earliest mo) 
ment that the condition of the roads and weathet 
would permit, consistent with saving his guns and ac 
cumulated supplies. He had reported his army aa 
crippled and its efficiency and discipline greatly imi 
paired owing to the lack of a sufficiency of general offi 
cers, and that the great accumulation of subsistence! 
stores at Manassas and at the meat-curing establish] 
ment at Thoroughfare Gap would prove a serious im 
pediment to his prompt withdrawal, and he feared tha; 
much of these supplies would have to be sacrificec 
owing to the limited means of transportation at hi 
disposal. The activity displayed by the Union troop 
under Hooker on the eastern shore, when prepara. 
tions were being made to attack the Potomac bat 
teries, of which Johnston was informed by his spiee 
convinced him that McClellan was preparing for ai 
early movement. He was also greatly concerned b 
the Harper's Ferry movement on the 27th of Feb 
ruary threatening his extended left flank and wa 
preparing to withdraw about the last of Februar 
without risking further delay. It thus appears th^ 
had the Potomac canal boats been a few inche 
narrower McClellan's Harper's Ferry expeditio 
might have precipitated the retirement of the Cor 
federate army under adverse circumstances to ther 
and justified McClellan's anticipations of a gloriou 
success. 

The Confederates began retiring from their pos 
tions on the Potomac early on the morning of the 8t 



MANASSAS EVACUATED. 



223 



)f March, but the troops in the vicinity of Manassas 
lid not leave their camps till the following evening, 
t was conducted with secrecy and celerity, consider- 
hg the limited transportation and badness of the roads, 
nd but little property other than the heavy guns in 
he Potomac batteries and the subsistence surplus be- 
ore mentioned was abandoned or destroyed. It must 
)e confessed that this movement on the part of the Con- 
lederates was a complete surprise to McClellan, and 
n his ignorance of its immediate probability is found 
mother marked evidence of the utter inefficiency of 
'lis service of information. On his arrival at General 
Porter's headquarters, McClellan issued orders for a 
general movement of the Army of the Potomac toward 
^entreville and Manassas, to take place on the morn- 
ng of the loth of March. This was not with any in- 
dention of inaugurating the overland campaign, but, 
is he states, " to give the troops an opportunity to gain 
ome experience on the march and in bivouac prepara- 
ory to the campaign, and to get rid of the superfluous 
baggage and other impedimenta, which accumulates 
30 easily around an army encamped for a long time 
in one locality." After a brief one day's march toward 
Centreville the main body of the army was moved back 
on the nth of March to the vicinity of Alexandria to 
f)repare for embarkation to the Peninsula, and a brigade 
of cavalry, under General Stoneman's command, was 
sent forward in reconnoissance of the enemy's line of 
retreat on the morning of the 14th, and which ended at 
Cedar Run. McClellan believed that the withdrawal of 
the Confederates was due to a knowledge of his intended 
movement, which they had in some way acquired, and 
he ever maintained that it justified his prediction of 
their action should his Urbana campaign be adopted. 
lit is certainly now well established that McClellan was 
i|in error in assuming that his plan of campaign was 
Iknown to General Johnston. Indeed, the latter was 
for several days in complete ignorance as to the line 
[of advance that McClellan intended to follow, and, in 
'lorder to provide for every contingency, he first estab- 



224 



GENERAL McCLELLAN. 



lished himself on the Rappahannock, placing General 
Holmes with the brigades of Whiting, Wigfall, and 
Hampton on the right in the vicinity of Fredericks- 
burg; the two divisions of Ewell and Early at the 
center on the Orange and Alexandria Railroad; and 
the divisions of Smith and Longstreet on the left at 
Culpeper Court House. In justification of this dis- 
position, he says : " We had to regard four routes to 
Richmond as practicable for the Federal army : That 
chosen in the previous July ; another east of the Poto- 
mac to the mouth of the Potomac Creek and thencei 
to Fredericksburg; the third and fourth by water,- 
the one to the Lower Rappahannock, the other to 
Fort Monroe ; and from these points respectively by} 
direct roads. As the Confederate troops in Virginia; 
were disposed, it seemed to me that invasion by thet 
second route would be the most difficult to meet; 
for as the march in Maryland would be covered by tliei 
Potomac, the Federal general might hope to conceal 
it from us until the passage of the river was begum 
and so place himself at least two days' march nearer 
to Richmond than the Army of Northern Virginia on 
Bull Run. I did not doubt, therefore, that this route* 
would be taken by General McClellan. The opiniom 
was first suggested by the location of a division of the 
United States Army on it opposite Dumfries." 

To carry out the provisions for the permanent re-: 
tention of Manassas Junction and the security of) 
Washington, General McClellan issued the necessary 
instructions, March i6th, to Generals Banks and 
Wadsworth. Banks commanding the Fifth Corps, 
then consisting of Williams's and Shields's divisions. 
was directed to intrench his command strongly in the 
vicinity of Manassas, and to open the line of the Ma- 
nassas Gap Railroad as far as Strasburg in the Shenan- 
doah Valley, and when this was accomplished to in- 
trench at least a brigade near the crossing of the Shen- 
andoah ; to build blockhouses at all the railroad bridges 
and to occupy, with strong grand guards, Warrenton. 
Warrenton Junction, and, if possible, the theater as fan 



til 



MANASSAS EVACUATED. 



225 



fo the front as the Rappahannock, the general object' 
Deing to cover theline of the Potomac and Washington 
securely. He enjoined Wadsworth, who had been des- 
ignated by the President as the military Governor of 
;he District of Columbia, to maintain the forts and their 
armaments in the best possible condition, and to make 
such a disposition of the troops under his command 
IS to insure a thorough protection of his front and 
flanks, relying upon efficient patrols to scour the coun- 
try in advance for information as to the movements of 
the enemy. In formulating these instructions McClel- 
lan had no other idea than that the enemy would cer- 
Itainly withdraw the bulk of his forces to meet him on 
the Peninsula, and thus leave only insignificant raid- 
iing parties in the vicinity of Washington. With this 
in mind he conceived that he had fulfilled all the re- 
quirements of leaving Washington entirely secure. 
But he had not reckoned upon the audacity of Stone- 
wall Jackson in command of the Confederate forces 
in the Valley. The withdrawal of the Confederates 
to the Rappahannock on the Qtli of March necessarily 
compelled Jackson to retire from Winchester, which 
he did rather reluctantly on the evening of the nth 
of March, and was followed up the Valley by Shields's 
division of Banks's corps as far as Mount Jackson, 
about twenty miles south of Strasburg. On the 20th 
of March Williams's division, in obedience to McClel- 
lan's instructions of March i6th, began its march from 
Winchester to Manassas via Berryville and Snicker's 
Gap, and Shields withdrew from his advanced position 
at Strasburg to Kernstown, near Winchester. 

Jackson was informed of this retrograde move- 
ment on the 2 1st by Colonel Ashby, his cavalry 
commander, who kept a close touch with the rear 
guard of Shields's division, and as he had also heard 
through his spies in Winchester of the movement of 
Williams's division, he determined to hasten forward 
all his available strength for an immediate attack. 
He hoped for success, for his information led him to 
believe that the strength of the Union forces remain- 
15 



226 GENERAL McCLELLAN. 

ing at Winchester was less than was actually the case, 
but at any rate he was apprehensive lest they should 
leave the Valley, and it was important to detain them 
there. Accordingly he hastened the march of his three 
brigades and formed his line of battle about two 
o'clock in the afternoon of the 23d of March in front; 
of the position assumed by Shields's division at Kerns-'^ 
town. Colonel Kimball, Fourteenth Indiana Volun-- 
teers, who commanded the Union troops on the day 
of the battle, Shields having been wounded the after- 
noon before in Ashby's preliminary attack, promptly 
penetrated Jackson's plan of turning the Union right.. 
The Confederates were defeated with a loss in killed,, 
wounded, and missing of seven hundred and eighteen,, 
while that of the Union troops amounted to five hun-- 
dred and ninety. But the advantages that accrued toj 
the Confederate cause more than balanced the loss of 
victory. By this bold stroke Jackson seriously inter- 
fered with the contemplated disposition of the Union 
forces in the establishment of the Manassas Gap line. 
General Banks, who, after consulting with Shields on 
the morning of the 23d, had concluded that Jackson 
would not hazard an attack so far from any support, 
had taken his departure for Washington after seeing, 
that Williams's division was well on its way to Ma- 
nassas. He had not proceeded far before he was over- 
taken by the news of the battle, and he hastily returned,! 
turning back meanwhile the two brigades of Wil- 
liams's division that were within reach. The second; 
brigade (Abercrombie's) had reached Aldie on the day 
of the battle, and this alone of Williams's division pro- 
ceeded to Manassas in accordance with the original 
plan. 

The result of all this was that Banks followed Jack- 
son with five brigades up the Valley, and the arrange-, 
ments that had been devised by McClellan for the pro-, 
tection of Washington had to be abandoned at a time 
when it was most inopportune for him. For at this 
time the divisions of his army were being embarked 
from Alexandria as rapidly as water transportation 



MANASSAS EVACUATED. 227 

:ould be furnished, and he was calculating upon tak- 
ng the entire strength of four corps for service in the 
Peninsula. But now came into operation the effects 
3f that centralization of military authority, which the 
F'resident's War Order No. 2 had fixed in the War 
Department, by virtually constituting the Secretary 
he general in chief. Following this assignment, four 
iiilitary departments were constituted in the eastern 
heater of war, whose commanders were independent 
3f each other, their common military superior being 
he Secretary of War. These were : The Middle, under 
he command of Major-General Dix, March 22d ; the 
Vlountain, under Major-General Fremont, March 
J9th ; the Rappahannock, under Major-General Mc- 
Dowell ; and the Shenandoah, under Major-General 
Banks, April 4th; these, with Wool in command at 
^ort Monroe and McClellan in command of the Army 
)f the Potomac, ^ave six separate commanders inde- 
)endent of each other. Thus was McClellan, at a time 
)f essential importance to him, shorn of all power to 
iecure joint co-operation of these portions of the 
\rmy of the Potomac in the same theater of war. 
granting all that the most enthusiastic admirers of 
Vlr. Stanton claim for him as a war minister, it can 
icarcely be conceded that he was equal to the task of 
iirecting armies or planning campaigns. And while 
t is true that Mr. Lincoln was himself a close student 
)f the military situation, and was endowed with the 
•arest sagacity and discernment, yet he was enor- 
nously hampered by the flood of suggestion that 
poured in upon him from the active-minded and ag- 
f^ressive members of the Committee on the Conduct 
!)f the War, from members of the Cabinet and of Con- 
i;;ress, as well as by the exigencies of the chang- 
ing political situation. Such a condition of afifairs is 
Iways to be expected in a Government like ours, 
nd the exception to the rule occurs only when an 
■ducated soldier like Grant achieves such marked suc- 
cess as to be authorized by the President, as commander 
n chief, to employ the armed forces of the nation, 



228 GENERAL McCLELLAN. 

entirely unhampered by the miUtary judgments of a 
civiUan Secretary of War. 

The first serious disappointment that McClellan ex- 
perienced was the order detaching Blenker's division 
from the Army of the Potomac and assigning it tOi 
Fremont. How this came about is explained in the; 
President's own words, in his letter to General Fre- 
mont, June i6, 1862: ''Your dispatch of yesterday,: 
reminding me of a supposed understanding that I! 
would furnish you a corps of thirty-five thousand men, 
and asking of me the ' fulfillment of this understand- 
ing,' is received. I am ready to come to a fair settle- 
ment of accounts with you on the fulfillment of under- 
standings. 

" Early in March last, when I assigned you to thei 
command of the Mountain Department, I did tell you 
I would give you all the force I could, and that II 
hoped to make it reach thirty-five thousand. You ati 
the same time told me that within a reasonable timet 
you would seize the railroad at or east of Knoxville, 
Tenn., if you could. There was then in the depart- 
ment a force supposed to be twenty-five thousandj 
the exact number as well known to you as to me. 
After looking about two or three days, you called and 
distinctly told me that if I would add the Blenker divi- 
sion to the force already in the department you would 
undertake the job. The Blenker division contained 
ten thousand, and at the expense of great dissatisfac- 
tion to General McClellan, I took it from his army 
and gave it to you. My promise was literally fulfilled.! 
I have given you all I could, and I have given you 
very nearly, if not quite, thirty-five thousand." 

This loss of one division of the Second Corps, and 
the changed conditions of the intended covering force 
in front of Washington at the very moment that Mc- 
Clellan was about to proceed to Fort Monroe, gave 
him much anxiety in arranging for a suitable force 
that would leave Washington " entirely secure.'' 
Keeping in view the integrity of the strength that he 
conceived to be necessary for the work he had to per- 



DEFENSE OF WASHINGTON. 



229 



form on the Peninsula under the fixed idea that he 
would there fight the whole strength of the Confed- 
eracy, and that nothing of theirs would be left behind, 
he sent the following letter to the adjutant general: 

Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 

Steamer Commodore, April i, 1862. 

General: I have to request that you will lay the follow- 
ing communication before the honorable Secretary of War: 

The approximate numbers and positions of the troops left 
near and in rear of the Potomac are as follows: 

General Dix has, after guarding the railroads under his 
charge, sufficient to give him five thousand for the defense 
of Baltimore and one thousand nine hundred and eighty- 
eight available for the Eastern Shore, Annapolis, etc. Fort 
Delaware is very well garrisoned by about four hundred men. 
The garrisons of the forts around Washington amount to 
ten thousand six hundred men ; other disposable troops now 
with General Wadsworth, about eleven thousand four hun- 
dred men. 

The troops employed in guarding the various railways in 
Maryland amount to some three thousand three hundred and 
fifty-nine men. These it is designed to relieve, being old 
regiments, by dismounted cavalry, and to send forward to 
Manassas. 

General Abercrombie occupies Warrenton with a force 
which, including Colonel Geary at White Plains and the cav- 
alry to be at his disposal, will amount to some seven thousand 
seven hundred and eighty men, with twelve pieces of artillery. 
I have the honor to request that all the troops organized 
for service in Pennsylvania and New York, and in any of the 
Eastern States, may be ordered to Washington. I learn from 
1 Governor Curtin that there are some three thousand five hun- 
; dred men now ready in Pennsylvania. This force I should 
be glad to have sent to Manassas. Four thousand men from 
' General Wadsworth I desire to be ordered to Manassas, 
i These troops, with the railroad guards above alluded to, will 
i make up a force under the command of General Abercrombie 
j of something like eighteen thousand six hundred and thirty- 
I nine men. 

I It is my design to push General Blenker's division from 
■ Warrenton upon Strasburg. He should remain at Strasburg 
long enough to allow matters to assume a definite form in 
[that region before proceeding to his ultimate destination. 
fi The troops in the Valley of the Shenandoah will thus, in- 
\ eluding Blenker's division, ten thousand and twenty-eight 
strong, with twenty-four pieces of artillery; Banks's Fifth 
> Corps, which embraces the command of General Shields, 



230 GENERAL McCLELLAN. 

nineteen thousand six hundred and eighty-seven strong, with i 
forty-one guns ; some three thousand six hundred and \ 
fifty-two disposable cavalry and the railroad guards, about • 
two thousand one hundred men, amount to about thirty-five 
thousand four hundred and sixty-seven men. 

It is designed to relieve General Hooker by one regiment, 
say eight hundred and fifty men, being, with some five hun- 
dred cavalry, one thousand three hundred and fifty men on i 
the Lower Potomac. 

To recapitulate: 

At Warrenton there is to be 7,7^0 

At Manassas, say 10,859 

In the Valley of the Shenandoah 35,467 

On the Lower Potomac i,35o 

In all 55,456 

There would thus be left for the garrisons and the front of f 
Washington, under General Wadsworth, some eighteen 1 
thousand, inclusive of the batteries under instruction. The : 
troops organizing or ready for service in New York, I learn, , 
will probably number more than four thousand. These : 
should be assembled at Washington, subject to disposition 1 
where their services may be most required. 

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

Geo. B. McClellan, Major General Commanding. 

Brigadier-General 'L,. Thomas, Adjutant General, U. S. Arm}'** 

But the very next day, April 2d, General Wads- 
worth reported to the Secretary of War that in his 
judgment the numerical strength and character of the 
force left under his command was entirely inadequate 
to and unfit for the important duty to which it was 
assigned. He reported that he had but fifteen thou- 
sand three hundred and thirty-five infantry, forty-two 
hundred and ninety-four artillery, and eight hundred 
and forty-eight cavalry, a total of twenty thousand four 
hundred and seventy-seven, leaving, after deducting 
those sick, in arrest, and confinement, but nineteen 
thousand and twenty-two present for duty. 

* Official War Records, vol. v, p. 60 et seq. 



CHAPTER X. 

EMBARKATION FOR FORT MONROE. OPENING OF 

PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN. SIEGE OF YORKTOWN. 

BATTLE OF WILLIAMSBURG. ADOPTION OF WHITE 

HOUSE AS BASE. 

Upon this the Secretary of War referred the matter 
to Adjutant-General Lorenzo Thomas and Major- 
General E. A. Hitchcock with instructions to examine 
all the circumstances bearing on the case, and to re- 
port to him whether the President's order and instruc- 
tions had been complied with in respect to the forces 
to be left for the defense of Washington and its se- 
curity, and at Manassas, and, if not, wherein those in- 
structions had been departed from. These officers at 
once substantially reported that the President's order 
required that the city of Washington should be left 
! entirely secure before any new base of operations 
I should be taken up ; that in their opinion it was the 
! judgment of the general officers forming the council 
;of war of March 13th that it would require a force of 
thirty thousand men to man the forts properly, which, 
with the covering force of twenty-five thousand, would 
' make a total force of fifty-five thousand ; that if there 
was need of a military force for the safety of the city 
of Washington within its own limits, that referred to 
in the report of General Wadsworth would seem to be 
entirely inadequate. In conclusion they say : " In view 
of the opinion expressed by the council of the com- 
manders of army corps of the force necessary for the 
defense of the capital, though not numerically stated, 
and of the force represented by General McClellan as 
left for that purpose, we are of the opinion that the 

231 



232 



GENERAL McCLELLAN. 



requirement of the President that this city shall be 
left entirely secure, not only in the opinion of the ■ 
general in chief, but tltat of the commanders of all the 
army corps also, has not been fully complied with." 

As a result of this report and its full approval by 
the War Department and the President, the latter 
directed that either Sumner's or McDowell's corps be 
detached from McClellan's command and be retained 
in front of Washington, and on April 4th the order 
detaching McDowell's corps was issued. Thus in- 
stead of carrying with him to the Peninsula, as he had 
expected, four full corps, McClellan was at the last 
moment deprived of a corps and a division, amounting 
in all to about fifty thousand men. 

Before this action of the Administration was taken 
McClellan had embarked on the steamer Commodore, 
and was on his way to Fort Monroe, having in mind 
no apprehension that his strength was to be further 
reduced after Blenker had been taken from him, and 
though he feared he could not rely upon any efficient 
co-operation of the navy, he allowed his imagination 
to indulge in the hope that some sort of assistance 
might be arranged by him in consultation with Com- 
modore Goldsborough. He also believed that he 
would be able to control the movements and disposi- 
tion of all the forces operating in the Valley and those 
in the vicinity of Washington and at Manassas. With 
these anticipations in mind he reached Fort Monroe 
on the afternoon of the 2d of April, and as early as 
possible sought an interview with Commodore Golds- 
borough, from whom he learned that the assistance 
he expected from the navy could not be furnished ; 
that the James River, as a line of supply or for flank- 
ing operations, must needs be eliminated from his 
plans so long as the Merrimac threatened aggressive 
action ; and that but a limited assistance of the navy 
could be furnished as a protection to his right flank 
below the mouth of the York River. General McClel- 
lan was forced to concede the justness of Commodore 
Goldsborough's decision in this matter, as the latter 



QuJrn-^ YORKTOWN 

■ek TO 

WILLIAMSBURG 

Scale 




OPENING OF THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN. 



233 



was especially charged with the destruction of the 
Merrimac should this vessel again seek a conflict with 
the United States fleet in Hampton Roads, and he 
was precluded from diminishing his naval strength so 
long as this formidable armor-clad was afloat. 

Under these circumstances McClellan was forced 
to plan his campaign up the Peninsula, with the James 
River on his left flank controlled by the Confederate 
navy. The strip of country called the Peninsula lies 
between the James and York Rivers and the Chesa- 
peake Bay south of the mouth of the York. These 
rivers form tidal estuaries of the Chesapeake, and from 
them and the bay itself many smaller estuaries, also 
afTected by the tides, make well up into the Peninsula, 
thus affording many excellent positions of defense 
where a small force may hold a much greater one in 
temporary check. But these could readily be turned 
should the flank approaches by water be in the pos- 
session of the aggressor. The ground is generally low- 
lying and covered with dense wood, except where 
clearings have been made for cultivation ; the soil is 
a sandy loam which readily becomes miry and boggy 
after light rains. Many marshes occur in the neigh- 
borhood of the numerous creeks, w^hich in rainy 
weather are impassable except upon corduroy roads. 
The Peninsula is traversed by but two main roads from 
the vicinity of Fort Monroe to Williamsburg, near 
where they unite to separate again in their progress 
northward ; the westerly, or Warwick road, starting 
from Newport News skirts the James River and passes 
through Warwick Court House and crosses the War- 
wick River at Lee's Mill ; the easterly, or Yorktown 
road, starts from Hampton, running generally parallel 
to the Warwick road, crossing the head waters of the 
Back and Poquosin Rivers, and passes through Big 
Bethel and Cockletown until it reaches Yorktown ; 
thence it approaches the Warwick road to within a mile 
at the Halfway House and joins it at Williamsburg. 
Several connecting roads unite these main roads, but 
they are all ordinary country roads generally found in 



234 GENERAL McCLELLAN. 

a sparsely settled territory of an agricultural people. 
Beyond Williamsburg the Peninsula is divided by the 
Chickahominy into two portions ; that on the east 
lying between the Pamunkey and the Chickahominy, 
and the western portion between the Chickahominy 
and the James. Here the land is somewhat higher 
and drier, but it is also much better adapted to a de- 
fensive than to an olTfensive campaign, owing to its 
indifferent roads, marshy streams, and dense woods. 

The importance of the Peninsula as affording a pos- 
sible line of operations to the Union forces toward 
Richmond as an objective had not been ignored. As . 
early as May 21, 1861, General J. B. Magruder, hav- • 
ing been assigned to the command of the Confederate : 
forces on the Peninsula, was directed to take immedi- • 
ate measures to strengthen the defenses at Yorktown i 
and to hasten the construction of a line of defense : 
at Williamsburg by joining the heads of College and I 
Queen's Creeks by an intrenched line. Recognizing ; 
the extreme importance of his problem, Magruder did 
not hesitate to employ every means within his power* 
to accomplish it at the very earliest opportunity. Not t 
only did he utilize every soldier of his command for' 
the necessary labor, but also made requisitions uponi 
the slave owners to the extent of half of their slaves, , 
and impressed all the free negroes for compulsory^ 
labor to construct the lines of works deemed neces-- 
sary for his purpose. By the latter part of July, 1861,, 
he had practically completed three strong defensive; 
lines across the Peninsula. The first or more advanced 
of these extended from Harrod's Mill on the Poquosin 
to Young's Mill on Deep Creek, having supporting; 
batteries covering its flanks ; the second, or what after- 
ward became the main line, had its left flank at Glou- 
cester and Yorktown, whose works closed the mouth 
of the York River ; then followed the right bank of the 
Warwick to the vicinity of Lee's Mill, where it turned 
to cross Mulberry Island, and rested its right upon 
Skiff Creek ; the third, consisting of a series of de- 
tached redoubts, was placed in front of Williamsburg 



OPENING OF THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN. 235 

effectively to command all the roads approaching the 
village from the direction of Fort Monroe. With a 
living faith in the supreme importance of his trust, he 
labored with indefatigable industry to strengthen his 
lines with all possible accessory means of defense, and 
at the same time never ceased to importune the Con- 
federate War Department for additions to his forces 
and to his armament during this period of preparation. 

In the meantime the Assistant Secretary of War, 
Mr. John Tucker, assisted by Colonel Ingalls and Cap- 
tain Hodges, of the Quartermaster's Department of the 
regular army, was fully occupied in effecting the trans- 
fer of the Army of the Potomac to its new base at Fort 
Monroe. " In thirty-seven days," says he, '' from the 
time I received the order in Washington, the vessels 
chartered (one hundred and thirteen steamers, one 
hundred and eighty-eight schooners, and eighty-eight 
barges) had transported from Perryville, Alexandria, 
and Washington, one hundred and twenty-one thou- 
sand five hundred men, fourteen thousand five hun- 
dred and ninety-two animals, eleven hundred and fifty 
wagons, forty-four batteries, seventy-four ambulances, 
besides pontoon bridges, telegraph materials and the 
enormous quantity of equipage, etc., required for an 
army of such magnitude." While this problem of 
logistics was in process of execution it was a matter 
of the gravest apprehension lest the Merrimac should 
steal from her anchorage and inflict a deadly blow 
upon the transports while unloading their precious 
freight at the wharves of Fort Monroe. 

Notwithstanding the great success that attended 
the transshipment of so vast an army, unexpected de- 
lays and dilBculties had occurred, especially with re- 
gard to the wagons and animals belonging to the land 
transportation of some of the troops. At the time 
of McClellan's arrival at Fort Monroe, in the after- 
moon of April 2d, the disembarkation of the cavalry 
land artillery reserve was still in progress. Deciding 
upon an immediate advance he hastened the unloading 
of the transports then in the harbor, and proceeded to 



236 GENERAL McCLELLAN. 

organize the available troops for this purpose. These 
were Sedgwick's division of the Second Corps, Hamil- 
ton's and Porter's of the Third, and Couch's and 
Smith's of the Fourth ; Sykes's brigade of regular in- 
fantry, Hunt's reserve artillery, and the Fifth United 
States and the Third Pennsylvania Regiments of cav- 
alry — in all about fifty-eight thousand men and one 
hundred guns, besides the artillery batteries attached 
to the several divisions. Casey's division of the Fourth 
Corps had also been disembarked at this time, but as 
it was not then supplied with wagon transportation it 
could not participate in the forward movement. 

With the exception of the more prominent features ; 
of the Peninsula, such as were delineated upon the : 
Coast Survey charts, much of the important topog-- 
raphy of his new theater of operations was practically ' 
unknown to General McClellan. In planning his cam-- 
paign he relied mainly upon the topographical details 
as laid down upon what was known as the " Cram " 
map, compiled by Colonel T. J. Cram, of the Topo- 
graphical Engineers, serving at Fort Monroe as staff f 
officer of General Wool. In his report McClellan 1 
says : " As to the force and position of the enemy, the 
information then in our possession was vague and un- 
trustworthy. Much of it was obtained from the staffi 
officers of General Wool, and was simply to the effect 1 
that Yorktown w^as surrounded by a continuous line^ 
of earthworks, with strong water batteries on the Yorks 
River, and garrisoned by not less than fifteen thou-- 
sand troops, under the command of General J. B. 
Magruder. Maps which had been prepared by thC' 
Topographical Engineers under General Wool's com- 
mand were furnished me, in which the Warwick River 
w^as represented as flowing parallel to, but not cross- 
ing the road from Newport News to Williamsburg, 
making the so-called Mulberry Island a real island ; 
and we had no information as to the true course of 
the Warwick across the Peninsula, nor of the formi- 
dable line of works which it covered." This is in strong 
contrast to the language he used in describing the 



OPENING OF THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN. 



237 



character of the theater of operations he desired to 
assume in his letter of February 3d to the President. 

The condition of things at this time, as they must 
have presented themselves to his mind, may be de- 
scribed as follows : The greater bulk of his army had 
reached its new base, and the remainder, either en route 
or about to embark, would give him four full army 
corps with which to carry on his campaign ; with suf- 
ficient wagons to move the greater part of the force 
already landed, he deemed it more prudent to advance 
upon Yorktown at once without waiting to collect the 
transports necessary to land a force on the Gloucester 
side of the York River, and, expecting to invest York- 
town on the second day of his movement, he confi- 
dently hoped to be then in a better position to deter- 
mine his future plans. Ignorant of the obstacle pre- 
sented by the strong defenses of the Warwick, which 
were not delineated on the Cram map, his plan ap- 
peared to be entirely feasible. Accordingly, on April 
3d he issued orders for the movement to begin early 
the next morning. His command was organized into 
two columns, each to follow separate roads ; the left 
column, under the command of General Keyes, was 
directed to follow the James River or Warwick road 
to the vicinity of Young's Mill, while the right column 
was to move upon the Yorktown road by way of Big 
Bethel and Howard's Bridge. The former was com- 
posed of Smith's and Couch's divisions with the Fifth 
United States Cavalry attached, and the latter, com- 
manded by General Heintzelman, comprised Porter's, 
Hamilton's, and Sedgwick's divisions, to which Aver- 
ill's Third Pennsylvania Cavalry was assigned. Fol- 
lowing the right column came the reserve infantry, 
cavalry, and artillery of the army. The object of the 
first day's march was to force the enemy to abandon 
the works at Big Bethel, Howard's Bridge, and Ship 
Point on the right, and those of Young's Mill on 
the left, all of which was successfully accomplished. 
Orders for the next day directed Keyes to move upon 
Lee's Mill, brush aside any of the enemy's force found 



238 



GENERAL McCLELLAN. 



in his path, and to proceed to the vicinity of the Half- 
way House in rear of Yorktown, where he was to estab- 
hsh his command so as to prevent the escape of the 
garrison at Yorktown and re-enforcements from being 
thrown in. Meanwhile the right column was expected 
to establish itself in front of Yorktown, and the com- 
bined operations of the two would isolate the garrison 
and effect its speedy capture. 

The satisfactory progress of the first day's march 
was not to be repeated on the second day. Keyes's 
column came in sight of the enemy's works at Lee's 
Mill at eleven o'clock, and he was forced to deploy his 
leading division (Smith's) to develop the enemy's 
strength and position. It was not until late in the 
afternoon that Keyes ascertained that the enemy occu- 
pied ** a strongly fortified position behind Warwick 
River, the fords in which have been destroyed by dams, 
and the approaches to which are through dense forests, 
swamps, and marshes. No part of his line as far as 
discovered can be taken by assault without an enor- 
mous waste of life." The rain had been falling in tor- 
rents since early morning, causing the roads to become • 
exceedingly difficult for troops and almost impassable 
for wheeled vehicles. Hence but few pieces of artillery 
could be brought to the front to reply to those of 
the enemy in position, and later, when the troops 
bivouacked for the night, none of their ammunition, 
forage, and provision trains had arrived. 

The right column. Porter's division leading, was 
united at Cockletown on the morning of the 5th, and 
moved toward Yorktown over a marshy and narrow 
road which the heavy rain rendered almost impassable. 
The rear divisions were compelled to halt for some 
hours to have a clear road, while Porter deployed his 
division in front of the Yorktown defenses in the face 
of skirmish and artillery fire. In the mists and rain 
the defenses of the enemy loomed up with magnified 
impressiveness, the ground in front appeared to be 
impracticable for the deployment of the light batteries 
of the Union forces, and, until this was cleared of the; 



OPENING OF THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN. 



239 



enemy by skirmishers, no advance in force seemed 
practicable. The leading division therefore bivouacked 
on the ground which the orders of the previous day 
directed it to occupy, while the remainder of the right 
column was practically anchored in the mire some dis- 
tance to the rear. 

McClellan, having found himself thus unexpectedly 
held in check on his left and his plan of isolating the 
garrison of Yorktown unexecuted, was, under the ne- 
cessity of immediate action, forced to decide upon a 
new plan. To add to his discouragements, he just then 
received notification from the War Department that 
McDowell's corps had been detached from the force 
under his immediate command and ordered to report 
to the Secretary of War. '' To me," says McClellan, 
" the blow was most discouraging. It frustrated all 
my plans for impending operations. It fell when I 
was too deeply committed to withdraw. It left me 
incapable of continuing operations which had been 
begun. It compelled the adoption of another, a dif- 
ferent, and a less effective plan of campaign. It made 
rapid and brilliant operations impossible. It was a 
fatal error." This extract from McClellan's report, 
written, it must be remembered, some time after the 
campaign had terminated, seems to imply that the re- 
tention of McDowell's corps at Washington had an 
immediate and controlling influence upon the plan of 
operations that needs must be determined upon in the 
predicament in which the Army of the Potomac found 
itself on the afternoon of the 5th of April. A better 
insight of the workings of McClellan's mind is, how- 
ever, presented in the letters he wrote about this time 
to Commodore Goldsborough in making a request for 
naval assistance in his operations against Yorktown. 
In that of April 5th, 10.30 p. m., he says : " The rebels 
are close in my front, and we have had sharp cannonad- 
ing most of the afternoon, with but little loss on our 
side — some eight or ten killed. Our neighbors are in a 
very strong position, their left at Yorktown (strongly 
intrenched with numerous guns), thence extending 



240 



GENERAL McCLELLAN. 



along the line of the Warwick River to its mouth. This 
river is some seven feet deep to a point near Lee's 
Mill, banks marshy and almost impassable ; from point 
to point they have batteries. The roads are inferior 
and I have had great difficulty in moving. To-morrow 
I shall spend in making reconnoissances, in repairing 
the roads, getting up supplies, and establishing my 
depot at Ship Point. I can not turn Yorktown with- 
out a battle, in which I must use heavy artillery and go ■ 
through the preliminary operations of a siege. The 
reconnoissances of to-morrow will enable me to form i 
a pretty correct judgment of what I have to meet and I 
the best way of overcoming the difficulties before me. . 
Naval co-operation seems to me more essential than i 
ever. I can give you my best ideas to-morrow night. . 
I learn that the Mystic has reached you. Will youi 
be able to put her at the Yorktown batteries if I find! 
it necessary? 

" If I find the position as strong as I now antici 
pate, I will probably propose to you that I shall gett 
my siege guns and mortars in battery to open simul-- 
taneously with the action of such naval vessels as youi 
can spare. Re-enforcements are said to be arriving^ 
from Richmond and Norfolk. I fear our Severn ex-- 
pedition may be impracticable. I received this morn-- 
ing a dispatch from the adjutant general informing^ 
me that McDowell's corps (some thirty-five thousand 
men) had been withdrawn from my command. I need 
not tell you that nothing could have astonished met 
more. I received the dispatch while listening to the; 
rebel guns, and was w^ell assured that I required all 
the force I had counted on." 

In response to a request for naval assistance on 
April 3d, Commodore Goldsborough had sent three 
small screw steamers — the Wachusett, Penobscot, and 
Currituck — to York River, under the command of 
Commander Missroom, with directions to co-operate 
with the army. These were wooden vessels of suffi- 
cient armament to protect the transports against any 
of the enemy's vessels on the York River, and to covet 



OPENING OF THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN. 24I 

any landing the troops might be required to make 
outside the range of the great guns of the enemy, but 
not at all designed to attack the heavily armed earthen 
forts at Yorktown and Gloucester. McClellan per- 
fectly understood their limitations, and could have had 
no expectation that they were to be otherwise em- 
ployed. Commodore Goldsborough, in his reply to 
the letter above quoted, was explicit on the point as to 
what he might rely on so far as the assistance of the 
navy was concerned at Yorktown. He says : " Mystic 
not here, and not expected for some time. Until the 
guns at Gloucester Point be turned by the movement 
up the Severn it will be wholly impracticable, in my 
judgment, for the small naval force I can now detail to 
assist you to attack the forts at Yorktown and Glouces- 
ter with any prospect of success, unless, forsooth, 
it be practicable to run past these forts at night and 
so get on the inside of them and assail them in flank. 
Of this Missroom may judge. Teh him what I say. 
You know my position here. I dare not leave the 
Merrimac and consorts unguarded. Were she out of 
the way, everything I have here should be at work in 
your behalf ; but as things stand, you must not count 
on my sending any more vessels to aid your operations 
than those I mentioned to you. Some of these are 
now at and about York River, under Missroom, and 
the other three I hold here to move with your division 
up the Severn, if you still intend to send over there ; 
and if you do not, I shall send them off to Missroom 
on being informed of the fact by you." 

McClellan had now arrived at the most critical point 
of his career as a commander of an army in the pres- 
ence of an enemy. At the end of the second day's 
march he found himself unexpectedly blocked in front 
of an unsuspected obstacle, behind which the enemy 
v^as prepared to offer the utmost resistance. He as- 
sumed that Magruder had then a strength of from fif- 
teen thousand to twenty thousand men, and that he was 
,also receiving re-enforcements from Richmond and 
Norfolk. He had just learned that McDowell's corps 
16 



242 



GENERAL McCLELLAN. 



was taken from him, and that the navy could give him 
no assistance in the reduction of the Yorktown defenses. 
Added to these maiA sources of discouragement 
there were many vexatious incidents that occurred at 
this most inopportune time to contribute their de- 
terring effect so far as aggressive action was con- 
cerned. The slow progress over roads rendered almost 
impassable by heavy rains, the difficulty of getting up 
supplies, the congestion of the roads by reason of the 
excessive impedimenta, and the unfavorable nature of 
the topography for the deployment of troops, were dis- 
tressing sources of vexation and discouragement. In 
addition to these untoward circumstances of his im- 
mediate surroundings he could not but believe that the 
Administration was unfriendly and ungenerous. For 
he had received the order depriving him of all control 
over General Wool and the troops under his command, 
and forbidding him to detach any of them without the 
latter's sanction ; he had been notified that the Secretary 
had directed the discontinuance of recruiting of volun- 
teers and broken up the recruiting depots, and had 
organized the troops in the eastern theater of war into 
six separate departments, each independent of the oth- 
ers, and all reporting directly to the Secretary of War. 

What effect any or all of these conditions had in 
causing him to adopt the waiting policy of a siege 
rather than the bold action of an immediate assault 
it would be difficult to determine. Practically, the ; 
former course was decided upon in his own mind att 
the end of the second day's movement. Its develop- 
ment can be traced back to the influence which his> 
observations and study of the siege of Sevastopol lefti 
upon his mind; he refers to it as a possibility in his^ 
letter of March 19th to the Secretary of War; also im 
his confidential memorandum of INIarch 22d, specifying 
the character and amount of siege artillery he desired 
to have at his disposition at Fort Monroe ; and, finally, 
from the fact that he brought with him a siege train 
for just such an eventuality. 

Again we have to consider the marked contrast 



SIEGE OF YORKTOWN. 243 

that existed between his characteristics as a subaltern 
and as a commander. In the Mexican War, as a junior 
officer, he was brave, courageous, intrepid, and some- 
times rashly venturesome; later in life, as a com- 
mander, he was timid, irresolute, halting, and extremely 
cautious. Had the qualities of the commander been ex- 
changed for those of the subaltern, the result of the mag- 
nificent discipline and glowing patriotism of the noble 
army that he had organized and commanded would 
have been different from that which history has recorded. 
Considering the disparity of strength in McClel- 
lan's favor and the incomplete condition of the defenses 
between Yorktown and the head of the Warwick, it 
was incumbent upon him to have made a determined 
efifort by assault before deciding upon a siege. The 
latter was a last resort and always possible. Of this 
portion of the line General Barnard, chief engineer 
of the army, says : *' The connection between Fort 
Magruder (the ' white redoubt ') and the ' red re- 
doubt ' was a mere rifie pit, and from the red redoubt 
to the swamp there zvas nothing zvhatever. The ground 
between and behind these two works was seen and 
could be swept by our artillery lire. Our assaulting 
columns would have been from two thirds of a mile 
to one mile removed from the artillery of Yorktown, 
from the fire of which undulations of the ground 
afforded much cover, even supposing that the fire of 
that place could not have been subdued by our own 
batteries. The red redoubt, toward which the assault 
would have been directed, was a very insignificant 
work." Of this opinion, which was published in 1864, 
General McClellan says : '' Barnard never expressed to 
him any opinion that an assault was practicable upon 
any part of the enemy's line, but was decidedly of the 
opinion that heavy guns were necessary. That he 
never, at any time, heard a contrary opinion from any 
one. That there was entire unanimity of general offi- 
cers and staff that the course pursued was the only 
practicable one." However true this statement may 
be — and there is no reason to question it — it in reality 



244 



GENERAL McCLELLAN. 



has nothing to do with the question whether or not 
McClellan should have.assauUed the Yorktown Hues. 
No commander can shield himself behind the opinions 
or counsel of his staff or of subordinate commanders, 
for he is solely responsible for his own decision and 
the results that flow from it. Their function is to 
furnish facts that come within their observation, and 
to obey orders even when they are directly opposed to 
their most pronounced opinions. The responsibilities 
of the commander are great, but so also are the rewards 
that follow success, and the question to be considered 
here is : Would another commander of a different tem- 
perament, with all the conditions as they existed on 
the evening of April 5th, have arrived at the determi- 
nation to make the assault, and, making it at any time 
prior to the loth of April, would he have scored a vic- 
tory? This leads to an examination of the condition 
of the Confederates at the time in question. 

General Magruder was quite well aware of the 
weak points in his line, and, while he felt the neces- 
sity of presenting a bold front to his adversary, he 
was exceedingly apprehensive of the result. When 
McClellan's pickets appeared in front of Yorktown he 
telegraphed General Lee : *' I have made my arrange- 
ments to fight my small force, but without the slightest 
hope of success. If I am re-enforced in time with ten 
thousand men I think I can block the way to Rich- 
mond." Previous to this, however, owing to the un- 
certainty as to the destination of McClellan, Magruder 
had received but slight additions to his strength ; two 
Alabama regiments having been sent him on March 
24th, and a few companies of cavalry, infantry, and 
artillery within the next five days. 

News had of course been received by the Confed- 
erate authorities at Richmond of the passage down the 
Potomac and Chesapeake Bay of the fleet of transports 
and of the disembarkation of large bodies of troops 
at Fort Monroe ; but so well had the secret of McClel- 
lan's plan been kept that they were in doubt up to the 
very last moment with regard to his true objective. 



SIEGE OF YORKTOWN. 



245 



Indeed, as late as March 31st, General Lee telegraphed 
Maguder : " From present indications I think that Nor- 
folk is quite as seriously threatened as the Peninsula, 
and more probably the object of attack." Such, then, 
was the uncertainty at Richmond, that on March 27th 
General Johnston was directed to detach ten thousand 
of his troops from the line of the Rapidan and send 
them to Richmond, so that they could, on arrival there, 
be dispatched either to Huger at Norfolk or to Ma- 
gruder at Yorktown, according to the necessities of 
the moment. He was also directed at about the same 
time to prepare to withdraw all but a strength sufficient 
to constitute a mere army of observation, and, to guide 
him in his judgment. General Lee informed him that 
President Davis had expressed the opinion " that the 
loss of the central road and communication with the 
Valley at Staunton would be more injurious than the 
withdrawal from the Peninsula and the evacuation of 
Norfolk." In accordance with these instructions, 
Ewell's division, with a regiment of cavalry, was left in 
observation on the upper Rappahannock, and he was 
directed to obey any call for assistance from Jackson, 
then in the Valley confronting Banks ; a mixed force 
of about brigade strength, taken from G. W. Smith's 
division, was left in front of Fredericksburg, and the 
remainder and Longstreet's division were ordered to 
Richmond ; and on the 5th of April Hill's and Early's 
divisions were ordered to move early in the morning 
with all possible rapidity to the same point. Thus 
everything indicated that the Confederate authorities 
considered the situation a critical one, particularly as 
McClellan had so placed himself as to threaten both 
Norfolk and Yorktown, against either of which he was 
able to bring greatly preponderating forces at his 
option. 

For at least four days after April 5th McClellan had 
the golden opportunity of a magnificent success within 
his grasp, but he failed to seize it because he did not 
perceive it. He failed to see it because he was charac- 
teristically non-aggressive as a commander, and in- 



246 GENERAL McCLELLAN. 

Stead of organizing a well-supported column of assault 
to derive the requisite information, he relied upon the 
personal reconnoissances of his staff, who from the 
nature of the country and the alertness of the enemy- 
could furnish practically no information of value. 
From the very instant that the idea of a siege became 
the predominating one in his mind every advantage 
that the flank movement by water had put in his pos- 
session was sacrificed, and the resulting campaign was 
doomed to failure and disaster. 

The reputation that McClellan enjoyed as an ac- 
complished officer at this time was so high through- 
out the army that whatever decision lie might arrive 
at would necessarily receive the almost unquestioned 
support of his subordinate commanders, his staff, and 
the rank and file of the army. There was a great 
unanimity in the belief that he had been badly treated 
by the Administration, and that the retention of Mc- 
Dowell's corps was deliberately intended to minimize 
his chances of success rather than to provide for the 
security of Washington, and that the radical element 
at Washington, operating through the Secretary of 
War, would neglect no opportunity to interfere with 
the success of his plans, and some even went so far 
as to believe that this adverse influence would be will- 
ing to sacrifice the army rather than help him to vic- 
tory. His engaging manner, as exhibited in his per- 
sonal intercourse with his troops, his martial bearing 
and skillful horsemanship as he rode the lines of the 
army, added their influence in sowing the seeds of affec- 
tion in the hearts of his soldiers that made them trust 
him, believe in him, and love him. With such con- 
fidence and affection he could then have ventured any- 
thing with that army and it would not have failed in its 
response. 

Strongly believing that the preliminary operations 
of a siege would have to be undertaken, McClellan 
nevertheless ordered reconnoissances to ascertain 
whether there wxre any possible favorable points in 
the line for assault, and these were continued until 



SIEGE OF YORKTOWN. 



247 



the loth of April, much to the satisfaction of Ma- 
gruder, who welcomed every day's delay to make 
his lines stronger and to secure additional re-enforce- 
ments. But the character of the country was such 
that personal reconnoissance could give little informa- 
tion of the strength that the enemy held behind his 
lines, for they everywhere exhibited an activity that 
deceived McClellan with respect to the strength of their 
forces at a time when extraordinary exaggeration was 
rife and somewhat excusable. And in the meantime, 
while awaiting the reports of the reconnoitring offi- 
cers, it was necessary to establish depots of supply, to 
make them accessible by corduroyed roads, and to 
locate the various subdivisions of the army with refer- 
ence to convenience for supply and security against 
the enemy. The horrible weather that prevailed at 
this time turned the country into a quagmire and enor- 
mously increased the fatiguing and unaccustomed 
labor to which the troops were subjected, and this in- 
juriously afifected their morale, health, and discipline. 
Siege operations having finally been determined 
upon, extensive preparations were necessary to get the 
landings, roads, and bridges in proper condition, to 
locate and build the batteries, and to bring the necessary 
siege material together in accessible depots. Worm- 
ley's Creek offered many advantages for this purpose, 
and it was therefore chosen. Many ravines heading in 
the close vicinity of Yorktown lead into it, and its 
mouth, distant only about thirty-five hundred yards 
from the village, was available under cover of darkness 
for the unloading of siege material covered from the 
view of the enemy. The location of the several bat- 
teries thought necessary for the reduction of the York- 
town defenses was determined upon after a careful pre- 
liminary study of the ground, and their construction 
was begun on the 17th of April. The enormous labor 
required in their erection as well as that for the better- 
ment of the roads, the construction of bridges, land- 
ings, wharves, etc., was necessarily performed by the 
troops, and they were unceasingly engaged upon it 



248 GENERAL McCLELLAN. 

until the evacuation of Yorktown by the enemy. The 
siege works comprised, fourteen batteries and four re- 
doubts with their connecting parallels, with an arma- 
ment of two 200-pounders, twelve lOO-pounders, 
twelve 30-pounders, thirty-two 20-pounders, twelve 
4.5-inch rifles, ten 13-inch seacoast mortars, ten 10- 
inch, fifteen lo-inch, and seven 8-inch siege mortars, 
and two 8-inch siege howitzers, making a total of one 
hundred and fourteen pieces of heavy siege artillery. 

In all this work General McClellan took the great- 
est personal and professional interest. He watched the 
development of the siege operations from day to day, 
anxious to bring them to a successful conclusion, and 
drawing upon his own study of the siege of Sevastopol 
for devices to hasten and improve this development. 
In order to expedite the work and systematize the 
labor and responsibility to better advantage. General 
Fitz-John Porter was made director of the siege, April 
27th, and, becoming responsible thereafter, was re- 
quired to report twice daily to the commanding gen- 
eral to receive instructions. 

Meanwhile the army in bivouac covered the line 
from the York to the James; the right wing, under 
Heintzelman, consisting of Porter's, Hooker's, and 
Hamilton's divisions, extended, in the order named, 
from Wormley's Creek to the Warwick road at 
Wynn's Mill ; while the left wing, under Sumner, con- 
sisting of Sedgwick's, Smith's, Couch's, and Casey's 
divisions, extended the line to the James near the mouth 
of the Warwick. By the loth of April, at which time 
Casey's, Hooker's, and Richardson's divisions had 
joined, or were near at hand, the strength of the army, 
present and absent, was over one hundred thousand 
men. With the exception of the attack by Smith's 
division at Dam No. i, on the i6th of April, no aggres- 
sive movement of any importance occurred during the 
progress of the siege. In this afifair it was the inten- 
tion to push a strong reconnoissance on the enemy's 
line at this point in order to ascertain his strength 
there, the character of his works, and to put a stop 



SIEGE OF YORKTOWN. 



249 



to the construction of a battery ; also to sustain the 
reconnoitring party by a real attack if found expedient, 
so as to obtain a lodgment on the other side of the 
Warwick at this point. Smith began the movement of 
the brigades of his division at six o'clock to protect 
his flanks against a possible counter attack, and to 
support the light batteries of his division advanced to 
the front. While this was in progress and the bat- 
teries were delivering an overwhelming fire upon the 
three pieces of the enemy, Lieutenant Noyes crossed 
the creek and advanced sufficiently far to ascertain 
that the enemy's rifle pits could readily be taken. This 
being reported to Smith, he obtained from General 
McClellan, who was then present on the field, permis- 
sion to cross over a small body of infantry to verify 
this information, and instructed its commander, if suc- 
cessful, to signal the fact so that supports might be 
sent over to secure the position. Four companies of 
Colonel Hyde's Third Vermont were selected. They 
succeeded in crossing and taking possession of the 
enemy's rifle pits, which they held for about forty min- 
utes ; but information of this success did not reach 
the brigade commander in time to be made of use, 
so that their heroic action did not bear the fruit worthy 
of their intrepidity and sacrifice. The Confederate 
troops defending the dam were for a time thrown into 
confusion, which, had it been taken due advantage of, 
would have resulted in breaking their line and might 
have forced the abandonment of the whole line of the 
Warwick. They, however, quickly rallied, bringing 
three regiments against the four companies, and the 
latter were compelled very reluctantly to withdraw. 
This partial success emboldened General Smith to 
make a second attempt later in the afternoon, and at 
five o'clock the Sixth Vermont, supported by a por- 
tion of the Fourth Vermont, moved forward to the 
attack. The enemy had, however, now concentrated 
three brigades to meet this advance, which was speedily 
stopped, and this repulse brought an end to the day's 
conflict. The loss on the Union side amounted to one 



250 GENERAL McCLELLAN. 

hundred and sixty-five in killed, wounded, and miss- 
ing, the greater portion falling upon the Vermont regi- 
ments engaged. This 'was in reality another lost op- 
portunity to break the enemy's line which had been 
made possible by the splendid behavior of the troops, 
but which unfortunately had not been provided for by 
the major general commanding as among the possi- 
bilities of the day. 

It may be well now to inquire what were the rela- 
tions existing between McClellan and the Administra-^ 
tion during this month of siege. It is useless to deny 
the fact that Stanton had about lost confidence in himi 
even as early as April 6th, for on that day he asks of[ 
General Wool: " Please let me know fully the state off 
operations toward Yorktown, and whether it is neces-- 
sary to send more than Sumner's corps, which is onila 
the way down," thus allowing the opinion of a junior; 
and an independent commander to influence his de-- 
cision upon a request for re-enforcements. We: 
now know that McClellan continually magnified the; 
strength of the enemy, and based his request for re- 
enforcements upon his erroneous assumptions, askings 
first for the First Corps, but saying that if for any 
reason not known to him this could not be granted, 
to send him Franklin's division. In answer to this the 
President tells him : " You now have over one hun- 
dred thousand men independent of Wool. I think 
you had better break the enemy's line from Yorktown 
to Warwick River at once. They will probably use 
time as advantageously as you can." This brought 
a reply from McClellan to the effect that when all his 
troops joined he would only have eighty-five thou- 
sand men for duty, and that at present he had but fifty- 
three thousand, but that the balance was coming as 
rapidly as the means of transportation would allow 
This discrepancy is not clearly accounted for by the 
general, for the returns of April 13th, a week there- 
after, show a total present and absent of one hundred 
and seventeen thousand seven hundred and twenty- 
one ; an aggregate absent of twelve thousand four hun-i 



SIEGE OF YORKTOWN. 



251 



dred and eighty-six ; an aggregate on special duty, 
sick, and in arrest of forty-two hundred and sixty-five ; 
eaving a total present for duty of one hundred thou- 
;and nine hundred and seventy. His dispatch to Stan- 
on on the 7th of April is most depressing in its tone, 
ind gives but little prospect that any satisfactory prog- 
ress can be made. He says : " The whole line of the 
Warwick, which really heads within a mile of York- 
own, is strongly defended by detached redoubts and 
Dther fortifications, armed with heavy and light guns. 
The approaches, except at Yorktown, are covered by 
he Warwick, over which there is but one, or, at most, 
wo passages, both of which are covered by strong bat- 
eries. It will be necessary to resort to the use of 
leavy guns and some siege operations before we can 
assault. All the prisoners state that General J. E. 
Johnston arrived in Yorktown yesterday with strong 
re-enforcements. It seems clear that I shall have the 
whole force of the enemy on my hands, probably not 
ess than one hundred thousand (100,000) men, and 
possibly more. In consequence of the loss of Blenker's 
division and the First Corps, my force is possibly less 
han that of the enemy, while they have all the advan- 
tage of position. 

" I am under great obligation to you for the ofifer 
that the whole force and material of the Government 
will be as fully and speedily under my command as 
heretofore, or as if the new departments had not been 
created. 

*' Since my arrangements were made for this cam- 
paign, at least fifty thousand men have been taken 
from my command. 

*' Since my dispatch of the 5th instant five divisions 
have been in close observation of the enemy, and fre- 
quently exchanging shots. When my present com- 
'mand all joins I shall have about eighty-five thousand 
imen for duty, from which a large force must be taken 
for guards, escorts, etc. With this army I could assault 
the enemy's works, and perhaps carry them, but were 
I in possession of their intrenchments, and assailed by 



252 GENERAL McCLELLAN. 

double my numbers, I should have no fears as to the 
result. 

" Under the circumstances that have been devel- 
oped since my arrival here, I feel fully impressed witl: 
the conviction that here is to be fought the great battk 
that is to decide the existing contest. I shall, of course; 
commence the attack as soon as I can get up nn 
siege train, and shall do all in my power to carry th(, 
enemy's works ; but to do this with a reasonable de- 
gree of certainty, requires, in my judgment, that J| 
should, if possible, have at least the whole of the Firs! 
Corps to land upon the Severn River, and attaclj 
Gloucester in the rear. My present strength will noi 
admit of a detachment sufficient for the purpose, with' 
out materially impairing the efficiency of this column.', 

The reply of Mr. Lincoln to these dispatches^ 
though kindly in tone, was characteristically indicativs 
of his irritation at the prospect of interminable delay 
foreshadowed by the plan that McClellan seemed t^ 
adopt. He says : 

My dear Sir: Your dispatches, complaining that you ar 
not properly sustained, while they do not offend me, do par 
me very much. 

Blenker's division was withdrawn from you before you let 
here, and you know the pressure under which I did it, ano 
as I thought, acquiesced in it — certainly not without re, 
luctance. 

After you left I ascertained that less than twenty thousan; 
unorganized men, without a single field battery, were all yo 
designed to be left for the defense of Washington and Manass 
Junction, and part of this even was to go to General Hooker 
old position. General Banks's corps, once designed for Mana 
sas Junction, was diverted and tied up on the line of Winchest( 
and Strasburg, and could not leave it without again exposin 
the upper Potomac and the Baltimore and Ohio Railroa 
This presented, or would present when McDowell and Sun 
ner should be gone, a great temptation to the enemy to tur 
back from the Rappahannock and sack Washington. M' 
explicit order that Washington should, by the judgment 
all the commanders of army corps, be left entirely secur 
had been neglected. It was precisely this that drove me 1 
detain McDowell. 

I do not forget that I was satisfied with your arrange 
ment to leave Banks at Manassas Junction; but when thl 



SIEGE OF YORKTOWN. 



253 



rrangement was broken up and nothing was substituted for 
:, of course I was constrained to substitute something for 
: myself. .And allow me to ask, Do you really think I should 
ermit the line from Richmond via Manassas Junction to 
lis city to be entirely open except what resistance could be 
resented by less than twenty thousand unorganized troops? 
'his is a question which the country will not allow me to 
vade. 

There is a curious mystery about the number of troops 
ow with you. When I telegraphed you on the 6th, saying 
ou had over one hundred thousand with you, I ha-d just 
obtained from the Secretary of War a statement, taken, as 
e said, from your own returns, making one hundred and 
ight thousand then with you and en route to you. You now 
ay you will have but eighty-five thousand when all en route 
D you shall have reached you. How can the discrepancy of 
wenty-three thousand be accounted for? 

As to General Wool's command, I understand it is doing 
DV you precisely what a like number of your own v/ould have 
do if that command was away. 

I suppose the whole force which has gone forward to you 
3 with you by this time, and, if so, I think it is the precise 
ime for you to strike a blow. By delay the enemy will rela- 
ively gain upon you — that is, he will gain faster by fortifi- 
ations and re-enforcements than you can by re-enforcements 
lone. And once more let me tell you it is indispensable to 
'OU that you strike a blow. I am powerless to help this, 
t^ou will do me the justice to remember I always insisted 
hat going down the bay in search of a field, instead of fight- 
ng at or near Manassas, was only shifting and not surmount- 
ng a difificulty; that we would find the same enemy and the 
ame or eciual intrenchments at either place. The country 
vill not fail to note, is now noting, that the present hesita- 
ion to move upon an intrenched enemy is but the story of 
Vlanassas repeated. 

I beg to assure you that I have never written you or 
poken to you in greater kindness of feeling than now, nor 
vith a fuller purpose to sustain you, so far as, in my most 
inxious judgment, I consistently can. But you must act. 

From this time on McCIellan was persistent in his 
lippeals for re-enforcements, especially for Franklin's 
md McCall's divisions. On April loth he telegraphs 
Stanton : " Reconnoissance to-day proves that it is nec- 
essary to invest and attack Gloucester Point. Give me 
Franklin's and McCall's divisions and I will at once 
.mdertake it. If circumstances of which I am not 
aware make it impossible for you to send me two 



■S4 



GENERAL McCLELLAN. 



divisions to carry out this final plan of campaign, I willj' 
run the risk and hold piyself responsible for the results f 
if you will give me' Franklin's division. If you still f 
confide in my judgment I entreat that you will grant 
this request. The fate of our cause depends upon it.. 
Although willing under the pressure of necessity to 
carry this through with Franklin alone, I wish it to be 
distinctly understood that I think two divisions are| 
necessary. Franklin and his division are indispensable tj 
to me. . . ." Under this pressing importunity the 
Administration finally yielded, and Franklin was di- 
rected to embark his division for service in the Penin4 
sula. Including Franklin's division, the strength of 
the Army of the Potomac, as exhibited by the returns 
of April 30th, was, for duty, one hundred and nine thouH 
sand three hundred and thirty-five ; sick, fifty-six hun-i 
dred and eighteen ; in arrest and confinement, three 
hundred and ninety-seven ; absent, eleven thousand' 
and thirty-seven ; a total of one hundred and twenty 
six thousand three hundred and eighty-seven. 

To return now to the plans of the Confederates; 
After General Johnston had completed his inspection 
of the Yorktown lines he clearly perceived that it was 
only a question of time when McClellan's superior 
artillery would force the abandonment of the Confed 
erate position under circumstances that might be disas- 
trous. He therefore hastened to Richmond to pro 
pose a change of plan to President Davis, whicl 
seemed to the latter of such importance that he callec 
together the Secretary of War, General Randolph, anc 
Generals Lee, Longstreet, and G. W. Smith, to discusj 
it with General Johnston. The latter pointed out tha 
while Magruder had been successful in delaying Mc- 
Clellan's advance up the Peninsula, yet his arrange- 
ments would not enable the Confederates to defea 
McClellan, and that there was a strong probability tha 
the latter, with his superior artillery, would soon de 
molish the defenses of Yorktown and Gloucester, opei 
the York River to his gunboats and transports, ano 
thus place himself in so favorable a position in thei 



SIEGE OF YORKTOWN. 



255 



ear as to threaten the fall of Richmond. Instead, 
herefore, of merely delaying the advance of the Union 
irmy, he proposed that all of the available forces of 
he Confederacy then in North Carolina, South Caro- 
ina, Georgia, those at Norfolk, and on the Peninsula, 
md the troops then arriving at Richmond from the ' 
,\rmy of Northern Virginia, should be collected to- 
gether into a single army and give battle to McClel- 
an at some selected favorable point in the vicinity of 
Richmond. In his opinion the result would be an 
Dverwhelming defeat for the Union army taken at a 
lisadvantage, over a hundred miles from its base at 
Fort Monroe, and be decisive of the war. 

The proposition was long and thoroughly dis- 
:ussed. Lee opposed it because it would subject the 
mportant seaports of Charleston and Savannah to cap- 
ure, and because he believed the Peninsula offered 
excellent fields of battle for a small army contending 
igainst a large one. Randolph also opposed it because 
ts adoption would enforce the abandonment of Nor- 
olk and the loss of the navy yard there. Johnston 
and Smith supported the plan, and Longstreet was 
ilent. Mr. Davis closed the conference by deciding 
Igainst it, and thereupon directed Johnston to proceed 
;o the Peninsula to carry out the present arrangements, 
md gave orders for Smith's and Longstreet's divisions 
o the same destination. Johnston assumed command 
of the Peninsula, and claims that when Smith's and 
Longstreet's divisions reported to him his strength 
amounted to fifty-three thousand men, including 
three thousand sick. He at once took measures to 
complete and strengthen the works of defense, espe- 
cially the weak portion between the head of the War- 
wick and Yorktown, which had so far been the most 
aoticeably neglected. 

His purpose was now to hold on to his position 
to the last moment consistent with the safety of his 
army. He recognized that he always had a secure 
line of retreat unless this was cut by the sudden pas- 
sage of the York River, which would enable McClellan 



256 



GENERAL McCLELLAN. 



to interpose a strong force in his rear while in the deh- 
cate operation of a retreat. He did not intend to subject 
his army to the casualties of the formidable bombard- 
ment that day by day became impending, and accord- 
ingly, on the night of the 3d of May, he gave the neces- 
sary directions for the troops to withdraw from their 
defenses while the heavy artillery was to continue its 
fire until two o'clock the next morning. So success- 
fully was this arrangement carried out that McClellan 
did not discover the abandonment until dawn of the 
4th, and by that time the bulk of Johnston's forces 
were in the vicinity of Williamsburg. 

McClellan expected to be ready to open his bom- 
bardment by the 6th of May at the latest, and although 
many of his batteries were ready for action before this 
time, he preferred to delay awaiting the completion oft 
all, in order that the volume of fire should be over-- 
whelming and as destructive as possible. 

In a home letter, dated 12.30 a. m.. May 3d, Mc- 
Clellan says: *' After the hot firing of to-day every-- 
thing is so unusually still that I am a little suspicious: 
that our friends may intend a sortie; so I have taken] 
all the steps necessary to be ready for them, and am 
sitting up for a while to await developments. ... I 
don't half like the perfect quietness which reigns now. 
... It don't seem natural. It looks like a sortie or 
an evacuation. If either, I hope it may be the 
former. . . ." Had he then taken counsel of his sus- 
picions and designated a division of infantry to be 
held in light marching order for immediate service, 
the grievous and bitter disappointment caused by the 
evacuation of Yorktown on the morning of the 4th 
might have been mitigated by the happy results that 
would have attended a vigorous and rapid pursuit. 
But the enemy succeeded in getting away without loss 
of morale, men, or supplies, except only the heavy 
artillery in position and other materiel that is neces 
sarily abandoned in a leisurely retreat. Not antici- 
pating this movement McClellan was not prepared for 
immediate pursuit, and the main body of the enemy had 



BATTLE OF WILLIAMSBURG. 



257 



therefore the advantage of a start of about twelve 
hours. Although the evacuation of Yorktown was 
a disappointment, orders were at once issued direct- 
ing General Stoneman to take up the pursuit as soon 
as possible with all the available cavalry, consist- 
ing of the First and Sixth Regulars, the Eighth Illi- 
nois, Third Pennsylvania, and Barker's squadron, 
and four batteries of horse artillery, following the 
Yorktown road to the Halfway House and there en- 
deavor to reach the rear of that part of the enemy 
which had been reported as retreating on the Lee's 
Mill road. Hooker's division was directed to follow 
Stoneman as a support ; Kearny's division to be held 
in readiness, and Heintzelman, the corps commander, 
to control the entire movement. General Sumner, in 
command of the left wing, was directed to repair the 
bridges over the Warwick as speedily as possible so as 
to cross the Fifth United States Cavalry, Smith's and 
Couch's divisions, and Casey's, if necessary, and push 
his advance along the Lee's Mill road, driving the 
enemy, but not to attack until Stoneman could get in 
their rear ; Sedgwick's and Richardson's divisions to 
be held in readiness subject to the orders of the com- 
manding general in expectation of being needed to 
support the right column, Porter's division to move 
to Yorktown, and Franklin's, which had been disem- 
barked on the preceding day at Cheeseman's landing, 
to re-embark as soon as possible. 

These dispositions of the several divisions of the 
army would seem to be judicious, and as McClellan 
had no reason to expect that any resistance would be 
offered other than that of a rear guard disputing the 
Union advance at every favorable opportunity, he 
confided the management of the pursuit to General 
Sumner, the next ollicer in rank to himself, while 
he, justly regarding the flank movement to be the 
more important, remained at Yorktown to expedite 
the embarkation of the designated troops. For his 
action in remaining at Yorktown he has been severely 
criticised, because of the tactical mismanagement of the 
17 



258 GENERAL McCLELLAN. 

Union troops at Williamsburg, but, in his own justifi- 
cation, he claims that he had every reason to expect 
that with five divisions at hand and two others within 
supporting distance Sumner ought not to have failed 
to score a victory. 

To carry out the orderly movement of the various 
parts of an army of a hundred thousand men in ac- 
cordance with a well-digested plan is a problem of no 
small magnitude, even with a most competent and thor- 
oughly instructed stafif. How much greater were the 
difficulties in the present unexpected emergency can 
very well be imagined when we recall the condition of 
the army when the evacuation was made known. 
Many of the troops had been on fatigue duty in the 
trenches during the night, and neither rations nor 
transportation were ready in a single division for an im- 
mediate movement, as is shown by the report of every 
division and corps commander. Owing to this condi- 
tion of unreadiness for the march Stoneman did not 
leave Yorktown until ten o'clock, and Hooker did not 
get well under way until near one o'clock ; Smith's 
leading brigade, preceded by Chambliss's squadron, 
somewhat more prompt, reached Skifif Creek about 
1 0,30, to find that the Confederate rear guard of cavalry, 
under Stuart, had blocked his farther advance on this 
road by burning Lee's Bridge over Skiff Creek. The 
last of the Confederate infantry from the Yorktown 
lines had passed within the line held by this rear guard 
shortly after daybreak, and Stuart's cavalry presented 
a screen extending fgpm Skiff Creek to the York 
River, covering the two main roads leading to Wil- 
liamsburg. 

Stoneman moved rapidly, and about noon, at a dif- 
ficult crossing on the Yorktown road, came in contact 
with a portion of Stuart's force, under the command of 
Colonel Wickham, which was, however, quickly driven 
off by Gibson's battery. Here General Emory, with 
a regiment and a squadron of cavalry and a battery, 
was sent over to the Lee's Mill road to intercept the 
enemy whom General Smith was supposed to be driv- 




BATTLE j 

WILLIAMSBURG 

May 5^^ 1862 



BATTLE OF WILLIAMSBURG. 



259 



ing on that road, while the remainder of Stoneman's 
command, under General Cooke, hastened toward Wil- 
liamsburg. In a narrow wood road on his way to the 
left Emory was attacked by a small detachment of 
Stuart's cavalry, under Colonel Goode, which after a 
spirited contest was driven off, but the delay incident 
thereto enabled Stuart to make good his escape with 
his command by the Beach road bordering the James 
River, the only route then available. Cooke's ad- 
vanced guard, proceeding rapidly, soon came in view 
of the line of redoubts in front of Williamsburg, and 
there he perceived that the enemy on the plateau dis- 
played such superior strength in numbers and posi- 
tion that any attack by his cavalry alone would be 
futile. Nevertheless, as he expected that the infantry 
supports would soon arrive, and as he had been em- 
powered by Stoneman to attack at discretion, he threw 
forward a section of Gibson's battery near the junction 
of the roads and opened fire, at the same time sending 
Major Williams with four squadrons of the Sixth Cav- 
alry by a road to the right to attack on that flank. 
After about an hour's contest, during which there 
were several spirited cavalry charges, Cooke was 
obliged to retire from his advanced position after suf- 
fering a considerable loss in men and horses, and was 
also obliged to abandon one gun of Gibson's battery 
which had become so deeply mired that it could not 
be extricated. 

General Johnston had concentrated his army at 
Williamsburg at midday on the 4th, but had not in- 
tended to delay his retreat to fight a battle, as he knew 
full well that McClellan would hasten his transports 
up the York River and endeavor to strike the flank 
of his column while in retreat and capture or destroy 
his trains. Finding, however, that his trains were 
making slow progress, and in order to gain time for 
their better advancement, he ordered Semmes's brigade 
of McLaws's division, which was then about entering 
Williamsburg, to countermarch and occupy Fort Ma- 
gruder and its adjacent redoubts. This was about one 



26o GENERAL McCLELLAN. 

o'clock, and two hours later, hearing of Stoneman' 
approach, he also ordered the return of Kershaw 
brigade and Manly's bat'tery of the same division, an 
it was this force that effectually interposed itself as a 
obstacle to Cooke's troopers. Had there been a divi-j 
sion of Union infantry promptly on the ground t 
support Stoneman it is quite likely that Fort Magrude: 
might have been seized before the Confederates coul 
have reached it, and the battle of the next day, ha 
there been one, would have had a very different resul 

To follow now the movements of the Union i 
fantry divisions, it will be remembered that Smith ha 
reached the arm of Skiff Creek at half past ten o'cloc 
where he was halted by a peremptory order of Sumne 
who had at noon, by General McClellan's direction' 
been placed in charge of operations connected with the 
pursuit, although Heintzelman had not been notified 
of the change. Sumner, coming up about two o'clock, 
directed Smith to move over to the Yorktown road 
and proceed by that road to the support of Stoneman's 
advanced guard. Smith's division filed into this road 
just before Hooker's reached the point of intersection, 
and the latter was compelled to halt until Smith's 
had passed, involving a delay of several hours. Sum- 
ner, accompanying Smith's division and apparently not 
concerning himself with the troops in rear, hastened 
forward w^ith the design of putting Smith's division 
into action that afternoon, under the impression, de- 
rived from Stoneman, that the enemy had but a small 
force in his front. But it was half past six o'clock 
before the organization of Smith's division in battle 
formation was effected in the woods that screened the 
Confederate position, and the quick-falling darkness, 
together with the difffcult nature of the ground, pre- 
vented his design from being accomplished. 

In the meantime. Hooker, impatient and restive 
under his enforced detention, and finding that the road 
he was following was filled with troops, sought and ob- 
tained permission from General Heintzelman, his corps 
commander, to cross to the Lee's Mill road, and thus it : 



BATTLE OF WILLIAMSBURG. 261 

was that Smith's and Hooker's divisions interchanged 
their routes of march and confusion was first intro- 
duced. Hooker, with his characteristic ardor, pressed 
the march, hoping to come up with the enemy before 
morning. " This," he says, " I soon found would be 
impossible, for the roads were frightful, the night in- 
tensely dark and rainy, and many of my men exhausted 
from loss of sleep and from labor the night before in 
the trenches. The troops were halted in the middle 
of the road between ten and eleven o'clock p. m., re- 
solved to stop until daylight, when we started again, 
and came in sight of the enemy's works before Wil- 
liamsburg about half past five o'clock in the morning." 

Smith's and Hooker's divisions were thus on sepa- 
rate roads, which, however, united a short distance in 
front of Fort Magruder, but on the night in question 
there was no communication between the two divisions 
owing to the interposition of a dense wood and some 
marshy ground. Casey's and Couch's divisions had 
reached the vicinity of the Halfway House, where they 
bivouacked in the rain during the night, and Kearny's 
division was in bivouac about two or three miles from 
Yorktown. 

Sumner's intention to attack with Smith's division 
early in the morning was changed during the night 
by the reflection that perhaps the enemy might be 
considerably stronger than Stoneman had reported, 
and besides, he had ascertained that a part of this divi- 
sion had marched without rations. He concluded 
therefore to pause a little and consider a change of 
plan. Smith was ordered to withdraw his division to 
the hither edge of the woods for the present, that it 
might obtain rations and knapsacks. Keyes and Heint- 
zelman, the other two corps commanders, were present 
the next morning, and at the suggestion of the former 
an informal consultation was held by Sumner to con- 
sider the situation. Information having been received 
that some of the enemy's redoubts on their left had not 
been re-occupied it was decided to verify this fact, and, 
if true, to make an attack by that flank. A reconnois- 



262 GENERAL McCLELLAN. 

sance under Captain Stewart, of the Engineers, was 
ordered, and by half past ten o'clock Sumner was in- 
formed that the plan was feasible. Hancock was 
selected to command the flanking force, and he suc- 
ceeded in getting to his destination at about twelve 
o'clock, but as he did not become seriously engaged 
with the enemy until after five o'clock, we shall leave 
him for the present and direct our attention to what 
was happening upon the left of the Union line. 

Hooker's division was on the Lee's Mill road by 
virtue of the permission granted the evening before 
by Heintzelman, who then understood that he was in 
" control of the entire movement." Hooker himself 
had no specific instructions to bring on a battle, but 
was authorized to make a demonstration against the 
enemy. In justification of his subsequent action he 
says :" Being in pursuit of a retreating army, I deemed 
it my duty to lose no time in making the disposition 
of my forces to attack, regardless of their number and 
position, except to accomplish the result with the least 
possible sacrifice of life. By so doing, my division, 
if it did not capture the army before me, would at least 
hold them, in order that some others might. Besides, 
I knew of the presence of more than thirty thousand 
troops not two miles distant from me, and that within 
twelve miles — four hours' march — was the bulk of the 
Army of the Potomac. My own position was tenable 
for double that length of time against three times my 
number." However commendable this bold and ag- 
gressive spirit of a division commander may be, 
Hooker was not justified in assuming the role of an 
independent commander at this juncture, especially as 
he knew of the presence of his corps commander on 
the field, who had limited his action to making a dem- 
onstration merely. Notwithstanding the corps organi- 
zation of the army, it will be seen that the battle was 
fought by subordinate commanders acting somewhat 
independently, and to comprehend this a brief refer- 
ence to the map is all that is necessary. 

A branch of Queen's Creek from the east and one 



BATTLE OF WILLIAMSBURG. 



263 



of College Creek from the west head very near each 
other just in front of Fort Magruder, and encircle the 
elevated and partially cleared plateau upon which Gen- 
eral Magruder had established his third line of defense 
just in front of Williamsburg. This consisted of Fort 
Magruder, the principal work, covering the junction of 
the two roads from Yorktown and Lee's Mill, and 
thirteen other redoubts, five on the west and eight on 
the east, each being so placed as to cover its special 
avenue of possible approach, and the whole in defen- 
sive relations with each other and the ground in their 
front. The timber within a circumference of a mile 
radius from the redoubts had been slashed to give their 
guns a sufficient range and to make a difficult abatis, 
and slashings had also been made for the width of half 
a mile along the edges of the two main roads before 
they joined in front of Fort Magruder. Upon the 
right flank a road from King's Mill Wharf and Allen's 
Farm crossed a mill pond just in front of the most 
westerly redoubt, but nevertheless offered the most 
feasible route for an attack by this flank. A similar 
road on the Confederate left crossed Cub Dam Creek, 
and it was by this avenue that Hancock was enabled 
to place himself in so favorable a position owing to 
the fact that the redoubt covering the crossing had not 
been occupied by the enemy that morning. The posi- 
tion in which Hooker found himself upon emerging 
from the Lee's Mill road was in front of the redoubts 
on the west of Fort Magruder, having in his front a 
difficult ravine covered with slashed timber, and hav- 
ing all the lateral ravines under the direct fire of the 
several redoubts — the most difficult of all possible ap- 
proaches from which to deliver an attack. A cleared 
belt about six hundred yards wide, dotted all over with 
rifle pits, intervened between the felled timber and the 
general line of the redoubts. 

From his cheerless bivouac Hooker had pushed 
forward early on the morning of the 5th, Grover's 
brigade leading, and his skirmishers were in action 
before six o'clock. He himself hastened to the front 



264 GENERAL McCLELLAN. 

to learn something of the position, but the dense woods 
prevented him from getting much information. The 
four regiments of Grover's brigade were deployed 
about half past seven o'clock, and under cover of this 
screen Webber's battery was pushed forward to a little 
clearing on the right of the road, but no sooner did 
it emerge from the cover of the woods than it was 
assailed by so destructive a fire from Fort Magruder, 
and by the sharpshooters in front, that its gunners 
abandoned it before a single gun could be brought 
into action. Volunteers from the men of Osborn's 
battery gallantly remanned it, and shortly afterward 
Bramhall's battery coming into action on its right, 
their combined fire, together with the fire from the skir- 
mishers of Grover's brigade, soon drove the enemy's 
pickets back to the cover of their redoubts and silenced 
the Confederate artillery. Up to nine o'clock every 
attempt on the part of the Confederates to re-estab- 
lish their picket line and artillery fire was frustrated, 
for Anderson's command, occupying the redoubts, was 
overmatched by the two brigades that Hooker had 
established in its front. At this time the Union line, 
extending from the woods on the left of the road to 
the vicinity of the Yorktown road, comprised the fol- 
lowing regiments in order: The Eighth, Seventh, and 
Sixth New Jersey, of Patterson's brigade — the Fifth 
New Jersey, the remaining regiment of this brigade, 
being posted as a support to Webber's and Bramhall's 
batteries near the center of his line ; the First Massa- 
chusetts, Second New Hampshire, Eleventh Massa- 
chusetts, and Twenty-sixth Pennsylvania of Grover's 
brigade. The Confederates had Anderson's and 
Pryor's brigades in the redoubts or in their immediate 
neighborhood, comprising the following regiments 
from right to left: The Eighth and Fourteenth Ala- 
bama, Fourteenth Louisiana, and a battalion of the 
Thirty-second Virginia, of Pryor's brigade ; the Fourth, 
Fifth, and Sixth South Carolina, a battalion of Loui- 
siana Rifles, and the Palmetto sharpshooters of Ander- 
son's brigade, mainly under cover of the four redoubts 



BATTLE OF WILLIAMSBURG. 



265 



to the west of Fort Magruder and two to the east, as 
well as Fort Magruder itself. They were simply on 
the defensive up to nine o'clock, awaiting the arrival 
of the brigades of Wilcox, A. P. Hill, Pickett, and 
Colston, which had been ordered back from Williams- 
burg to meet the strong pressure that Hooker was 
exerting, and which threatened to drive the Confed- 
erate rear guard back in confusion upon the trains 
that were then experiencing great difficulty in retiring 
over the muddy road leading out of Williamsburg. 

Up to this time Hooker had carried out his design 
of making a demonstration on the enemy, but as there 
had been no attack in force. General Johnston received 
ithe impression that Hooker's movement was only in- 
tended to delay him and annoy his rear until McClel- 
lan could reach his fiank by way of York River. He 
had therefore determined to send back the remainder 
of Longstreet's division and attack Hooker, or at least 
hold him oiT until he had gained sufficient time to 
insure the safety of his trains. For this purpose Wil- 
cox was ordered to countermarch at seven o'clock, and 
A. P. Hill and Pickett at eight o'clock to go to the 
assistance of Anderson. At about nine o'clock Ander- 
son ordered Wilcox across the ravine in front of the 
redoubts into the woods, where the Jersey brigade 
had shortly before been deployed. Taking advantage 
of the lateral ravines to cover the crossing of his troops, 
Wilcox advanced in line with the Nineteenth Missis- 
sippi in the center, the Tenth Alabama on his right, and 
the Ninth Alabama on his left, penetrated the woods, 
and came upon the left, center, and flank of Hooker's 
line. Pryor, with two regiments of his brigade, came 
up on Wilcox's right, and at about half past ten o'clock 
A. P. Hill's brigade came into action on Pryor's right, 
and was followed by Pickett's still farther to the right 
of the Confederate line ; Colston's brigade and the re- 
mainder of Pryor's joining on the right of Pickett, while 
Wilcox was bearing to his left and Anderson firing from 
the redoubts, the whole constituted so preponderating 
a force in favor of the Confederates upon the Union 



266 GENERAL McCLELLAN. 

front, with a continued overlapping of the Union left, 
as to force Hooker from his advanced position to the 
felled timber near the road. Hooker's other brigade, 
Taylor's, comprising the Seventieth, Seventy-second, 
Seventy-third, and Seventy-fourth New York, some- 
what delayed in reaching the field, did not become fully 
engaged much before one o'clock. In the meantime 
the troops on the battle front, from long-continued 
action, had nearly exhausted their ammunition, and at 
about eleven o'clock the Seventy-second was sent im 
to relieve the First Massachusetts fighting on the left! 
of the road, and they in turn were relieved at one; 
o'clock by the Seventieth; the other two regiments ofi 
Taylor's brigade, first sent to relieve the three regi-- 
ments of the New Jersey brigade, were returned to the; 
road before being able to do so, in order to meet at a;| 
critical time the constantly increasing pressure on that' 
part of the line. Webber's and Bramhall's batteries.- 
were abandoned at about half past twelve o'clock, the 
cannoneers being driven from them by the increasing 
fire of the enemy and the impossibility of withdrawing 
the guns owing to the losses sustained in horses and 
the miry condition of the ground. The constantly; 
increasing strength of the Confederate line brought 
greater pressure upon Patterson's and Taylor's bri- 
gades and the left of Grover's, so that the Union left 
was gradually forced into the tangled undergrowth! 
and felled timber on the left of the road, until about 
two o'clock a charge of the enemy forced the Uniom 
line into the woods to the rear of the positions occu 
pied by the batteries, which then fell into the hands o 
the Ninth Alabama. Up to this time Hooker had re^ 
ceived no assistance, and the enemy, looking for a rout 
were preparing to follow up their success with a cav 
airy charge by Stuart's troopers. But just at this time 
Peck's brigade of Couch's division became engagec 
on Hooker's right, and Kearny's division was reportec 
near at hand, giving material encouragement to tho 
almost exhausted men of Hooker's division. 

Kearny's division began its march from its bivouac 



BATTLE OF WILLIAMSBURG. 26/ 

nearly nine miles to the rear of Hooker, at nine o'clock, 
but upon receiving orders at a quarter to eleven o'clock 
to pass everything in his front and hasten to the aid 
of Hooker, he pushed his division through the con- 
fused mass of troops and trains that encumbered the 
muddy Yorktown road until he reached the Brick 
Church, where his route diverged to the Lee's Mill 
road. Discarding knapsacks when within three miles 
of the battlefield, he was able to re-enforce Hooker be- 
tween three and four o'clock in the afternoon, in time 
to prevent the enemy from reaping the reward of their 
vigorous onset. The Fifth Michigan and the Thirty- 
seventh New York of Berry's brigade were deployed 
to the left of the road, and the Thirty-eighth and For- 
tieth New York of Birney's brigade to the right, cov- 
ering their front with two companies of the Second 
Michigan deployed as skirmishers. The Union line 
thus strengthened soon began to gain ground, and 
ultimately forced the enemy from his advanced posi- 
tion in the captured batteries. Darkness soon falling, 
the firing ceased and the battle on the left was ended. 

The vigorous resistance offered by the troops of 
Hooker's and Kearny's divisions that were actively 
engaged is best attested by their losses. In Hooker's 
division the aggregate loss was fifteen hundred and 
five, of which two hundred and fifty-three belonged to 
Grover's brigade, five hundred and twenty-six to Pat- 
terson's, and seven hundred and seventy-two to Tay- 
lor's ; and in Kearny's division of the aggregate loss 
of four hundred and sixteen, distributed among five 
regiments, two hundred and ninety-nine belonged to 
Berry's and one hundred and seventeen to Birney's 
brigade. The official report, compiled from incom- 
plete returns, gives the aggregate loss of the Confed- 
erate brigades engaged with Hooker and Kearny as 
ten hundred and fifty-two, which, however underesti- 
mated it may be, is sufficient to show the desperate 
character of the contest on this portion of the field. 

Let us now return to the right to follow Hancock's 
movement. With five regiments — the Fifth Wiscon- 



268 GENERAL McCLELLAN. 

sin, the Forty-ninth Pennsylvania, and the Sixth Maine 
of his own brigade, the Seventh Maine and Thirty- 
third New York of Davidson's brigade, and Cowan's 
six-gun battery — he occupied the abandoned redoubt 
overlooking Saunders's Pond on Cub Dam Creek 
without opposition, and reported the fact to his divi- 
sion commander. General Smith, at about noon. With 
clear vision he saw the importance of his position, re- 
ported the practicability of securing substantial advan- 
tage, and asked for an additional brigade. Receiving 
information that four regiments and a battery would 
be sent him, he advanced his line and occupied another 
redoubt and opened a skirmish and artillery fire upon 
the enemy occupying two redoubts in his front. After 
a considerable delay he received word from General 
Sumner that he could not be re-enforced, and was di- 
rected to withdraw to his first position and maintain 
himself there. Still unwilling to yield until the last 
moment he again sent urgent representations to his 
division commander, who likewise recommended that 
he be re-enforced ; but Sumner, anticipating an attack 
on the remainder of Smith's division, and fearing to 
weaken it further, again directed the retirement of Han- 
cock to the first redoubt. But before this last message 
came back to Hancock the enemy was observed near 
at hand, preparing to attack him. There had been 
some slight skirmishing between Hancock and a por- 
tion of Colonel Jenkins's command, which was gar- 
risoning the two left redoubts during the afternoon, 
and Hancock's movements were being observed by 
the Jeff Davis Legion of cavalry, but there had been 
no considerable body of infantry in Hancock's front 
during the afternoon, as the Confederate attention had 
been wholly occupied in the battle going on with 
Hooker on their right. 

At about three o'clock in the afternoon Longstreet 
had asked that the division of D. H. Hill be sent to 
his assistance, and Early's brigade, followed by those 
of Rains, Featherston, and Rodes, were promptly, 
countermarched from their positions a short distance: 






BATTLE OF WILLIAMSBURG. 



269 



in front of Williamsburg and concentrated in rear and 
to the Confederate left of Fort Magruder. Two regi- 
ments of Early's brigade — the Second Florida and the 
Mississippi Battalion — were sent to re-enforce Ander- 
son, and the remaining four were organized for an 
attack upon Hancock in expectation of being able to 
capture his battery that had been firing upon the re- 
doubts, and which General Early very much coveted. 
This attacking force consisted of the Twenty-fourth 
and Thirty-eighth Virginia, under the immediate charge 
of General Early, as a left wing, and the Twenty-third 
and Fifth North Carolina as a right wing, under the 
personal direction of General D. H. Hill. The line of 
battle was formed in a wheat field under cover of a 
piece of woods, through which it was to advance into 
the open field in front of Hancock ; but on emerging, 
only the two flank regiments were found in position, 
the other two through indifferent leadership and poor 
discipline having crowded too much to the left to be 
available for the attack which the impetuous Early im- 
mediately undertook. The gallant colonel of the Fifth 
North Carolina, seeing Early attack with the Twenty- 
fourth Virginia alone, marched his regiment from the 
extreme right across the open field to his assistance, 
and the Sixth South Carolina emerging from the re- 
doubts operated against Hancock's left flank. Han- 
cock's position was well chosen, and although the Con- 
federates displayed magnificent courage, their attack 
was met with such a severe musketry and artillery fire 
followed by a bayonet charge that their lines were 
broken and they were driven from the field in disorder. 
Hancock lost ninety-five men, of which seventy-nine 
belonged to the Fifth Wisconsin alone, while the 
enemy lost five hunded and thirty. Being without re- 
enforcements, and night approaching, Hancock did not 
deem it prudent to pursue, but occupied his troops in 
securing his position and in caring for the dead and 
wounded on the field of battle. 

Hooker's battle on the left and Hancock's on the 
right were thus separate and independent affairs, with 



270 



GENERAL McCLELLAN. 



regard to which Sumner, the commanding general, ap- 
parently exercised no directing influence. The brunt 
of the fighting on the 'left up till two o'clock had in 
reality fallen upon ten of the twelve regiments of 
Hooker's division, at which time four regiments of 
Peck's brigade, Couch's division, became engaged, and 
between three and four o'clock five of the twelve regi- 
ments of Kearny's, or in all twenty-one regiments, were 
so seriously engaged during some portion of the day 
as to indicate by the severity of their losses that they 
were actively at work on the fighting line. In the five 
divisions under the command of Sumner there were, in 
Smith's, thirteen regiments ; in Hooker's, twelve ; in 
Kearny's, twelve ; in Couch's, fourteen ; and in Casey's, 
thirteen ; in all, sixty-four regiments. Adding the five 
regiments of Hancock which were engaged to the 
twenty-one engaged on the left, there remain thirty- 
eight which do not seem to have been utilized for battle, 
but it is proper to remark that five of this number were 
under fire for a short time, their aggregate loss, how- 
ever, being not more than twenty men. To understand 
how this came about it will be necessary to refer to 
the movements of the various fractions of the army 
during the day. 

Smith's division, with the exception of the five regi- 
ments with Hancock, remained continuously in posi- 
tion in front of Whitaker's throughout the day and was 
not engaged. Casey's division arrived within a mile 
and a half of the front at 10.30 a. m., where he was 
directed to remain by General Sumner and endeavor to 
get up some subsistence for the men. About one 
o'clock he was ordered by his corps commander, Gen- 
eral Keyes, to advance to the front, and while prepar- 
ing to do so he received orders from Sumner to move 
to the support of Hooker on the left. After proceed- 
ing three miles in the attempt to execute this order, 
he was overtaken while accompanying his leading bri- 
gade (Naglee's) by an express directing him to obeyi 
his first order from General Keyes. He promptly^ 
countermarched and returned as quickly as possible,; 



BATTLE OF WILLIAMSBURG. 271 

and soon after was ordered to go to the support of 
Hancock : from which it is evident that this division 
was not made use of in the shghtest degree, except 
that Keim's brigade, under General Couch's orders, 
was placed as a support on the left of Peck's brigade 
of the latter's division late in the afternoon. Couch's 
division, coming up from its bivouac of the night of 
the 4th, met Casey's division halted in the road about 
II A. M. About twelve o'clock orders were received 
for his leading brigade (Peck's) to move to the sup- 
iport of Hooker. In a drenching rain Peck moved 
[over the bad roads with all possible speed and was able 
!to become engaged at about two o'clock, and it was 
the influence of his prompt attack that somewhat re- 
leased the pressure on Hooker's right at that time. 
Before night Couch sent him as a support General 
Devens with two regiments, and shortly afterward 
General Palmer with two, and General Keim with 
three, all of which he utilized in preparation for a pos- 
sible attack by the enemy during the night. 

Kearny's division, the most distant of all from the 
scene of Hooker's engagement, was necessarily late 
in reaching its destination, and when within a mile 
of the battlefield its commander was ordered by Gen- 
eral Heintzelman to detach one regiment from Berry's 
brigade and two from Birney's to support General 
Emory, who was then on the extreme left at Allen's 
farm endeavoring to reach the enemy's right flank by 
way of the King Mill road. This depletion of Kearny's 
two leading brigades at a critical time could only be 
justified by a decided success of Emory. But the latter 
officer accomplished nothing, owing, it is said, to his 
ignorance of the country, the absence of guides, and 
the lateness of the hour at which his infantry re-en- 
forcements had been sent to him. Jameson's brigade 
brought up the rear of Kearny's division and did not 
reach the battlefield until four o'clock ; it was then 
utilized to form a supporting second line in two col- 
umns of regiments. 

Owing to the unfavorable character of the ground 



272 



GENERAL McCLELLAN. 






for the employment of cavalry and artillery neither of 
these arms were of much use to the Union forces dur- 
ing this battle ; Emory, as just stated, being held to 
the left and rear of Hooker's position, while Stoneman 
was, by Sumner's direction, held in reserve on the 
Yorktown road. 

With regard to the corps commanders, it may be 
said that Sumner, who had none of his own corps on 
the field, was, by virtue of his rank and the orders of 
McClellan, in command of the Union forces up to 
near five o'clock, when McClellan himself reached the 
field. His management throughout displayed inde- 
cision and an absence of every principle of general- 
ship. Immediately after the battle McClellan ordered 
him back to Yorktown to take command of his own 
corps, which was due, in Sumner's opinion, " to mis- 
representations that were made to General McClellan." 
General Heintzelman remained at Sumner's head- 
quarters until about eleven o'clock, when, by directioni 
of Sumner, he went to the left where Hooker was fight- 
ing, but he was so long on the journey that he did nott 
reach his destination until about half past one o'clock, 
much too late to influence the conduct of affairs in thati 
quarter. He did, however, perceive the great impor- 
tance of the movement by the left flank, and it is pos- 
sible that he might have utilized it had he been earlier! 
on the ground. Keyes was in his proper position, but 
the immediate presence of Sumner prevented him from 
exercising that direct control of his three divisions 
that he would otherwise have had. Perceiving dur 
ing the night of the 4th that a battle was imminent 
on the next day, he sent orders to Casey and Couch 
to start early from their bivouacs so as to reach the 
front, where he expected them by nine o'clock, but 
owing to contradictory orders to Casey from Sumner 
Casey's division was halted until one o'clock, and thiji 
blocked the troops that were in his rear, and closec 
almost effectually the only avenue to the front for the 
better part of the day. Again this same division, aftei 
starting to support Hooker in the afternoon, waii 



BATTLE OF WILLIAMSBURG. 



273 



^ordered to return to execute a previous order of Keyes. 
Couch and Casey were not employed to the best ad- 
vantage. Smith's, Keyes's other division, was directly 
controlled by Sumner, and though the order was twice 
given to send supports from it to Hancock, Sumner 
countermanded the order. 

General McClellan reached Sumner's headquarters 
about five o'clock in the afternoon, and the news of 
his presence on the field revivified the drooping spirits 
of men and officers. During the progress of the battle 
he had remained at Yorktown engaged in making 
preparations for the embarkation of Franklin's divi- 
sion on its transports, for its speedy movement up the 
York River, and to make the necessary arrangements 
for the co-operation of the navy. He had had no ex- 
pectation that his pursuing columns under Sumner 
would meet with excessive resistance, or other than 
that which would usually accompany that of a rear 
guard in retreat. He had sent two officers of his staff 
with Sumner to report to him from time to time as to 
the progress of aflfairs, and he says that it was not until 
about one o'clock that he learned that matters at the 
front were not progressing favorably. When he did 
so learn he left Yorktown by boat for his camp to 
reach his horses, and then hastened with all possible 
speed to the front. When he arrived there he could 
not learn much about the condition of afifairs on the 
left, for even at that time there was no ready communi- 
cation between the two wings of the Union army. 
With quick perception, however, he saw that Hancock 
should be promptly re-enforced in view of the next 
day's possibilities, and he issued orders for Smith's 
division and Naglee's brigade of Casey's division to 
proceed thither with all celerity. During the night he 
learned of Hooker's and Kearny's losses, and that the 
former's division could not be relied upon for serious 
work the next day. The congested condition of the 
roads over which he had traveled convinced him that 
it would not be possible to gain much from Sedgwick's 
and Richardson's advance overland from Yorktown, 
18 



274 



GENERAL McCLELLAN. 



which, as a measure of precaution, he had previously 
ordered, and he therefore directed them to return to 
Yorktown preparatory to embarkation to fohow 
Frankhn. 

With regard to Frankhn's division, which at Mc- 
Clellan's urgent and repeated sohcitation liad been 
sent him, and from whicli so mucli had been promised 
and expected, it was the victim of many untoward cir- 
cumstances that neutrahzed its expected efficiency. It 
reached McClellan on the 226. of April, but as it w^as 
then considered too small to be detached to the Severn, 
it was decided to disembark it on the north bank of the : 
York River to operate on Gloucester ; but nearly two • 
weeks were consumed in preliminary preparations for ■ 
this project, when, on the 3d of May, he concluded to » 
disembark it at Cheeseman's, on the Poquosin, for the ; 
contemplated assault on the Yorktown defenses after* 
the bombardment had taken place. The next morning, , 
however, the evacuation had taken place, and Franklin 1 
received orders at ten o'clock to re-embark his division, , 
it being then in camp on the Poquosin River. It was, 
not until noon of the 5th that Franklin succeeded ini 
re-embarking his artillery and putting his transports 
in motion, so that he did not reach Yorktown until 
dusk of that day. It was then too late to start thatt 
night up the York, and he did not get of¥ until the 
morning of the 6th. He reached Eltham that after- 
noon, and completed his disembarkation on the morn-- 
ing of the 7th. The divisions of Sedgwick, Porter,- 
and Richardson subsequently followed Franklin to thee 
vicinity of West Point by water, while the remaining, 
divisions, the trains, and reserve artillery moved by 
land. 

The concrete result of these two days' operations 
may thus be summed up : The Confederates had evacun 
ated the Yorktown lines with the loss of some heavy 
artillery and worthless impedimenta, had with a greatly 
inferior force held in check five divisions of the Unioni 
army for an entire day, inflicting upon them greater loss 
than they themselves had. sustained, and had succeeded 






BATTLE OF WILLIAMSBURG. 



275 



in getting their stalled trains off in safety to continue 
their retreat unmolested. The honors of war were 
clearly theirs. Excuses and explanations, however 
abundant and conclusive, can not affect the fact of their 
superior generalship. 

Early on the morning of the 6th it was found that 
the Confederates had abandoned the Williamsburg 
lines and continued their retreat. Magruder's division 
had reached Diascund Bridge the preceding night, and 
G. W. Smith's next following was at Barhamsville. 
The twenty-four hours' delay gained by the battle had 
enabled the trains, though hampered by the horrible 
roads, to make good their escape, and they were covered 
by Hill's and Longstreet's divisions protecting their 
rear. These two divisions reached Burnt Ordinary, 
twelve miles from Williamsburg, the evening of the 6th, 
and the next day were concentrated at Barhamsville to 
be in readiness for Franklin in case he should attempt 
to attack from Eltham's Landing, while the Confederate 
trains were in motion on the road in the near vicinity. 
But this had already been provided for by General G. 
W. Smith, who had sufficient notice of the arrival of 
the transports, and had correctly estimated the strength 
of Franklin's division. Hoping that Franklin would 
advance beyond the protection of his gunboats, Whit- 
ing's division was placed in a favorable position to 
cover his debouch from Eltham's, but there being no 
evidence of Franklin's immediate advance, at seven 
o'clock Whiting was ordered to attack. The Confed- 
erate force, consisting of three brigades — Hood's in 
the center, Hampton's on the right, and S. R. Ander- 
son's on the left — became engaged by nine o'clock, 
and after driving the Union pickets out of the woods 
that surrounded the landing, fell upon Newton's bri- 
gade that held the right of the Union line and guarded 
the main line of approach. On Newton's left were 
Slocum's and Dana's brigades, the latter, belonging to 
Sedgwick's division, having just that morning landed. 
The battle, beginning at nine o'clock, continued until 
about three o'clock in the afternoon, when the Confed- 



276 GENERAL McCLELLAN. 

erate attack ceased, and the Union line was again re- 
established in its position of the morning. In the 
meantime the Confederate trains had moved unmo- 
lested past the dangerous position, and the flanking 
had failed of its purpose. The Union loss was reported 
as one hundred and eighty-six, mainly in Newton's 
brigade, while the Confederates reported a loss of only 
fifty- two. 

The Confederates having retreated by daybreak of 
the 6th, Williamsburg was occupied by the Union 
forces, but the condition of the latter was such that 
no immediate pursuit was possible. The bad manage- 
ment of the two preceding days had brought about the 
greatest confusion, and the inefficient staff service had 
not been able to extricate the trains nor clear the roads. 
Notwithstanding the corps organization of the army, 
headquarter orders recognized the division as the unit 
of maneuver, and as a consequence corps commanders 
found themselves separated from their proper com- 
mands, their usefulness restricted, and their responsi- 
bilities lessened. The troops were somewhat disheart- 
ened by a consciousness of poor leadership and I 
wretched administration. Many of them were without : 
blankets and knapsacks, and nearly all without food. , 
A continuous rain of thirty-six hours' duration had I 
converted the roads into almost impassable quicksands 
and beds of liquid mud, so that there was no immediate 
prospect of any relief. Under these circumstances itt 
was of the first importance to bring up supplies, and to ) 
this end McClellan turned his immediate attention. 

The advanced guard under Stoneman moved out! 
on the morning of the 7th, and the next day reached 
Hockaday Springs, six and a half miles from Eltham, 
where it came in communication with Franklin's^ 
pickets. It was not until the afternoon of the 8th thati 
Smith's division took up the march from Williams- 
burg, followed on the morning of the 9th by Couch, 
Casey, and Kearny, and the advance of the army began. 
Headquarters, with Sykes's division of regulars, en- 
camped four miles from Williamsburg the night oft 



BATTLE OF WILLIAMSBURG. 277 

the 9th, and the next night joined the four advanced 
divisions at Roper's Church. Hooker's division was 
in rear, and those of Sedgwick, Porter, and Richardson 
had joined Frankhn by water, so that the army was 
practically united, its various divisions being within 
supporting distance of each other. 

Following the occupation of Williamsburg impor- 
tant results took place. Huger evacuated Norfolk, the 
Merrimac was sacrificed, and the James River opened 
to the Union navy. It was an important epoch in 
McClellan's career. He now had a choice of base 
either upon the James or upon the York and Pa- 
munkey. Upon the soundness of his judgment and 
the boldness of his action future success depended. 
It is at such epochs that the governing characteristics 
of men assert themselves and proclaim their greatness 
or their mediocrity. 

McClellan's analysis of the existing conditions after 
the Confederate retreat from Williamsburg exhibits 
clearly the question that it was necessary for him to 
decide at that time. He says : " Two courses were to 
be considered : First, to abandon the line of the York, 
cross the Chickahominy in the lower part of its 
course, gain the James, and adopt that as the line of 
supply; second, to use the railroad from West Point 
to Richmond as the line of supply, which would oblige 
us to cross the Chickahominy somewhere north of 
White Oak Swamp. The army was perfectly placed 
to adopt either course. 

" Masking the movement by the advanced guard, 
the army could easily have crossed the Chickahominy 
by Jones's Bridge, and Cole's Ferry and Barret's 
Ferry by pontoon bridges, while the advanced guard, 
and probably one or two corps, could have followed 
the movement by Long Bridge and under cover of the 
White Oak Swamp, and the army would have been 
concentrated at Malvern Hill, ready either to advance 
upon Richmond by the roads near the left bank of the 
James, or to cross that river and place itself between 
Richmond and Petersburg. 



2^8 GENERAL McCLELLAN. 

" With all the aid of the gunboats and water trans- 
portation I am sure that I could have occupied Peters- 
burg and placed the ^rmy in position between that 
place and Richmond, so that the enemy would have 
been obliged to abandon his capital or to come out to | 
attack in a position of my own choosing, where, with 
the whole army concentrated, success would not have 
been doubtful and Richmond would have been the 
prize of victory. 

'' Moreover, the water line of transportation would 
have insured the prompt and safe arrival of the First 
Corps, or such other re-enforcements as might have 
been sent to me. It is needless to state that the army 
was well placed to follow the second line of operation 
indicated." * 

McClellan's headquarters were established at Ro- 
per's Church, nineteen miles from Williamsburg, on 
the evening of May loth, and remained there until 
the morning of the 13th. He had received informa- 
tion from Stanton on the nth of the destruction of 
the Merrimac, and consequently knew that this would 
open the line of the James. It is therefore more than 
probable that when he arrived at his decision any 
doubt that he may have had as to the availability of ' 
this line was eliminated. There is every reason to sup- 
pose that the governing cause that impelled him to • 
adopt the line of the Pamunkey was timidity arising; 
from an exaggerated estimate of the Confederate ; 
strength that could then be concentrated against him 
in front of Richmond. In addition to this, the near- 
ness of White House as a base of supplies and the 
certainty of its speedy occupation was a circumstance 
that had a preponderating influence at the time. His- 
dispatch to Stanton on the loth furnishes the strongest i 
evidence with respect to the first point. In it he says : : 
*' From the information reaching me from every source 
I regard it as certain that the enemy will meet us withi 
all his force on or near the Chickahominy. They cam 

* McClellan's Own Story, p. 343. 



BASE AT WHITE HOUSE. 27Q 

concentrate many more men than I have, and are col- 
lecting troops from all quarters, especially well-dis- 
ciplined troops from the South. Casualties, sickness, 
garrisons, and guards have much reduced our num- 
bers, and will continue to do so. I shall fight the rebel 
army with whatever force I may have, but duty re- 
quires me to urge that every effort be made to re- 
enforce me without delay with all the disposable troops 
in Eastern Virginia, and that we concentrate all our 
forces as far as possible to fight the great battle now 
impending and to make it decisive. ... I beg that 
the President and Secretary will maturely weigh what 
I say, and leave nothing undone to comply with my 
request. If I am not re-enforced, it is probable, that 
I will be obliged to fight nearly double my numbers, 
strongly intrenched. I do not think it will be at all 
possible for me to bring more than seventy thousand 
men upon the field of battle." 

By the 12th McClellan had definitely decided upon 
the line of the Pamunkey, and orders were issued on 
that day for the troops to take up their march for 
Cumberland and New Kent Court House, and on the 
14th orders were issued for the concentration of the 
various divisions of the army at White House, Cum- 
berland, and New Kent. By the 15th, headquarters, 
and the divisions of Franklin, Porter, Sykes, and Smith, 
were at Cumberland ; Couch and Casey were near New 
Kent ; Hooker and Kearny near Roper's ; and Richard- 
son and Sedgwick in the vicinity of Eltham and Cum- 
berland. The next day Franklin, Smith, and Porter 
were established with the headquarters of the army at 
White House, where a permanent depot was estab- 
lished. 

From Cumberland, on the 14th, McClellan sent an- 
other dispatch to the President of the same tenor as 
his previous one of the loth to the Secretary, to which 
the President replied by telegram on the 15th, and 
through the Secretary by letter on the i8th. The tele- 
gram indicates his disappointment in these words : 
" Your long dispatch of yesterday is just received. I 



28o ^^ GENERAL McCLELLAN. 

will answer more fully soon. Will now say that alll 
your dispatches to the Secretary of War have been 
promptly shown to n>e. Have done and shall do all, 
I can to sustain you. Hoped that the opening of 
James River and putting Wool and Burnside im 
communication, with an open road to Richmond, or 
to you, had effected something in that direction. I[ 
am still unwilling to take all our force off the direct 
line between Richmond and here." 

The written answer was as follows : "^ 

Washington, May i8, 3 p. m. 

General: Your dispatch to the President asking re-- 
enforcements has been received and carefully considered. 

The President is not willing to uncover the capital en- 
tirely, and it is believed that, even if this were prudent, itt 
would require more time to effect a junction between your' 
army and that of the Rappahannock by way of the Potomac; 
and York Rivers than by a land march. In order, therefore, , 
to increase the strength of the attack upon Richmond at the ■ 
earhest moment, General McDowell has been ordered to 
march upon that city by the shortest route. He is ordered — 
keeping himself always in position to save the capital fromi 
all possible attack — so to operate as to put his left wing ini 
communication with your right wing, and you are instructed 1 
to co-operate, so as to establish this communication as sooni 
as possible, by extending your right wing to the north off 
Richmond. It is believed that this communication can be: 
safely established either north or south of the Pamunkey 
River. In any event, you will be able to prevent the main 1 
body of the enemy's forces from leaving Richmond and fall- 
ing in overwhelming force upon General McDowell. He willl 
move with between thirty-live thousand and forty thousand! 
men. 

A copy of the instructions to General McDowell are with 
this. The specific task assigned to his command has been to 
provide against any danger to the capital of the nation. 

At your earnest call for re-enforcements he is sent for- 
ward to co-operate in the reduction of Richmond, but 
charged, in attempting this, not to uncover the city of Wash- 
ington ; and you will give no order, either before or after 
your junction, which can put him out of position to cover 
this city. You and he will communicate with each other by 
telegraph or otherwise as frequently as may be necessary for 

* McClellan's Own Story, p. 345. 



BASE AT WHITE HOUSE. 28 1 

sufficient co-operation. When General McDowell is in posi- 
tion on your right his supplies must be drawn from West 
Point, and you will instruct your staff officers to be prepared 
to supply him by that route. 

The President desires that General McDowell retain the 
command of the Department of the Rappahannock and of the 
forces with which he moves. 

By order of the President, 

Edwin M. Stanton, Secretary of War. 

General McClellan has maintained that this order 
rendered it impossible for him to use the James River 
as a line of operations, forced him to establish his depots 
on the Pamunkey, and to approach Richmond from 
the north. But, as has already been noted, this de- 
cision had been reached by him before the reception 
of this order. In a dispatch to Stanton, dated May 
loth, while he was at Roper's Church, he said : " I 
have fully established my connection with the troops 
near West Point, and the dangerous movement has 
passed. The West Point Railway is not very much 
injured. Materials for repairs, such as rails, etc., cars, 
and engines, may now be sent me. Should Norfolk 
be taken and the Merrimac destroyed, I can change 
my line to the James River and dispense with the rail- 
road." The only conclusion that it is possible to draw, 
taking into consideration the tenor of all his dispatches 
and the letters that have been made public, may be 
thus summarized. He felt satisfied that his conduct 
of affairs had been on the whole gratifying. With a 
force greatly inferior to that of the enemy, according 
to his own estimate, he had forced the evacuation of 
Yorktown, had won a brilliant victory at Williams- 
burg, and was about to concentrate all the divisions 
of his army at New Kent, where, after a thorough ex- 
amination of the country, he would be able to act 
understandingly. He nowhere exhibits his intention 
to attack the enemy, but confidently relies upon his 
ability to resist any attack that the latter may make 
upon him, and the expectation that the scene of this 
great battle will be near the Chickahominy is frequently 
stated. To enable him to reap the most decisive re- 



282 GENERAL McCLELLAN. 

suits he incessantly implores the Administration to 
send him re-enforcements, to bring his fighting force 
up to that which he estimates the enemy has, and to 
satisfy him he is promised the co-operation of Mc- 
Dowell at the earliest moment. But this promise is 
coupled with the restriction that the latter shall not 
uncover Washington while making the junction. 

From this time until the Army of the Potomac was 
established on the banks of the Chickahominy the 
movements were painfully slow. The roads, it is true, 
were exceedingly bad and the weather unprecedentedly 
wretched ; a depot had to be established and supplies . 
had to be collected ; the country was unknown and its . 
topography had to be investigated. Granting all these : 
time-devouring causes, there was nevertheless a lack of i 
enterprise and aggressiveness that should not haveii 
characterized a pursuing army on the heels of one dis-- 
heartened by its supposed defeat at Williamsburg. 

A few days after the battle of Williamsburg Gen- 
eral McClellan expressed his dissatisfaction to the 
Secretary of War with the corps organization of the; 
Army of the Potomac, stating that as it came near 
bringing on a disastrous defeat there he was unwilling; 
to be held responsible for the existing arrangement,, 
and requested full and complete authority to relievei 
from duty commanders of corps or divisions who) 
proved themselves incompetent. The Secretary, ini 
reply, authorized him to temporarily suspend that or- 
ganization in the army under his command and adopt! 
any other that he might see fit, until further orders.. 
But the President, in granting him this authority, 
thought it best to give him some words of caution. 
He says : '' I wish to say a few words to you privately^ 
on this subject. I ordered the army corps organiza- 
tion not only on the unanimous opinion of the twelve**! 
generals whom you had selected and assigned as gen-- 
erals of divisions, but also on the unanimous opinion 
of every military man I could get an opinion from and 
every modern military book, yourself only excepted. 
Of course, on my own judgment, I do not pretend to 



BASE AT WHITE HOUSE. 



283 



jnderstand the subject. I now think it indispensable 
or you to know how your struggle against it is re- 
:eived in quarters which we can not entirely disregard, 
[t is looked upon as merely an effort to pamper one 
3r two pets and to persecute and degrade their sup- 
Dosed rivals. I have no word from Sumner, Heintzel- 
man, or Keyes. The commanders of these corps are, 
ji course, the three highest officers with you, but I 
am constantly told that you have no consultation or 
:ommunication with them ; that you consult and com- 
municate with nobody but General Fitz-John Porter 
and perhaps General Franklin. I do not say these 
complaints are true or just, but at all .events it is proper 
you should know of their existence. Do the com- 
manders of corps disobey your orders in anything? 

" When you relieved General Hamilton of his com- 
mand the other day you thereby lost the confidence 
of at least one of your best friends in the Senate. And 
here let me say, not as applicable to you personally, 
that senators and representatives speak of me in their 
places as they please without question, and that officers 
of the army must cease addressing insulting letters to 
them for taking no greater liberty with them. 

*' But to return : Are you strong enough — are you 
strong enough, even with my help — to set your foot 
upon the necks of Sumner, Heintzelman, and Keyes 
all at once? This is a practical and very serious ques- 
tion for you. The success of your army and the cause 
of the country are the same, and of course I only desire 
the good of the cause." 

Certainly up to this time McClellan had not sought 
advice from his corps commanders, and had never 
called them together in councils of war. His failure 
to do so may have given rise to an impression through- 
out the army that he was antagonistic to them, strength- 
ened perhaps by the knowledge that in the selection of 
the corps commanders his wishes and advice had not 
been consulted. All three had been present at Wil- 
liamsburg, and there affairs had been woefully misman- 
a.9-ed. On the other hand, it was also a matter of gen- 



284 GENERAL McCLELLAN. 

eral knowledge that he had a high admiration for Gen- 
eral Porter especially, and for Generals Smith and 
Franklin as well. Thdr belief in McClellan's military 
ability and admiration for his personal character were 
strengthened by constant association, and resulted in 
the strongest mutual affection, which, when we con- 
sider the charming traits of McClellan's personality, , 
is not surprising. 

Under the authority granted him McClellan reor- 
ganized the army, forming the Fifth and Sixth Provi- 
sional Corps, under the command of Generals Porter 
and Franklin respectively, on the i8th of May, so) 
that for the remainder of the campaign the five corps ^ 
of the army were as follows : 

Second, Sumner, Richardson's and Sedgwick's i 
divisions; Third, Heintzelman, Hooker's and Kearny's? 
divisions; Fourth, Keyes, Couch's and Casey's divi-- 
sions; Fifth, Porter, Porter's (afterward Morell's) andl 
Sykes's divisions and the reserve artillery ; Sixth, ,| 
Franklin, Franklin's (afterward Slocum's) and W. F., 
Smith's divisions. 



CHAPTER XL 

Jackson's valley campaign. — hanover court 
house. battle of seven pines. fair oaks. 

Very slowly did the Army of the Potomac move 
toward Richmond, for it was not until the 21st of 
May that its front was established along the Chicka- 
hominy. Its tardy progress was excused by the 
wretched roads, made worse than usual by the unprece- 
dented inclement weather, and the necessity of cautious 
advance in the presence of a supposed superior force 
ready to offer battle at the first favorable opportunity. 
Meantime the Confederate army leisurely retreated 
without compulsory pressure, Smith's and Magruder's 
divisions taking the road through New Kent to Balti- 
more Cross Roads, nineteen miles from Barhamsville, 
while Longstreet's and Hill's divisions, following the 
road to Long Bridge, occupied the line of the York 
River Railroad near Bottom's Bridge. In this posi- 
tion they had direct communication with Richmond by 
the railroad, and here they remained for five days. But 
when, on the 14th, Johnston heard of the destruction 
of the Merrimac, he crossed his army the next day to 
cover Richmond against a possible advance from the 
south, and on the 17th his army was encamped on the 
main roads leading into Richmond from that direc- 
tion, and covering at the same time the approaches 
by way of New Bridge and Mechanicsville to the east. 

A brief reference to the sequence of events which 
intervened to prevent McDowell from joining forces 
with McClellan may not be out of place. It will be 
remembered that from the time when McClellan ceased 
to be general in chief, the duties of that office were ad- 

285 



286 "^^^^ GENERAL McCLELLAN. 

ministered by the Secretary of War. Shortly afterward !|ti 
six separate departments were established which were « 
commanded respectively by McClellan with the Army o 
of the Potomac, Woof at Fort Monroe, Dix at Balti- 
more, Banks in the Shenandoah Valley, Fremont imp 
tne Mountain Department, and Wadsworth in the city y] 
of Washington. The arrangements which McClellan i 
had made for Banks's forces to cover Washington on i 
the line of the Manassas Gap Railroad were brokem 
up in consequence of Jackson's first Valley campaign, , 
resulting in the battle of Kernstown, March 23d, and I 
this necessitated the retention for a time of Shields's > 
and Williams's divisions under Banks in the Valley 
to drive Jackson from that region. McDowell's corps ; 
was detached from the Army of the Potomac to cover • 
Washington, and was concentrated in the vicinity of - • 
Manassas with its advance for a time at Catlett's Station i 
on the Orange and Alexandria Railroad. The political . 
pressure which had caused the President to detach 1 
Blenker's division from McClellan's command and as- ■ 
sign it to the new department created for Fremont has ; 
already been mentioned.* Blenker's division was first 
directed to move by way of Harper's Ferry and report 
from there to Fremont, but McClellan obtained author- • 
ity to order him to move with two of his brigades direct 
to Strasburg for temporary duty with Banks, the third ! 
brigade to follow when relieved by troops drawn from 
the railway brigade of Colonel Miles. Blenker left 
Warrenton, April 6th, and was practically lost until 
the War Department heard of him at Salem, and sent 
Rosecrans to conduct his division to Fremont. It did 
not reach Winchester until about April 19th, and then 
it was in a deplorable condition, needing tents, shoes, 
provisions, and forage, and its animals much jaded 
and nearly starved. It was not until May 8th that its 
three brigades were united at Romney, and three days 
afterward were turned over by Rosecrans to Fremont 
at Petersburg. For forty-two days it had been prac- 

See page 228. 



JACKSON'S VALLEY CAMrAIGN. 28/ 

tically eliminated as a fighting force, and in the mean- 
while suffered such privations and hardships as seri- 
Dusly to affect its discipline and efficiency. 

Fremont, in a letter dated April 21st, outlined the 
plan of operations which he proposed to adopt. It 
was substantially to unite Blenker's division of nine 
thousand men with that of Schenck's three thousand 
at Moorefield or Franklin, and, acting in conjunction 
with Banks in the Valley of the Shenandoah, to move 
to Monterey, where he expected to be joined by Mil- 
roy's command of thirty-five hundred men, and then to 
strike the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad at or near 
Salem. Cox, operating in the Kanawha Valley with 
seven thousand men, was expected by him to take 
possession of Newbern, or, joining him, and thus in- 
creasing his strength to twenty-two thousand, certainly 
seize the railroad, and thus destroy the connection 
between Knoxville and the Confederate army in East- 
ern Virginia, turn Cumberland Gap, and seize Knox- 
ville. This plan was approved by the War Department, 
but he was directed not to advance toward Knoxville 
after striking the railroad without further instructions, 
and advised that in the prosecution of his operations 
he was not to consider the positions or movements 
of General Banks as subject to his control or to be 
dependent upon his movements. Up to May ist the 
War Department hoped that this movement of Fre- 
mont's might be speedily undertaken, but nothing 
came of it ; the delay of Blenker's division, the difficul- 
ties caused by bad weather, deficient transportation, 
and other causes had scattered Fremont's command 
from Moorefield to Franklin at the time when Milroy 
was attacked by Jackson on May 8th at McDowell. 

On the 26th of April Banks was informed by the 
War Department that the President did not desire him 
to prosecute his advance farther to the south, and he 
was requested to consider whether he was not already 
making too wide a separation between the body of 
troops under his immediate command and his sup- 
porting force, and as it was possible that events might 



288 '^^fc^ GENERAL McCLELLAN. 



make it necessary to transfer Shields's division to the 
Department of the Rappahannock he was desired to 
act accordingly. On May ist Banks was directed to 
fall back to Strasburg; and notified that Shields would 
within a day or two be detached to join McDowell; 
but Shields was informed the next day that he was noti 
expected to move with his division until Banks had 
arrived at or was near vStrasburg with the remainder 
of his forces. Delays ensued, and as late as May 9th 
Banks, being still at New Market, was reminded by 
Mr. Stanton of his orders of the ist, and cautioned thatt 
he was out of position should events make it necessary 
to move to the support of McDowell. At that time 
the War Department did not know the whereabouts 
of Jackson with certainty, as the most contradictory 
intelligence had been received from Fremont and Mc- 
Dowell, and Banks had not supplied any certain in- 
formation. The latter had, it is true, reported on the 
26. that Jackson was moving toward Port Republic,, 
his destination being either Waynesborough or Staun-- 
ton, and, if the latter, with the design of attacking 
Milroy at McDowell, but no confirmation of this con- 
jecture had afterward been sent. Finally Banks begam 
his movement from New Market for Strasburg, May/ 
1 2th, and Shields started for Catlett's Station, which he 
reached May i8th, and, after refitting there, arrived att 
his destination opposite Fredericksburg, May 22d. 

General McDowell had reported his strength om 
May i6th as thirty thousand one hundred and twelves 
officers and men for duty, and the President had de- 
termined, in response to the call of General McClellan, 
to send him forward, after Shields had joined, to oper- 
ate against Richmond in co-operation with McClellan, 
but at the same time to cover Washington. He accord- 
ingly notified McClellan, May 22d, that he would set 
out probably by the 24th and would meet the Confed- 
erate force of General Anderson, estimated from twelve 
thousand to fifteen thousand strong, on the first day's 
march, which he purposed to turn by its left flank, and 
inquired as to the extent of the co-operation he might 



JACKSON'S VALLEY CAMPAIGN. 289 

expect by an extension of McClellan's right flank in 
an endeavor to cut this force off from a retreat on 
Richmond. He stated that his force would be about 
thirty-eight thousand men, for which he would need 
subsistence, and would also require forage for eleven 
thousand animals. 

The military situation of the Confederate forces in 
Northern Virginia about the middle of April and until 
Jackson began his strategical movements was not 
specially hopeful for their cause, and General Robert 
E. Lee, who had been placed in general charge of army 
operations under President Davis, could then see no 
certain means of success. 

General Edward Johnson, with about twenty-eight 
hundred men, had been forced by Milroy east of the 
Shenandoah Mountains, and finally took his stand at 
West View, a few miles west of Staunton. Jackson 
had retreated from in front of Banks and had taken 
up a position in Elk Run Valley at the foot of Swift 
Run Gap, April 17th, where he was within support- 
ing distance of Ewell, and in a position to take advan- 
tage of any mistake that might be made by Banks. 
Ewell, with about eighty-five hundred effectives, was in 
the vicinity of Gordonsville, under general orders to 
obey Jackson. McDowell having occupied Falmouth 
with his advanced guard April 19th, Field, to observe 
McDowell's movements, had fallen back about fourteen 
miles from Fredericksburg, not being strong enough 
to prevent the occupation of the town. In opposition 
to these Confederate forces there were Banks with 
twenty thousand in the Valley confronting Jackson ; 
Fremont with about sixteen thousand scattered in the 
mountains west of the Shenandoah Valley from 
Moorefield to FrankHn and McDowell; Geary with 
a brigade at White Plains guarding the line of the 
Manassas Gap Railroad ; and McDowell with two divi- 
sions on the line of the Fredericksburg Railroad cover- 
ing Washington, designing to occupy Fredericksburg ; 
in all there were certainly seventy thousand Union 
troops available against not more than about twenty- 
19 



GENERAL McCLELLAN. 

five thous,and Confederates. But the latter had the 
advantage of being under a single military direction, 
while the Union troops were under commanders who 
were severally charge'd with diverse objects by the 
authorities at Washington. 

After a good deal of correspondence and sugges- 
tion, Jackson asked, April 26th, for a re-enforcement 
of five thousand men to enable him to attack Banks 
with some prospect of success, saying, " Now, as it 
appears to me, is the golden opportunity for striking 
a blow." But as it did not appear possible to get thi-s 
re-enforcement, he proposed three plans, April 29th : 
'' Either to leave Ewell at Swift Run Gap to threaten 
Banks's rear in the event of his advancing on Staunton 
and move with my command rapidly on the force in 
front of General Edward Johnson ; or else co-operate 
with Ewell, to attack the enemy's detached force be- 
tween New Market and the Shenandoah, and, if suc- 
cessful in this, to press forward and get in Banks's 
rear at New Market and thus induce him to fall back ; 
the third is, to pass down the Shenandoah, east of the 
Blue Ridge, and thus threaten Winchester z'ia Front 
Royal. Of the three plans I give the preference to 
attacking the force west of Staunton, for, if successful, 
I would afterward only have Banks to contend with, 
and in doing this would be re-enforced by General Ed- 
ward Johnson, and by that time you might be able to 
give me re-enforcements, which united with the troops 
vmder my control would enable me to defeat Banks. 
If he should be routed and his command destroyed, 
nearly all our forces here could, if necessary, cross the 
Blue Ridge to Warrenton, Fredericksburg, or any 
other threatened point." 

For the purposes of this memoir it is only necessary 
to note the salient events connected with Jackson's 
successful strategy and their bearing upon the fortunes 
of the Army of the Potomac. Suffice it to say, then, 
that Jackson, on the afternoon of the 30th of April, 
prosecuting his first plan, moved his three brigades 
from their camps in Elk Run Valley on the road to 



JACKSON'S VALLEY CAMPAIGN. 201 

Port Republic, and directed Ewell to occupy his posi- 
tion in observation of Banks. The road was horrible 
and the difficulties correspondingly great, so that he 
succeeded in making only about twelve miles from his 
camp by the night of May 2d. Instead of passing 
through Port Republic, he diverged to the left, crossed 
the Blue Ridge at Brown's Gap, following the road to 
Meacham's Station on the Virginia Central Railroad, 
thus diverting suspicion of his object. Here transpor- 
tation awaited his infantry, and without delay he has- 
tened toward Staunton, where his command was united 
on the 5th of May and his junction with Johnson 
effected. His movements had been well screened by 
Ashby's cavalry, and his purpose was so far unsus- 
pected. Giving his troops one day's rest, he marched 
west on May 7th, fought the battle of Sitlington Hill 
on the 8th, and by its successful issue and his superior 
numbers forced Milroy and Schenck to retreat toward 
Franklin. Jackson kept up the pursuit as far as Frank- 
lin, but was unable to inflict any further damage upon 
the Union forces. He had, however, by this operation 
succeeded in throwing back Fremont's column and 
in eliminating all possibility of its co-operation with 
Banks while the latter was in the upper Valley. To 
prevent Fremont having access to the Valley by the 
lateral by-paths he had these obstructed by felled trees 
and other temporary obstacles. He began his return 
on the 1 2th, and by rapid marching was in communi- 
cation with Ewell on the 17th. Banks in the mean- 
time had retired to Strasburg, and Shields's division 
had started eastward to join McDowell. The elimina- 
tion of Fremont from the combination that a few days 
before was so formidable, and the depletion of Banks's 
force by Shields's division, gave Jackson an unex- 
pected advantage that he was not slow to improve. 
Uniting with Ewell at New Market and keeping Ashby 
in front of Banks on the Valley Turnpike, he moved 
his command across the Massanutten Mountains into 
the Luray Valley, and on the 22d bivouacked his ad- 
vance under Ewell ten miles from Front Royal, Banks 



292 



GENERAL McCLELLAN. 



being in complete ignorance of his movements. The 
next day Colonel Kenly's command, of about a thou- 
sand men at Front Royal, were surprised and over- 
whelmed after making as gallant a resistance as was 
possible under the circumstances, and the Confederates 
gained possession of the road to Newtown on Banks's 
line of retreat to Winchester. The latter succeeded, 
however, in effecting his retreat to Winchester and 
holding Jackson in check in the battle of the 25th until 
he could secure the safety of the major portion of his 
trains while continuing his retreat to Martinsburg and 
thence across the Potomac to Williamsport. The 
mere tactical advantages of Jackson's operations were 
relatively unimportant as compared with the strate- 
gical. He had, it is true, won a victory over Milroy at 
Sitlington Hill, but had suffered greater loss than the 
latter, and then turning upon Banks had been able to 
drive him out of the Valley and across the Potomac, 
barely missing the entire capture of Banks's six thou- 
sand men with his own twenty thousand, but he was 
not in sufficient strength to essay any further advance. 
The authorities at Washington, however, finding some 
comfort in the escape of Banks's force, immediately 
entertained the design of attempting the capture of 
Jackson, who until May 30th remained in the vicinity 
of Harper's Ferry and Martinsburg threatening the 
capture of the former place. 

This project was in effect to direct Fremont to move 
in from the west directly upon Harrisonburg, while 
McDowell should detach twenty thousand of his forces 
to Strasburg, and Banks and Saxton from Williams- 
port and Harper's Ferry should occupy Jackson's at- 
tention in front. And it was in the prosecution of this 
plan that McDowell's corps was diverted from its in- 
tended movement overland to make junction with Mc- 
Clellan, and half its strength was started toward the 
Valley in the hope of intercepting Jackson. 

Mr. Lincoln had but just returned to Washington 
from a visit to McDowell at Fredericksburg when he 
heard of the disaster at Front Royal, and on the 24th 



JACKSON'S VALLEY CAMPAIGN, 293 

of May, before he was aware of its consequences to 
Banks, he notified McClellan that McDowell's move- 
ment would certainly begin on Monday morning, the 
26th, as Shields's division was much too worn to start 
earlier. He also suggests : '* If, in conjunction with 
McDowell's movement against Anderson, you could 
send a force from your right to cut off the enemy's 
supplies from Richmond, preserve the railroad bridges 
across the two forks of the Pamunkey, and intercept 
the enemy's retreat, you will prevent the army now 
opposed to you from receiving an accession of num- 
bers of nearly fifteen thousand men, and if you succeed 
in saving the bridges you will secure a line of railroad 
for supplies in addition to the one you now have. Can 
you not do this almost as well as not, while you are 
building the Chickahominy bridges? McDowell and 
Shields both say they can, and positively will, move 
Monday morning. I wish you to march cautiously 
and safely." But later in the afternoon, when the con- 
dition of affairs in the Valley was better understood, 
Mr. Lincoln telegraphs him : " In consequence of Gen- 
eral Banks's critical position I have been compelled 
to suspend General McDowell's movements to join 
you. The enemy are making a desperate push upon 
Harper's Ferry, and we are trying to throw General 
Fremont's force and part of General McDowell's in 
their rear." 

McClellan at once perceived that there was no longer 
any hope of the participation of McDowell's army in 
the immediate operations in front of Richmond, and 
he replied to the President that he would make his cal- 
culations accordingly. From this instant, the evening 
of the 24th of May, the Administration hdd the right 
to expect some aggressive action against the enemy 
in McClellan's immediate front to counteract the ex- 
hilarating influence of Jackson's successes, as well as 
to relieve the tension of the public mind, and there is 
every reason to believe that McClellan himself was fully 
impressed with the necessity of some such action. He 
was unfortunately in poor physical condition at this 



294 



GENERAL McCLELLAN. 



time, which, reacting upon his mental tone, gave a 
somewhat morbid tinge to his thoughts, diminishing 
his confidence and accentuating his apprehension of 
disaster. Mr. Lincoln was himself very greatly har- 
assed and depressed at the state of affairs at this time, 
as shown in his dispatches advising McClellan of the 
progress of events in the Valley, where, after detailing 
the efforts of the Administration to relieve the situa- 
tion at Harper's Ferry by " sending such regiments 
and dribs from here and Baltimore as we can spare," 
he says : '' If McDowell's force was now beyond our 
reach we should be entirely helpless. Apprehensions of 
something like this, and no unwillingness to sustain 
you, has always been my reason for withholding Mc- 
Dowell's forces from you." And later : " The enemy is 
moving north in sufficient force to drive General 
Banks before him, precisely in what force we can 
not tell. He is also threatening Leesburg, and Geary 
on the Manassas Gap Railroad, from both north and 
south, in precisely what force we can not tell. I think 
the movement is a general and concerted one, such 
as would not be if he was acting vipon the purpose of 
a very desperate defense of Richmond. I think the time 
is near when you must either attack Richmond or give 
up the job and come to the defense of Washington. 
Let me hear from you instantly." 

In his reply McClellan expressed the opinion that 
Jackson's movement was for the purpose of prevent- 
ing re-enforcements being sent to the Army of the 
Potomac, that the mass of the rebel troops was still 
in the vicinity of Richmond, and that the time was very 
near when he should attack Richmond, as two corps 
were already across the Chickahominy and the others 
would be ready to cross when the bridges were com- 
pleted. The next day's reports indicated a more cheer- 
ful tone at Washington, and conveyed the information 
from McDowell that the Confederate General Ander- 
son's force was leaving the vicinity of Fredericksburg, 
coupled with a rumor that their destination was either 
to join Jackson or the forces at Richmond. This im- 



HANOVER COURT HOUSE. 



295 



polled the President to inquire of McClellan, " Can you 
not cut the Aquia Creek Railroad ? " To which the 
latter replied : " Have arranged to carry out your last 
order. We are quietly closing in upon the enemy 
preparatory to the last struggle. Situated as I am I 
feel forced to take every possible precaution against dis- 
aster, and to secure my flanks against the probably supe- 
rior force in front of me. My arrangements for to-mor- 
row are very important, and, if successful, will leave me 
free to strike on the return of the force detached." 

These arrangements had reference to an expedition 
under General Fitz-John Porter for the distinct pur- 
pose of clearing the enemy from the upper Peninsula 
as far as Hanover Court House, or beyond, and to 
destroy the railroad and other bridges over the South 
Anna and Pamunkey Rivers. This Confederate force 
consisted of the command of General Branch, which 
had been ordered from Gordonsville on the 20th of 
May and directed to take position at Hanover Court 
House for the purpose of covering the two railroads 
from Richmond, and to keep up the connection with 
General J. R. Anderson's command then in front of 
Fredericksburg. The possible concentration of these 
two considerable bodies of the enemy upon his right 
flank gave McClellan some uneasiness in regard to the 
security of this flank, and he determined to strike them 
before entering upon any general movement of the 
army.' It was now no longer the purpose to preserve 
the connection by rail between Fredericksburg and Mc- 
Clellan's right, but, on the contrary, to destroy as effec- 
tively as possible the railway communications from 
Richmond to the Confederate forces in Northern Vir- 
ginia. At this time McClellan had no hope of Mc- 
Dowell's advance, and the supposition that this expe- 
dition was organized for the purpose of stretching out 
a helping hand to McDowell has no foundation in 
fact; its especial purpose being for the protection of 
his own right flank, lest any considerable body of the 
enemy by turning that flank should threaten his com- 
munications. 



GENERAL McCLELLAN. 



Porter's command, consisting of an advanced guard: 
under General Emory, comprising the Fifth and Sixth 
United States Cavalry and Benson's horse battery. 
General Morell's division of Martindale's, Butterfield's, 
and McQuade's brigades, Berdan's sharpshooters, and 
three light batteries under Captain Griffin, started at 
daybreak early on the 27th from their camps at New 
Bridge, taking the direct road through Mechanicsville 
to Hanover Court House. In addition to this force, 
Colonel G. K. Warren's provisional brigade, consist- 
ing of the Fifth and Thirteenth New York Infantry, 
the First Connecticut Heavy Artillery acting as infantry, 
and Weeden's Rhode Island battery, moved on a road 
parallel to the Pamunkey from Old Church to the 
same destination, the combined force having the re- 
spectable strength of about twelve thousand men. 
Rain began in the night and continued during the 
greater part of the morning, making the roads bad and 
the marching difficult ; but early in the afternoon a 
portion of the enemy, consisting of the Twenty-eighth 
North Carolina and a section of artillery, commanded 
by Colonel Lane, was found in position across the 
road about two miles in front of Hanover Court 
House. This force, after inflicting some damage upon 
the Twenty-fifth New York, which had previously been 
sent forw^ard to support the cavalry advanced guard, 
was driven off, after an hour's conflict, by Butter- 
field's brigade assisted by Benson's battery. Under 
the mistaken notion that the whole of Branch's bri- 
gade was in front, the pursuit was taken up by the 
main body of Porter's command, leaving Martin- 
dale's brigade at the junction of the Ashland road 
with instructions to move west to the railroad and 
follow it up to Hanover Court House. Instead, how- 
ever, of such being the case, Branch had moved his^ 
camp the night before and was on the left of Mar- 
tindale near the railroad. It thus happened that Mar- 
tindale was soon in conflict with a much superior force, 
while the bulk of the Union forces was continually 
separating itself from him. With the Second Maine, 



HANOVER COURT HOUSE. 



297 



the Forty-fourth New York, the depleted Twenty- 
fifth New York, and a section of Martin's battery, Mar- 
tindale was driven back to the main road and obUged 
:o maintain an unequal contest for several hours until 
the main body of the Union forces could be counter- 
marched from the vicinity of the Court House to bring 
him the requisite succor. This was done before the 
threatened destruction of his small command was ac- 
romplished, and by nightfall the enemy retired, suf^er- 
ng some loss in prisoners but without serious demorali- 
sation. Considering the disparity of numbers, the ad- 
ntage was upon the Confederate side, principally 
Decause of the misconception as to the exact situation 
3f Branch's main body. 

McClellan attached greater importance to the re- 
sults of this operation than it in reality deserves, and 

eemed aggrieved that neither the Secretary nor the 
President did " at all appreciate the value and mag- 
litude of Porter's victory." That he himself was much 
impressed with it is evidenced in the dispatch of that 
night to the Secretary, saying : " Porter has gained two 
:omplete victories over superior forces, yet I feel 
Dbliged to move there in the morning with re-enforce- 
ments, to secure the complete destruction of the rebels 
in that quarter. In doing so I run some risk here, 
but I can not help it. The enemy are even in greater 
force than I had supposed. I will do all that quick 
movement can accomplish, but you must send me all 
:he troops you can, and leave to me full latitude as to 
choice of commanders. It is absolutely necessary to 
destroy the rebels near Hanover Court House before I 

an advance." Under this feeling of the importance 
Di General Porter's mission, Sykes's regulars were 
sent forward as a support, and McClellan himself rode 
forward to the scene of the engagement, got wet, and 

hus brought on a return of his old Mexican fever, 
which laid him up in great physical suffering at a 
time that proved afterward to be most unpropitious. 
The damage inflicted upon the railroad communica- 
tions of the enemy was but temporary and was soon 



298 



GENERAL McCLELLAN. 



repaired, so that upon the whole it would have been 
much better had McClellan ignored Branch's com- 
mand and devoted his attention to a general move- 
ment of the whole army, for there was no further 
serious engagement on the extreme right flank, and; 
the Union troops were recalled on the 29th to theirij 
former camps. 

However, before McDowell's recall was known to 
the Confederates, General Johnston was exceedingl/ 
apprehensive lest his junction with McClellan should, 
take place, and he had resolved upon an attack of Mc- 
Clellan's right flank at Mechanicsville, hoping, if suc- 
cessful, to prevent it. This project was certainly at- 
tended with great risk, for had he failed, Richmond 
would have been in jeopardy. Having learned from, 
Anderson on the 27th that McDowell's advance had 
reached six miles from Fredericksburg, he immediately}^ 
issued orders for the concentration of his troops to 
carry out his purpose of attack at Mechanicsville. A.i 
P. Hill's division, comprising the commands of Ander- 1 
son and Branch, was brought down from the vicinity^^j 
of Ashland and placed on the east side of the Chicka-i 
hominy near Mechanicsville, under orders to attack at'], 
early dawni on the 29th ; Whiting's division, strength-i 
ened by the addition of Hatton's and Pettigrew's bri-j, 
gades and D. R. Jones's division, were concentratedj, 
near the Meadow and Mechanicsville Bridges, with:, 
orders to cross at the instant that Hill attacked, the^, 
whole to constitute a right wing under the command | 
of General G. W. Smith, who was, if possible, to over-.j 
whelm McClellan's right flank, while the remainder offj 
Johnston's force should operate to the best advantage., 
as circumstances might determine. But just as the^j 
troops on the south side of the Chickahominy were:ij 
moving into position on the 28th, word came fromifij 
General Stuart, the alert Confederate cavalryman, that,, 
McDowell's advance had been stopped, and that it was j 
believed that he was moving north from Fredericks-. 'j 
burg. Johnston immediately abandoned his contem-h 
plated attack, withdrew A. P. Hill by the bridge on the] 



BATTLE OF SEVEN PINES. 200 

Dad from Richmond to Ashland without his presence 
aving been suspected by the Union forces, and placed 
im on the left of the Confederate army, within easy 
upporting distance of the troops guarding the upper 
hickahominy bridges. He then returned to his pre- 
onceived plan of attacking the two corps of Keyes 
nd Heintzelman, which had in the meantime crossed 
fie Chickahominy at Bottom's Bridge and were iso- 
ited from the right wing of the Union army. To 
nderstand the situation a brief reference to the sur- 
oundings of Richmond will probably suffice. 

Notwithstanding the admirable natural defensive 
dvantages that Richmond possessed, the absence of 
ny strong artificial defenses in the spring of 1862 
ecessitated the presence of a strong and skillfully 
andled army to make its tenure reasonably secure, 
nd such was then the character of the Confederate 
rmy under General Johnston. The Chickahominy 
iver, with its low marshy bed and prominent blufifs, 
ormed a great natural ditch fronting southeast, and 
onstituted an almost impassable barrier in this direc- 
ion. Its bottom lands on either side, in times of freshet, 
vere completely overflowed, and then, except where 
mbanked causeways, as at New Bridge, led from the 
ising ground to pile or trestle bridges across the 
Qain channel, it was at such times elsewhere impass- 
ible. These bottom lands varied from a mile to a 
nile and a half in width, and especially on the right 
)ank were fringed with high blufifs rising above the 
ree tops of the valley. The prominent crossings of 
he Chickahominy within the theater of operations 
vere at the Meadow, Mechanicsville, New, Bottom's, 
md Long Bridges, from which points the roads lead- 
hg into Richmond traversed the intervening country 
hrough a thickly wooded territory that afforded 
l^reater advantages to the defense than to an attacking 
Jirmy. The general direction of the roads coming 
irom the southeast was nearly parallel to the Chicka- 
lominy, and it was upon the most easterly, the Wil- 
fiamsburg road, that the two corps of the Army of the 



300 



GENERAL McCLELLAN. 



Potomac were located when General Johnston deter-; 
mined to attack. 

It seems to have been McClellan's intention, aftei 
Casey's division had* made a lodgment on the righli 
bank of the Chickahominy, which he did on the 20th 1 
to push over the remaining division of the FourtH 
Corps, to be followed by the Third Corps, so as to have 
a sufficient force on the right bank to hold it while hcj 
forced a passage for his right wing at New Bridge 
The position at the latter point had been carefully re- 
connoitered, and the engineers of the army had coMj 
lected sufficient bridge material to reconstruct NeW 
Bridge as well as two trestle bridges a half mile abovfj 
and below this point. It is asserted that these bridges 
could have been thrown and the army crossed by the! 
28th had the order been given. But just at this time! 
McClellan's attention was directed to the affair at Han-\ 
over Court House and the order was not issued. Ir 
the meantime Sumner's corps, located near Tyler'j 
House, began the construction of two bridges, after< 
ward known as Sumner's upper and lower bridges^ 
which were practically completed by the 30th, and ho! 
was thus brought into communication with Casey 'r 
pickets at Dr. Trent's on the opposite bank. ThesG 
bridges, though not at first contemplated in the gen-: 
eral engineering operations, had a very great impori 
tance afterward upon the battle of Fair Oaks, especialljl^ 
the upper or Grapevine Bridge. ' 

After the crossing of the Third and F'ourth Corp.o 
had been effected General Heintzelman was placed iii, 
command, and he was instructed to hold the crossing:^ 
at White Oak Swamp and Bottom's Bridge, pusK 
Casey's division forward on the Williamsburg roac^ 
about five eighths of a mile beyond Seven Pines, when 
he was to construct a redoubt and line of rifle pits tC; 
be located by the engineers of General McClellanV 
staff, and move up Couch's division to Seven Pines ii, 
support. The two divisions of the Third Corps wer< 
placed, one (Kearny's) at the tefe-de-pont at Bottom'; 
Bridge, and the other (Hooker's) at White Oal' 



BATTLE OF SEVEN PINES. 



301 



wamp ; the remaining three eorps of the army were 
n the north bank, stretching from MechanicsviUe to 
rapevine Bridge, the latter point being somewhat 
lore than four miles by the road from Bottom's 
ridge and about three and a quarter miles from 
ie railroad bridge, which was then about completed. 
The isolation of that portion of the Army of the 
otomac on the right bank of the Chickahominy and 
le wide separation of its component parts afforded 
eneral Johnston the tempting opportunity for which 
e had been waiting. General Keyes, the commander 
f the Fourth Corps, clearly perceived the danger of 
is extremely isolated position, and although he 
trongly protested against it he endeavored by in- 
'reased vigilance to lessen the hazard. Casey's divi- 
ion, though occupying the most important and vul- 
erable position of the whole army, was, in fact, com- 
osed of the most unreliable troops. He himself 
lys : " On leaving Washington, eight of the regiments 
/ere composed of raw troops. It has been the mis- 
Drtune of the division in marching through the Penin- 
ula to be subjected to an ordeal which would have 
everely tried veteran troops. Furnished with scanty 
ransportation, occupying sickly positions, exposed to 
he inclemency of the weather, at times without tents 
r blankets, and illy supplied with rations and medical 
tores, the loss from sickness has been great, espe- 
ially with the officers." This division, so lacking in 
ealth and preparation for the defense of the impor- 
ant position to which it had been assigned, he was 
bliged still further to weaken by the detail of large 
arties for guard, picket, and intrenching duty, so that 
/hen attacked by Hill's division on the 31st he could 
ot bring into action more than forty-two hundred and 
"iifty-three men in his entire command. Surely the 
esponsibility of the disaster of that day should rest 
ipon the shoulders of those in authority, who appeared 
o have been deaf to proper soldierly remonstrances 
nd blind to the inevitable consequences of this vio- 
ation of the simplest principles of the art of war. 



GENERAL McCLELLAN. 



While Casey was engaged in constructing the 
works of defense indicated by the engineers during the 
two days that elapsed before he was so vigorously 
attacked, and at the sSme time withstanding the efforts 
of Garland's brigade to reconnoiter his position, John- 
ston had decided in his own mind that the Uniom 
advance had come near enough to be struck a decisive 
blow. Garland had reported to him by noon of the 
30th the position of the Union forces in his front, and 
Rodes, whose brigade was in observation on the 
Charles City road, had found no evidences of an ad-i 
vance in that direction. His original plan, which was 
considerably modified in execution through some mis-5 
understanding of Longstreet, commanding the righli 
wing of the Confederate army, involved the concentra-i 
tion of twenty-three of the twenty-seven brigades oh 
his army upon the field of battle by the Charles Cityy 
Williamsburg, and Nine-mile roads, so as entirely tc( 
overwhelm Keyes's corps, drive it back upon Heintzel-l! 
man's, and capture or destroy that portion of the Arm);! 
of the Potomac then on the right bank of the Chicka-i 
hominy. The movement was to begin early on the' 
31st, and a glance at the disposition of the component 
parts of his army on the evening of the 30th will exhibili 
the entire feasibility of his project. 

Huger's division of three brigades was southeast 
of Richmond on the bank of Gillis's Creek ; Rodes's' 
brigade of Hill's division was three and a half milee^ 
out in observation on the Charles City road, the re-.^ 
maining three brigades of this division being about the 
same distance out on the Williamsburg road ; of Long' 
street's division of six brigades, three were some thre( | 
miles out on the Nine-mile road, and the other three 
were posted near where this road leaves Richmond I 
these three divisions constituted the right wing of th( j 
Confederate army under the command of Genera 
Longstreet. The left wing, commanded by Genera 
G. W. Smith, comprised Whiting's division of five bri 
gades, which had received orders about midnight o 
the 30th to take position early in the morning in sup- 






■w' •!;,' Ov 




BATTLE OF SEVEN PINES. 303 

ort of Longstreet an the Nine-mile road ; iMcLaws's 
^vision of three brigades, stationed on the Chicka- 
pminy Bluffs, overlooked the crossings between New 
id Mechanicsville Bridges ; D. R. Jones's division of 
^o brigades was on McLaws's left, and A. P. Hill's 
till farther to the left. 

I From the position of these several divisions on 
iie 30th and the instructions that General Johnston 
ransmitted to their commanders, he clearly intended 
[lat Huger should move at an early hour on the 
Charles City road, so as to relieve Rodes's brigade to 
nable it to join Hill on the Williamsburg road, and 
lat Huger should then make his progress on the 
Charles City road conform to that of Hill, being ready 
3 support his flank by attack, but at the same time 
e was cautioned to maintain a strong reserve to cover 
le right flank of the army ; that Hill, after being joined 
y Rodes, should open the attack with his four bri- 
ades moving down the Williamsburg road upon the 
Jnion position, which had been accurately recon- 
oitered by Garland on the 30th ; that Longstreet, 
loving down the Nine-mile road, should support 
lill's attack, the two divisions coming together at 
even Pines ; that Whiting, provided his division 
cached its prescribed position in time, was to support 
vongstreet, and, if not, part of McLaws's and Jones's 
ivisions were to be drawn from their positions for this 
urpose and their places to be occupied by Whiting 
oming up later. It is impossible to conceive how the 
wo Union corps could have escaped entire destruction 
ad this plan been carried out as devised. But, most 
ortunately for the Union army, Longstreet misunder- 
tood his instructions and moved his division over to 
he Williamsburg road, and in so doing delayed Whit- 
ig, Hill, and Huger in turn. This delayed the arrival 
f Rodes also, so that it was not until about one o'clock 
hat the signal was given for Hill's brigades to move 
6 the attack. 

The head of Whiting's division had reached the 
icinity of General Johnston's headquarters about eight 



GENERAL McCLELLAN. 



o'clock on its way to the Nine-mile road, and was thenc 
stopped until the position of Longstreet's division was^ 
ascertained, since it was to follow the latter. Johnstonr: 
doubted the accuracy of the information that was soon 
brought to him that Longstreet had moved over to the 
Williamsburg road, and dispatched his aid. Lieutenant! 
J. B. Washington, to find Longstreet, and, if the in-ii 
formation were true, to direct Longstreet to return the 
three brigades of his division to the Nine-mile road.,' 
provided this could be done without material loss oi)j 
time. Under the impression that he was to be foundi] 
on this road, Washington galloped rapidly down the' 
Nine-mile road, passed the Confederate pickets, andi' 
was captured by Casey's pickets about ten o'clock neat' 
Fair Oaks, and it was the capture of this aid that con-i! 
vinced Keyes that Johnston was in person on the fields 
and that an attack in force was imminent. He, how-^l 
ever, believed that the movement was to be expecteeii 
from the direction of Fair Oaks, and, guided by thisii 
warning and from other evidences, he directed thei' 
troops of Casey's and Couch's divisions to be undet 
arms by eleven o'clock, and made such other disposi-i 
tions as were possible to meet the coming attack. 

The defensive features of the position held by thc' 
Fourth Corps consisted of a line of rifle pits at Seven 
Pipes, at the junction of the Williamsburg and Nine< 
mile roads, which was held by Couch's division! 
About half a mile in advance, under construction, was 
an inclosed redoubt with rifle pits extending on bothJ 
flanks, which was occupied by Casey's division. Mid-1 
way between Casey and Couch a belt of timber had' 
been cut down to form a slashing that extended to the 
woods on both sides of the clearing. Another slash- 
ing, not quite so extensive, had been made in the edge 
of the woods about eight hundred yards in front o: 
Casey's division, and at about a mile and a half in real 
of Seven Pines there was a third line of rifle pits, cross- 
ing the Williamsburg road. All of these intrench- 
ments were in an unfinished state, and Casey's line ir 
particular could of¥er but little resisfance because the 



BATTLE OF SEVEN PINES. 305 

ainy weather, the scarcity of intrenching tools and 
xes, and the short time it had been under construc- 
ion, combined to retard its progress. Its weak point 
i/as the left flank, which, unless strongly guarded, was 
sapable of being turned under cover of the dense 
^oods that concealed the by-paths that crossed the 
ead waters of the White Oak Swamp. 

As the limits of this volume will not permit the 
.etailed description of the battle of the 31st of May, it 
Hll sufifice to confine our attention to those incidents 
ivhich determined its important issues. Casey, upon 
vhose division the brunt of Hill's attack was to fall, 
tad disposed his troops as follows : Naglee's brigade 
)n the right, Wessell's in the center, and Palmer's on 
he left. Naglee's, the strongest of the three, had one 
egiment off on the extreme right on the Nine-mile 
oad, about seven hundred yards from Fair Oaks Sta- 
iion, supporting the line of pickets ; another on the left 
C>f the York River Railroad, about five hundred yards 
outh of Fair Oaks ; his remaining three regiments, 
^ith the exception of seven companies of one and two 
:ompanies of another on picket, were in support of 
5pratt's battery, which had been advanced about half- 
ivay between the redoubt and the edge of the woods 
)eyond. The strength of this brigade taken into action 
A^as seventeen hundred and fifty-three officers and men. 
^Vessell's brigade of four regiments of raw troops occu- 
pied the line of intrenchments, with the exception of 
he One Hundred and Third Pennsylvania, which just 
oefore the action commenced had been advanced to 
trengthen the line of pickets ; its effective strength 
was two thousand and sixty-one, and, deducting its 
oickets and working party, left, according to its com- 
mander, about fifteen hundred as its fighting strength 
when the battle opened. Palmer's brigade of four 
regiments, also raw, sent forward two regiments to 
support Spratt's battery on the left, leaving the remain- 
ing two to hold the left of the main line ; its fighting 
strength is reported by Palmer as about one thou- 
sand. Couch's division, half a mile to the rear of 



GENERAL McCLELLAN. 



Casey, had Abercrombie on the right, Devens in the 
center, and Peck on the left. Two regiments of Aber- 
crombie's brigade and a battery were detached to guard 
the depot at Fair Oaks, thus leaving ten regiments, 
and three batteries of Couch's division to hold the posi-; 
tion to which it had been assigned. Heintzelman, ini 
general charge of the troops on this side, appreciat- 
ing the danger of Casey's critical position and not 
having sufficient confidence in his raw troops, moved 
Berry's and Birney's brigades of Kearny's division 
from their position at Bottom's Bridge to the third 
line of rifle pits, which they reached only at about nooni 
of the 31st. Jameson's, the remaining brigade of this 
division at Bottom's Bridge, and Hooker's divisioni 
at White Oak Swamp, some miles to the rear, com-i 
plete the disposition of- the troops of the Third and( 
Fourth Corps of the army. 

Late in the afternoon of the 30th, after Johnstoni 
had issued his orders for the next day's attack, a raini 
storm of unprecedented violence set in which lasted( 
during the whole night, and although this was likely\ 
to delay the movements of his troops he did noti 
countermand his orders for attack, for he believed its^ 
influence in preventing the crossing of McClellan's",^ 
troops across the rapidly rising Chickahominy wouki 
more than ofifset any disadvantage in this respect. It!' 
was not, therefore, because of this storm that the move-^ 
ments for the 31st were ordered, as has so frequently} 
been maintained, but he held to his purpose despite its 
deterring influence. 

Returning now to the disposition of the thirteen! 
brigades of the right wing of the Confederate army, i 
we find that although there was some delay, owing to 
the storm, the more serious delay arose from Long- 
street's misunderstanding of General Johnston's plan. 
Under his direction Wilcox's, Colston's, and Pryor's 
brigades of his own division were sent to the Charles 
City road as a support to Blanchard's and Armistead's 
brigades of Huger's division, and were, until about 
half past three o'clock, kept marching and counter- j 



BATTLE OF SEVEN PINES. 



307 



marching on this road. Finally these brigades were 
ordered to march across to the Williamsburg road, 
which was reached by five o'clock. Mahone's brigade 
of Huger's division remained in observation out on 
the Charles City road until late that night, when it was 
ordered to the vicinity of Casey's redoubt, which it 
reached early the next morning. Pickett's brigade of 
Longstreet's division was ordered to move from the 
Williamsburg road, just as the battle opened on the 31st, 
to guard the York River Railroad, where it remained 
bntil night, and then was ordered to march at daylight 
the next morning and report to General D. H. Hill. 
The two remaining brigades of Longstreet's division 
i(Jenkins's and Kemper's), commanded by General R. 
H. Anderson, were on the Williamsburg road sup- 
porting Hill's division. 

The latter, comprising four brigades, was organized 
under cover of the woods for the direct attack of Casey's 
position, by placing Garland's brigade on the left of the 
Williamsburg road and Rodes on the right, each pre- 
ceded by a regiment deployed as skirmishers. G. B. An- 
derson's brigade supported Garland, and Rains followed 
Rodes ; the strength of this division was about nine 
thousand effectives, and it was scarcely possible that 
Casey's raw troops in their scattered disposition could 
^vithstand the onset of so formidable a body led by 
experienced commanders. But they resisted with un- 
expected stubbornness, until Rains, by moving to his 
right and finding the exposed flank of Casey's line, 
compelled the latter to retire upon Couch's position 
at Seven Pines. The stubborn fighting of Casey's 
raw troops had lasted for more than two hours, and 
Hill was compelled by the losses that he had ex- 
perienced to. call for assistance from Longstreet, who 
sent forward R. H. Anderson's fine brigade, under 
Colonel Jenkins. In the meantime Berry's brigade of 
Kearny's division had been sent forward, and though 
the message from Keyes to Heintzelman had been 
.greatly delayed in transmission, it took position in 
the woods to the rear and left of Casey's line about 



GENERAL McCLELLAN. 



three o'clock, where it prevented any farther advance 
by the Confederates on this flank. But now, strength- 
ened by Anderson's brigade, the Confederates were 
able to sweep away all Resistance to their progress upon 
the right of the Union line, which the best efforts of 
Couch, upon whom the attack then fell, could not 
prevent. Couch, with two of his regiments, was cut; 
off and forced in the direction of Fair Oaks, and, the ■ 
way being opened, the Confederate troops poured 
down the Williamsburg road, forcing the bulk of the 
Union troops to seek the third line of intrenchments 
as a final point of resistance.* Here, at the third line, . 
at the close of the day, they held their position, and I 
preparations were made during the night to renew the; 
contest the next morning, by the concentration off 
Keyes's corps. Berry's and Jameson's brigades oft 
Kearny's division, and a brigade and two regiments; 
of Hooker's division brought up from White Oak: 
Swamp. Birney's brigade of Kearny's division, which i 
had been moved up the York River Railroad during^ 
the afternoon, had not been engaged, but was in posi-- 
tion to connect the Union right at Fair Oaks with the ^ 
left at the third line. 

Meantime, upon the Confederate left, General! 
Johnston had moved out on the Nine-mile road with; 
Whiting's division of five brigades, holding Ma- 
gruder's division under arms near at hand as a sup- 
port, and was awaiting the sound of Hill's musketry 
before giving the order to advance for attack. But the 
atmospheric conditions were such that afternoon that 
the intervening space was impervious to such sounds. 
Occasionally cannonading could be heard, but up to 
four o'clock no other indications of a severe battle 
were audible, and Johnston was uncertain whether or 

* This was due in a great measure to the remarkable cour- 
age and persistent advance of three regiments, the Twenty- 
seventh Georgia and Fifth and Sixth South Carolina, under Colo- 
nel Jenkins, who successively drove before him the fragmentary 
forces of Union troops and opened the way down the Williams- 
burg road. 



FAIR OAKS. 309 

not his plan of battle, even as modified by Longstreet's 
misunderstanding, had miscarried until word was 
finally brought by a staff officer that the battle had 
been for some time in progress. This delay was ex- 
ceedingly fortunate for Couch's small command of four 
regiments and battery that then constituted the entire 
Union right in the vicinity of Fair Oaks, for by the 
time that Whiting's pressure began to be felt Sedg- 
wick's division of Sumner's corps had reached the 
Adams House, where a strong line of battle was estab- 
lished. This timely succor was due to the soldierly 
spirit of Sumner, who at the first indications of battle 
had advanced the heads of his two divisions to the 
bridges, anticipating the order to cross, which Mc- 
Clellan at once issued. Sumner's prompt action saved 
an hour — a most precious hour; and although the 
bridges did not appear to be passable, so great was 
the urgency that the attempt was made and was suc- 
cessfully accomplished by Sedgwick's division at the 
upper bridge, and by a portion only of Richardson's 
at the lower, before the latter gave way. Kirby's bat- 
tery, through extraordinary exertions on the part of 
his men and other assisting troops, was the only one 
that could be brought forward in time to take part 
in the battle of that afternoon at Fair Oaks, and to the 
admirable handling of its guns Sumner's success was 
in a great measure due. Four brigades of Whiting per- 
sistently attempted to overthrow Sedgwick and Couch, 
but after suffering great loss they were compelled to 
desist. Johnston, who. could not believe that McClel- 
lan had succeeded in crossing any of his troops, had 
started with Hood's brigade to aid Longstreet, who 
had called for assistance on the left of his line, but the 
strong resistance developed by Sumner compelled his 
presence on the left of the army, where about dusk he 
was so severely wounded that he was compelled to 
relinquish command, which then devolved upon Gen- 
eral G. W. Smith, the next in rank. 

At the close of the day the Confederate commander 
had not succeeded in his design of destroying the two 



3IO ^^^ GENERAL McCLELLAN. 

Union corps, and although he had driven the troops -i 
of Casey and Couch back to the third hne of the ; 
Union position, there was not satisfactory evidence \ 
that these troops were demorahzed ; while Hill's divi- 
sion had been so severely punished that its active. 1 
employment the next day was questionable. The?; 
Confederate left wing, on the other hand, had suf--: 
fered a repulse, and, though not defeated, it could note 
without re-enforcement hope to be successful on an- 
other trial. Under these circumstances General Smith, 
the new Confederate commander, determined to openi 
the attack the next morning with Longstreet's thirteen i 
brigades, fighting toward the north and pivoting the: 
movement on Whiting, who was to attack Sumner att 
the instant that Longstreet became engaged. As ai 
support to Whiting, Ripley's brigade, which was ex- 
pected to arrive at Richmond in time, was ordered 1 
forward by Lee, and was to be joined to one ofi 
Huger's that Longstreet was directed to transfer to the: 
left. GrifBth's and Semmes's brigades of Magruder'S' 
division were also ordered to support Whiting, and I 
Cobb's and Kershaw's were moved nearer to New 
Bridge to replace them. During the night, however, 
Hill's division had been drawn back to the edge of[ 
the woods from whence they had emerged to attack: 
on the 31st. 

By daybreak on June ist the Union forces in posi- 
tion were awaiting attack in the following order : On 1 
the extreme right, Sedgwick's division and Couch's 
four regiments faced west in line of battle, tneir right 
being about a half mile north of the Adams House 
and their left a few hundred yards east of the station 
at Fair Oaks. Next came Richardson's division, which, 
having been brought up during the night, was posted 
on the railroad, and thus formed with Sedgwick's line 
almost a right angle. On Richardson's left came 
Birney's brigade, to which the Seventh Massachusetts 
of Devens's brigade was temporarily attached and 
formed its right. On the left of Birney, occupying the 
third line of intrenchments, came Kearny's other twf 



FAIR OAKS. 3U 

rigades, then Casey's and Couch's divisions, and 
ickles's brigade of Hooker's division. It will be seen 
rom the disposition of the Union troops that an ad- 
ance along the Williamsburg road would concen- 
rate the three corps in the vicinity of Seven Pines, with 
he result of renewing the conflict upon the same bat- 
lefield as that of the preceding day. But there was no 
ingle authority to whom was confided the conduct of 
if.fifairs, and, besides, the situation was not well under- 
tood either by Sumner, commanding on the right, nor 
^eintzelman on the left, and McClellan, on the other 
;ide of the Chickahominy, possessed only the most con- 
used and contradictory information of the result of the 
lay's battle. Under these circumstances no plan of 
Dattle was adopted by the two Union commanders, 
3Ut they awaited the initiative of the Confederates. We 
lave seen what plan had been devised by General 
Smith, the Confederate commander, but it was far from 
being carried out. The thirteen brigades forming 
Longstreet's command appear to have been under the 
direct control of General D. H. Hill, as there is no 
evidence that any of these brigades operated that day 
except by orders emanating from the latter officer. He 
had learned early on the morning of June ist that the 
Union forces had been largely re-enforced during the 
night, and therefore determined to concentrate the 
thirteen Confederate brigades in and about Casey's re- 
doubt in the hope that an attempt would be made by 
the enemy to attack, and accordingly gave orders for 
the advance brigades to draw in their lines and form 
near this position. 

But early in the morning, before this was done, 
Hill had ordered an advance of Mahone's, Armistead's, 
and Pickett's brigades into the woods which intervened 
between Richardson's division, and thus brought on 
the battle of that day. The severest fighting occurred 
in the contest of Armistead's and Mahone's brigades 
against the left of French's brigade, the latter being 
re-enforced by Ploward's and a portion of Meagher's 
brigades. Pickett's brigade, on Armistead's right, was 



312 '^^^ GENERAL McCLELLAN. 

also badly punished by Birney's brigade and had to b: 
re-enforced by a portion of Colston's. In the mean 
while Wilcox's and Pryor's brigades were attacke( 
by five regiments of'the Third Corps on the railroad 
and by Sickles's brigade on the Williamsburg road 
and after a short engagement were withdrawn becauset 
as Wilcox asserts, of written orders of General Hili 
directing this withdrawal, owing to the bad behavior o 
Mahone's brigade in that morning's fight. The severity 
of the Confederate attack on French required nearh 
all of Richardson's division successfully to withstanc 
it, and it was upon this division that the greatest Unior 
losses fell. But they continually gained ground until 
the battle ceased, and about noon the two days' contest 
ended. During the second day the main struggle hao 
therefore occurred' between opposing forces of abouu 
five brigades on each side, in a square stand-up figh* 
under no definite plan of battle. The losses during 
both days were, according to the best estimates avail- 
able, as follows : On the Union side, seven hundred anc( 
ninety killed, thirty-five hundred and ninety-foui 
wounded, and six hundred and forty-seven missing,^ 
aggregating five thousand and thirty-one. On thei 
Confederate side, nine hundred and eighty killed, forty-' 
seven hundred and forty-nine wounded, and four hun+ 
dred and five missing, a total of sixty-one hundredcj 
and thirty-four. 

On the night of the 2d of June the Confederate 
army, to the command of which General Robert E. Leet 
had been assigned the previous day, was withdrawn 
to the vicinity of Richmond, and the Union army re- 
occupied the lines of Casey and the ground in front 
of Fair Oaks, where a strong defensive hue was at once 
projected and afterward constructed. 

As in the battle of Williamsburg, so in this of Seven 
Pines and Fair Oaks, the influence of General McClel- 
lan's personal direction was most meagre. He did, it 
is true, order Sumner to be ready to move when shortly 
after one o'clock the firing of Hill's attack was heard, 
and did afterward direct him to cross in support of 



FAIR OAKS. 313 

Heintzelman. He was at that time suffering from sick- 
ness, having been confined to his bed for two days, and 
was not physically lit to exercise the active command. 
During the night of the 31st he had an interview with 
Heintzelman at the railway station on the left bankj 
and after learning what the latter's impressions were 
of the events of the day, told him that he relied upon 
him to hold the position at the third line of defense. 
About noon the next day he came to Sumner's head- 
quarters, and afterward rode to Heintzelman's, receiv- 
ing a splendid ovation from the troops as he passed on 
the way. He had then no intention of ordering an ad- 
vance of the army, but directed his attention to hasten- 
ing the construction of the bridges to reopen the com- 
munication between the two wings of the army. 

But on the night of the 26. of June Longstreet's 
and Hill's divisions were withdrawn, the latter to the 
intrenchments they had occupied before the battle, and 
the former to the vicinity of Richmond, while Huger's 
division was held on the Williamsburg road in advance 
of Hill's, and Whiting's division was kept in close 
contact with Sumner's corps on the Nine-mile road. 
The close proximity of Whiting caused Sumner to ap- 
prehend an attack for two successive mornings, and 
Heintzelman was directed to support him should this 
happen. It thus appears that, so far as the Union forces 
were concerned, there was no immediate intention to do 
more than recover the ground from which they had 
been driven, and McClellan certainly did not intend to 
attempt the passage at New Bridge, while Sumner was 
apprehensive of being himself attacked at the same 
time. On the part of the Confederates, both Hill and 
Longstreet had lost their aggressiveness on the second 
day, doubtless because of the terrible losses experienced 
by those brigades that had been engaged, but it no- 
where appears that these divisions were not ready for 
a stubborn fight, should such be the orders, for their 
organization and discipline were unimpaired. 

The assignment of General Robert E. Lee to the 
command of the Confederate army was perhaps the 



314 



GENERAL McCLELLAN. 



most fortunate event that could have happened to the i 
Confederate cause, for, in addition to possessing the t 
entire confidence of Mr. Davis, he was a thorough and ji 
accompHshed soldier, 'and he had the great advantage * 
l^of a personal knowledge of the characteristics of his I 
antagonist. He immediately began the construction > 
of the intrenched lines about Richmond, which after--' 
ward made the city a strongly intrenched camp, and I 
enabled him to operate with the bulk of his army upon f 
McClellan's right iiank at the precise instant that such! 
a movement offered the greatest advantages. During! 
this waiting period he was enabled by his great influ-J 
ence and prestige to gather together as great an army\l 
as was possible for the Confederacy by drawing troops;? 
from far and near, and by the enforcement of the con-^j 
scription act by the most rigorous measures. j 

With regard to McClellan's conduct of affairs sub-| 
sequent to the battle of Fair Oaks, a fair summary may\ 
be drawn from his dispatches, letters, and orders thatf 
have been published in the Official War Records.;' 
From these it appears that it was Heintzelman's severed 
strictures upon the behavior of Casey's division, based^ 
upon imperfect knowledge of the events of the day and: 
the uncertainty as to what the next day would brings 
forth, together with the knowledge of the destructionr 
of Sumner's bridges, that aroused the gravest fears inr 
the mind of McClellan. At twenty minutes past nine^ 
o'clock that night he ordered the engineers to pushi* 
to the utmost all the works and approaches on thee 
bridges, so as to be ready to cross artillery and infantry^^ 
in the morning, and directed cooked rations and am-' 
munition to be issued to Franklin's and Porter's corps' 
in anticipation of the necessity of forcing the passage-' 
at New Bridge and at such others in the vicinity as' 
were practicable. The debouches of these bridges, it 
must be remembered, were in possession of the enemy,' 
and a movement of Sumner's corps toward Old Taverm 
would have been necessary to make this crossing a 
possibly successful one. But the raging torrent and' 
the darkness of the night prevented much being accom-ii 



FAIR OAKS. 



315 



iished before dawn, and it was not till a quarter past 
ght o'clock before New Bridge was built, and late 
[ the afternoon that the trestle and pontoon bridges 
ere practicable for infantry. The rising flood, how- 
v^er, made breaches in the causeway of New Bridge 
lat lessened its availability for artillery crossing, 
lore cheering news now began to be received from 
le battlefield, and it soon became evident that the ad- 
ance of the enemy had been certainly checked and 
lat he had sufifered very serious losses. But even yet 
was not certain that he would not again attack, and 
then seemed advantageous to re-establish the former 
nes, strengthen them, and hold them until more per- 
lanent bridges, both of whose debouches would be 
ithin the lines of the army, could be constructed unit- 
ig the two wings of the army. That this policy was 
ue in a measure to the apprehension of Sumner that 
le enemy was on the point of attacking him on the 
lorning of June 2d is exceedingly probable, and a 
aiting attitude was assumed until the permanent 
ridges were finished and promised re-enforcements 
rrived. As the whole matter of the Chickahominy 
ridges has been much misunderstood, it may be well 
3 present the facts of the case according to the records. 
Bottom's Bridge had served for the passage of 
Reyes's and Heintzelman's corps and was their means 
f communication wiUi the right bank ; the railroad 
ridge, a short distance above, afforded the means of 
apply to the two corps on the right bank shortly after 
ley had there established themselves ; Sumner's two 
ridges, ordered by McClellan and constructed by the 
roops of the Second Corps, had never been consid- 
red a part of the system of bridge connection under 
tie control of the engineers, whose scheme had to do 
/holly with New Bridge and the two trestle bridges 
ituated near the latter, and until their debouches on 
he enemy's side of the river were carried by an ad- 
ance of the left wing of the army the engineers could 
lo no more than complete the necessary arrangements 
or throwing the bridges at the proper time, an opera- 



GENERAL McCLELLAN. 

tion that would then have required but a few hours o 
labor. But in the unexpected and unforeseen state o 
affairs caused by the, extraordinary freshet of the 31s 
of May it was beyond the power of men to do mor 
than was done by the engineers that night. After th 
battle of Fair Oaks no immediate movement of an 
aggressive character was contemplated until the comi 
munications across the Chickahominy were greatly imi 
proved, and it was only from this moment that the intenr 
tion of constructing any bridges other than those o 
New Bridge and its adjacent trestle bridges was seri 
ously entertained. But now that the project of carryinn 
the debouch of New Bridge on the enemy's side waj 
temporarily abandoned, it was determined to construci 
five other bridges, both of whose debouches would bt 
within the lines of the army. These were the " foot : 
bridge, about three quarters of a mile below Nev 
Bridge, available for infantry only ; Duane's, next i:i; 
order, practicable for all arms ; then Woodbury's inf 
fantry bridge, Woodbury and Alexander's and thh 
Grapevine Bridges, the last two being practicable foe 
all arms and all being near the army headquarters' 
These were all completed by the 19th of June, ani 
afforded as ample means of uniting the two wings cc 
the army as the topography of the swamps and low 
lands of the river would permit. About four mile( 
below Grapevine Bridge the Railroad and BottomV 
Bridges gave the most direct means of supply from thr 
depot at White House Landing for that portion of thlj 
army on the right bank of the Chickahominy. 



CHAPTER XII. 

ee's plans. — Stuart's raid. — battle of beaver 

dam creek. gaines's mill. retreat to the 

james. white oak bridge. glendale. 

After the battle of Fair Oaks McClellan deter- 
lined to transfer the bulk of his army to the south 
ide, but for several days the weather was most un- 
ropitious. Frequent rains kept the Chickahominy full 
3 its banks, made the roadways impassable for artillery, 
nd greatly delayed the necessary preparations. He 
requently assured the War Department that he would 
ttack the enemy as soon as his bridges were ready 
nd the conditions of the ground and weather were 
avorable. He repeated his requests for re-enforce- 
aents, and even suggested that part of Halleck's army 
hould be sent to liim from the West. In response to 
hese urgent requests, McCall's division of McDowell's 
:orps, about ninety-five hundred strong, was sent by 
vater and reached him on the 12th and 13th of June, 
nd he was informed by a message on the nth that 
t was the intention of the War Department to send 
he residue of McDowell's command overland as 
peedily as possible. But McClellan the next day 
ent a remonstrance as to the proposed route of Mc- 
Dowell's movement, giving strong reasons against it, 
;aying : " I beg leave to suggest that the destruction 
)f the railroad bridges by flood and fire can not prob- 
bly be remedied under four weeks ; that an attempt to 
n^mploy wagon transportation must involve great delay 
md may be found very difficult of accomplishment. 
^.n extension of my right wing to meet him may in- 
volve serious hazard to my flank and my line of com- 

317 



GENERAL McCLELLAN. 



munications, and may not suffice to rescue from an) 
peril in which a strong movement of the enemy ma) 
involve him. . . . The junction of his force vi^ith th( 
extension of my riglll: flank can not be made withouir 
a derangement of my plans, and if my recent experi-! 
ence of moving troops be indicative of the difficulties 
incident to McDowell's march, the exigencies of m) 
present position will not admit of the delay." * 

This certainly furnishes sufficient evidence that Mc- 
Clellan had no intention to modify, without further ex< 
plicit orders, whatever plans he may have devised for th(i. 
employment of his army t.o make them conform to tho 
proposed overland march of McDowell's forces, anot 
it is reasonable to suppose that he reached this con-i 
elusion at the time that Porter's expedition destroyed 
the bridges over the South Anna, about the last of May} 
The evident purpose in his mind was to gain a posii 
tion on the south bank of the Chickahominy suffi-i 
ciently near to Richmond to be able to lay siege to itit 
and he clearly perceived that in doing this his base od 
supplies at the White House would be put in jeopardyy 
unless, in the meanwhile, he should receive re-enforce-e 
ments sufficient to cover that exposed and weak flankk 
But where, except from McDowell, could he hope to re-e 
ceive these re-enforcements in time to be of any service' 
for immediate operations? In view of his repeateei 
promises that, as soon as the weather was favorabhl 
and his bridges ready, he would move, it is difficult to 
understand the attitude that he afterward assumed irii 
attempting to throw the blame of his failure upon thn 
Administration, and to assert that the separation of thd 
two wings of his army by the Chickahominy was du( 
to his orders to await McDowell's coming. I 

In conformity with his general purpose to conducq 
his advance from the south side of the Chickahominy 
Franklin's corps was transferred to that side on th( 
17th and placed on the right of the intrenched line ir 



* Report of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War 
1863, part i, p. 335. 



McCLELLAN'S PLANS. 



319 



he vicinity of Golding's farm, and Porter, strength- 
ned by McCall's division, was charged with the 
lontrol of the operations of the right wing on the 
lorth bank. McClellan's headquarters were estab- 
ished at Trent's House on the south bank on the 
2th, and under his direct supervision the defensive 
ine covering the four corps of his army on that 
')ank approached completion. But the enemy in 
lis immediate front were also busy strengthening 
heir defensive line to cover the approaches into Rich- 
nond, which they screened from all attempts to re- 
onnoiter by a strong picket line that was ever active 
^nd sometimes aggressive. All that McClellan at this 
ime deemed possible was to attempt a slight advance 
pn the Williamsburg road to secure advantageous 
ground on his left, so that Franklin might the more 
urely make an attack upon Old Tavern about the 
j6th with some prospect of success. Gaining this posi- 
ion, McClellan would then be near enough to Rich- 
nond to begin its siege, and at the same time secure 
he debouch of New Bridge and thus bring Porter's 
:orps closer to the rest of the army. But in the interim 
le was not buoyed up with the certainty of success ; 
he tone of his dispatch of the 20th of June to the 
resident reveals rather apprehension of disaster, for 
le says : *' There is not the slightest reason to suppose 
hat the enemy intends evacuating Richmond ; he is 
iaily increasing his defenses. I find him everywhere 
n force, and every reconnoissance costs many valuable 
ives. Yet I am obliged to feel my way foot by foot 
fit whatever cost, so great are the difhculties of the 
ountry. By to-morrow night the defensive works 
::overing our position on this side the Chickahominy 
hould be completed. I am forced to this by my in- 
feriority of numbers, so that I may bring the greatest 
possible numbers into action, and secure the army 
against the consequences of unforeseen disaster." * 



* McClellan's Own Story, p. 390 ; and Official War Records, 
irol. xi, part i, p. 48. 



GENERAL McCLELLAN. 



And then follows this most remarkable request, whichi 
subsequently brought out the astounding letter whichi 
he handed to the President at Harrison's Landing om 
the 7th of July follo\<4ng : " I would be glad to have, 
permission to lay before your Excellency, by letter or 
telegraph, my views as to the present state of military 
affairs throughout the whole country. In the mean-i 
time I would be pleased to learn the disposition as toi 
numbers and position of the troops not under my com- 
mand in Virginia and elsewhere." 

One can not analyze the private and official corre-. 
spondence of McClellan, nor study the disposition) 
of the various portions of his army during the fort-l 
night that preceded the opening of the Seven Days,^ 
fight, without being impressed with the conviction 
that his generalship was not up to the standard thati 
the situation demanded. In arriving at a just esti-i 
mate of the soundness of his views in the disposi-i 
tion of his army we are obliged to reason from thfn: 
same premises which guided him in reaching his con-i; 
elusions, and one of the most erroneous of these was: 
his overestimate of the enemy's strength. Acceptingi. 
that of the chief of his secret service, which placed Lee'i" 
army after Jackson had joined at two hundred thoui' 
sand, and knowing that his own returns for the 20tl:l 
of June gave him but one hundred and fifteen thousanoc 
one hundred and two present for duty, or but abouiii 
ninety-five thousand for battle formation, he was com 
fronted with so great a disparity that he felt able onl;l 
to act on the defensive, and that with the greatest cau.i 
tion. But in reality the Confederate effective w^as no 
greatly different from that of McClellan's, a few thouij 
sand more or less either way not being sufficient ii ! 
general to affect the result of possible tactical com ' 
binations in such a field of battle. This constitutiona 
defect of McClellan's judgment in overestimating th 
strength of the enemy was ever in evidence, in Wes 
Virginia, on the Potomac, at Yorktown, and now o 
the Chickahominy ; it seriously detracted from hi 
efficiency as a commander, compelling him to adop 



LEE'S PLANS. 32 1 

cautious and inactive course when he should have 
>een bold and aggressive. His requests for additional 
le-enforcements were therefore unceasing, to the end, 
irst, that his strength should be made equal to that 
vhich he conceived the enemy to possess, and next, 
hould be made so superior as to insure so decisive 
I victory in the great battle that he expected to fight 
IS to bring the war speedily to an end. It was con- 
titutionally impossible for him to reason correctly 
ipon this subject, probably because the exuberance of 
lis vivid imagination gave no ground for the exercise 
)f his analytical powers. 

From this fundamental error all the progeny of 
Drocrastinating movements and false positions arose. 
McClellan's repeated promises to attack upon the ar- 
rival of McCall's division failed of fulfillment, just as 
similar promises with regard to Franklin's division at 
^orktown had failed. A waiting policy seems to stand 
3Ut distinctly as the result of the study and thought he 
^ave to his problem. To hold on to the left bank of 
he Chickahominy, and to advance foot by foot on the 
right bank until he could gain a position so near to 
Richmond that the siege guns and mortars could reach 
it, seemed the best he could do. And while so doing 
he intended to hold the bulk of his army in close rela- 
tions to their strong defensive line so as to give it the 
preponderating advantage in case of attack. There is 
no doubt that he recognized the weakness of his ex- 
posed right flank and the unfortunate position of his 
line of supply from the White House, but he expected 
;by persistent importunity to get sufficient re-enforce- 
ments to make these reasonably secure. 

On the other hand, his antagonist, General Lee, 
iperceived that it was especially incumbent upon him 
to cause McClellan to loosen his grip upon Richmond 
at the earliest possible moment, for not only was the 
existing status seriously detrimental to the Confed- 
erate cause at home and abroad, but there was a strong 
probability that McClellan might be so greatly re-en- 
forced in the near future that the task would be beyond 
21 



GENERAL McCLELLAN. 



the power of the Confederate government to perform 
Within a week after his assignment to the commanc. 
of the Confederate army Lee had formulated a simpldl 
yet bold plan of operations. It was, '' to construct de- 
fensive lines in front of Richmond, so as to enable j 
part of the army to defend the city and leave the othex 
part free to cross the Chickahominy and operate or 
the left bank. By sweeping down the river on thaa 
side and threatening his communications with York 
River it was thought that the enemy would be com-i 
pelled to retreat or give battle out of his intrench^): 
ments." This plan having received the approval oc 
Mr. Davis, every means within the power of the Conn 
federate Executive was employed to strengthen thn 
Confederate army at Richmond, not the least of which 
was the rigid enforcement of the wide-embracing Con-n 
scription Act, approved April i6th, and which subo 
jected every white man resident in the Confederate 
States, between the ages of eighteen and forty-five 
years, to conscription for the military service. 

The co-operation of Jackson was essential to thd 
success of this plan ; but at this time he was retreating; 
up the Shenandoah Valley after his successful cami 
paign against Banks, pursued by Fremont and Shields.' 
who were endeavoring to elYect a jimction befor<r 
bringing him to battle. His superior military ability) 
however, enabled him to defeat this purpose June Stt 
and 9th, and the battles of Cross Keys and Port Ret 
public were so favorable to him and unfortunate tC' 
his opponents as to relieve him from all apprehension 
of farther pursuit. By this time Lee had informed hin; 
of his general plan, and again on the nth, after hearing; 
of Jackson's victories, sent him word that he was to b< 
re-enforced with six regiments under General Lawtoi i 
from Georgia and eight veteran regiments from Richt! 
mond under Whiting, to enable him to crush the enem; ; 
in his front, so that he could then speedily return witl 
all his strength to aid in the general plan agains 
McClellan, which was outlined to him. His instnic 
tions were : " Leave your enfeebled troops to watch th( 



STUART'S RAID. 323 

ountry and guard the passes covered by your cavalry 
nd artillery, and with your main body, including 
Swell's division and Lawton's and Whiting's com- 
nands, move rapidly to Ashland by rail or otherwise, as 

ou may find most advantageous, and sweep down be- 
ween the Chickahominy and Pamunkey, cutting up the 
nemy's communications, etc., while this army attacks 
General McClellan in front. He will thus, 1 think, be 
orced to come out of his intrcnchments, where he is 
trongly posted on the Chickahominy, and apparently 
)reparing to move by gradual approaches on Rich- 
nond. Keep me advised of your movements, and, if 
jracticable, precede your troops, that we may confer 
md arrange for simultaneous attack." 

McClellan heard on the i8th of the dispatch of 
ihese re-enforcements to Jackson, and, in communicat- 
ng the information to the President, expressed the 
opinion that, if it were true, it illustrated the strength 
md confidence of the enemy in front of him ; but the 
President, with better discernment, suggested that it 
?vas probably meant to deceive, but at all events, if it 
vere true, it would be equivalent to a re-enforcement 
lO McClellan of an equal number. 

To gain intelligence with regard to the dispositions 
sf-the troops and the character of the defenses of the 
iJnion right flank for his guidance in formulating his 
orders for the contemplated movement, Lee directed 

eneral Stuart to make a secret movement to the right 
md rear of the Union position. With a force of about 
:welve hundred cavalry and two pieces of horse artil- 
lery, all fresh and in excellent condition, this expedition 
tarted at dawn on the 13th of June from the vicmity 
3f Ashland, where they had secretly bivouacked the 
night before, and headed for Hanover Court House, 
distant two hours' ride. By celerity of movement and 
vigor in attack the small outlying detachments of 
Union scouts, pickets, and supports were quickly dis- 
persed until the position at Old Church was reached. 
Here, at about four o'clock in the afternoon, the main 
support of two squadrons of the Fifth United States 



GENERAL McCLELLAN. 



\ 



cavalry, under the command of Captain Royall, was t 
attacked and defeated and their camp burned. By this [ 
time Stuart had learned that the Totopotomy was not ijj 
strengthened by artificial defenses, and that the Union ''] 
right flank was in the air, the specially important in- [ 
formation that General Lee desired to obtain, and the^,t 
main purpose of the expedition was thus attained. To/ij 
return in the direction of Hanover Court House Stuart Ij' 
recognized would be particularly hazardous, in view\: 
of the fact that the Union forces would certainly gather r , 
in sufficient force to oppose him. He therefore boldly vi 
adopted an unexpected course, and pushed on toward i| 
Tunstall's Station on the York River Railroad, withi 
the intention of crossing the Chickahominy at Forge c 
Bridge and thus complete his circuit in rear of thee 
Union army. The very audacity of the plan caused it l; 
to be successful. On his way he destroyed somee; 
barges at Garlick's Landing, captured some prisoners si 
and stores at Tunstall's, and made good his escapee] 
across an improvised bridge before the forces organ--' 
ized for his pursuit had struck his trail. This success- - 
ful raid demonstrated the vulnerability of McClellan'ss. 
line of communications with White House, and prob--l 
ably directed his attention to the possibility of its early/ 
abandonment for a base on the James, and satisfied 1 
General Lee that his plan of attacking the Union right ; 
flank possessed all the elements of success. 

Accordingly, on the i6th of June, the next day after r 
the return of Stuart, General Lee, having come to a a 
decision that the time was ripe for his contemplated 1 
movement, wrote to Jackson: " I have received yourr 
letter by the Hon. Mr. Boteler. I hope you will be 
able to recruit and refresh your troops sufficiently for; 
the movement proposed in my letter of the nth. You i 
have only acknowledged my letter of the 8th ; I am 
therefore ignorant whether that of the nth has reached 
you. From your account of the position of the enemy ^ 
I think it would be difficult for you to engage him in i 
time to unite with this army in the battle for Richmond. I 
Fremont and Shields are apparently retrograding, their i 



LEE'S PLANS. 325 

roops shaken and disorganized, and some time will 
)e required to set them again in the field. If this is 
';o, the sooner you unite with this army the better. 
■McClellan is being strengthened ; Burnside is with 
lim, and some of McDowell's troops are also reported 
:J:o have joined him. There is much sickness in his 
wanks, but his re-enforcements by far exceed his losses. 
BThe present, therefore, seems to be favorable for a 
■unction of your army and this. If you agree with 
me, the sooner you can make arrangements to do so 
[he better. In moving your troops you could let it be 
Linderstood that it was to pursue the enemy in your 
iront. Dispose those to hold the Valley so as to de- 
ceive the enemy, keeping your cavalry well in their 
front, and at the proper time suddenly descending upon 
he Pamunkey. To be efficacious, the movement must 
be secret. Let me know the force you can bring, and 
be careful to guard from friends and foes your pur- 
pose and intention of personally leaving the Valley. 
The country is full of spies, and our plans are immedi- 
ately carried to the enemy. Please inform me what 
arrangements you can make for subsisting your troops. 
Beef cattle could at least be driven, and, if necessary, 
we can subsist on meat alone. 

" Unless McClellan can be driven out of his in- 
trenchments he will move by positions under cover of 
his heavy guns within shelling distance of Richmond. 
I know of no surer way of thwarting him than that 
proposed. I should like to have the advantage of your 
views and be able to confer with you. Will meet you 
at some point on your approach to the Chickahominy. 
I inclose a copy of my letter of the nth, lest the origi- 
nal should not have reached you." 

The sequence of events that brought Lee's army 
into position may now be briefly outlined. Jackson's 
forced march from Port Republic toward Richmond 
began on the 17th, and the head of his column reached 
Meachum's River Station at midday on the 19th, and, 
following the general direction of the railroad, arrived 
at Gordonsville about noon on the 21st. Here he in- 



326 



GENERAL McCLELLAN. 



vestigatcd a rumor that a heavy Union force was ad- 
vancing from the Rapidan some sixteen miles distant, 
and finding it false, Ordered his troops forward and 
himself hastened to Richmond for the conference de- 
sired by General Lee. By the night of the 25th he had 
assembled his whole command around Ashland Sta- 
tion, on the Richmond and Fredericksburg Railroad, 
a movement characterized by such celerity and secrecy 
that no hint of it had reached the authorities at Wash- 
ington, and at that time only an unsupported rumor 
had been carried to McClellan by the capture of a. 
Confederate spy the day before. 

At the conference held by General Lee on the 23d, I 
at which were present Longstreet, A. P. Hill, D. H. 
Llill, and Jackson, the details of the contemplated I 
movement were decided upon, and, in accordance 
with these, Lee issued, on the 24th, his orders as 
follows : 

Headquarters Army of Northern Virginia, y^une 24, 1862. 

General Orders No. 75. 

I. General Jackson's command will proceed to-morrow 
from Ashland toward the Slash Church and encamp at some 
convenient point west of the Central Railroad. Branch's i 
brigade, of A. P. Hill's division, will also to-morrow even- 
ing take position on the Chickahominy near Half-Sink. At: 
three o'clock, Thursday morning, 26th instant, General Jack- 
son will advance on the road leading to Pole Green Church, 
communicating his march to General Branch, who will im- 
mediately cross the Chickahominy and take the road leading; 
to Mechanicsville. As soon as the movements of these col- 
umns are discovered. General A. P. Hill, with the rest of his 
division, will cross the Chickahominy near Meadow Bridge 
and move upon Mechanicsville. To aid his advance, the 
heavy batteries on the Chickahominy will at the proper time 
open upon the batteries at Mechanicsville. The enemy being 1 
driven from Mechanicsville and the passage across the bridge 
opened, General Longstreet, with his division and that of 
General D. H. Hill, will cross the Chickahominy at or neari| 
that point. General D. H. Hill moving to the support ofi 
General Jackson, and General Longstreet supporting General' 
A. P. Hill. The four divisions, keeping in communication 
with each other and moving in echelon on separate roads, if 
practicable, the left division in advance, with skirmishers and 
sharpshooters extending their front, will sweep down the; 



LEE'S PLANS. 337 

Chickahominy and endeavor to drive the enemy from his 
position above New Bridge, General Jackson bearing well 
to his left, turning Beaver Dam Creek, and taking the direc- 
tion toward Cold Harbor. They will then press forward 
toward the York River Railroad, closing upon the enemy's 
rear and forcing him down the Chickahominy. Any advance 
of the enemy toward Richmond will be prevented by vigor- 
ously following his rear and crippling and arresting his 
progress. 

IL The divisions under Generals Huger and Magruder 
will hold their positions in front of the enemy against attack, 
and make such demonstrations Thursday as to discover his 
operations. Should opportunity ofifer, the feint will be con- 
verted into a real attack, and should an abandonment of his 
intrenchments by the enemy be discovered, he will be closely 
pursued. 

in. The Third Virginia Cavalry will observe the Charles 
City road. The Fifth Virginia, the First North Carolina, 
and the Hampton Legion (cavalry) will observe the Darby- 
town, Varina, and Osborne roads. Should a movement of 
the enemy down the Chickahominy be discovered, they will 
close upon his fiank and endeavor to arrest his march. 

IV. General Stuart, with the First, Fourth, and Ninth 
Virginia Cavalry, the cavalry of Cobb's Legion and the Jeff 
Davis Legion, will cross the Chickahominy to-morrow and 
take position to the left of General Jackson's line of march. 
The main body will be held in reserve, with scouts well ex- 
tended to the front and left. General Stuart will keep Gen- 
eral Jackson informed of the movements of the enemy on 
his left, and will co-operate with him in his advance. . The 
Tenth Virginia Cavalry, Colonel Davis, will remain on the 
Nine-mile road. 

V. General Ransom's brigade, of General Holmes's com- 
mand, will be placed in reserve on the Williamsburg road by 
General Huger, to whom he will report for orders. 

VI. Commanders of divisions will cause their commands 
to be provided with three days' cooked rations. The neces- 
sary ambulances and ordnance trains will be ready to accom- 
pany the divisions and receive orders from their respective 
commanders. Of^cers in charge of all trains will invariably 
remain with them. Batteries and wagons will keep on the 
right of the road. The chief engineer. Major Stevens, will 
assign engineer officers to each division, whose duty it will 
be to make provision for overcoming all difficulties to the 
progress of the troops. The staff departments will give the 
necessary instructions to facilitate the movements herein 
directed.* 



* Official War Records, vol. xi, part ii, p. 498. 



k 



328 



GENERAL McCLELLAN. 



General Lee's distinctness of purpose and knowl- 
edge of the situation as outlined in the above order 
were clear and precise. He knew with considerable 
accuracy the strength and disposition of McClellan's 
army and that its vulnerable point was its right flank^ 
and made his dispositions accordingly. He also knewi 
that Jackson's operations had eliminated for the time 
being the forces of Fremont, Shields, and Banks, then 
more than a hundred miles to the northwest, and that 
McDowell, more than forty miles to the north, could 
not be brought within the theater of operations in time; 
to be of the least avail in the w^ay of assistance to Mc- 
Clellan. On the other hand. General McClellan be- 
lieved, up to the 24th of June, that Jackson was in thd 
upper Shenandoah Valley, and could scarcely leavet 
there to join Lee without being followed by the Union 
forces in his front and due intelligence sent him by^ 
telegraph of the fact. His overestimate of the Confed- 
erate strength in his immediate front was so erroneous^ 
that he was committed by prudential considerations to; 
a strictly defensive policy behind his intrenched lines, 
and with the single exception of designing an attacks 
to capture a position at Old Tavern, a few hundred! 
yards in front of Golding's farm on the Chickahominy,! 
he did so confine himself. Under these circumstances^ 
it is not difficult to determine which of these two com-- 
manders was at that time the greater master of thai 
art of war. 

On the 24th of June, Colonel Farnsworth, in com-- 
mand of the Union outposts on the upper Chicka- 
hominy, captured an unusually shrewd and intelligent] 
Confederate spy named Charles Rian, who, under close | 
examination, revealed the fact that Jackson's advance] 
had reached Frederick's Hall Station on its way toj 
Richmond to re-enforce Lee, with the expectation oftf 
attacking McClellan's right flank about the 28th. This 
information was sufficiently plausible and alarming as ^ 
to cause McClellan to telegraph the circumstance to '; 
the War Department and to ask for information as to ^ 
Jackson's whereabouts, but the answer disclosed the 



LEE'S PLANS. 



329 



fact that the War Department was as ignorant upon 
this point as McClellan himself. At 6.15 p. m. the next 
day IMcCleUan rephes : " I have just returned from the 
field, and found your dispatch in regard to Jackson. 
Several contrabands just in give information confirm- 
ing supposition that Jackson's advance is at or near 
Hanover Court House, and that Beauregard arrived 
with strong re-enforcements in Richmond yesterday. 

" I incline to think that Jackson will attack my right 
and rear. The rebel force is stated at tw^o hundred 
thousand, including Jackson and Beauregard. I shall 
have to contend against vastly superior odds if these 
reports be true. But this army will do all in the power 
of men to hold their position and repulse any attack. 
I regret my great inferiority of numbers, but feel that 
I am in no way responsible for it, as I have not failed 
to represent repeatedly the necessity of re-enforce- 
ments, that this was the decisive point, and that all the 
available means of the Government should be concen- 
trated here. I will do all that a general can do, with 
the splendid army I have the honor to command, and 
if it is destroyed by overwhelming numbers, can at 
least die with it and share its fate. 

" But if the result of the action, which will probably 
occur to-morrow or within a short time, is a disaster, 
the responsibility can not be thrown on my shoulders ; 
it must rest where it belongs. Since I commenced this, 
I have received additional intelligence confirming the 
supposition in regard to Jackson's movements and 
Beauregard's arrival. I shall probably be attacked to- 
morrow, and now go to the other side of the Chicka- 
hominy to arrange for the defense on that side. I feel 
that there is no use in my again asking for re-enforce- 
ments." 

It is difficult to understand the mental attitude that 
caused McClellan to indite so desponding a message. 
It can only be accounted for under the supposition 
that his strongly imaginative cast of mind unduly in- 
fluenced the logical conclusions of his reason. Doubts 
continually assailed him and weakened his intellectual 



k 



330 



GENERAL McCLELLAN. 



vigor. Many evidences of this irresolution are founc 
in his correspondence. Thus, on the 15th, he hope< 
to attack Old Tavern on the 17th or i8th, push th- 
enemy behind his works into Richmond, bring up hii 
heavy guns, shell the city, and carry it by assault! 
Again, on the 21st he hoped to do it within a couple oi 
days, but the next day he thinks he ought to be prudent 
and the day after he has a presentiment that something 
he knows not what, is going to happen. Finally, h 
decides on the 24th to take a decisive step, which, : 
successful, will place him a couple of miles nearer t' 
Richmond. 

This last decision brought on the affair known a 
Oak Grove, where the participants were two brigade 
of Hooker's and one of Couch's divisions of Heintzet 
man's corps, resisted by two brigades of Huger's am 
one of Holmes's divisions. McClellan's object was tt 
gain possession of a piece of timber crossing the Wi' 
liamsburg road between the intrenched lines of th 
two armies for the better posting of Heintzelm.an's am 
Sumner's corps in the contemplated attack of Frank 
lin on Old Tavern. The affair was a spirited on( 
being gallantly maintained by the Union troops am 
obstinately resisted by the Confederates. But aftet 
Hooker had been engaged for some three hours h 
was directed to withdraw from the advanced positio 
which he had gained due to some misapprehension ci 
the state of affairs at general headquarters, but Mc 
Clellan arriving opportunely upon the field, h 
promptly rectified the mistaken order and directe 
Hooker again to advance, and the desired position ws 
occupied. At five o'clock in the afternoon McClella 
was satisfied that substantial advantage had bee 
gained for the object in view, and hopefully looked fc 
the morrow to push Franklin forward upon Old Ta^ 
ern. But upon his return to headquarters he foun 
awaiting him the direful news of the presence of Jacl< 
son in the vicinity of Hanover Court House, and th 
sudden change from confidence in himself to a stat 
almost of demoralization is depicted in the messag 




BATTLB _ 

BEAVER DAM CREEK^ 

June 26^M862, 

Scale 



i 




Union 

Confederate 



BATTLE OF BEAVER DAM CREEK. 



331 



already quoted. Hastening to Porter's headquarters in 
this frame of mind, he could only anticipate disaster 
tinder the mistaken view that he then entertained of 
the greatly preponderating strength of the enemy as 
compared with his own. He directed that an outlying 
flanking force, consisting of two regiments of cavalry, 
two of infantry, and a battery of artillery, drawn from 
Porter's command, be formed under the command of 
General Stoneman, to operate from Old Church to 
retard Jackson's advance. This force moved out early 
on the 26th, and so efficiently did it perform the duty 
assigned to it, by obstructing roads, destroying bridges 
over the Totopotomoy, and by its active resistance, as 
to prevent Jackson from taking part in the engage- 
ment at Beaver Dam Creek, as contemplated in Gen- 
eral Lee's plan. Other than this McClellan took no 
decided step looking to aggressive measures. About 
noon on the 26th he notified the Secretary of War that 
his cavalry pickets were being driven in on the right, 
probably by Jackson's advance guard. Then he says : 
If this be true, you may not hear from me for some 
days, as my communications will probably be cut of¥. 
The case is perhaps a difficult one, but I shall resort 
to desperate measures, and will do my best to out- 
maneuver, outwit, and outfight the enemy." At 2.30 
p. M. the same day he knows definitely that Jackson is 
actually driving in his pickets, and acknowledges that 
his telegraphic communication can not be maintained 
much longer. Up to this time, therefore, with the 
exception noted, he remains in a waiting attitude, his 
troops being disposed as follows : 

On the extreme right flank, separated from the re- 
mainder of the army, was Fitz-John Porter's corps, 
comprising three divisions, aggregating about twenty- 
five thousand men. On the right bank of the Chicka- 
hominy the other four corps, aggregating about sev- 
enty thousand men, were behind the intrenched line 
stretching from Golding's to the head waters of White 
Oak Swamp — a line about three and a half miles 
long; Franklin, Sumner, Heintzelman, and Keyes in 



33: 



GENERAL McCLELLAN. 



the order named from right to left. A portion c 
Keyes's corps was, however, farther to the rear guarc 
ing the White Oak -Swamp Bridge and the crossin 
at Bottom's Bridge ; Casey was m command of th 
troops protecting the depot at White House Lane 
ing; and Stoneman, as before stated, commande 
the flanking outlying force guarding the countr 
between the Pamunkey and Hanover Court Hous* 
Porter's corps, upon whom the brunt of the figh 
ing was to fall, was thus disposed : Seymour's an 
Reynolds's brigades of McCall's division occupie 
a strong defensive line on the left bank of Beavc 
Dam Creek, which had been made yet strong^ 
by infantry and artillery intrenchments, Meade's bn 
gade being in reserve, and a regiment of infantry wit 
a battery occupied Mechanicsville as an advanced fore: 
Cavalry and infantry pickets also watched the bridg< 
at Mechanicsville, the Meadow Bridges, and beyon 
to the near vicinity of Atlee's Station on the Virgin) 
Central Railroad. The other two divisions of Porten 
corps, Morell's and Sykes's, were in the vicinity <[ 
Gaines's Farm, in support of McCall, watching Nee 
Bridge, and connecting him with the bridges over tH 
Chickahominy. 

The dispositions of the Confederate forces to carr 
out the aggressive movement contemplated by Genen 
Lee's order were, with the exception of Jackson's con 
mand, all promptly executed. Longstreet and D. I 
Hill withdrew their divisions from their places in fro: 
of Richmond at 2 and 3 a. m. on the 26th, and marcht 
to their bivouacs on the Richmond side of the ^I 
chanicsville Bridge ready to cross at the appoint( 
time. A. P. Hill, with five of his brigades, was sirr! 
larly placed at the Meadow Bridges, and his remaii 
ing brigade, under Branch, was at Winston's Brid< 
awaiting information from Jackson that he was cros 
ing the Virginia Central Railroad before he put h 
troops in motion. But Jackson, who was expected 
move from Slash Church at 3 a. m., did not reach As" 
land until the night of the 25th, and accordingly he w. 



BATTLE OF LEAVER DAM CREEK. 



333 



six hours late in crossing the railroad. Branch did not 
therefore get under way until about ten o'clock, while 
A. P. Hill, impatiently waiting for news of the ap- 
proach of Branch and Jackson, and fearing that a 
longer delay on his own part might jeopardize the suc- 
cess of General Lee's plan, took the initiative without 
further orders, and began the crossing at the Meadow 
Bridges at three o'clock in the afternoon. But General 
Lee, apprehensive lest the long delay consequent upon 
Jackson's tardiness might prevent him from carrying 
out his plan at so late an hour, sent a message to A. 
P. Hill to suspend his movement, which, however, did 
not reach Hill in time, and this resulted in the battle 
of Mechanicsville, or, as it is called by the Union 
forces, Beaver Dam Creek. Of the remaining Con- 
federate forces, Magruder's and Huger's divisions oc- 
cupied the intrenchments skirting the Chickahominy 
and the line from Old Tavern to beyond the Charles 
City road, in aggregate about twenty-five thousand 
men, Huger having been strengthened by Ransom's 
and Walker's brigades of Holmes's division from Pe- 
tersburg and Drewry's BlufY ; leaving Daniell's brigade 
at Drewry's and Wise's brigade at Chaf^n's Bluf¥, be- 
sides other detached commands at Petersburg to watch 
the extreme right flank of the Confederate position 
while the turning movement was in process of exe- 
cution. 

Porter's understanding of the duty expected of him 
by General McClellan was derived from a dispatch 
sent to him on the 23d by the chief of staff, in which, 
after stating that the disposition of his forces was ap- 
proved by the commanding general, he says : " If you 
are attacked, be careful to state as promptly as possible 
the number, composition, and position of the enemy. 
The troops on this side will be held ready either to 
support you directly or to attack the enemy in their 
front. If the force attacking you is large, the general 
would prefer the latter course, counting upon your 
skill and the admirable troops under your command 
to hold their own against superior numbers long 



GENERAL McCLELLAN. 



enough for him to make the decisive movement whic 
will determine the fate of Richmond." But on th 
26th, when the greatly superior forces of the enem 
were moving to attack Porter at Beaver Dam Creeh 
McClellan had made no provision to carry out this ir: 
tention by forming his columns of assault on the sout 
bank of the Chickahominy. And had Jackson beet 
in time for his turning movement, it is certain tha 
Porter's corps would have been disastrously defeatec 
if not entirely captured or destroyed. 

As it was, however, A. P. Hill, without waiting fo:j 
though expecting, Jackson, advanced with impetuositj 
to attack the admirable defensive position where Re}; 
nolds's and Seymour's brigades of McCall's divisio 
were in battle formation behind their intrenched line^' 
The stream in their front was only waist deep, but it 
banks were bordered by swamps and protected b 
slashings, while the ground in front was well swep 
by the artillery and infantry fire of the Union troop; 
As the only practicable crossings for artillery were th 
two bridges on the Bethesda Church and Ellerson 
Mill roads, Hill's effort was mainly directed agains 
those points. Anderson's brigade, diverted to the le 
before reaching Mechanicsville, was directed towari 
the right of the Union position ; Field, in advancr 
pushed toward the right center, while Archer ke| 
straight on the Bethesda road to carry the crossing 
and Pender was directed toward the bridge at Ellei 
son's Mill. Unaware of the difBcult and dangeroir 
task confided to them, the Confederate troops (k 
ployed with conspicuous bravery and moved forwar 
to the assault, first against the Union right and aftei 
ward against the left. Both attempts were disastrousl 
repulsed by the gallant men of Reynolds's and Se} 
mour's brigades. Finally re-enforced by Ripley's br 
gade of D. H. Hill's division, which had just crosse 
at Mechanicsville, another attempt was made to carr 
the position, which likewise failed. In this affaii 
which ended about 9 p. m., the Confederates loJ 
nearly two thousand men, while the casualties of th 



BATTLE OF BEAVER DAM CREEK. 



335 



Union troops amounted to only three hundred and 
sixty-one. 

While Porter's advanced division, under McCall, 
I was thus stubbornly holding Beaver Dam Creek 
against A. P. Hill's unsupported attack and in immi- 
(nent danger of having its right turned by Jackson's 
(advance, aided by Longstreet's and D. H. Hill's divi- 
i sions, which were then crossing at Mechanicsville, Mc- 
jClellan was at his own headquarters on the south side 
[of the Chickahominy, endeavoring to come to some 
i decision as to his course of action. That he had in 
[view the abandonment of his base at White House 
[Landing is evidenced from the fact that on the i8th he 
[directed his chief commissary, Colonel H. F. Clarke, 
tto have eight hundred thousand rations forw^arded 
j from Yorktown to the vicinity of City Point on the 
r James River; and on the 23d, 25th, and 26th of June 
;|his chief quartermaster. General Van Vliet, was simi- 
:larly directed to take precautionary measures for 
i the transportation of food and forage supplies from 
I the depots at White House to the James, and to aban- 
^don the base at that point should it become necessary 
5 by the rapid development of events. By noon of the 
j26th he must have become convinced that he must 
[either receive battle on the left bank of the Chicka- 
l hominy, or, abandoning this bank by withdrawing 
[Porter and cutting loose from his base, concentrate 
I his whole army on the right bank and seek a new base 
on the James. Still undecided in the afternoon, and 
[hoping to hold on to the left bank, he directed his 
I chief engineer, General Barnard, to reconnoiter a posi- 
[tion covering his bridges, and some time after four 
1 o'clock in the afternoon hastened to confer with Gen- 
\ eral Porter. In view of the grave importance of the 
j battle of Gaines's Mill upon the fortunes of the Army 
I of the Potomac, and of the insight it gives of McClel- 
I lan's characteristics at this critical time, Barnard's ac- 
j count of his mission deserves insertion. He says : " It 
;. had been known some davs previous to this that Jack- 
son's command had reached Frederick's Hall Station 



GENERAL McCLELLAN. 



on its way from the Shenandoah, and there was pre- 
sumptive evidence that an attack on our right wing was 
meditated by the concentrated forces of the enemy 
and that, too, on the '27th. It was understood by mi 
to be the intention of the commanding general to con- 
centrate our own forces either on one side or other 
of the Chickahominy ; and so far as I could infer, fron 
a conversation in which no positive decision was an- 
nounced on his part, the plan to which preference was 
given was, after the enemy's plans should be suffi-i 
ciently developed, to withdraw from the left bank o 
the Chickahominy, concentrate on the right bank, anc> 
attack Richmond while the enemy was massed on the 
other side. Indeed, the work thrown up on the nighii 
of the 26th (that in front of Golding's farm) was unden 
stood to be a preparation for an attack to be made on 
the morning of the 27th. 

'' On the afternoon of the 26th I was told by the 
commanding general that, in case of withdrawing from 
the other side (left bank), he would still be glad tC( 
maintain his hold on that side in order to be able tc< 
recross, should events make it necessary or desirablet 
I said to him that I thought with any small force ili 
was impracticable to hold the debouches of all oun 
bridges, or even those from Duane's down to Sum-i 
ner's upper bridge, but that possibly the heads of the 
two important bridges, Alexander and Woodbury'j' 
and Sumner's upper bridges (which were within a few 
hundred yards of each other) might be held. He de-; 
sired me to go that afternoon and reconnoiter the 
ground for a position for that purpose. This was prob- 
ably about 4 p. M. 

" I left the headquarters camp (then in rear of Dr 
Trent's) as soon as I could get my horses, and pro- 
ceeded on this reconnoissance. I had passed the 
Chickahominy when I was overtaken by an aide-de^ 
camp (Lieutenant Custer), who informed me that tho 
commanding general desired to modify his instruct 
tions ; that he wished me to reconnoiter a position ex-^ 
tending from near to Dr. Gaines's to Barker's Mil 



BATTLE OF BEAVER DAM CREEK. 337 

Pond. He (Lieutenant Custer) asked for my map, and 
i sketched with a pencil a line extending between those 
i limits. How or by what force it was intended to oc- 
I cupy that position I was not informed. 

" I took the road by McGee's house to New Cold 
Harbor and to Dr. Gaines's ; thence back on to the 
spur on the right of Dr. Gaines's ; thence through the 
woods to New Cold Harbor again ; thence to Old Cold 
Harbor; thence by the road to Dispatch Station to 
near where I started ; thence by the same road to near 
Barker's sawmill. 

" It was late when I commenced, and I had been 
obliged to ride fast. When I reached Barker's Mill 
it was getting dark and I proceeded from thence back 
to camp. I thought that a position moderately favor- 
able for a large force to fight a battle, in equal or not 
greatly inferior numbers, might be taken along this 
line, but not one which gave any very decided advan- 
tages. According to the force in which it was occupied, 
, its left would rest on the first spur to the right (east) of 
Dr. Gaines's house, embracing the woods ; or, con- 
tracting the front, rest on the spur where Watt's house 
is, partially embracing the woods in front, and running 
in front of McGee's house. The right would extend 
past McGee's house, along the Dispatch Station road 
through the woods, to the eminence near where a 
house is marked on the map ; or, perhaps still better, 
I keep along the edge of the woods toward the Chicka- 
hominy. 

** When I returned to headquarters camp after dark 
I found that the commanding general had left for Gen- 
eral Porter's camp, having been summoned either by 
General Porter himself, or by the sound of the attack 
made late that afternoon. At 10 p. m. I received a 
telegram directing me to repair at once to General 
Porter's headquarters. I reached there about mid- 
night, and found the commanding general and Gen- 
eral Porter together in bivouac (all camp equipage, 
wagons, etc., having been sent to the other side). 
After explaining on the map to the commanding gen- 
22 



GENERAL McCLELLAN. 

eral what I had done in the afternoon, he rose to leave, 
intimating that he desired me to remain with General 
Porter. 

'' On his leaving, General Porter seemed to be in 
doubt whether he should withdraw his troops from 
their actual positions. Finding that he had no positive 
instructions, I told him that I supposed it indispensable 
to fall back, at least to the position covering the 
bridges, in order to put himself in communication with 
the rest of the army; and he issued his orders to this 
effect about i a. m. (27th), and at dawn or early day- 
light the troops were in motion near us, falling back. 

" At this time the doubts seemed to have revived in 
General Porter's mind as to the expediency of the 
movement, he alleging the probability of McCall's 
division being cut to pieces in the operation, I could 
only repeat my conviction that it was indispensable 
in order to put himself in connection with the rest of 
the army, and it was continued ; and we proceeded to^ 
gether to the ground I visited the evening before. O 
the way, or before starting, he asked me how many 
troops I thought he ought to be re-enforced with. ] 
replied substantially that I could not answer the ques- 
tion ; that, according to any understanding I had oil 
the matter, I supposed that the whole army was ta 
fight on one side or the other; that I had all along 
supposed that he was to retire to the other side. ! 

" After reaching the ground he put his left on iho 
spur of Watt's house, and, riding farther along thti 
position, he concluded he could not extend his righl^ 
beyond the clearing and spur where McGee's house 
is. After this I returned to headquarters, presuming 
that in reference to the arrangements of the day the 
commanding general might have further instructions 
for me. I reached headquarters about 9 or 10 a. m. 
and, being informed that the commanding general was 
reposing, I went to my tent and remained there unti; 
afternoon. 

" I have gone somewhat minutely into the historj 
of my connection with that battlefield, because upor 



n 



BATTLE OF BEAVER DAM CREEK. 330 

this battle, fought by General Porter with twenty-seven 
thousand men, hinged the fate of the campaign." * 

From this narration it is evident that the nnportant 
position selected to cover the bridges by Porter's corps 
was hurriedly chosen. For more than a month the site 
had been m undisturbed possession of the Union forces, 
and for half of that period had been within touch of 
general headquarters. Certainly from the 24th the 
probability of its occupation should have been patent 
to the commanding general, and it was especially his 
duty to see that its natural defensive features should 
have been improved to the utmost by every means 
known to field fortification. " Beheving," says Porter, 
my force too small to defend successfuhy this long 
line, I asked of General Barnard, who had selected 
and pointed out this position, to represent to the major 
general commanding the necessity of re-enforcement, 
and he was to send me felling axes for defensive pur- 
poses." But it was not till afterward that he learned 
that this message was not delivered, and a second call 
for axes brought them so late that they could not be 
helved in time to be made useful. " The barricades 
prepared by borrowing the axes of the artillery," he 
says, " insured desperate and prolonged resistance, and 
had the call for axes first asked for and the troops been 
delivered and filled, the fate of the day and the result 
of the campaign upon the prolonged contest between 
' the two sections of our country may have been most 
materially changed." Whether the fact that the com- 
manding general was reposing at the time of Barnard's 
f arrival at headquarters prevented the reception and 
\ action upon Porter's message it is impossible to say, 
i but at all events the failure to convey so vital a message 
' is a sad commentary upon the competency of the head- 
i quarters staf¥ in the transaction of urgent public busi- 
ness that involved the safety of the army. 

Upon McClellan's return to his headquarters on 
the south side of the Chickahominy he found no 

* Official War Records, vol. xi, part i, p. 116. 



240 ^^^ GENERAL McCLELLAN. 

change in the situation to warrant holding Porter ati 
Beaver Dam, and therefore sent him the order to with 
draw to the selected ^position at Gaines's Mill ; this 
order reached Porter after midnight, which necessitated 
the execution of this delicate operation in the face of 
a greatly superior force in the broad light of day. For 
tunately the severe punishment inflicted by McCall's 
division upon A. P. Hill's the afternoon before caused 
the Confederates to be less enterprising than would 
otherwise have been the case. Thanks to the admi 
rable manner in which Seymour's brigade covered the 
retreat and the strong opposition offered by the rear 
guards along the roads and at the bridge crossings 
Porter was enabled to dispose his corps for a defen- 
sive battle in the new position before noon with am 
inconsiderable loss of men and supplies, and to savei 
also the heavy siege guns that had been posted in the: 
vicinity of Hogan's and Gaines's farms. 

The accompanying map indicates the characteristic 
features of the ground upon which the battle of Gaines's 
Mill, was fought. The valley of the creek that drained 
into Boatswain Swamp formed a natural ditch that 
covered its west and north front, while its eastern flankl 
was somewhat protected by thick woods and the creekt 
that flowed into Barker's Mill Pond. Its weakest 
point was very near the center of its front, due to the 
intrusion of a well-wooded valley by which the road 
from New^ Cold Harbor ascended to the plateau. Had 
time allowed attention to its defensive features, those 
which Nature had provided could have been, with little 
labor, immensely strengthened, and the timber which 
enabled the Confederates to form their lines for attacl< 
unseen could have been felled, and there is every reasor 
to believe that the result of the battle would have 
proved disastrous to the Confederate attack. 

Porter, believing that the enemy outnumbered hirr 
three to one, was forced to fight a purely defensive 
battle, and from the configuration of the ground hij 
line presented a convex front toward the enemy, ane 
although its extent was much too great for the num-' 



GAINES'S MILL. 34I 

ber of his troops, he had reason to hope that his chief 
would not fail to send him re-enforcements as speedily 
as possible. According to the estimate of General A, 
S. Webb, Porter's strength amounted to seventeen 
thousand three hundred and thirty infantry, twenty-five 
hundred and thirty-four artillery, and six hundred and 
seventy-one cavalry for duty on that field, but from the 
character of the ground but little of the artillery and 
cavalry could be used to advantage. Morell's division, 
comprising Butterfield's, Martindale's, and Griffin's bri- 
gades, held the left ; Sykes's division, comprising War- 
ren's, Lovell's, and Buchanan's brigades, the right ; 
and McCall's division of Reynolds's, Seymour's, and 
Meade's brigades was first placed in reserve, since it 
had fought the preceding day at Beaver Dam, but after- 
ward its component parts were sent in to sustain differ- 
ent portions of the line as the exigencies of the battle 
demanded. The task of defending the position was 
intrusted to General Fitz-John Porter, an officer of 
distinguished merit, who possessed in the highest de- 
gree the confidence of his chief, and who clearly per- 
ceived the great importance of his task. He says : '' I, 
however, determined to hold my position at least long 
enough to make the army secure. Though in a des- 
perate situation, I was not without strong hope of some 
timely assistance from the main body of the army, witb 
which I might repulse the attack and so cripple our 
opponents as to make the capture of Richmond by the 
main body of the army, under McClellan, the result 
of any sacrifice or suffering of my troops or of myself. 
I felt that the life or death of the army depended upon 
our conduct in the contest of that day, and that on the 
issue of that contest depended an early peace or a pro- 
longed, devastating war — for the Union cause could 
never be yielded. Our brave and intelligent men of all 
grades and ranks fully realized this, and thousands of 
them freely offered up their lives that day to maintain 
the sacred cause which they had voluntarily taken up 
arms to defend to the last extremity." 

General Lee, in execution of his plan to attack the 



342 



GENERAL McCLELLAN. 



fragmentary portion of McClellan's army on the north 
bank of the Chickahominy and cut the Hne of com- 
munication with the supply depots at White House 
on the Pamunkey, sent forward four strong divisions 
against Porter ; these were Longstreet's, A. P. Hill's, 
Jackson's, and D. H. Hill's, and in aggregate num- 
bered very nearly sixty thousand men, leaving twenty- 
five thousand men in front of McClellan on the south 
side of the Chickahominy to make such vigorous dem- 
onstrations as would suffice to retain that portion of 
the Army of the Potomac within its own lines while 
he overwhelmed the single corps of Porter on the 
north bank. Longstreet and A. P. Hill, after crossing 
Beaver Dam Creek, followed the roads leading to 
Gaines's House and Mill respectively ; while Jackson 
and D. H. Hill, moving from the Mechanicsville road 
upon Old Cold Harbor, had the longer route to travel 
to reach their designated position. 

In this tactical disposition General Lee hoped that 
the appearance of Jackson and D. H. Hill at Cold 
Harbor would cause Porter to extend his defensive 
line to the right to cover the York River Railway, the 
main Union line of communication with the Pa- 
munkey, and thus sufficiently weaken the Union line 
in front of Longstreet and A. P. Hill, who would them 
be sent forward to the attack. He placed the whole 
left wing of the Confederate army under the direct t 
command of Jackson, and imparted his expectations 
to the latter in order that Jackson might be governed 
accordingly. Through some mistake of his guides 
Jackson's division was delayed in its advance to the 
field of battle, and D. H. Hill's division reached Cold 
Harbor in advance of Jackson, and shortly after noon 
some of his regiments were skirmishing with the Union 
right. In the meantime A. P. Hill had carried the 
bridge crossing at Gaines's Mill and deployed his six 
brigades in front of New Cold Harbor preparatory to 
making an assault upon MorelFs division, the Union 
left, whose strong position on the left bank of Boat- 
swain Creek had been developed by the severe skirmish' 



GAINES'S MILL. 343 

fire that lasted from noon till near half past two o'clock. 
After satisfying himself that Longstreet was in posi- 
tion on his right, A. P. Hill ordered his division for- 
ward in echelon of brigades. "Desperate and un- 
availing attempts," says he, " were made to force the 
enemy's position. Gregg and Branch fought with 
varying success, Gregg having before him the vaunted 
Zouaves and Sykes's regulars. Pender's brigade was 
suffering heavily but stubbornly held its own. Field 
and Archer met a withering storm of bullets but 
pressed on to within a short distance of the enemy's 
works, but the storm was too fierce for such a handful 
of men. They recoiled and were again pressed to the 
charge, but with no better success. These brave men 
had done all that any soldiers could do. Directing 
their men to lie down, the fight was continued and 
help awaited. From having been the attacking I now 
became the attacked, but stubbornly, gallantly was the 
ground held. My division was thus engaged full two 
hours before assistance was received. We failed to 
carry the enemy's lines, but we paved the way for the 
successful attacks afterward, and in which attacks it 
was necessary to employ the whole of our army that 
side the Chickahominy." 

While A. P. Hill's attack was in progress Jackson 
had so disposed D. H. Hill's division and his own 
corps as to be able to gather the fruits of the expected 
Confederate victory, but it soon became evident from 
the sounds of battle that A. P. Hill was not making 
satisfactory progress, and Jackson was forced to deploy 
his command for attack. With D. H. Hill's division 
of five brigades upon the extreme Confederate left and 
Ewell's four brigades next in line, a strong assaulting 
line was formed in front of Sykes's position, which 
struggled for nearly two hours to gain a foothold 
within the Union lines, but without success. The four 
brigades of Jackson's own division were sent in to re- 
enforce the Confederate line, according to the exigen- 
cies of the time, as they came upon the field of battle ; 
Lawton to strengthen Ewell, Jones to aid Wilcox of 



344 



GENERAL McCLELLAN. 



Longstreet's division, Fulkerson to the support o£i 
Whiting's division, and Winder, the last to arrive on 
the field, going into the fight under the direction of 
A. P. Hill. In the meantime General Lee had directed! 
Longstreet to make a feint upon the extreme right in 
aid of A. P. Hill, but Longstreet soon perceived that itt 
would be necessary to convert the feint into a strong at-- 
tack to be of any avail in the present critical situation. 
x\ccordingly he sent in the four brigades of Pickett, 
Wilcox, Pryor, and P^eatherston, with part of that of R. 
H. Anderson's, holding the remainder of the latter audi 
Kemper's brigade in reserve. By the time these com- 
binations were perfected it was nearly dusk, and itt 
was of the utmost importance to Lee that victory, 
should be gained before the night should fall. To the: 
final effort, therefore, the Confederate line moved for- 
ward with such impetus that it was not within the; 
power of the Union line to resist, weakened as the! 
troops were by their losses and exhaustion of their r 
long and heroic struggle. Their line was first pierced I 
by Whiting's division, which, assaulting in two lines- 
with conspicuous bravery and daring, suffered a loss oft 
over a thousand men wdiile they were crossing the: 
deadly zone of their approach in front of the Unioni 
center. 

Porter's dispositions for his defensive battle were: 
skillfully made, and his troops fought with great gal-^ 
lantry and persistency. He had every reason to expectt 
that McClellan would send him ample re-enforcements,, 
and early in the morning had been cheered by the ap- 
pearance of a portion of Slocum's division crossings 
Duane's Bridge as if coming to his support. But these 
troops were recalled to their camps in the morning and^ 
were not ordered to Porter's support until after twoi 
o'clock in the afternoon, just about the time that A. 
P. Hill was forming for his attack, and they did nott 
reach him until about four o'clock, when they werei 
in time to complete the repulse of Hill. Porter was^ 
thus forced to put in his reserve of McCall's division atl 
an early period of the battle, and when A. P. Hill moved:^ 



GAINES'S MILL. 



345 



orward to the attack Meade was pushed forward to 
■upport Martindalc and Griffin on the left center, Sey- 
noiir to the right and rear of Sykes, and then to the 
eft of the division to strengthen Warren, while Rey- 
lolds, who had been sent to the right to cover the 
oad at Barker's Mill, was hastened to the right of 
jriffin. Thus every component part of Porter's corps 
vas fully employed and every regiment fighting in its 
lesignated position until its ammunition was exhausted, 
md then, if temporarily relieved, returning again and 
igain to the firing line. When Slocum's division 
irrived upon the battlefield the exigencies of the 
truggle were such that its several brigades had to be 
lurried to the distressed points of the line, and it could 
not be employed under the eye of its capable com- 
nander. Thus Newton's brigade, being in advance, 
kvas sent to the right of Griffin to drive back the enemy 
:hat had temporarily gained a foothold ; Bartlett's was 
sent most opportunely to aid Sykes at McGee's 
tiouse, and Taylor's was distributed by regiments in 
[he vacant spaces of Morell's division as necessity de- 
nanded. From this time till darkness had fallen, save 
:or a short interval after A. P. Hill's defeat, the fighting 
vvas continuous and severe. Muskets became heated 
and fouled to such a degree that when the crisis of the 
battle drew near rapid firing became impossible, and it 
is not surprising that at the last advance of the whole 
Confederate line the weakened and exhausted Union 
line should have been carried. But though defeated, 
Porter's troops were not demoralized nor panic- 
stricken. They fell back nearer to the bridges, still 
opposing a brave front to the enemy. Just at this 
time the two fine brigades of French and Meagher of 
Sumner's corps appeared upon the plateau, and the 
cheers announcing their arrival, together with the fast 
approaching darkness, caused the Confederates to sus- 
pend their advance and bring the battle to an end. To 
the magnificent service of the Union artillery much 
of the sturdy defense was undoubtedly due, and al- 
though twenty-two pieces were lost, no discredit is 



346 ^^ GENERAL McCLELLAN. 






attached to that gaUant arm of the service on that day. 
When the reserve batteries on the left were endeavor- 
ing to check the rapid advance of Law's and Hood's 
brigades south of Watt's house, and no infantry sup- 
ports were there to aid them, a desperate charge o£, 
two squadrons of the Fifth Regular Cavalry was or- 
dered by General Cooke to cover their withdrawal,! 
and although scarcely two fifths of these gallant troop- 
ers returned from their fateful mission, the delay was 
sufficient to save some of the guns from capture. 

The loss in killed and wounded upon both sides: 
conspicuously exhibits the fighting qualities of the 
yVmerican soldier ; the total Union loss being sixty- 
eight hundred and thirty-seven, of which eight hundreo 
and ninety-four were killed, thirty-one hundred and 
seven wounded, and twenty-eight hundred and thirty- 
six missing, the latter being due mainly to the capture 
of two entire regiments — the Fourth New Jersey anc 
the Eleventh Pennsylvania — who, on the firing linei 
enveloped in the smoke of battle and growing dark- 
ness, w^ere unaware of their hazardous position unti 
they found themselves surrounded by the enemy anc 
were obliged to surrender. The Confederate loss has 
never been specifically stated, but it is supposed, witt 
reason, to exceed in killed and wounded the total lost: 
of the Union troops ; for, excluding Longstreet's anc 
A. P. Hill's divisions, the loss was thirty-two hundrec 
and eighty-four, and since A. P. Hill's division war 
severely punished in his two hours' contest in thd 
early part of the afternoon, and Longstreet's divisioi 
was engaged from half past four o'clock until dusk, thi 
conclusion does not appear unwarranted. 

While the battle of Gaines's Mill was in progress 
Magruder, south of the Chickahominy, was so activel; 
aggressive as completely to deceive McClellan and hi 
corps commanders on that side, as to the strength o 
the force he had under his command. It will be re 
membered that McClellan imagined that Lee ha< 
nearly twice the force which he actually had, and h 
was confirmed in this impression by the chief of hii 



GAINES'S MILL. 047 

ecret service, Major Allan, who on the 26th of June 
reported that Lee would have one hundred and eighty 
thousand men, and probably more, after Jackson 
joined. The same authority also reported that there 
were fifty-two earthworks around Richmond, on thirty- 
six of which two hundred and five guns were mounted. 
Reliance upon this egregiously erroneous estimate 
undoubtedly caused McClellan to justify to himself a 
most disproportionate division of his strength on the 
two sides of the Chickahominy, so that while Porter, 
at first, with nine brigades, comprising but thirty-seven 
regiments of infantry, afterward re-enforced with the 
twelve regiments of Slocum's three brigades, was fight- 
ing twenty-seven Confederate brigades, comprising 
one hundred and fifteen regiments, Magruder, with 
but forty-three regiments in his eleven brigades, was 
holding at least nineteen Union brigades, with over 
ninety regiments within their strong defensive lines, in 
such a state of apprehension that the corps command- 
eers did not deem it safe to detach any of their troops 
■to re-enforce Porter, even when late in the afternoon 
his position was reported critical. Language is scarce- 
ly strong enough to condemn in appropriate terms the 
inef^cient administration of the service of information 
whereby so gross a miscalculation should have been 
evolved, and especially since the two armies, with the 
exception of Jackson's corps, had been within close 
contact for more than a month. Conceding, however, 
that McClellan was bound to make his dispositions 
conform to his information, such as it was, it is scarcely 
possible, even with this concession, to justify the neces- 
sity, obligation, or propriety of fighting the battle of 
Gaines's Mill. His strongest friends and warmest ad- 
mirers — Porter, Franklin, and Smith — sustained it in 
the expectation that McClellan would attack Magruder 
with the bulk of his forces on the south side, while 
Porter was holding the position to which he had been 
assigned to the last extremity. And if in his own 
mind he had decided that there was no alternative but 
a retreat to the James, it was incumbent upon him to 



348 



GENERAL McCLELLAN. 



withdraw Porter from Beaver Dam Creek in the dark- 
ness after his successful action of that day. His trains 
could have commenced their movements on the night 
of the 26th, and his dispositions for defending the cross- 
ings of the Chickahominy at the lower bridges were 
just as feasible in the one case as in the other. The 
uncertain element in the whole problem that makes . 
any forecast of probabilities difficult is whether McClel- 
lan possessed sufficient tactical ability to handle an 
army of one hundred thousand men in the battles that ■ 
Lee would force upon him during the retreat. 1 

The completely distorted view of the condition of^ 
affairs and the state of McClellan's mind with respect: 
to the authorities at Washington after the battle ofi 
Gaines's Mill is exhibited in the letter he sent to Mr.. 
Stanton, and which he wrote at midnight after he had I 
learned the particulars of his defeat. He says : 

" I now know the full history of the day. On this ; 
side of the river (the right bank) we repulsed several 1 
strong attacks. On the left bank our men did all that : 
men could do, all that soldiers could accomplish, but: 
they were overwhelmed by vastly superior numbers,, 
even after I brought my last reserves into action. The ; 
loss on both sides is terrible. I believe it will prove to • 
be the most desperate battle of the war. The sad rem- ■ 
nants of my men behave as men. Those battalions ^ 
who fought most bravely and suffered most are still 1 
in the best order. My regulars were superb, and I 
count upon what are left to turn another battle in com- 
pany with their gallant comrades of the volunteers. 
Had I twenty thousand, or even ten thousand, fresh 
troops to use to-morrow, I could take Richmond ; but 
I have not a man in reserve, and shall be glad to cover 
my retreat and save the material and personnel of the 
army. 

" If we have lost the day we have yet preserved ouri 
honor, and no one need blush for the Army of the 
Potomac. I have lost this battle because my force was ' 
too small. 

" I again repeat that I am not responsible for this,. 



GAINES'S MILL. 349 

and I say it with the earnestness of a general who feels 
in his heart the loss of every brave man who has been 
needlessly sacrificed to-day. I still hope to retrieve our 
fortunes ; but to do this the Government must view 
the matter in the same earnest light that I do. You 
must send me very large re-enforcements, and send 
them at once. I shall draw back to this side of the 
Chickahominy, and think I can withdraw all our ma- 
terial. Please understand that in this battle we have 
lost nothing but men, and those the best we have. 

*' In addition to what I have already said, I only 
wish to say to the President that I think he is wrong 
in regarding me as ungenerous when I said that my 
force was too weak. I merely intimated a truth which 
to-day has been too plainly proved. If, at this in- 
stant, I could dispose of ten thousand fresh men, I 
could gain a victory to-morrow. I know that a few 
thousand more men would have changed this battle 
from a defeat to a victory. As it is, the Government 
must not and can not hold me responsible for the 
result. 

" I feel too earnestly to-night. I have seen too 
many dead and wounded comrades to feel otherwise 
than that the Government has not sustained this army. 
If you do not do so now the game is lost. If I save 
this army now, I tell you plainly that I owe no thanks 
to you or to any other persons in Washington. You 
have done your best to sacrifice this army." * 

Just before inditing this intemperate letter he had 
called together the corps commanders and informed 
them of his plan of retreat and contemplated orders 
to carry it out. For a brief moment he had enter- 
tained the thought of concentrating his strength 
against Magruder in the endeavor to gain a compensat- 
ing advantage, but the suggestion was rather an im- 
pulse arising from emotional influences than a judg- 
ment based upon rational considerations. The retreat 
having been decided upon, Keyes was directed to move 

* Official War Records, vol. xi, part i, p. 61. 



350 



GENERAL McCLELLAN. 



his corps across White Oak Swamp to cover the move- 
^ment, and by dark, his corps, with the exception of 
Naglee's brigade left behind to guard the railroad and 
Bottom's Bridges, was in position covering the junc- 
tion of the Long Bridge road with those leading from } 
Richmond, the most vulnerable point of the line of I 
retreat. The vast accumulation of supplies, munitions, 
camp equipage, baggage, etc., necessary for so great t 
an army could not possibly be transported during the ' 
retreat. Neither was it possible to save the seriously 
wounded and sick that were under the care of the sur- 
geons in the hospitals, and of these it was necessary 
to abandon about twenty-five hundred to the mercy 
of the enemy. Orders were therefore issued to the: 
several commanders to load the wagons with food! 
and ammunition and necessary baggage and to de- 
stroy the remainder. During all of the day and' 
night of the 28th the long trains of reserve and siege 
artillery, the four thousand transportation wagons • 
and ambulances, and the herd of twenty-five hundred I 
beef cattle steadily moved along the single road across- 
White Oak Swamp Bridge seeking the security of the: 
new base upon the James River that was now their 
goal. 

Porter's corps and McCall's division, having foughtl 
at Gaines's Mill, were ordered to follow Keyes, and:' 
both w^ere across the Swamp by morning of the 29th. 
Slocum's division, designated by McClellan as a re- 
serve, was ordered to Savage Station, where it arrived 
early on the 29th, and thence was directed to the cross- 
roads to relieve Keyes. 

While these movements were in progress the de- 
fensive lines were held by Sumner's and Heintzel- 
man's corps, and Smith's division of Franklin's corps 
so securely that Magruder could gain no information! 
as to what was passing within the lines of the Army of 
the Potomac. In attempting to follow up Smith's 
withdrawal from his advanced position in front of 
Golding's on the morning of the 28th, two Georgia 
regiments suiYered severely and Magruder gained not 



RETREAT TO THE JAMES. 35 1 

nformation. In the meanwhile Lee was anxiously 
Awaiting to ascertain what McClellan was doing or in- 
ended doing. The former certainly expected that Mc- 
;riellan would attempt to recover his line of communi- 
:ation with the Pamunkey, and to provide against this 
eventuality he dispatched Early's division to the vicin- 
ty of the railroad and Bottom's Bridge, while Stuart's 
:avalry was sent to White House Landing. Lee kept 
:he remainder of his army on the north bank of the 
Zhickahominy awaiting developments and reliable in- 
'ormation, but it was not until evening of the 28th 
:hat he felt satisfied that McClellan had definitely aban- 
loned his base and was seeking a new one on the banks 
)f the James. 

To press McClellan's rear and strike his flank dur- 
ng the retreat were the obvious things to do, and for 
his purpose he directed Magruder to follow down the 
VVilliamsburg road, Huger to move by the Charles 
^ity road, while Longstreet and A. P. Hill, crossing 
he Chickahominy at New Bridge, should move by 
he Darbytown road in the endeavor to strike McClel- 
an's flank at its junction with the Long Bridge road, 
lackson and D. H. Hill were directed to cross by the 
jrapevine Bridge and unite with Magruder in follow- 
ing up the rear of McClellan's army, while Ewell was 
for the present to remain in the vicinity of Bottom's 
Bridge north of the Potomac, lest McClellan should 
mdeavor to seek that avenue down the Peninsula. The 
Drecious twenty-four hours that McClellan gained by 
Lee's inaction were invaluable, since it enabled him to 
lold on to his intrenched lines till the morning of the 
129th, and by that time his trains and impedimenta were 
ivell on their way to Haxall's Landing on the James. 
[McClellan himself felt that the most pressing part of 
'lis duty pertained to the safety of his trains and the 
Idetermination of a suitable defensive position for his 
^irmy under the protection of the gunboats of the 
'aavy. In acting under this conviction he has been 
Ipcverely criticised by military writers, and not very suc- 
pessfully defended by his ardent admirers. As a matter 



352 



GENERAL McCLELLAN. 



of fact, his headquarters during the whole of the ri 
treat were unduly distant from the several fields o1 
battle, and so much so, indeed, that so far as his per- 
sonal or professional influence was concerned, it may 
be almost completely ignored in all tactical combina- 
tions. Thus he established his headquarters at Savage 
Station early on the 28th, where he remained till early 
the next morning, and then crossed the swamp. 
Speaking of the 29th, he says : " As the essential part; 
of this day's operations w^as the passage of the trains 
across the swamp and their protection against attack 
from the direction of New Market and Richmond, as 
well as the immediate and secure establishment of our' 
communications with the gunboats, I passed the day 
in examining the ground, directing the posting oii, 
troops, and securing the uninterrupted movement oi)' 
the trains." 

While he was engaged on this duty, which should 
properly have been intrusted to his staff officers, Man 
gruder was attacking Sumner at Allen's farm, but with- 
out success, while Smith, on Sumner's right, w^as neaii 
Trent's, and Heintzelman, on his left, was moving dowr 
to his old intrenchments near Savage Station. No 
specific instructions had been issued by McClellan foD 
the unity of these commands under a single head, whict 
should have been done, as he himself was sufficientl) 
far to the rear to be incapacitated for active direction 
Later, Sumner was prevailed upon to withdraw to Sav-, 
age Station for concentration, and there, about fiv( 
o'clock, was again attacked, but although he com- 
manded by virtue of seniority and understood tha 
Heintzelman was in position on his left flank, the latte] 
officer, under the supposition that the place was mucl 
too crowded with troops, moved ofY across the swamf 
by Brackett's Ford unknown to Sumner, who at 
critical period of the battle was forced to recall a por 
tion of Smith's division to prevent his being flankec 
in that part of the field where he supposed Heintzel 
man's corps was in position. In the possibility o 
Jackson's early appearance by the Grapevine Bridge 



GLENDALE. 



353 



5Umner's position was hazardous, but that sturdy 
ighter was not disposed to retire from his position at 
ravage Station. Fortunately for him, Jackson was 
induly delayed in repairing his bridge, and the whole 
)f the Union rear guard crossed the swamp during the 
light and early the next morning, and the bridge was 
hen destroyed. 

The next day, at about noon, Longstreet and A. P. 
jlill were on the New Market road, within striking dis- 
ance of the crossroads, the most important and most 
/ulnerable point of McClellan's line of retreat, while 
Huger, on the Charles City road near Brackett's, was 
xpected to open the attack on the Confederate left. 
Here again a condition of affairs had haphazardly 
arisen, due to the lack of unity of command and the 
jong distance that separated the commanding ofhcer 
Df the army from the battlefield, and which came very 
near resulting in disaster. 

A brief statement of the movements of the several 
divisions in arriving upon the battlefield of Glendale 
will suffice for a comprehension of the situation : First, 
Slocum's division of Franklin's corps, under the direct 
orders of McClellan, crossed the swamp to relieve 
Keyes and reached its designated position at 7 p. m. 
on the 29th, but early the next morning was moved 
out on the Charles City road about a mile from the 
junction. Here the road beyond was blocked, Brack- 
ett's Ford destroyed, and a detachment placed to de- 
fend its crossing. Next, Kearny's division of Heintzel- 
man's corps crossed the swamp during the evening of 
the 29th, Berry's brigade at Fisher's Ford and Bir- 
ney's and Robinson's at Brackett's Ford, the whole 
division encamping at about 10 p. m. in the position 
afterward occupied by Slocum, but the next morning 
was moved to the left to guard the country between 
the Charles City and the New Market roads, a front of 
about two and a half miles. McCall's division, that had 
fought so severely at Beaver Dam on the 26th and at 
Gaines's Mill on the 27th, remained at Trent's until 
8 p. M. on the 28th, when it was ordered to the cross- 



354 



GENERAL McCLELLAN, 



ing of the swamp, taking with it thirteen batteries of 
the reserve artillery. But so congested was the road 
that McCall did not succeed in crossing with his divi- 
sion until afternoon of the next day, when at 5 p. m.. 
he was ordered to the Glendale crossroads to take 
position covering it from the approach of the enemy. 
This was effected by midnight, and by early morn- 
ing his division was posted a short distance in front 
of the crossroads, mainly upon the left of the Long 
Bridge road and in communication with Kearny, who 
was upon his right. The other division of Heintzel- 
man, under Hooker, had followed the main portion 
of Kearny's division and crossed at Brackett's Ford,l 
and was finally moved to McCall's left and somewhat 
to his rear, leaving a gap of several hundred yards be- 
tween the two commands on this flank. Finally Sedg- 
wick's division of Sumner's corps, after crossing the 
swamp about daybreak on the 30th and getting a short 
rest, was marched to the crossroads, being placed to 
the rear of McCall's division, but the division had not 
been here long before Dana's and Gorman's brigades 
were ordered to return to support Franklin at White 
Oak Swamp Bridge, who at eleven o'clock was being; 
attacked by Jackson in an endeavor to force a passage ; 
Richardson's division of Sumner's corps and Smith's 
division of Franklin's and Naglee's brigade of Peck's; 
division of Keyes's corps comprised the force unden 
Franklin's command. On this day the remainder of 
the Army of the Potomac, namely, Keyes's corps, less 
Naglee's brigade and Porter's corps, were in the vicinity\ 
of Malvern Hill, some two miles to the left of the Glen- 
dale battlefield. It must have been evident to General 
McClellan that Lee would attack that day both at the> 
White Oak Swamp Bridge and at the crossroads and 
that the crisis of the retreat had arrived, and yet hei 
had withdrawn himself from the immediate vicinity of 
a battlefield where, had the consequences been averse, 
his army would have been lost. And still more 
astounding is the fact that he had not by explicit 
orders placed the four divisions of the army that had 



GLENDALE. 



355 



been collected at the crossroads under a single com- 
mander with specific instructions for battle. The con- 
sequence of this was that the four division command- 
ers there present were practically unaware of the par- 
ticular situation of their neighboring commands, and 
they actually fought their divisions independently. It 
is true that two corps commanders, Sumner and Heint- 
zelman, were there, but the former had but a brigade 
of his own corps when the battle opened, and Heintzel- 
man's two divisions were separated by McCall's divi- 
sion, so that the unity of the command was broken. 
On the right at the bridge crossing, Franklin, who was 
charged with its defense, was in better circumstances 
in this respect. 

With regard to the disposition of the Confederates, 
Longstreet and A. P. Hill, encouraged by General 
Lee's presence, were ready for attack at three o'clock 
in the afternoon, and were waiting to hear the sound 
of Huger's guns on the Charles City road before going 
into action. Holmes's division was moving down the 
River road, deploying in front of Porter at Malvern 
Hill, while Magruder, marching to Holmes's support 
and then countermarching in obedience to contradic- 
tory orders, was eliminated from all active participation 
:hat afternoon. Jackson with his own corps and D. 
H. Hill's division arrived in front of the destroyed 
Dridge at White Oak Swamp at about noon, and 
Ewell's division was moving on the north side of the 
Chickahominy to follow after Jackson. General Lee 
NSiS thus endeavoring to concentrate the bulk of his 
irmy, nearly seventy thousand men, at the Charles City 
;rossroads, which, had he accomplished it, would 
jiave proved the destruction of the Union army. But 
'ortunately for McClellan, Franklin was successful in 
oreventing Jackson from crossing on the 30th, Huger 
vas held in check by Slocum and Kearny, and Ma- 
gruder was not available. The battle which ensued, 
mown as that of Glendale, Charles City crossroads, 
jMelson's, or Frazier's Farm, was fought on the Con- 
'ederate side by Longstreet's and A. P. Hill's divisions, 



356 



GENERAL McCLELLAN. 



and on the Union side by McCall's division and a por- 
tion of Hooker's and Kearny's and Sedgwick's divi- 
sions. 

McCall's division, which had suffered severely in 
the battles of Beaver Dam Creek and Gaines's Mill, 
and was further weakened by the exhaustion arising 
from loss of rest, did not number more than six thou- 
sand men, and it was upon this small body that Long- 
street hurled the twelve brigades of his command, who 
were inspired by the presence of General Lee himself. 
McCall, expecting the attack, had placed Meade's bri- 
gade on his right, Seymour's on his left, and Rey- 
nolds's in reserve, the latter then commanded by Colo- 
nel Simmons ; in front of his line he had six batteries, 
Thompson's and Randol's on the right of the road, 
Amsden's and Cooper's on the left of the road, and 
farther to the left two four-gun batteries of 20-pounderi 
Parrotts, commanded by Diederichs and Knieriem of 
Morell's division. The ground in his front was open,; 
offering a beautiful battle ground, with the exception 
that it was too extensive for the strength of his com- 
mand. 

Longstreet, hearing the sound of Slocum's and 
Huger's guns on the Charles City road and interpret- 
ing this as the indication of Huger's readiness to attack,; 
hastened some of his artillery to the front and opened 
fire in response. Then at about 3 P. m. he sent forward 
Jenkins's brigade, and followed rapidly with the re- 
mainder of his division in repeated assaults upon Mc-' 
Call's line. After a vigorous resistance of two hours 
part of Seymour's left gave way and was forced back 
in disorder upon the right of Hooker, whose right 
brigade, however, held the line. Knieriem and Die- 
derich's batteries were abandoned without much resist- 
ance on the part of the cannoneers, and Cooper's waj 
captured after a heroic struggle to hold its position 
On the right two Alabama regiments of Wilcox's bri- 
gade, in wedge formation and with their muskets at i 
trail, heroically breasting the close fire of canister fron 
Randol's guns, carried the battery and drove off its 



GLENDALE. ^r^ 

supports. This magnificent behavior of McCall's divi- 
sion could not, however, finally withstand the over- 
whelming preponderance of Longstreet's and Hill's su- 
perior force, and Sedgwick, with Hooker's right, were 
brought into action, while on the right of the Union 
fine Kearny's left became hotly engaged near the close 
of day. The gallant resistance offered by McCall's 
division from 3 p. m. till dark thus prevented the 
Confederates from gaining their object of breaking 
the line of retreat of the Union army. The battle 
ended along about nine o'clock, while during its 
progress the slow-moving trains were making their 
way in safety to their resting place on the banks of the 
James. 

The sturdy defense of that portion of the Union 
army at Glendale and the successful resistance that 
Franklin had opposed to Jackson's crossing at White 
Oak Sw^amp insured the safety of the reserve artillery 
and supply trains, the rear of which reached Malvern 
Hill at four o'clock in the afternoon of the 30th. It 
was about this time that Holmes's division appeared 
in front of Warren's small brigade on the River road 
near Turkey Creek Bridge and opened fire with its 
artillery. But the concentrated fire of about thirty 
pieces of artillery from the western crest of Malvern 
Hill, together with the demoralizing fire of the gun- 
boats and the infantry of Warren's command, soon 
drove back Holmes's division, so that Lee gained noth- 
ing from this flanking force. When night fell no 
orders had been received by the several Union corps 
commanders, for McClellan was awaiting the return 
of his aids to inform himself of the results of the day's 
operations, of which at this time he was practically 
ignorant. Franklin, assuming that he had complied 
with his instructions to hold the bridge until nightfall, 
and that then he was authorized to withdraw, began 
his movement to the rear at ten o'clock after sending 
word to Sumner and Heintzelman of his purpose. In 
consequence of Franklin's retiring, both Sumner and 
Heintzelman w^ere compelled to follow suit, since their 



58 



GENERAL McCLELLAN. 



position was untenable as soon as Jackson could con- 
trol the passage of the swamp, and thus it was that 
without orders from the commanding general the posi- 
tions held during the day were most fortunately aban- 
doned. 



CHAPTER XIII. 

*IALVERN HILL. HARRISON's LANDING. WITH- 
DRAWAL OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC FROM THE 

PENINSULA. pope's CAMPAIGN. McCLELLAN's 

RESTORATION TO COMMAND. 

General Lee, though grievously disappointed at 
:he failure of his combinations on the 30th, took im- 
jnediate measures to follow McClellan early the next 
norning, the junction of the component portions of 
lis army having been then effected at the crossroads." 
[ackson was directed to pursue by the Willis Church 
-oad ; Huger to pass from his position on the Charles 
City road and move on Jackson's right ; while Ma- 
^ruder, who had come up from the River road during 
;he night to the battlefield of Glendale, was directed to 
move also on Jackson's right by the Quaker road ; 
md Longstreet and A. P. Hill were to form the reserve 
3f the Confederate army. General Lee, who was suf- 
"ering from illness and excessive fatigue, that morning 
mvited Longstreet to make reconnoissance with Ma- 
^ruder and Huger's columns to ascertain the feasibility 
3f making aggressive battle upon the Union position, 
md Longstreet, joining Magruder, found him foUow- 
ng the road running almost due south from the Long 
Bridge road, a few hundred yards east of Enroughty's 
House, which was known locally as the Quaker 
'oad. But Longstreet, believing him too far west from 
[ackson, and that the road was not the Quaker road as 
.mderstood at headquarters, finally succeeded in hav- 
ing Magruder ordered to change his route after the 
atter had proceeded some distance. This caused some 
ielay in getting Magruder into position, and Huger 

359 



360 ^^ GENERAL McCLELLAN. 

was eventually interposed between D. H. Hill and Ma- 
gruder. Longstreet himself soon arrived at a piece o 
elevated ground from which he had a good view o 
Porter's disposition at Malvern Hill, and could alsc 
see Jackson's troops, which were then filing into Poin 
dexter's field. Believing that a hundred guns concen 
trated in front of Jackson, crossing their fire with ; 
forty-gun battery established on the ground near hiii 
point of observation, would soon overwhelm the Unioi 
artillery and justify a frontal attack on Porter's lines 
he so reported to General Lee. The latter adoptee 
Longstreet's suggestion and directed his pioneer corpy 
to cut the roads for the advance of the artillery, anc 
Armistead's brigade, being then in the vicinity of the 
proposed battery of position, Lee issued the follows 
ing order : " Batteries have been established to rak* 
the enemy's line. If it is broken, as is probable, Armii 
stead, who can witness the effect of the fire, has beei 
ordered to charge with a yell. Do the same." 

This proposed concentration of artillery upon thu 
Confederate right and left was not effected, and there 
do not appear to have been explicit orders issued to 
bring it about, for, though the Confederate chief o; 
artillery, General Pendleton, industriously sought foj 
suitable sites for his reserve artillery, he makes nc 
reference to the fact that he was acting under specific 
orders, and Jackson is likewise also silent with regarc 
10 the concentration of artillery. Armistead, however: 
was enterprising in bringing Grimes's, Pegram's, anc 
Moorman's batteries up, but these were soon disabled 
due to the efificient concentrated fire of Porter's bat' 
teries, and similar results obtained against Balthis's 
Poague's, Carpenter's, and other batteries in front o 
Jackson's command in Poindexter's farm. 

According to Longstreet, this failure to concentrat ' 
the Confederate artillery caused General Lee to aban 
don his adopted plan of battle, although he issuec 
no orders specifically recalling it, under the impressioi 
that his officers had realized its failure and the aban 
donment of the plan, and he then sought, accom 



MALVERN HILL. 361 

panied by Longstreet, a route by which the two reserve 
divisions of Longstreet and A. P. Hill might reach 
McClellan's right flank. After a hasty reconnoissance 
a feasible route was thought to have been found, and 
the troops of the reserve were actually on the march 
when the battle was opened by the troops in front. 

Some explanation such as this given by Long- 
street seems to be necessary to account for Lee's ex- 
traordinary order, and the lack of his usual directive 
influence in the conduct of battle which was so mark- 
edly absent in that of Malvern Hill. 

Malvern Hill, the theater of the final battle of the 
Seven Days' contest, was admirably adapted for a de- 
fensive battle, and McClellan, quickly perceiving the 
advantages that it offered, gave directions for posting 
the troops as they arrived upon the ground, and spe- 
cially directed General Humphreys to take charge of 
this duty. Early on the morning of the ist he rode 
the circuit of the position, approved the disposition 
that Porter and Couch had made of their troops, and 
then returned to his headquarters at Haxall's Land- 
ing, but shortly afterward went on board of the gun- 
boat Galena to select, with Commodore Rodgers, the 
final emplacements for the army and its depots. No 
argument has ever been considered strong enough to 
justify this separation of General McClellan from his 
army, then manifestly on the eve of battle. Not only 
the security but the salvation of the army was in jeop- 
ardy, and at this juncture it would seem that these 
must necessarily depend upon the best generalship that 
it was possible for him to exercise on that day. All the 
component parts of Lee's army were certain to be 
united before noon, and it could hardly be doubted 
that they would be sent forward to attack under the 
skillful direction of Lee himself. The continued pres- 
ence of General McClellan with his troops, seeing to 
their best tactical disposition and giving them the in- 
spiration of his undoubted personal magnetism, was 
a duty of the first importance, in comparison with 
which everything else was relatively of no military 



362 GENERAL McCLELLAN. 

value whatever ; for- had his army been defeated at 
Malvern Hill, not even a fragmentary portion would 
have reached Harrison^s Landing; and because it was 
successful, he being, absent, every explanation of this 
absence put forward by his defenders must ever be in 
the nature of an unsatisfactory apology. 

McClellan having, however, decided upon a strictly 
defensive battle, confided its management to General 
Fitz-John Porter, whose troops comprised Griffin's, 
Martindale's, and Butterfield's brigades, Morell's divi- 
sion of his own corps, Palmer's, Abercrombie's, and 
Howe's brigades of Couch's division, Fourth Corps, 
forming the front of the defense; Buchanan's and 
Lovell's regular brigades of Sykes's division covering 
the left flank, and McCall's division, under Seymour, 
placed in front of the Malvern House as a reserve ; be- 
sides these, about a hundred guns of the artillery re- 
serve and the siege artillery, under the efficient direc- 
tion of Colonel Hunt, were massed in suitable emplace- 
ments in rear of the main defensive line to concentrate 
their fire upon such artillery positions as the enemy 
might assume, as well as to break up their infantry 
formations as they emerged from the screen of woods ; 
the divisional light batteries were also judiciously dis- 
tributed along the front and left flank. While awaiting 
the attack, Porter, Couch, and the subordinate com- 
manders took advantage of the inequalities of the 
ground to shelter their troops as much as possible dur- 
ing the preliminary artillery combat that preceded the 
enemy's advance in line. 

Heintzelman's and Sumner's corps, arriving during 
the night, were placed to the right and rear of Couch, 
and Franklin's corps, coming into position on the 
morning of the ist, was placed to the right of Sumner. 
McCall's weakened division, under Seymour, was placed 
in reserve near the Malvern House, and Keyes, with 
Peck's division of his corps, joining Smith's right, con- 
tinued the Union line to the right, covering Haxall on 
the James. From the disposition of the Union forces 
and the configuration of the ground it will be seen that 



MALVERN HILL. 



;63 



le brunt of the Confederate attack would necessarily 
ill upon Porter and Couch, and it was all-important 
lat this line should be held to the last extremity for 
le salvation of the Union army. 

Upon the Confederate side there does not appear 
) have been that co-operation in the deployment 
f the several divisions designated for the attack 
) necessary for success, so that Armistead's and 
/right's brigades of Huger's division, advancing tenta- 
vely about three o'clock against Porter's left, suf- 
;red severely, as did also G. B. Anderson's brigade 
:tacking Palmer on Couch's left. D. H. Hill, recog- 
izing the strength of the Union position after a care- 
i\ examination of it with his brigade commanders, 
sported his conclusions to Jackson and asked for 
rders ; he was told to obey those already issued, 
.bout five o'clock, hearing the sound of infantry fir- 
[g and shouting on his right, and imagining that this 
as the indicated signal from Armistead, he directed 
Is brigade commanders to advance. Through the 
:reen of woods and over the difficult ground his five 
rigades moved up the slopes of Malvern Hill, assailed 
Y the storm of shot, shell, and canister from the artil- 
ry, and the sheets of musketry fire from Porter's line, 
hey had near eight hundred yards to go, and no 
oops in line could breast that plane of destruction, so 
lat when the brigade reserves had been called upon to 
eady the weakened lines before they had passed over 
ilf the distance and no other supports were at hand to 
id their aggressive impulse, the line wavered, faltered, 
id then fell back suffering a bloody and disastrous 
pulse. Shortly after this, Magruder, on the extreme 
ft, pushed forward the nine brigades of his own and 
uger's commands with a like result, and although the 
)ntest was stubbornly maintained until nearly nine 
clock, not only were the Confederates badly defeated, 
it many of the troops were almost completely de- 
oralized by the terrible punishment they had received, 
t no time were the Union lines in danger, although 
some points the magnificent courage and intrepidity 



3^4 



GENERAL McCLELLAN. 



of the Confederate troops had carried them to withir| 
a short distance of the Union hne, hut the severity o 
the fire to which thejt were then exposed could not b(i 
withstood by troops advancing in hne without th(| 
* strongest supports. From time to time the Uniotj 
regiments and batteries that had expended their ami] 
munition were withdrawn from their positions in hn' 
to be replaced by others, and it was only on the left 
in front of the Crew House, where Wright's, Mahone's 
and Armistead's Confederate brigades had succeedec 
though after great losses, in reaching a close vicinit 
of the Union lines, that some temporary confusion re 
suited. The crisis of the battle occurred about si: 
o'clock, when Hill's five brigades on the Confederat 
left were advancing over the open field toward th 
crest held by the Union lines, and at about the tim 
that Magruder was making his attempt on the rigl 
with nine brigades of his own and Huger's division; 
The demoralization of the Confederate troops afte 
the unsuccessful attempt, as reported by the brigad 
commanders, was excessive, and this condition cor 
tinned during the night. Both Porter and Hunt, wh 
had accompanied Meagher's brigade to the front ncc 
the close of day, were so satisfied of the success th; 
had been won by the Union army that they hoped thr 
McClellan would hold his ground, and were indeed a 
their way to make this recommendation when order 
were received to continue the retreat during the nigh 
Upon the representations of Commodore Rodge 
that the army could not with safety nor certainty \ 
supplied by the transports above City Point, McClelk 
decided, upon personal inspection, to locate the arn 
at Harrison's Landing, and after the battle of Malvei 
Hill orders were issued to continue the retreat to th 
point. By daybreak on the 26. the army was well c 
its way, and although the roads became difftcult owir 
to a heavy rain that began in the morning and co 
tinned all day, by nightfall the greater portion of tl 
army and its trains had reached the end of their jou 
nev. Within the next few davs the lines of the arrti 



MALVERN HILL. 



365 



/ere securely located and constructed, and Lee did 
ot feel warranted in making another attack on an 
itrenched position. 

During the retreat the Army of the Potomac had 
teen subjected to a tremendous test as an organized 
ody, and had responded to it magnificently, justifying 
n the highest degree its splendid discipline and powers 
f endurance. Following this period of intense nerv- 
ous excitement and physical exhaustion many of the 
roops succumbed and the sick list increased greatly, 
)Ut the overworked surgeons, aided with abundant 
ations, vegetables, and medicine, soon brought it 
lown to normal proportions. McClellan's anxiety 
luring this period was also excessive, but he was forced 
o conceal every sign of the fear • that continually 
launted him that his ai^my was in danger of capture 
)r destruction. He therefore felt highly elated when 
le saw the army safe within the lines, and correspond- 
ngly embittered that no official recognition had been 
extended to its gallant performances and heroic en- 
durance by the authorities at Washington. But with 
^regard to the Administration it must be said that the 
;enor and tone of McClellan's dispatches during this 
3eriod, and the absence of reliable information while the 
army was in transit, gave rise to the gravest apprehen- 
sion as to its safety, and as these had some consider- 
able influence upon the decision afterward arrived at 
in regard to the disposition of the army, they will be 
briefly quoted. 

To Secretary Stanton, June 30th, 7 p. m., he says : 
" Another day of desperate fighting. We are hard 
pressed by superior numbers. I fear I shall be forced 
to abandon my material to save my men under cover 
of the gunboats. You must send us very large re- 
enforcements by way of Fort Monroe, and they must 
come very promptly. My army has behaved superbly, 
and have done all that men could do. If none of us 
escape, we shall at least have done honor to the 
country. I shall do my best to save the army. Send 
more gunboats." And in a similar dispatch to the 



GENERAL McCLELLAN. 



adjutant general he adds : '' If it is the intention of tht 
Government to re-enforce me largely, it should be dom 
promptly and in mass. I need fifty thousand mori 
men, and with them I 'will retrieve our fortunes. Mor^ 
would be well, but that number sent at once w411, 
think, enable me to resume the ofifensive. I can no 
too strongly urge the necessity of prompt action ir 
this matter. Even a few thousand fresh men withn 
the next twenty-four or forty-eight hours will do mucl 
toward relieving and encouraging this wearied army 
which has been engaged in constant combat for th( 
last five or six days." And to the same official, Jul^^i 
1st: "My whole army is here (Haxall's) with aU itt 
guns and material. The battle of yesterday was ven; 
severe, but the enemy was repulsed and severely pun 
ished. After dark the troops* retired to this position 
My men are completely exhausted, and I dread thd 
result if we are attacked to-day by fresh troops. Ij 
possible I shall retire to-night to Harrison's Bar,- where 
the gunboats can render more aid in covering ouii 
position. Permit me to urge that not an hour should 
be lost in sending me fresh troops. More gunboatl 
are much needed. I hope that the enemy was so set 
verely handled yesterday as to render him careful in hi;i 
movements to-day. I now pray for time. My met 
have proved themselves the equals of any troops iii 
the world, but they are worn out. Our losses havf 
been very great. I doubt whether more severe battlei: 
have ever been fought. We have failed to win onH 
because overpowered by superior numbers." In addi 
tion to these, the rather startling statement, found ir 
his dispatch of July 3d, should be noted : '' It is, o 
course, impossible to estimate as yet our losses, but '. 
doubt whether there are to-day more than fifty thou- 
sand men with their colors. To accomplish the grea; 
task of capturing Richmond and putting an end tc 
this rebellion, re-enforcements should be sent to md 
rather much over than much less than one hundrec 
thousand men. I beg that you will be fully impressec 
by the magnitude of the crisis in which we are placed 



MALVERN HILL. 



367 



We require action on a gigantic scale — one commen- 
surate with the views I expressed in a memorandum to 
the President submitted early last August, when first 
ordered to command the Army of the Potomac. The 
safety of the country and the preservation of its honor 
demand the utmost energy and intelligence." 

These dolorous dispatches, while they made the 
President's burden harder to bear, did not cloud his 
reason nor warp his judgment. He replied, July 2d : 
''Your dispatch of Tuesday 'morning induces me to 
hope that your army is having some rest. In this 
hope allow me to reason with you a moment. When 
you ask for fifty thousand men to be promptly sent 
you, you surely labor under some gross mistake of 
fact. Recently you sent papers showing your disposal 
of forces made last spring for the defense of Wash- 
ington and advising a return to that plan. I find it 
included in and about Washington seventy-five thou- 
sand men. Now, please be assured I have not men 
enough to fill that very plan by fifteen thousand. All 
of Fremont's in the Valley, all of Banks's, all of Mc- 
Dowell not with you, and all in Washington, taken 
together, do not exceed, if they reach, sixty thousand. 
With Wool and Dix added to those mentioned, I 
have not, outside of your army, seventy-five thousand 
:'men east of the mountains. Thus the idea of sending 
■you fifty thousand, or any other considerable force 
promptly, is simply absurd. If, in your frequent men- 
tion of responsibility, you have the impression that I 
blame you for not doing more than you can, please be 
relieved of such impression. I only beg that in like 
manner you will not ask impossibilities of me. If you 
;hink you are not strong enough to take Richmond 
ust now, I do not ask you to try just now. Save the 
army, material and personnel, and I will strengthen it 
or the offensive again as fast as I can. The governors 
Df eighteen States offer me a new levy of three hundred 
housand, which I accept." 

Orders were sent, July 3d, to General Burnside to 
Dring up all of his available infantry from Newbern, 



GENERAL McCLELLAN. 



N. C, and to General Hunter at Hilton Head, S. C, 
to send ten thousand of his infantry to Fort Monroe 
for the purpose of re-enforcing the Army of the Po- 
tomac. But previous to this the President had asked 
General Halleck to send twenty-five thousand men ofi 
his army, provided it could be done without endanger-- 
ing the Chattanooga expedition then about to be un-- 
dertaken, but this latter order was finally counter- - 
manded upon Halleck's representations. To satisfy 
himself of the condition of affairs the President deter- 
mined to visit the army at Harrison's Landing before 
deciding upon a course of action. He arrived July 8th, 
and conferred freely with General McClellan and his; 
principal officers, inspected the army, and made such 
personal observations as were possible in his stay of 
less than twenty-four hours. "While he was there Gen- 
eral McClellan handed him a letter containing the views; 
that he had requested permission, on the 20th of June, 
to submit to the President. The letter is as follows : 

Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 
Camp near Harrison's Landing, Va., July 7, 1862. 

Mr. President: You have been fully informed that the 
rebel army is in our front, with the purpose of overwhelm-i 
ing us by attacking our positions or reducing us by block- 
ing our river communications. I can not but regard our con-i 
dition as critical, and I earnestly desire, in view of possible 
contingencies, to lay before your Excellency, for your pri-i 
vate consideration, my general views concerning the existing 
state of the rebellion, although they do not strictly relate tc 
the situation of this army, or strictly come within the scope 
of my official duties. These views amount to convictions, anc 
are deeply impressed upon my mind and heart. Our causf 
must never be abandoned; it is the cause of free institution5' 
and self-government. The Constitution and the Union musi 
be preserved, whatever may be the cost in time, treasure 
and blood. If secession is successful other dissolutions are 
clearly to be seen in the future. Let neither military disaster 
political faction, nor foreign war shake your settled purpose 
to enforce the equal operation of the laws of the United State; 
upon the people of every State. 

The time has come when the Government must deter 
mine upon a civil and military policy covering the whol< 
ground of our national trouble. The responsibility of deter 
mining, declaring, and supporting such civil and militan 



HARRISON'S LANDING. 



369 



policy, and of directing the whole course of national affairs 
in regard to the rebellion must now be assumed and exer- 
cised by you, or our cause will be lost. The Constitution gives 
you power sufficient even for the present terrible exigency. 
This rebellion has assumed the character of a war; as such 
it should be regarded; and it should be conducted upon the 
highest principles known to Christian civilization. It should 
not be a war looking to the subjugation of the people of any 
State in any event. It should not be at all a war upon popu- 
lation, but against armed forces and political organizations. 
Neither confiscation of property, political executions of per- 
sons, territorial organizations of States, or forcible abolition 
of slavery should be contemplated for a moment. In prose- 
cuting the war, all private property and unarmed persons 
should be strictly protected, subject only to the necessity of 
military operations. All private property taken for military 
use should be paid or receipted for; pillage and waste should 
be treated as high crimes; all unnecessary trespass sternly 
prohibited, and offensive demeanor by the military toward 
citizens promptly rebuked. Military arrests should not be 
tolerated, except in places where active hostilities exist, and 
oaths not required by enactments constitutionally made 
should be neither demanded nor received. Military govern- 
ment should be confined to the preservation of public order 
and the protection of political rights. Military power should 
not be allowed to interfere with the relations of servitude, 
either by supporting or impairing the authority of the master, 
except for repressing disorder, as in other cases. Slaves con- 
traband under the act of Congress, seeking military protec- 
tion, should receive it. The right of the Government to 
appropriate permanently to its own service claims to slave 
labor should be asserted, and the right of the owner to com- 
pensation therefor should be recognized. 

This principle might be extended, upon grounds of mili- 
tary necessity and security, to all the slaves of a particular 
State, thus working manumission in such State; and in 
Missouri, perhaps in Western Virginia also, and possibly 
even in Maryland, the expediency of such a measure is only 
a question of time. 

A system of policy thus constitutional, and pervaded by 
the influences of Christianity and freedom, would receive 
the support of almost all truly loyal men, would deeply 
impress the rebel masses and all foreign nations, and it 
.might be humbly hoped that it would commend itself to the 
favor of the Almighty. 

Unless the principles governing the future conduct of our 
struggle shall be made known and approved, the effort to 
obtain requisite forces will be almost hopeless. A declara- 
tion of radical views, especially upon slavery, will rapidly 
disintegrate our present armies. 
24 



370 



GENERAL McCLELLAN. 



The policy of the Government must be supported by con- 
centrations of miUtary power. The national forces should not 
be dispersed in expeditions, posts of occupation, and numer- 
ous armies, but should be mainly collected into masses and 
brought to bear upon the armies of the Confederate States. 
Those armies thoroughly defeated, the political structure 
which they support would soon cease to exist. 

In carrying out any system of policy which you may form, 
you will require a commander in chief of the army; one who 
possesses your confidence, understands your views, and who 
is competent to execute your orders by directing the military 
forces of the nation to the accomplishment of the objects 
by you proposed. I do not ask that place for myself. I am 
willing to serve you in such position as you may assign me. 
and I will do so as faithfully as ever subordinate servedi 
superior. 

I may be on the brink of eternity, and as I hope for- 
giveness from my Maker, I have written this letter witfci 
sincerity toward you and from love for my country. 

Very respectfully, your obedient servant, ; 

G. B. McClellan, Major General Commanding. 
His Excellency A. Lincoln, President."^ 

The short period that had elapsed since the incep- 
tion of war had witnessed many remarkable and surr 
prising changes in public opinion, for the people hac 
become accustomed to the thought that, after all, slav-. 
ery was the single exciting cause of the rebellion, anc 
to the belief that until that cause was removed success 
was unattainable. To strengthen the Union side anc 
weaken the Confederate, emancipation was advocatec 
as a prime military necessity, and both the strengtl: 
and persistency of such advocates were continuall} 
increasing and bringing the strongest influences to bea- 
upon the President to take radical action. The opposi, 
tion was formed of heterogeneous elements. It com 
prised all those who w^ere opposed to the war and who 
sought to place every obstruction in the way of it', 
prosecution, and of those men of conservative mind 
who believed that the purpose of the war was to re^ 
store the Union as it was. McClellan, by his previouj 
political predilections and his conservative cast o^ 

* Official War Records, vol. xi, part i, p. 73. 



HARRISON'S LANDING. 



371 



mind, belonged naturally to the latter class, and hop- 
ing for a speedy successful termination of the war, 
he was opposed to every measure that would leave a 
sting of bitterness in the hearts of those who would 
50on again become citizens of the republic. He prided 
limself upon conducting war in a gentlemanly way, 
and felt outraged that orders such as those General 
Pope had issued should receive the implied sanction of 
he Administration. 

It must be confessed that McClellan touched upon 
questions in this letter that were beyond his preroga- 
tive as a commander of an army officially to discuss. 
He crossed the boundaries within which both the 
President and Congress had specific jurisdiction, and 
lience his letter has been almost universally con- 
demned. It was considered by many to have a politi- 
cal purpose in view, intended to pave the way for his 
|selection as the standard bearer of the political party 
'that was then crystallizing in opposition to the Ad- 
ministration. But this ascribes to him an ignoble 
purpose that is entirely out of harmony with the whole 
of his life and every trait of his character. It is more 
in keeping with these to accept his earnest statement 
that in submitting it he was actuated solely by sincerity 
and patriotism. With perfect confidence in his own 
military talents and political sagacity, he felt entirely 
competent to teach Mr. Lincoln something, whom, 
as President, he regarded as his official superior, but 
otherwise as his intellectual inferior. Seward, Chase, 
and many others less prominent, had committed the 
same error and learned to profit by it ; but it was not 
the good fortune of McClellan, while in active service, 
to have this beam removed from his intellectual organs 
of vision. The President, after quietly reading the 
letter, refrained from making any comments upon its 
contents, merely thanking him as he placed it in his 
pocket. 

Shortly after the close of the Valley campaign the 
President determined to combine the armies of Mc- 
Dowell, Fremont, and Banks, and on the 26th of June 



372 



GENERAL McCLELLAN. 



Major-General John Pope, who had gained some repu- 
tation as a successful general in the West, was assigned 
to the command of the consolidated forces which were 
designated the Army 'of Virginia. General Pope waj' 
directed ** to conduct the operations of his army ir 
such a manner as to cover Washington, speedily attacV 
and overcome the rebel forces under Jackson anc 
Ewell, threaten the enemy in the direction of Char-| 
lottesville, and render the most effective aid to reliev(' 
General McClellan and capture Richmond." But 
this time, though unknown to the authorities at Wash ' 
ington, Jackson and Ewell had joined Lee, and tht' 
series of battles known as the Seven Days' had beer 
inaugurated, and long before Pope could gather th( 
scattered fragments of his command together th( 
Army of the Potomac had reached its resting place a: 
Harrison's Landing on the James. 

According to his own statement. General Pope wa:i 
very much averse to accepting his advancement fo: 
various reasons, and sought to have his assignmen 
countermanded, but without success. His task wai 
an exceedingly difficult one. He was junior in rani 
to all the officers named above, the troops had passec 
through a hard campaign and needed recuperation 
reorganization, and supplies, and before becoming 
capable of acting efficiently as an organized body 
a contest with Lee's veterans they needed assimilation 
and comradeship. Besides, there were deficiencie: 
in his own manner and temperament that militatec 
against that necessary hearty co-operation on the par 
of his subordinate officers that could only be overlooker 
by the exhibition of such qualities of leadership on th 
field of battle as were peculiarly his own. He was als< 
unfortunate in being kept away from his army, whil 
awaiting in Washington the arrival of General Hal 
leek, acting as the military adviser of the President 
this interim. Here he was often very imprudent 
speech, criticising in strong language the plans an< 
operations of General McClellan, and thus ranging him 
self on the side of the latter's opponents, so much sc 



WITHDRAWAL FROM THE PENINSULA. 373 

ndeed, that his own usefulness was thereby seriously 
mpaired. Notwithstanding this, however, when Pope 
heard of the critical situation of the Army of the Po- 
omac, he made known to McClellan, in a frank and 
manly letter, written July 4th, the exact condition of 
lis own army, and at the same time expressed his ear- 
lest wish to co-operate with him to the fullest extent 
n his power. At the time of writing, Pope's command 
ponsisted of twenty-three thousand men of all arms of 
Fremont's and Banks's forces, then much demoralized, 
broken down, and unfit for immediate active service ; 
McDowell's two divisions, one at Manassas and the 
other at Fredericksburg, aggregating nineteen thou- 
sand effective men, which was the only reliable portion 
of his army ; and Sturgis's force of seventeen thousand 
in and about Washington, mostly raw recruits and 
the broken fragments of regiments, in no condition 
jfor other service than the defense of Washington. It 
was evident from this presentation that McClellan 
could hope for no re-enforcements from Pope's army. 
When Mr. Lincoln returned to Washington it was 
a matter of supreme importance to decide what was 
best to be done with the Army of the Potomac. 
Franklin, Keyes, Newton, and Barnard had strongly 
recommended that it should be withdrawn, while Mc- 
Clellan strongly advised that re-enforcements should 
be sent to enable it to operate against Richmond from 
its present base. Secretaries Stanton and Chase had 
lost confidence in McClellan's ability, and there were 
undoubtedly many others in Washington of sufficient 
standing and influence to join with them in deterring 
the President from acceding to the desire of McClellan. 
Besides these influences it was very evident that the 
President was not favorably impressed with the relia- 
bility of McClellan's estimates of the actual effective 
strength of his own army or of the re-enforcements that 
would suffice to enable him to move actively and 
speedily against Richmond. In his dilemma he de- 
termined to send for Halleck, make him general in chief, 
and thus endeavor to get a solution of the difficulty 



374 



GENERAL McCLELLAN. 



by a military man of established reputation. Halleck 
was appointed July nth, but did not reach Washing- 
ton until the 22d, and was immediately sent to Har- 
rison's Landing to decide upon the possibility of Mc- 
Clellan's assuming the offensive, or, if that were found 
to be impracticable, to make provision for the removal 
of the Army of the Potomac. He was authorized to 
promise re-enforcements of twenty thousand men, 
being the troops of Burnside and Hunter, then under 
orders to assemble at Fort Monroe. 

Both Halleck and McClellan were well instructed 
theorists in the art of war, but neither possessed a boldi 
and aggressive disposition. Within three months theiri 
positions with respect to each other had been reversed 
by the orders of the President. Halleck, for many\ 
reasons, undoubtedly desired to accede to McClellan's; 
wish, but his information was explicit as to the numberi 
of re-enforcements that the War Department could 
furnish, and beyond these he could not promise a singlet 
man. He pointed out to McClellan the weak spot of- 
the latter's contention, viz., that if, as he believed,! 
Lee had two hundred thousand men, an addition of 
twenty thousand to McClellan's army, giving him only 
one hundred and ten thousand, could not possibly; 
justify any expectation of the latter's success, since he 
had failed with the same proportional numbers to suc- 
ceed with the advantage of nearer position. Besides.- 
Lee now occupied the interior position between Pope 
and McClellan which gave him a decided military ad-1 
vantage. On the other hand, McClellan believed that 
the withdrawal of the army from its position on thf 
James would seriously affect its morale, and would 
entail a surrender of all that it gained by the sacrifice? 
it had made. He thought a movement upon the soutl' 
bank of the James toward Petersburg would force Lef 
to attack him in a position favorable to the Union arms 
and at all events he would, by the control of the river 
be free to choose his line of operations, and, finally, he 
regarded his position and present line of operationf 
as the true defense of Washington. Upon being re^ 



WITHDRAWAL FROM THE PENINSULA. 



375 



quested to state what re-enforcements he would require 
to attack Richmond, he repHed that with thirty thou- 
sand he beheved he would have a good chance of suc- 
cess ; but Halleck again told him that he was author- 
ized to promise him only twenty thousand, and advised 
him to consult with his officers, consider the matter 
over night, and report the result of his conclusions 
the next day. The following morning McClellan told 
Halleck that though he thought the probabilities were 
not in his favor, he was willing to try it with the addi- 
tional twenty thousand. Halleck had told him that if 
he did not think he could succeed, it was the intention 
of the Administration to unite his army with that of 
Pope, and also gave him to understand that in that 
event the command of the combined forces would be 
given to McClellan. 

A careful study of Halleck's report of his interview 
with McClellan shows that he did not come away with 
any satisfactory conclusion in his mind that McClellan 
would meet the requirements of the situation, and 
therefore it is not improper to infer that he was ready 
to add his influence to those who believed that the 
army ought to be withdrawn from the James. Ac- 
cordingly, on the 30th of July McClellan was advised 
by Halleck to send away his sick with all dispatch, 
" in order to enable you to move in any direction 
as quickly as possible," informing him at the same 
time that deserters were reporting to Pope that the 
enemy was moving south of the James and that their 
numbers in Richmond were very small, and suggest- 
ing that he be pressed in that direction to ascertain 
the facts of the case. McClellan inferred from this 
that he was expected to undertake an ofifensive move- 
ment, and was further strengthened in this view by a 
dispatch of the next day informing him that Pope had 
telegraphed that '' the enemy is reported to be evacuat- 
ing Richmond and falling back on Danville and 
Lynchburg." 

With this idea in mind he advanced Hooker to Mal- 
vern Hill, which he expected to occupy during the 



GENERAL McCLELLAN. 

night of August 2d, but which, owing to the incom- 
petency of guides, was not effected until the 5th. But 
on the morning of the 4th he had received Halleck's 
dispatch of the 3d, saying: " I have waited most anx- 
iously to learn the result of your forced reconnoissance 
toward Richmond, and also whether all your sick have 
been sent away, and I can get no answer to my tele- 
gram. It is determined to withdraw your army from 
the Peninsula to Aquia Creek. You will take immedi- 
ate measures to effect this, covering the movement the 
best you can. Its real object and withdrawal should 
be concealed even from your own officers." 

McClellan proceeded to obey this order with all 
possible dispatch, but in the hope of having it counter- 
manded he sent the following telegram : *' Your tele- 
gram of last evening is received. I must confess that 
it has caused me the greatest pain I ever experienced, 
for I am convinced that the order to withdraw this 
army to Aquia Creek will prove disastrous to our 
cause. I fear it will be a fatal blow. Several days are 
necessary to complete the preparations for so impor- 
tant a movement as this ; and while they are in progress 
I beg that careful consideration may be given to my 
statements. 

" This army is now in excellent discipline and con- 
dition. We hold a debouche on both banks of the James 
River, so that we are free to act in any direction, and, 
with the assistance of the gunboats, I consider our 
communications as now secure. We are twenty-five 
miles from Richmond, and are not likely to meet the \ 
enemy in force sufficient to fight a battle until we have 
marched fifteen to eighteen miles, which brings us 
practically within ten miles of Richmond. Our long- 
est line of land transportation would be from this point 
twenty-five miles, but with the aid of the gunboats we 
can supply the army by water during its advance cer- 
tainly to within twelve miles of Richmond. At Aquia 
Creek we would be seventy-five miles from Richmond, 
with land transportation all the way. 

" From here to Fort Monroe is a march of about 



WITHDRAWAL FROM THE PENINSULA. 377 

seventy miles ; for I regard it as impracticable to with- 
draw this army and its material except by land. The 
result of the movement would thus be a march of one 
hundred and forty-five miles to reach a point now only 
twenty-five miles distant, and to deprive ourselves en- 
tirely of the powerful aid of the gunboats and water 
transportation. Add to this the certain demoraliza- 
tion of this army which would ensue, the terribly de- 
pressing effect upon the people of the North, and the 
strong probability that it would influence foreign 
powers to recognize our adversaries, and these appear 
to me sufficient reasons to make it my imperative duty 
to urge, in the strongest terms afforded by our lan- 
guage, that this order may be rescinded, and that, far 
from recalling this army, it may be promptly re-en- 
forced to enable it to resume the offensive. 

" It may be said that there are no re-enforcements 
available. I point to Burnside's force, to that of Pope 
— not necessary to maintain a strict defensive in front 
of Washington and Harper's Ferry — to those portions 
of the Army of the West not required for a strict de- 
fensive there. Here, directly in front of this army, is 
the heart of the rebellion ; it is here that all of our re- 
sources should be collected to strike the blow which 
will determine the fate of the nation. All points of 
secondary importance elsewhere should be abandoned 
and every available man brought here ; a decided vic- 
tory here, and the military strength of the rebellion 
is crushed, it matters not what partial reverses we may 
meet with elsewhere. Here is the true defense of 
Washington ; it is here on the banks of the James that 
the fate of the Union should be decided. 

" Clear in my convictions of right, strong in the 
consciousness that I have ever been, and still am, actu- 
ated solely by the love of my country, knowing that no 
ambitious or selfish motives have influenced me from 
the commencement of this war, I do now what I never 
did in my life before : I entreat that this order may be 
irescinded. If my counsel does not prevail, I will with 
a sad Heart obey your orders to the utmost of my 



378 



GENERAL McCLELLAN. 



power, directing to the movement, which I clearly 
foresee will be one of the utmost delicacy and diffi- 
culty, whatever skill J may possess. Whatever the 
result may be — and may God grant that I am mistaken 
in my forebodings — I shall at least have the internal 
satisfaction that I have written and spoken frankly, and 
have sought to do the best in my power to avert dis- 
aster from my country."* 

Halleck answered this August 6th, and since his 
answer presents very clearly the reasons that brought 
about the transfer, it is here quoted : " General : Your 
telegram of yesterday was received this morning, and I 
immediately telegraphed you a brief reply, promising, 
to write you more fully by mail. You, general, cer- 
tainly could not have been more pained at receiving my 
order than I was at the necessity of issuing it. I was 
advised by high officers, in whose judgment I had 
great confidence, to make the order immediately on 
my arrival here, but I determined not to do so until I 
could learn your wishes from a personal interview 
and even after that interview I tried every means in ni) 
power to avoid withdrawing your army, and delayec 
my decision as long as I dared to delay it. I assure 
you, general, it was not a hasty and inconsiderate act 
but one that caused me more anxious thoughts thar 
any other of my life ; but after full and mature con 
sideration of all the pros and cons, I was reluctantl}! 
forced to the conclusion that the order must be issued 
There was to my mind no alternative. 

" Allow me to allude to a few of the facts in th< 
case. You and your officers at one interview estimate( 
the enemy's forces in and around Richmond at tw( 
hundred thousand men. Since then you and other 
report that they have received and are receiving larg< 
re-enforcements from the South. General Pope's army 
covering Washington, is only about forty thousanc 
Your effective force is only about ninety thousanc 
You are thirty miles from Richmond, and Genera 

* Official War Records, vol. xi, part i, p. 8i. 



WITHDRAWAL FROM THE PENINSULA. -^-tq 

Pope eighty or ninety, with the enemy directly be- 
tween you, ready to fall with his superior numbers 
upon one or the other, as he may elect. Neither can 
re-enforce the other in case of such an attack. 

" If General Pope's army be diminished to re-en- 
force you, Washington, Maryland, and Pennsylvania 
would be left uncovered and exposed. If your force be 
reduced to strengthen Pope, you would be too weak 
to even hold the position you now occupy should the 
enemy turn round and attack you in full force. In other 
words, the old Army of the Potomac is split into two 
parts, with the entire force of the enemy directly be- 
tween them. They can not- be united by land without 
exposing both to destruction, and yet they must be 
united. To send Pope's forces by water to the Penin- 
sula is, under present circumstances, a military impos- 
sibility. The only alternative is to send the forces on 
the Peninsula to some point by water, say Fredericks- 
burg, where the two armies can be united. 

" Let me now allude to some of the objections 
which you have urged. You say that the withdrawal 
from the present position will cause the certain de- 
moralization of the army, ' which is now in excellent 
discipline and condition.' I can not understand why 
a simple change of position to a new and by no means 
distant base will demoralize an army in excellent dis- 
cipline, unless the officers themselves assist in that de- 
moralization, which I am satisfied they will not. Your 
change of front from your extreme right at Hanover 
Court House to your present position was over thirty 
miles, but I have not heard that it demoralized your 
troops, notwithstanding the severe losses they sus- 
tained in effecting it. A new base on the Rappahan- 
nock at Fredericksburg brings you within about sixty 
miles of Richmond, and secures a re-enforcement of 
forty thousand or fifty thousand fresh and disciplined 
troops. The change, with such advantages, will, I 
think, if properly represented to your army, encourage 
rather than demoralize your troops. Moreover, you 
yourself suggested that a junction might be effected at 



38o GENERAL McCLELLAN, 

Yorktown, but that a flank march across the isthmus 
would be more hazardous than to retire to Fort Mon- 
roe. You will remember that Yorktown is two or 
three miles farther than Fredericksburg is. Besides, 
the latter is between Richmond and Washington, and 
covers Washington from any attack of the enemy. 
The political efifect of the withdrawal may at first be 
unfavorable ; but I think the public are beginning to 
understand its necessity, and that they will have much 
more confidence in a united army than in its separated 
fragments. 

" But you will reply. Why not re-enforce me here, 
so that I can strike Richmond from my present posi- 
tion? To do this you said at our interview that you 
required thirty thousand additional troops. I told you 
that it was impossible to give you so many. You 
finally thought that you would have ' some chance ' 
of success with twenty thousand. But you afterward 
telegraphed me that you w^ould require thirty-five 
thousand, as the enemy was being largely re-enforced. 
If your estimate of the enemy's strength was correct, 
your requisition was perfectly reasonable, but it was 
utterly impossible to fill it until new troops could be 
enlisted and organized, which would require several 
weeks. To keep your army in its present position 
until it could be so re-enforced would almost destroy it 
in that climate. The months of August and September 
are almost fatal to whites who live on that part of the 
James River, and even after you received the re-en- 
forcements asked for, you admitted that you must re- 
duce Fort Darling and the river batteries before you 
could advance on Richmond. It is by no means cer- 
tain that the reduction of these fortifications would not 
require considerable time, perhaps as much as those at 
Yorktown. This delay might not only be fatal to the 
health of your army, but in the meantime General 
Pope's force would be exposed to the heavy blows 
of the enemy without the slightest hope of assistance 
from you. 

'' in regard to the demoralizing effect of a with- 




GEORGE BRINTON McCLELLAN. 



If 



WITHDRAWAL FROM THE PENINSULA. 



381 



drawal from the Peninsula to the Rappahannock, I 
must remark that a large number of your highest offi- 
fcers — indeed, a majority of those whose opinions have 
been reported to me — are decidedly in favor of the 
movement. Even several of those who originally ad- 
vocated the line of the Peninsula now advise its aban- 
donment. I have not inquired, and do not wish to 
know, by whose advice or for what reasons the Army 
of the Potomac was separated into two parts, with the 
enemy between them. I must take thmgs as I find 
them. I find the forces divided and I wish to unite 
them. Only one feasible plan has been presented for 
doing this. If you or any one else had presented a 
better plan I certainly should have adopted it. But 
all of your plans require re-enforcements, which it is 
impossible to give you. It is very easy to ask for re- 
enforcements, but it is not so easy to give them when 
you have no disposable troops at your command. 

" I have written very plainly as I understand the 
case, and I hope you will give me credit for having 
fully considered the matter, although I may have ar- 
rived at very different conclusions from your own." * 

This, of course, settled the matter, though very 
much to the disappointment of General McClellan ; and 
as the abandonment of the camp at Harrison's Landing 
was not finally completed until the i6th of August, his 
movements were deemed unwarrantably slow, and it 
w^as believed by Halleck, and generally in Washington, 
that he was intentionally delaying the movement that 
had been ordered. But the following facts entirely dis- 
prove this unjust criticism. Up to the 4th of August 
he had every reason to believe that he was to be re- 
enforced by at least tw^enty thousand men, and his 
previous orders to send ofif the sick were interpreted 
by him to comprise only those not likely soon to re- 
cuperate, but not the convalescent, who in a short 
time might return to duty and in the meantime could 
be made" useful with the army. This was entirely justi- 

* Official War Records, Series I, vol. xi, part i, p. 82. 



GENERAL McCLELLAN. 



fiable under the point of view that the army was to : 
make an advance toward Richmond from its base on 
the James, and he was in this expectation until the i 
arrival of Halleck's telegram of the 3d of August — that 
is, until the morning of the 4th. But from this time on 
he used every effort to carry out his orders to abandon ( 
his base, and all of the delay can be wholly accounted t 
for by his lack of transportation, wharf facilities, etc., 
as is clearly shown by the reports of his quartermasters 
and medical officers. On the other hand, the Wash- | 
ington officials took into consideration only the ac- I 
tual number of the vessels with the army in the James 
River and at Fort Monroe, without at the same time 1 
appreciating that the great bulk of them were laden ! 
with supplies for the army, constituting in reality a 
mere floating depot and were therefore not available 
for the immediate uses of transport for the material 
and personnel of an army of over one hundred thou- 
sand men, with its animals, wagons, baggage, stores, 
and other proportions of enormous impedimenta. 
Under these circumstances it is not surprising that, 
much recrimination was indulged in and bad feeling 
was engendered, that found expression afterward in the 
explanations that were submitted for the ill success 
of Pope's campaign. 

To return now to Lee's army. After McClellan had 
retired within the lines of Harrison's Landing and Lee 
had arrived at the conclusion that an attack would not 
be justifiable, he was forced to move his army back to 
the environs of Richmond in order to supply it, keep- 
ing only a reasonable force on the New Market road 
in observation. So long as McClellan kept his posi- 
tion he threatened Richmond from the south, and the 
bulk of the Confederate army was obliged to remain 
waiting McClellan's initiative. From every source 
troops were drawn to re-enforce the main Confederate 
army, in order to bring it up to its maximum strength 
and to supply the heavy losses it had experienced in 
the Seven Days' fighting. On the 13th of July Jack- 
son, with his own and Ewell's division, was ordered to 



POPE'S CAMPAIGN. 



383 



he vicinity of Gordonsville to hold Pope in check, 
v^hile the rest of the Confederate army was held in the 
licinity of Richmond to await McClellan's dispositions, 
'kit on the 13th of August, Lee, hearing that Burnside 
^as embarked for Aquia Creek and that some of Mc- 
Clellan's troops were also en route for the same desti- 
nation, sent Longstreet forward on the 15th, and 
fterward the remainder of the army, except D. H. 
iill's divisions, to join Jackson in order to inaugurate 
.n offensive campaign against Pope, hoping to gain 
ome advantage before Pope could be re-enforced by 
he Army of the Potomac. Thus it was that the 
heater of war was transferred from the vicinity of 
Richmond to the territory north of the Rappahannock, 
vhich terminated in the second battle of Manassas. 

In this campaign McClellan had no active par- 
icipation. His functions were first limited to forward- 
ng the several corps of the Army of the Potomac from 
heir points of embarkation — Fort Monroe, Newport 
^ews, and Yorktown to Alexandria and Aquia Creek 
—as rapidly as transportation could be supplied. 
/Vhen disembarked they were sent forward to Pope, 
.nd then passed from under the control of McClellan. 
rhe exigencies of the situation compelled Halleck to 
lirect that the infantry of the several corps be hastened 
orward, and thus their cavalry and artillery were left 
)ehind to come later when transportation became 
vailable. Of the five corps of the Army of the 
^otomac, Porter's disembarked at Aquia, August 22d, 
leintzelman's the same day at Alexandria, Franklin's 
•n the 24th, and Sumner's on the 28th at Alexandria, 
Ceyes's corps being retained temporarily at Yorktown. 
/[cClellan himself, with his staff and escort, left Fort 
/[onroe August 23d, arrived at Aquia on the 24th, 
nd in obedience to Halleck's wish came to Alexan- 
[ria, August 26th, to take charge of matters, as very 
Teat irregularities had been reported as existing there, 
ie endeavored to ascertain exactly what his status was, 
►ut could get no definite information except that he 
ras charged with forwarding troops and supplies from 



GENERAL McCLELLAN. 



Alexandria to Pope's army. There seems to be tij 
reasonable doubt that he was then somewhat dis-' 
credited and practically ignored, a mere intermediary 
through whom Halleck might transmit such orders 
to the fragmentary parts of the Army of the Potomac 
that were en route as he saw fit. Jndeed, the Army oi 
the Potomac was temporarily broken up, and instead 
of finding himself in command of the combined forces, 
as Halleck had more than once indicated to him would 
be the case should the Army of the Potomac be joined 
with that of Virginia, McClellan was reduced to the 
command of a corporal's guard. 

Though this deprivation of his military command 
proved to be but temporary, it doubtless would have 
been permanent had General Pope's campaign termi- 
nated successfully. The latter had come from the West 
with the reputation of an aggressive leader, glorified b} 
his success at Island No. lo, and had omitted no op- 
portunity while in Washington of impressing upor 
the powerful supporters of the Administration the 
efficacy of the new methods of warfare that he pro- 
posed to adopt. His fertile imagination and exuber- 
ance of expression captivated the Committee on the 
Conduct of the War. His criticisms of McClellan';' 
Peninsular campaign and strong recommendations tc 
withdraw that army served to cast suspicion upon Mo. 
Clellan's military judgment and reputation, and tc 
justify in the minds of the responsible authorities hi; 
exclusion from any active participation in militarj 
operations. Halleck, though more cautious in ex- 
pressing opinions, had become committed to McClel 
fan's withdrawal and to the management of the opera 
tions then being conducted by Pope to hold Lee it 
check while the Army of the Potomac was brough 
forward to Pope's assistance. The course of event 
had eliminated McClellan's active employment, tern 
porarily at least, and should success attend the effort 
of Halleck and Pope, there seems to be no doubt tha 
McClellan's military career in any high commanc 
would have ended at this time. 



POPE'S CAMPAIGN. 



385 



But important military events were crowding for- 
ward with unprecedented rapidity. General Lee, hav- 
ing the great advantage of uninterrupted rail com- 
fmunication from Richmond to Gordonsville, was able 
fto concentrate the bulk of his army on the Rapidan 
'by the i6th of August in close contact with Pope, just 
fabout the time when the last of the Army of the Po- 
tomac was evacuating Harrison's Landing, which 
compelled 'Pope to fall back to the Rappahannock line, 
trailing in his first plan of turning Pope's left^ Lee 
sent Jackson's corps on a long flank march to turn 
the Union right, and on the 26th Jackson struck Pope's 
line of communications at Bristoe Station, and that 
same evening captured the garrison and the immense 
stock of supplies belonging to Pope's army at Ma- 
nassas. This bold strategic movement of Jackson, 
though resulting in immediate advantage to the 
Confederates, gave Pope an unexpectedly great op- 
portunity to achieve an immense success. A rapid 
concentration of his army upon Gainesville, en- 
tirely feasible up to the 28th of August, would 
have isolated Jackson from the remaining half of 
the Confederate army, and his defeat would have fol- 
lowed. But on this day a most unfortunate move- 
ment of McDowell's and Sigel's corps left the avenue 
open for Jackson's escape, and also afforded Long- 
street the opportunity to bring the right wing of the 
Confederate army into junction with Jackson. This 
movement was successfully accomplished by noon of 
the 29th, and from this time Pope could in reality ex- 
pect no decided advantage over his adversary either 
by reason of his relative numerical strength or tactical 
position. The campaign ended, after two days' severe 
fighting on the 29th and 30th, in a bloody defeat of the 
Union forces and their withdrawal to the lines of 
Washington. 

General Pope had been re-enforced by Porter's and 
Heintzelman's corps and Reynolds's division of the 
Army of the Potomac, but neither Franklin's nor Sum- 
ner's corps, aggregating some twenty-three thousand 
25 



386 ^^^ GENERAL McCLELLAN. 

men, had joined him in time for the final battle. Very' 
severe strictures have been passed upon General Mc- 
Clellan for his failure to send forward Franklin's corps, 
which, it will be remembered, had arrived at Alexandria 
on the 26th, apparently in ample time to have made; 
junction with Pope, and certainly much before the 29th 
of August. To this subject we shall now refer. 

Taylor's brigade of Franklin's corps had been sentt 
forward to the railroad bridge over Bull Run by rail' 
early on the morning of the 27th, followed by two regi- 
ments of Cox's Kanawha division, but this force was 
defeated by a portion of A. P. Hill's division in frontr 
of Manassas and driven back. From this time all directt 
communication between Halleck and Pope was inter- - 
rupted until the 29th, and the gravest apprehensions ^ 
were entertained as to the fate of his army. Rumors^ 
were prevalent that Pope's army had been defeated andl 
cut off from its line of retreat, and the enemy, one hun- 
dred and twenty thousand strong, was making to the^ 
right by the way of Vienna to capture Washington.. 
Halleck was earnestly endeavoring to have Franklin's: 
corps move out from Alexandria to open communica- 
tion with Pope, and McClellan was repeatedly directed! 
to see that this was effected. The failure of the latterr 
to carry out Halleck's orders in this respect has sub- 
jected McClellan to the severest criticism, even to the; 
extent that he was actuated by the desire of seeing^ 
Pope defeated in order that he might be rehabilitated 
in supreme military command. And even at this latet 
day there exists a wide diversity of settled opinion be- 
tween the partisans of both generals as to the motives 
of McClellan — opinions that received their initial direc- 
tion at the time of the impending crisis and which have! 
become crystallized by passionate denunciation, injus- 
tice, and the inability of men upon whom vast respon- 
sibilities were then committed accurately to gauge the 
springs of each other's action. 

In attempting to reach a rational solution we may 
with propriety assume that all the great actors were^ 
loyal patriots, much more concerned with the success: 



POPE'S CAMPAIGN. 387 

of the cause than with their personal and professional 
iortunes. But this concession does not forbid the as- 
sumption of the hypothesis that Halleck, McClellan, 
and Pope may each have entertained altogether dif- 
ferent views as to the situation and military neces- 
sities of the time. McClellan has left on record the 
expression of his extreme distrust of Pope's military 
ibility, and Pope had severely criticised that of Mc- 
Clellan in his testimony before the Committee on the 
Conduct of the War. Halleck had assured Pope also 
that he might with certainty expect the arrival of the 
re-enforcements from the Army of the Potomac some 
days before they actually came. The delay that en- 
sued in the execution of this promise caused Pope to 
feel that he was not willingly supported by McClellan, 
3Ut this is now known to have been entirely unwar- 
ranted in point of fact. 

Up to noon of the 26th Halleck believed that the 
Confederates in strong force were moving to the Shen- 
andoah Valley, and so informed McClellan, who was 
then at Aquia Creek. Direct communication having 
been cut that night between Washington and Pope, 
he learns the next day from Porter through Burnside 
at Aquia that a battle is imminent, and in his dis- 
patch to McClellan communicating this information, 
says : '' Franklin's corps should move out by forced 
marches, carrying three or four days' provisions, and 
to be supplied as far as possible by railroad." At 12.05 
p. M. on the same day McClellan replies that the orders 
had been transmitted to the senior officer present with 
Franklin's corps, to place it in readiness to move at 
lonce, Franklin and his two division commanders being 
(then in Washington. Presumably these superior off- 
icers of the corps had gone to Washington to endeavor 
to get horses and transportation, so that the corps 
might be able to move. So far, then, Halleck's earnest 
desire that Franklin should move to open communi- 
cation with Pope had been responded to by McClellan, 
who had then done all that was possible for him to 
icarry out Halleck's wishes. But at 1.15 p. m., August 



388 



GENERAL McCLELLAN. 



27th, McClellan's cautious timidity had been awakened, 
as is evident by the following dispatch to Halleck: 
" Franklin's artillery .have no horses except for four 
guns without caissons. I can pick up no cavalry. In 
view of these facts, will it not be well to push Sumner's 
corps here by water as rapidly as possible, to make 
immediate arrangements for placing the works in front 
of Washington in an efihcient condition of defense ? I 
have no means of knowing the enemy's force between 
Pope and ourselves. Can Franklin, without his artil- 
lery or cavalry, effect any useful purpose in front: 
Should not Burnside take steps at once to evacuate 
Falmouth and Aquia, at the same time covering the 
retreat of any of Pope's troops who may fall back in 
that direction ? I do not see that we have force enough! 
in hand to form a connection with Pope, whose exact 
position we do not know. Are we safe in the direction 
of the Valley? " Again, at twenty-five minutes to two: 
in communicating his information of the disaster thai 
had overtaken Taylor's brigade, he says : " I think ouii 
policy now is to make these works perfectly safe, anc 
mobilize a couple of corps as soon as possible, but no': 
to advance them until they can have their artillery anc 
cavalry." 

From this instant Washington, threatened, as Mc 
Clellan believed, by way of Vienna, was, in hi: 
mind, of the first importance, wdiile Pope's army wa.i 
of secondary consideration. Halleck had telegraphec 
him in the afternoon of the 27th : " As you must bo 
aware, more than three quarters of my time is takei 
up with the raising of new troops and matters in th< 
West. I have no time for details. You will therefore 
as ranking general in the field, direct as you deem best 
but at present orders for Pope's army should g( 
through me." Under the authority conveyed in thi: 
dispatch McClellan held back Franklin's corps until itr 
artillery could be horsed and transportation furnished 
and also halted Cox's Kanawha division, which, late ii 
the afternoon of the 27th, was under orders to tak» 
cars at Alexandria to go to the front. He also wac 



POPE'S CAMPAIGN. 



389 



actively engaged in attending to the necessities of the 
defensive hne of works on the south bank of the Po- 
tomac, to put it in a more efficient state lest the enemy 
should place Washington in jeopardy. During the 
night he was in personal consultation with Halleck in 
Washington, and it appears that the latter then under- 
stood that Franklin was to move out the next day to 
drive the enemy from the railroad, but finding that he 
ihad not so moved, sent him a direct order to do so. 
To this McClellan replied at i p. m. : " Your dispatch 
to Franklin received. I have been doing all possible 
to hurry artillery and cavalry. The moment Franklin 
can be started with a reasonable amount of artillery he 
shall go." But McClellan still persists in his view 
ithat " the great object is to collect the whole army in 
Washington, ready to defend the works and act upon 
the flank of any force crossing the upper Potomac." 

But now Halleck becomes more insistent. At 3.30 
p. M., August 28th, he telegraphs : " Not a moment 
must be lost in pushing as large a force as possible 
'toward Manassas, so as to communicate with Pope 
Ibefore the enemy is re-enforced." And the answer is : 
i" Neither Franklin's nor Sumner's corps is now in con- 
dition to move and fight a battle. It would be a sacri- 
fice to send them out now. I have sent aids to ascer- 
tain the condition of the command of Cox and Taylor, 
but I still think that a premature movement in small 
force will accomplish nothing but the destruction of 
the troops sent out. I report that I will lose no time in 
preparing the troops now here for the field, and that 
whatever orders you may give after hearing what I 
have to say will be carried out." At 7.40 p. m. came 
peremptory orders for the movement of Franklin's 
corps for the next morning, " ready or not ready," and 
at 10 p. M. McClellan responds that he has issued the 
necessary orders for Franklin to move at six o'clock 
in the morning. 

That this movement of Franklin's was not in ac- 
cord with McClellan's judgment of the supposed state 
of aflfairs is undoubted, and abundantly confirmed by 



350 ^^ GENERAL McCLELLAN. 

its slow progress which received his sanction. It pro- 
ceeded that day only as far as Annandale, about eight 
miles, when General .W. F. Smith, commanding the 
leading division, sent back reports derived from strag- 
glers that the enemy was advancing in force from be- 
yond Fairfax Court House, and these reports beings 
transmitted to McClellan, the latter directed Franklin i 
to remain that night at Annandale. This dilatory prog- 
ress called forth a rebuke from Halleck, whereupon i 
McClellan assumed the responsibility of the order for 
the halt, saying : " It was not safe for Franklin to move: 
beyond Annandale, under the circumstances, until we; 
knew what was at Vienna. General Franklin remained] 
here (Alexandria) until about i p. m., endeavoring tO) 
arrange for supplies for his command. I am respon- 
sible for both these circumstances, and do not see thatt 
either was in disobedience of your orders. Please give; 
me distinct orders in reference to Franklin's move- 
ments of to-morrow." 

Another circumstance, occurring August 29th, 
added its detracting influence. In his reply to an in- 
quiry of the President asking for news, after answer-- 
ing, he adds : " I am clear that one of two courses > 
should be adopted : First, to concentrate all our avail- 
able forces to open communications with Pope;: 
second, to leave Pope to get out of his scrape,, 
and at once use all our means to make the capital per- 
fectly safe. No middle ground will now answer. Tell 
me what you wish me to do, and I will do all in my^ 
power to accomplish it. I wish to know what my 
orders and authority are. I ask for nothing, but wil' 
obey whatever orders you give. I only ask a prompt 
decision that I may at once give the necessary orders. 
It will not do to delay longer." 

The foregoing quotations from Halleck's and Mc- 
Clellan's dispatches suffice to show that these two com- 
manders had a very different view of the problem then 
confronting them, and consequently were often at cross 
purposes in their attempts to solve it. Uppermost in 
McClellan's mind was the imminent danger of the loss; 



POPE'S CAMPAIGN. ^qI 

of Washington, and while he knew nothing of what 
had happened to Pope he was not apprehensive of the 
ultimate safety of his army, believing that, if defeated, 
he had an avenue of escape by way of the Occoquan. 
But the safety of Washington was a matter of supreme 
importance, and he felt that all his efforts should 
primarily be directed to that end. In addition to this, 
if we give due weight to the habit he had of overesti- 
mating the numbers and activity of the enemy, we will 
have a logical explanation of his conduct, which is in 
perfect keeping with all the characteristics that he had 
heretofore exhibited. These characteristics made him 
antagonistic to any aggressive movement toward Cen- 
treville, where the enemy was reported in force, and 
were in accord with that cautious preparation for de- 
fense of the line which was then so vulnerable, and 
which, to his mind, it was so essential to hold. Halleck, 
on the other hand, by devoting the greater part of his 
time and energy to matters of less immediate impor- 
tance, such as those connected with affairs in the West 
and raising new troops, failed to give that controlling 
and directing attention to the crisis which was then 
involving the safety of Pope's army, an attention which 
was especially incumbent upon the general in chief at 
that time. 

The dispatches from Pope to Halleck on the 30th, 
some hours after the battle of that day had ended, were 
not disheartening, but rather encouraging, ending with 
the statement, '' We have lost nothing — neither guns 
nor wagons." But at a quarter to eleven the next 
morning came the inquiry : " I should like to know 
whether you feel secure about Washington should this 
army be destroyed? I shall fight it as long as a man 
will stand up to the work. You must judge what is 
to be done, having in view the safety of the capital." 
McClellan had, on the night of the 30th, sent his aid. 
Major Hammerstein, to the front to ascertain the exact 
condition of affairs, and the latter returned at about 
3 A. M. and reported Pope's army was badly whipped 
and the condition of affairs was critical. The next 



392 



GENERAL McCLELLAN. 



morning McClellan visited Washington, and there, in 
Halleck's office, was directed to take charge of Wash- 
ington and its defensQ3, but was expressly forbidden 
to exercise any control over the active troops under 
General Pope. At this interview McClellan tried to 
impress upon Halleck the facts in regard to the condi- 
tion of Pope's army that he had learned from Ham- 
merstein, but Halleck could not be persuaded that 
affairs at the front were in so critical a state. Finally, 
after much persuasion, Colonel Kelton, of Halleck's 
office, was sent out to ascertain the condition. In the 
meantime a large number of stragglers were then mak- 
ing their way into Washington, and the rumors of a 
great disaster were exercising their baneful influence 
upon the public mind. When Kelton returned and • 
rnade known to Halleck and the President that the con- 
ditions were much worse than even McClellan had rep- 
resented, that the army was entirely defeated and was 
falling back on Washington in confusion, more than 
thirty thousand stragglers being then on the roads, 
almost a panic ensued. Even some of the Cabinet 
members gave orders for the removal of public prop- 
erty, believing that Washington was certainly lost. In 
this critical state of affairs Mr. Lincoln came with Gen- 
eral Halleck, early on the 2d of September, and asked 
McClellan to resume command and do the best that 
could be done. McClellan promptly responded with 
assurances that his services were at the command of 
the President. 



CHAPTER XIV. 

:cCLELLAN AND THE ADMINISTRATION. LEE's MARY- 
LAND CAMPAIGN. BATTLES OF SOUTH MOUNTAIN 

GAPS. BATTLE OF ANTIETAM. McCLELLAN's FINAL 

REMOVAL. 

But during these days the most active personal 
ostihty had developed in the minds of Mr. Lincoln's 
dvisers against McClellan. On the 28th of August 
Ir. Stanton addressed a letter to General Halleck, re- 
uesting information as to the date when McClellan 
/as first ordered to move from the James River, and 
dien the movement was actually commenced ; what 
irders he had received for the movement of Franklin's 
orps, and whether both of these orders had been 
tbeyed with that promptness that the national safety 
lad required. Halleck's reply was decidedly uhfavor- 
ble to McClellan, and served to confirm in Stanton's 
aind the belief that McClellan was both incompetent 
nd disobedient. He therefore prepared a letter, to be 
igned by the members of the Cabinet, for presentation 
3 the President, as follows : 

Mr. President: The undersigned feel compelled by a pro- 
3und sense of duty to the Government and the people of 
le United States, and to yourself as your constitutional ad- 
isers, respectfully to recommend the immediate removal of 
reorg-e B. McClellan from any command in the armies of 
le United States. We are constrained to urge this by the 
onviction that, after a sad and humiliating trial of twelve 
lonths, and by the frightful and useless sacrifice of the lives 
f many thousand brave men and the waste of many millions 
f national means, he has proved to be incompetent for any 
mportant military command, and also because, by recent 
isobedience of superior orders and inactivity he has twice 
^perilled the fate of the army commanded by General Pope, 

393 



og^^^"^ GENERAL McCLELLAN. 

and while he continues in command will daily hazard th; 
fate of our armies and our national existence, exhibiting n^ 
sign of a disposition or capacity to restore by courage or dili 
gence the national honor that has been so deeply tarnishc' 
in the eyes of the world by his military failures. We ar 
unwilling to be accessory to the destruction of our armiei, 
the protraction of the war, the waste of our national re- 
sources, and the overthrow of the Government, which w,, 
believe must be the inevitable consequence of George V 
McClellan being continued in command, and seek, therefore 
by his prompt removal to afford an opportunity to capabl, 
officers, under God's providence, to preserve our natiom; 
existence. ; 

This paper, after being modified by Secretary Chase, 
was signed by both himself and Stanton, but thougi 
it is averred that its statements were assented to bj 
others of the Cabinet, none of them subscribed to r 
Subsequently, on the ist of September, the Secrci 
taries of War, the Treasury, the Interior, and the At 
torney General united in signing the following pape:: 
which, however, was never presented to the, Pres:^, 
dent : ^ ; 

" The undersigned, who have been honored witi 
your selection as a part of your constitutional advisen 
deeply impressed with our great responsibility in thl 
present crisis, do but perform a painful duty in declai; 
ing to you our deliberate opinion that at this time , 
is not safe to intrust to Major-General McClellan thl| 
command of any army of the United States. And w 
hold ourselves ready at any time to explain to you ii 
detail the reasons upon which this opinion is foundedij 

But the President was himself fully aware of tl:^ 
intense feeling against McClellan in the minds not onl 
of nearly all the members of his Cabinet, but generall 
throughout the community, among the members (| 
Congress, and the supporters of his Administratioii^ 
It required all the characteristic firmness and indivic; 
uality of that remarkable man to put himself in oppos. 
tion to this powerful sentiment, and to pursue a coun 
of action that seemed to him essential to meet so critic; 
an emergency. Secretary Welles says : '* At the state 
Cabinet meeting on Tuesday, the 2d of Septembe 



McCLELLAN AND THE ADMINISTRATION. 



395 



'hile the whole community was stirred up and in con- 
ision, and affairs were gloomy beyond anything that 
ad previously occurred, Stanton entered the council 
Dom a few moments in advance of Mr. Lincoln, and 
lid, with great excitement, he had just learned from 
reneral Halleck that the President had placed McClel- 
m in command of the forces in Washington. The 
iformation was surprising and, in view of the prevail- 
ig excitement against that ofificer, alarming. The 
'resident soon came in and, in answer to an inquiry 
•om Mr. Chase, confirmed what Stanton had stated, 
reneral regret was expressed, and Stanton, with some 
ieling, remarked that no order to that effect had is- 
Lied from the War Department. The President, calm- 
i but with some emphasis, said the order was his, and 
e would be responsible for it to the country. With a 
etreating and demoralized army tumbling in upon us, 
nd alarm and panic in the community, it was neces- 
ary,the President said, that something should be done, 
ut there seemed to be no one to do it. He therefore 
ad directed McClellan, who knew this whole ground, 
/ho was the best organizer in the army, whose faculty 
/as to organize and defend, and who would here act 
n the defensive, to take this defeated and shattered 
rmy and reorganize it. He knew full well the infirm- 
:ies of McClellan, who was not an afffrmative man ; 
^^as worth little for an onward movement ; but beyond 
ny other officer he had the confidence of the army, and 
le could more efficiently and speedily reorganize it 
.nd put it in condition than any other general. If 
he Secretary of War, or any member of the Cabinet, 
vould name' a general that could do this as promptly 
md well, he would appoint him. For an active fight- 
ng general he was sorry to say McClellan was a fail- 
ire ; he had the 'slows'; was never ready for battle, 
ind probably never would be; but for this exigency, 
vhen organization and defense were needed, he con- 
;idered him the best man for the service, and the 
country must have the benefits of his talents though he 
lad behaved badly. The President said he had seen 



396 ^^^ GENERAL McCLELLAN. 

and given his opinion to General Halleck, who w! 
still general in chief ; but Halleck had no plan or views'^ 
of his own, proposed, to do nothing himself, and fully 
approved his calling upon McClellan. ... A long 
discussion followed, closing with acquiescence in the 
decision of the President, but before separating the^ 
Secretary of the Treasury expressed his apprehensioni 
that the reinstatement of McClellan would prove a 
national calamity." * 

To exhibit still further the attitude of Mr. Lincoln^; 
with regard to McClellan, we quote Secretary Welles's' 
account of a personal interview, held on the succeed-l 
ing Friday. He says : " The President said most of oun 
troubles grew out of military jealousies. Whethec 
changing the plan of operations (discarding McClellani 
and placing Pope in command in front) was wise oc 
not, was not now the matter in hand. These things.^ 
right or wrong, had been done. If the Administration! 
had erred, the country should not have been made tC( 
suffer nor our brave men been cut down and butchered: 
Pope should have been sustained, but he was nott 
These personal and professional quarrels came in 
Whatever may have been said to the contrary, it coulci 
not be denied that the army was with McClellan. Ht 
had so skillfully handled his troops in not getting tc< 
Richmond as to retain their confidence. The soldieri- 
certainly had not transferred their confidence to Popec 
He could, however, do no more good in this quarteri 
It was humiliating, after what had transpired and al 
we knew, to reward McClellan and those who failed tc 
do their whole duty in the hour of trial, but so it was: 
Personal considerations must be sacrificed for the pub- 
lic good. He had kept aloof from the dissensions tha 
prevailed, and intended to ; ' but,' said he, ' I must hav( 
McClellan to reorganize the army and bring it out o: 
chaos. There has been a design, a purpose, in break- 
ing down Pope, without regard to the consequence.' 
^ to the country, that is atrocious. It is shocking to se( 

* Welles: Lincoln and Seward, p. 194. 



McCLELLAN AND THE ADMINISTRATION. 



397 



nd know this, but there is no remedy at present. Mc- 
Hellan has the army with him.' " * 

Mr. Lincohi's unfavorable opinion was derived in 
great measure from a dispatch sent by Pope, Sep- 
!ember ist, to Halleck, in which he distinctly charged 
nany brigade and some division commanders of the 
,\rmy of the Potomac with unsoldierly and dangerous 
onduct, and specifically cited the actions of a corps 
md a division commander (Porter and Griffin), in such 
erms as* indicated that he believed, them utterly dis- 
oyal to the commander of the army and the cause of 
ts defeat. He closes by saying : " You have hardly an 
dea of the demoralization among officers of high rank 
n the Potomac army, arising in all instances from per- 
gonal feeling in relation to changes of commander in 
chief and others. These men are mere tools and para- 
sites, but their example is producing, and must neces- 
sarily produce, very disastrous results." Upon the re- 
ceipt of this dispatch Mr. Lincoln requested McClellan 
to write to Porter and others to ask them to give 
General Pope a hearty co-operation. In obedience to 
ithe request of the President, and without knowing the 
cause of the request, McClellan wrote to Porter at once, 
saying : " I ask of you, for my sake, that of the country, 
and of the old Army of the Potomac, that you and all 
friends will lend the fullest and most cordial co-opera- 
tion to General Pope in all the operations now going 
on. The destinies of our country, the honor of our 
arms, are at stake, and all depends now upon the cheer- 
ful co-operation of all in the field. This week is the 
crisis of our fate. Say the same thing to all my friends 
in the Army of the Potomac, and that the last request 
I have to make of them is, that for their country's sake 
they will extend to General Pope the same support they 
ever have to me. I am in charge of the defenses of 
Washington. I am doing all I can to render your re- 
treat safe, should that become necessary." To which 
the gallant Porter, himself unaware that a most unjust 

* Welles: Lincoln and Seward, p. 197. 



398 



GENERAL McCLELLAN. 



and undeserved reproach had been cast upon him, re 
phed : '* You may rest assured that all your friends, a 
well as every lover hi his country, will ever give, a: 
they have given, to General Pope their cordial co 
operation and constant support in the execution of al 
orders and plans. Our killed, wounded, and enfeeble* 
troops attest our devoted duty." 

It was under this distressful and discouraging con 
dition of affairs that McClellan was placed in comman 
of the troops for the defense of Washington. Th 
President, forced in spite of the opposition of the ma 
jority of his Cabinet to retain him, and at the sam 
time believing that neither he nor his subordinates ha 
given willing and efficient support to Pope in the lat 
campaign, had certainly much to endure. But it wa 
not long before matters assumed a more cheerful a.' 
pect. The army received the news of McClellan's r( 
sumption of command with enthusiasm, its tone \\c 
improved, and its security assured. Within a shoi 
time the several corps were located as near as possibl 
in their former positions behind the defenses of Wasl 
ington, so that the safety of the city was no longe 
endangered. McClellan set to work at once to perfe( 
its organization, to see to its re-equipment, provide 
with its immediate necessities, and thus restore to it tb 
needful confidence that it could resist with certain! 
any attack the enemy might intend to make upon i 
line of defense. And thus it was that Mr. Lincoln wr 
justified in the decision that he had made to restoi 
McClellan to the command. 

In the meanwhile General Lee had to determine in 
mediately upon his course of action. By his magnil 
cent strategy and successful tactical combinations o 
the field of battle he had within a little over two montl 
driven McClellan from in front of Richmond to tl 
unhealthy banks of the James River ; then turning o 
Pope, had driven him in total defeat to the protection < 
the defenses of Washington, before he could be whol! 
re-enforced by the Army of the Potomac, and now he 
shut up both armies, defeated, dispirited, and shorn < 



I 



LEE'S MARYLAND CAMPAIGN. 



399 



their aggressive power, within their intrenchments. 
Surely he was entitled to consider his veterans in- 
vincible against any army that could be immediately 
brought against them. Under these circumstances he 
quickly decided to cross the upper Potomac by the 
fords in the vicinity of Leesburg and invade Maryland, 
and so much was he at this time the arbiter of his own 
action that, without waiting for the approval of Mr. 
Davis, he contented himself with announcing his de- 
cision to the Confederate President, and on September 
2d he issued his orders for the march. In his official 
report he gives the reasons that impelled his taking this 
step. He says : '' The war was thus transferred from 
the interior to the frontier, and the supplies of rich and 
productive districts made accessible to our army. To 
prolong a state of affairs in every way desirable, and 
not to permit the season for active operations to pass 
without endeavoring to inflict further injury upon the 
enemy, the best course appeared to be the transfer of 
the army into Maryland. Although not properly 
equipped for invasion, lacking much of the material of 
war, and feeble in transportation, the troops poorly 
provided with clothing, and thousands of them desti- 
tute of shoes, it was yet beheved to be strong enough 
to detain the enemy upon the northern frontier until 
the approach of winter should render his advance into 
Virginia difficult, if not impracticable. The condition 
of Maryland encouraged the belief that the presence of 
our arrny, however inferior to that of the enemy, would 
induce the Washington Government to retain all its 
available force to provide against contingencies, which 
its course toward the people of that State gave it reason 
to apprehend. At the same time it was hoped that 
military success might afford us an opportunity to aid 
the citizens of Maryland in any efforts they might^ be 
disposed to make to recover their liberties. The diffi- 
culties that surrounded them were fully appreciated, and 
we expected to derive more assistance in the attainment 
of our object from the just fears of the Washington 
Government than from any active demonstration on 



400^^^ GENERAL McCLELLAN. 

the part of the people, unless success should enable t 
to give them assurance of continued protection." 

With commendaJble military promptness Lee ha! 

tened the march of his columns, and with D. H. Hill 

division in advance, which had joined him from .Ricl 

mond, September 2d, he had completed the concentn 

tion of his army in the vicinity of Frederick by tb 

7th of September, taking the line of the Monocacy i 

his defensive front against the advance of McClellai 

Here he remained three days, to rest and recuperat 

his fatigued troops and arrange for the contemplate 

change in his line of supplies by way of the Shenai 

doah Valley. This latter became necessary to remo\ 

the danger of the line through Manassas, since tli 

latter was now too near the Union forces to be secur 

His intention was to move his army into western Mar 

land, establish his communications with Richmoi 

through the Shenandoah Valley, and, by threatenii 

Pennsylvania, induce his enemy to follow him and tht 

separate him from his base of supplies. But an ui 

foreseen circumstance occurred to modify this pla: 

The Union garrison of Harper's Ferry, of about eigl' 

thousand men, under Colonel D. S. Miles, with an a(i 

vanced post of about twenty-five hundred under Gei 

eral White, at Winchester, and about two thousand 

the vicinity of Martinsburg, had not retired into Mar 

land upon the advance of the Confederates, as Gentr 

Lee had anticipated they would do, and since they wci 

on his proposed line of communications he felt th 

it was necessary to drive them from their position ( 

capture them. General Halleck had directed Miles 1 

hold his position to the last extremity, and had expectti 

that he would be able to do so, at least until he couj 

be relieved by McClellan. Orders had been sent 1 

White to abandon Winchester, withdrawing his trooj 

to Harper's Ferry, and then assume command at Ma: 

tinsburg, and finally, if compelled to fall back upc 

Harper's Ferry, to join Miles there. These forces we:' 

at that time, and until September 12th, under the in; 

mediate command of General Wool, whose hea^i 



LEE'S MARYLAND CAMPAIGN. 40I 

quarters were at Baltimore, and althong-h McClellan 
early advised Halleck to direct them to abandon their 
station and join the Army of the Potomac, Halleck 
would not consent to this suggestion. Under the cir- 
cumstances, then, it was incumbent upon Lee to get 
rid of this threatening force situated upon his desired 
line of communication with Richmond, and accord- 
ingly, on September 9th, he issued the celebrated orders 
(No. 191) which had such an important bearing upon 
the subsequent campaign. They were as follows : 

Headquarters Army of Northern Virginia, 
September 9, 1862. 

Special Orders, No. 191. 

The army will resume its march to-morrow, taking the 
Hagerstown road. General Jackson's command will form the 
advance, and. after passing Middletown with such portion 
as he may select, take the route toward Sharpsburg, cross 
the Potomac at the most convenient point, and by Friday 
morning take possession of the BaUimore and Ohio Rail- 
road, capture such of them as may be at Martinsburg, and 
intercept such as may attempt to escape from Harper's Ferry. 

General Longstreet's command will pursue the main road 
as far as Boonsborough, where it will halt with the reserve, 
supply, and baggage trains of the army. 

General McLaws, with his own division and that of Gen- 
eral R. H. Anderson, will follow General Longstreet. On 
reaching Middletown will take the route to Harper's Ferry, 
and by Friday morning possess himself of the Maryland 
Heights and endeavor to capture the enemy at Harper's 
Ferry and vicinity. 

General Walker, with his division, after accomplishing 
the object in which he is now engaged, will cross the Poto- 
mac at Cheek's Ford, ascend its right bank to Lovettsville, 
take possession of Loudoun Heights, if practicable, by Friday 
morning. Keys' Ford on his left, and the road between the 
end of the mountain and the Potomac on his right. He will, 
as far as practicable, co-operate with General McLaws and 
General Jackson and intercept the retreat of the enemy. 

General D. H. Hill's division will form the rear guard of 
the army, pursuing the road taken by the main body. The 
reserve artillery, ordnance, and supply trains, etc., will pre- 
cede General Hill. 

General Stuart will detach a squadron of cavalry to ac- 
company the commands of Generals Longstreet, Jackson, 
and McLaws, and with the main body of the cavalry will 
cover the route of the army, bringing up all stragglers that 
may have been left behind. 
26 



402 ^^ GENERAL McCLELLAN. 

^ The commands of Generals Jackson, McLaws, and 
Walker, after accornplishing the objects for which they have 
been detached, will join the main body of the army at Boons- 
borough or Hagerstown! 

Each regiment on the march will habitually carry its axes 
in the regimental ordnance wagons, for use of the men at 
their encampments to procure wood, etc. 

R. H. Chilton, Assistant Adjutant General* 

The disappearance of the Confederate troops from 
the front of the defensive line south of Washington 
left McClellan uncertain as to Lee's plans. To provide 
for every contingency, he first made such dispositions 
of his troops that the line of works from Fort Ethan 
Allen at Chain Bridge to Fort Lyon near Alexandria 
should be thoroughly defensible, and then sent suci: 
cavalry as was available to watch the fords of the Poto- 
mac in the vicinity of Poolesville, to give timely notice 
of any attempt on the part of the enemy to cross intc 
Maryland. Orders were issued on the 3d of Septembei 
from the War Department to organize an army witl 
all possible dispatch for active operations independcn- 
of the forces deemed necessary for the defense of Wash 
ington ; and McClellan was the same day directed b} 
General Halleck to report the approximate force o 
each corps of the armies in the vicinity of Washingtoi 
which could be prepared within the next two days tc 
take the field, and also was directed to have them sup 
plied and ready for such service. Just about the tim( 
that General Lee was concentrating his army at Fred 
erick, McClellan had organized this active army, anc 
on the 6th of September its constituent parts were thi 
First and Ninth Corps, commanded respectively b; 
Hooker and Reno, forming the right wing unde 
Burnside, which w^as then advanced to Leesborough 
the center, under Sumner, comprising his own corps 
the Second, and the Twelfth, under Williams, at Rock 
ville ; the left wing, under Franklin, formed of his owi 
(Sixth) corps and Couch's division of the Fourtl 

* Official War Records, vol. xix, part ii, p. 603. 



LEE'S MARYLAND CAMPAIGN. 



403 



Corps, the former being at Tcnallytown and the latter 
at Offut's crossroads ; Sykes's division of regulars, 
the reserve, at Tenallytown, completed the active army 
as at first constituted. General Banks was, on the 8th, 
placed in command of the defenses of Washington, 
General A. S. Williams succeeding to the command of 
his corps now designated as the Twelfth. General 
Casey was charged with the instruction of the new regi- 
ments that were now coming into Washington, and 
which were as soon as possible thereafter assigned to 
the several corps of the army. Porter's Fifth, Heint- 
zelman's Third, and Sigel's Eleventh Corps were for 
the present retained in the defenses soiith of the Poto- 
mac ; in all, about seventy-three thousand men of new 
and old troops comprised the force thus assigned for 
the defense of Washington. 

McClellan left Washington on the 7th and estab- 
lished his headquarters at Rockville on the 8th, where 
it remained until the nth, and thence successively to 
Middlebrook and Urbana on the 12th, and on the 
next day to Frederick. During the greater portion 
of this time both Halleck and McClellan were uncer- 
tain as to Lee's designs, the former, indeed, being im- 
pressed with the idea that Lee contemplated drawing 
the Army of the Potomac sufficiently far from Wash- 
ington as to enable him by a rapid movement by the 
south bank of the river to capture Washington, while 
McClellan, bearing in mind the necessity to cover 
Washington and Baltimore, was obliged to move with 
one flank on the Potomac and the other on the railroad, 
so that he felt it necessary to advance with such cau- 
tion as to provide for a rapid concentration of his army 
in either eventuality. Certainly it was not much before 
the loth of September that McClellan was at all cer- 
tain that the whole of Lee's army was committed to 
an invasion of Maryland. On the 12th, Fitz-John Por- 
ter's two divisions of the Fifth Corps, which had been 
left behind in the defenses, were ordered to join the 
active army, and this accession brought McClellan's 
strength up to about eighty-seven thousand men, while 



404 



GENERAL McCLELLAN. 



his antagonist probably did not have more than fifty- 
five thousand. 

The slow progress made by McClellan has been 
very severely criticised by military writers, for, until 
his arrival at Frederick, it did not average more than 
six miles a day. An excuse has been offered that the 
army had been greatly disorganized during the previ- 
ous campaign, and that it needed abundant supplies for 
clothing and equipment. Be that as it may, it is never- 
theless true that in this period no contact of infantry 
occurred with the enemy, the enemy's cavalry being 
sul^cient to keep the Army of the Potomac from get- 
ting in touch with Lee's army and preventing anything 
like satisfactory information from being obtained for 
McClellan's guidance. However, when Frederick was 
occupied on the morning of the 13th, a copy of Lee's 
order, wrapped around three cigars, was picked up by 
a soldier and immediately sent to McClellan's head- 
quarters. From a dispatch which McClellan sent to 
the President, dated September 13th, 12 m., it appears 
that this order reached his hands before noon of that 
day, for he says, " I have all the plans of the rebels, and 
will catch them in their own trap if my men are equal, 
to the emergency." A dispatch received by McClellan 
on the 13th, from Governor Curtin, stating that Long 
street's division had occupied Hagerstown last night, 
and that Jackson had crossed the Potomac at Williams 
port to capture Martinsburg and Harper's Ferry, gave 
the amplest confirmation of the authenticity of the 
order. 

Certainly no greater piece of good fortune could 
have happened nor at a more opportune time than this 
w^hich gave McClellan complete information of the 
wide dispersion of Lee's army, and which was so 
abundantly confirmed by every circumstance of the 
time. Assuming that McClellan gave it full authen- 
ticity — and of this there appears to be no reason to 
doubt — the possibilities of the situation were enor- 
mous. To comprehend them, let us mark the positions 
of the several fractions of each army as they were at 



LEE'S MARYLAND CAMPAIGN. 405 

the instant that the dispatch was placed in McClellan's 
hands. 

First with regard to the Confederate army, com- 
prising forty brigades of infantry, three of cavalry, 
and seventy-seven batteries of artillery, which left 
Frederick in obedience to the requirements of Orders 
No. 191, heretofore quoted. It moved with celer- 
ity, especially Jackson's command, being much less 
encumbered with impedimenta than was McClel- 
lan's army. On the 13th, at midday, we find that its 
fragments were thus positioned : Jackson's three divi- 
sions, comprising fourteen brigades, had marched by 
Turner's Gap of the South Mountains through Boons- 
borough, crossing the Potomac at Williamsport, ap- 
proached Martinsburg from the west, and had reached 
Halltown, investing Harper's Ferry ; McLaws with 
his four brigades, and R. H. Anderson's six brigades, 
marched from Frederick on the loth, following after 
Jackson, but diverged to pass the South Mountain at 
Crampton's and Brownsville Gaps, entering Pleasant 
Valley on the nth; leaving Semmes's and Mahone's 
brigades to hold the gap, assisted by Munford's cavalry, 
McLaws sent Kershaw's and Barksdale's brigades, by 
way of Solomon's Gap, supported by Cobb's brigade, 
to capture Maryland Heights ; Wright's brigade along 
the South Mountain Ridge to command the defile at 
Weverton, holding the remaining four brigades to 
form lines across Pleasant Valley ; Walker's division 
of two brigades, after an unsuccessful attempt to de- 
stroy the aqueduct at the mouth of the Monocacy on 
the night of the 9th, crossed the Potomac the next 
night at Point of Rocks and marched to Loudoun 
Heights, which was reached on the morning of the 
13th; the investing force of Confederates south of the 
Potomac, surrounding Harper's Ferry, therefore 
amounted to sixteen brigades, and these, with Mc- 
Laws's ten brigades on the north side, made twenty-six 
brigades, or more than half of Lee's entire army. The 
remaining fourteen infantry brigades belonging to 
Longstreet's and D. H. Hill's commands, were at the 



4o6 GENERAL McCLELLAN. 

time referred to thus distributed : Five brigades of 
D. R. Jones's division, two of Hood's, and those of 
Evans's and Toombs^s, or nine in ah, belonging to 
Long-street's corps, had reached Hagerstown on the 
nth, and were there at midday on the 13th, while two 
of D. H. Hill's were at Turner's Pass, and the remain- 
ing three of this division were at Boonsborough, cover- 
ing the rear of the Confederate army ; Stuart's cavalry 
was east of the South Mountain passes watching the 
advance of the Union army, excepting the squadrons 
that had been detached for the commands of Jackson, 
McLaws, and Walker. 

In comparison with this wide dispersion of the Con- 
federate army at midday of the 13th of September, the 
position of the Union army was one of concentration ; 
for the First, Second, vTwelfth, a portion of the Ninth, 
and Sykes's division of the Fifth, were in the vicinity 
of Frederick, the Sixth at Buckeystown, Couch's divi- 
sion of the Fourth at Licksville, and the remainder of 
the Ninth at Middletown, supporting Pleasonton's cav- 
alry, which was then in touch with the cavalry rear 
guard of the Confederates. 

The military situation presented exceptional advan- 
tages to McClellan, and threatened the gravest of dis- 
asters to Lee. The generalship displayed by each of 
these commanders, whereby the one failed to reap the 
legitimate fruit of the situation and the other extricated! 
himself in a masterly manner from his critical position, 
is exceedingly characteristic of their abilities and ca- 
pacity for command. Thirty minutes should not have 
elapsed after coming into possession of Lee's plans 
before orders should have been issued by McClellan 
for the immediate and speedy movement of his several 
corps to the South Mountain passes, and Pleasonton 
should have been at once informed of the situation, 
with the necessity of extreme vigor of attack upon the 
Confederate rear guard. But it was not till a quarter to 
seven that Couch, with the rearmost division, was or- 
dered to move to Jefferson, not that night but the next 
morning, in order to join Franklin, whose orders, 



BATTLES OF SOUTH MOUNTAIN GAPS. 



407 



issued fifteen minutes earlier, and containing a com- 
plete review of the situation, directed him to move by 
Jefferson and Burkettsville upon Rohersville at day- 
break the next morning. The remaining corps were also 
directed to move early on the 14th, and thus it was not 
until more than twenty-four hours after McClellan had 
come into possession of Lee's plans that the Army of 
the Potomac was in position to attempt the passage 
of the South Mountain Range, which interposed the 
only barrier to an attack upon the separated portions 
of Lee's army. In the meantime the unwonted ac- 
tivity of McClehan was noted by Lee's lieutenants, 
and he was indeed informed on the night of the 
13th that McClellan was in possession of the 'Most 
order." He was at that time at Hagerstown, thir- 
teen miles distant, having with him, as before stated, 
Longstreet's nine brigades, and leaving only five 
brigades of D. H. Hill to defend the Boonsborough 
passes. With commendable military promptness, and 
even against the earnest advice of his able lieutenant, 
Longstreet, he ordered the immediate return of eight 
of these brigades to the support of Hill, starting them 
back at 3 a. m. on the 14th. 

There were two separate battles at South Mountain 
on the 14th, that at Turner's and that at Crampton's 
Gaps, which were separated by a distance of eight 
miles. The latter was fought by Franklin's corps on 
the Union side against a Confederate force of about 
twenty-two hundred men, commanded by General 
Cobb. The attack began about three o'clock, and the 
position was carried by dusk ; and Franklin, being 
joined by Couch's division on the western side of the 
gap at ten o'clock that night, found himself confronted 
by McLaws in Pleasant Valley. The battle at Turner's 
Gap was more considerable, since both the attack- 
ing and defending forces were stronger. On the 13th 
Pleasonton had driven the Confederate rear guard of 
cavalry through Middletown, and by evening to the 
base of the South Mountain Gap. Scammon's bri- 
gade, of Cox's Kanawha division, leaving Middletown 



4o8 ^^ GENERAL McCLELLAN. 

at six o'clock, reached the scene of action by nine 
o'clock, and was ordered forward by Pleasonton by 
the left to make the attack on Fox's Gap ; it was 
shortly afterward supported by Crook's brigade, the 
entire division, under Cox, forming the extreme left 
of the Union line, and being opposed by Garland's bri- 
gade and Rosser's cavalry. The struggle at this point 
lasted until about noon, resulting to the advantage of 
the Union troops. In the meantime Reno's and 
Hooker's corps were hastening to the front, the former 
being directed to the left of the main gap and the latter 
to the right. Willcox's division of Reno's corps was 
the first to arrive after the lull in the battle caused by 
Cox's success over Garland, and it was finally posted 
on the right of Cox and on the left of the Sharpsburg 
road, after some time lost in executing contradictory 
orders of superior commanders. Later came Sturgis's 
and Rodman's divisions, having left their camps five 
miles back at one o'clock and reaching the battlefield 
at half past three o'clock. Reno was directed to move 
them up to the crest held by Cox, and Willcox, as soon 
as he was informed that Hooker's corps was attacking 
on the right, was well advanced up the mountain. 

Hooker, marching from the Monocacy at daylight, 
reached Middletown at one o'clock, and was directed 
to attack by the old Hagerstown road, making thus a 
diversion in favor of Reno. With Meade's division on 
the right. Hatch's on the left, and Rickett's in reserve, 
the front covered by a strong body of skirmishers, the 
corps moved forward to the attack. 

Considering now the Confederate dispositions at 
Turner's Gap, it may be said that Stuart's sturdy re- 
sistance on the 13th enabled Hill to send back Gar- 
land's and Colquitt's brigades to defend the gap, 
which they occupied that night. The next morning 
Hill sent forward his three remaining brigades, G. B. 
Anderson's coming to the support of Garland before 
the battle with Cox had lulled in the forenoon. This 
lull, which lasted for two hours, enabled Hill to get the 
other two brigades of Rodes and Ripley into posi- 



BATTLES OF SOUTH MOUNTAIN GAPS. 409 

tion, the former to support Garland and the latter to 
I defend the approaches by way of the old Hagerstown 
road to the north of the main gap at Turner's. Soon 
after three o'clock Longstreet's brigades, after their 
long and dusty march, began to arrive on the field, 
and as soon as possible were placed in position. Dray- 
ton's and G. T. Anderson's, the first to arrive, were 
directed to the south side of the turnpike, then the most 
critical position ; and later, Longstreet having arrived, 
Evans's, followed by Kemper's, Garnett's, and Jen- 
kins's brigades, were sent to re-enforce Rodes on the 
north side of the turnpike. The main advance was 
made by the Union troops at about four o'clock and 
was desperately resisted by the Confederates. At 
nightfall the key of the pass on the north was in 
Hooker's possession, and although the Confederates 
still held the gap, their position was untenable, and 
they retreated to Boonsborough during the night. 

The Union losses on the 14th were eighteen hun- 
dred and thirteen at Turner's and five hundred- and 
thirty-three at Crampton's Gap, the greater portion of 
which may justly be regarded as the penalty exacted 
by the procrastination of the commanding general of 
the Union army. 

A few words now with regard to the military 
blunder committed by the Union troops at Harper's 
Ferry. Here, by the 13th of September, Jackson had 
shut in some twelve thousand Union troops, whose 
position was untenable as soon as the enemy gained 
possession of Loudoun and Maryland Heights. The 
latter, after a slight resistance, were shamefully aban- 
doned on the 14th by the officer commanding, Colonel 
Ford, and the former, not having been occupied by the 
Union troops, were readily seized by Walker's division 
the same day. Although the commander of the United 
States forces. Colonel D. S. Miles of the regular army, 
had been directed to hold his position to the last, his 
efforts were weak in the extreme, and the troops and 
position were surrendered at about half past eight on 
the morning of the 15th, an act which at once released 



4IO 



GENERAL McCLELLAN. 



the greater portion of the twenty-six Confederate bri- 
gades detached for its capture. This enabled Jackson 
to return to Lee and 'bring with him a considerable 
portion of his troops to assist his chief out of the seri- 
ous predicament which at that time threatened him. 

Un the 15th Lee retired with the fourteen brigades 
of Longstreet's and D. H. Hill's commands to the en- 
virons of Sharpsburg, receiving while on the way the 
grateful news of the capture of Harper's Ferry, and 
here he determined to make a stand against McClellan, 
hoping to be able to gather his widely detached forces 
in time to receive battle. By imperative orders the 
march of his detached divisions was hastened. Jack- 
son's own division, under D. R. Jones, starting from 
Harper's Ferry at i a. m. on the i6th, reached Boteler's 
Ford at sunrise, reported for orders, and after a two 
hours' rest was assigned to its place in line of battle on 
the left of Hood ; Ewell's division, then commanded by 
Lawton, also reported early in the morning of the 
i6th, and was placed on Lawton's left; while Walk- 
er's two brigades, leaving Loudoun Heights and cross- 
ing the Shenandoah on the afternoon of the 15th, ar- 
rived early on the i6th. These three divisions brought 
an accession of ten biigades to the fourteen that Lee 
had on the afternoon of the 15th, and thus lessened 
the great disparity of force then existing between the 
two combatants. There were, however, still absent 1 
from the Confederate army the ten brigades of 
McLaws's command and the six of A. P. Hill's. 
The former, withdrawing from Pleasant Valley dur- 
ing the night and early morning of the i6th, reached 
Sharpsburg by sunrise of the 17th and were most op- 
portunely immediately put to work, while Hill, leaving 
only one brigade to finish the necessary operations of 
completing the surrender, marched with his remaining 
five at 7.30 A. M. on the 17th, and reached the battlefield 
with the head of his column at half past two in the 
afternoon, in time to oppose the farther advance of the 
Ninth Corps. The rapid marches of these brigades un- 
doubtedly produced a great amount of straggling; 



BATTLE OF ANTIETAM. 41 I 

among the Confederate soldiers, and would account 
in a great measure for the diminished strength that is 
claimed by their military authorities as the aggregate 
that stood up so bravely against the superior force of 
McClellan's army on the 17th. Nevertheless one can 
not help but pay a just tribute to the endurance of these 
courageous veterans of Lee's army, and recognize that 
their success was due as much to their expeditious 
marching under such adverse circumstances, as to their 
superb fighting qualities and the magnificent leadership 
of their general. 

In striking contrast were the advancing movements 
of McClellan's superior army. On the morning of the 
15th it was soon evident that the Confederates had 
abandoned the position at Turner's Gap, and the pur- 
suit was at once undertaken by Pleasonton's cavalry 
and the divisions of Richardson and Sykes. McClel- 
lan's orders were to attack the enemy should they be 
found in retreat, but if in position to await his arrival. 
But they made no stand until they reached the other 
side of Antietam Creek, where Lee's artillery brought 
the pursuing divisions to a halt. In the meantime 
Franklin, overawed by the inferior force of McLaws, 
and concluding from the cessation of the artillery fire 
at Harper's Ferry that the latter place had fallen, did 
nothing but report his position to McClellan, and with- 
out an effort on his part allowed McLaws to make 
good his escape on the south bank of the Potomac by 
way of Harper's Ferry bridges. Very slowly did the 
remainder of the Army of the Potomac advance to the 
borders of Antietam Creek, and the advantageous op- 
portunity of an aggressive action against Lee's small 
force on the afternoon of the 15th was lost. But cer- 
tainly there was every reason to expect that this delay 
should not extend beyond the forenoon of the next day. 

Burnside's movements on the 15th were especially 
provokingly slow. Ordered at 8 a. m., being then at 
Bolivar, the headquarters of the army, to move 
promptly on Boonsborough, and informed at 9 a. m. 
that Porter would follow him as a support, and " that 



412 GENERAL McCLELLAN. 

General McClellan desires to impress upon you the 
necessity for the utmost vigor in your pursuit," a delay 
of four hours ensued before Burnside's troops were put 
in motion, and Sykes's division was pushed ahead in 
conformity with Porter's soldierly instincts to hasten 
the advance. Although Antietam Creek was only 
about eight miles from Turner's Gap, so dilatory were 
the movements of the great bulk of the Union forces 
pursuing a defeated enemy that the concentration for 
battle against Lee was not well advanced until the night 
of the 15th, nor completed till the next morning. The 
next day was practicahy wasted, " being compelled," 
as McClellan himself says, " to spend the morning in 
reconnoitering the new position taken up by the enemy, 
examining the ground, finding fords, clearing the ap- 
proaches, and hurrying up the ammunition and supply- 
trains, which had been delayed by the rapid march of 
the troops over the few practicable approaches from 
Frederick." 

By noon of the i6th McClellan had determined 
upon his plan of battle, which, as he states, was as 
follows : " To attack the enemy's left with the corps of 
Hooker and Mansfield, supported by Sumner's, and, if 
necessary, by Franklin's ; and as soon as matters looked 
favorably there, to move the corps of Burnside against 
the enemy's extreme right upon the ridge running to 
the south and rear of Sharpsburg, and, having carried 
their position, to press along the crest toward our 
right ; and whenever either of these flank movements 
should be successful, to advance our center with all the 
forces then disposable." 

There is now no question that McClellan had suf- 
ficient means at hand to carry out the designated plan 
to a successful issue, not only on the afternoon of the 
1 6th, but even upon the morning of the 17th, when the 
whole Confederate army, save A. P. Hill's six brigades, 
w^as drawn up along the strong defensive position to 
the north and east of Sharpsburg. His failure must 
be attributed to the faulty character of his orders, tacti- 
cal mistakes, and overestimation of the strength of the 



BATTLE OF ANTIETAM. 413 

enemy ; these, combined with the siiperl^ concUict of the 
defense, where ahiiost every brigade was used to the 
utmost of its resisting quahties, will readily account for 
all the phases of the battle. And it is with respect to 
these phases only that our attention need be directed to 
comprehend the qualities of leadership that belonged 
to McClellan. 

The shortcomings of Burnside on the 15th in de- 
laying his advance undoubtedly led to the withdrawal 
of Hooker's corps from his immediate command on 
the evening of that day, and it was accordingly placed 
on the right of the army, while his own corps was sent 
to the extreme left and placed near the bridge that after- 
ward was called by his name. At 4 p. m. on the i6th 
Hooker crossed the Antietam by the bridge above 
Pry's Mill, under instructions to place his corps on the 
enemy's left, and Mansfield, with the Twelfth Corps, 
to the command of which he had been assigned at Boli- 
var, followed the First Corps some hours afterward in 
support. Sumner, with the Second Corps, was directed 
to be ready to cross at daylight the next morning, 
and the two divisions of Porter's Fifth Corps were 
designated as the main reserve to guard the center and 
the supply trains of the army. Burnside's Ninth Corps 
was intended to force the passage of the Antietam over 
the bridge and near-by fords, where the Rohersville 
road crosses to the village of Sharpsburg. The Sixth 
Corps, under Franklin, was still at Brownsville, and 
Couch's division of the Fourth Corps was directed to 
occupy Maryland Heights. Pleasonton's cavalry divi- 
sion with its horse artillery batteries was also kept in 
the center of the army near the position of Porter. 

The topographical features of the field of Antietam 
are sufiftciently delineated on the map to afiford a gen- 
eral conception of the principal phases of the battle. 
From the village of Sharpsburg several roads radiate, 
of which the more prominent are : first, the Boonsbor- 
ough Pike, by which the Confederates had retreated 
from South Mountain, and whose extension to Shep- 
ardstown on the southwest afforded the only line of 



^14 GENERAL McCLELLAN. 

retreat across the Potomac at Boteler's Ford ; second, 
the Hagerstown Pike, which, running northerly and 
nearly parallel to the direction of the Confederate de- 
fensive line, gave them the great advantage of a secure 
and easy communication for the movement of troops 
along their whole front, the extension of this road to 
the south leading to a crossing of the Antietam near its 
mouth ; and, finally, the Rohersville road, which crossed 
the Antietam at Bridge No. 3, afterward known as Burn- 
side's Bridge. The notable points to which attention 
should be directed, owing to their importance on the 
outcome of the battle, are principally these : the eleva- 
tion on Nicodemus's farm, securely held by Stuart with 
artillery, cavalry, and infantry throughout the battle, 
and whose extreme importance was never recognized 
by the Union commanders ; the West Woods, whose 
cover and natural intrenchments of outcropping lime- 
stone ledges gave the Confederates a secure holding 
that more than compensated for their lesser numbers ; 
the East Woods, and the Cornfield lying between them 
and the Hagerstown road ; the commanding ridge run- 
ning to the south from these latter woods affording 
advantageous positions for the abundant artillery with 
which the Confederate army was supplied, and which, 
with the sunken road and Piper's House on the west- 
ern and the farms of Mume and Rullet on the eastern 
slope, were the scenes of bloody struggles ; and, lastly, 
the strong defensive features of the west bank of the 
Antietam at the Burnside Bridge, by means of which 
a few hundred brave men kept for so many hours an 
entire corps from crossing. Besides the two bridges 
mentioned, there were two others. No. i on the 
Keedysville road and No. 2 on the Boonsborough 
road ; several fords also existed, of which two in the 
near vicinity of Burnside's Bridge were not known to 
the Union forces until about noon of the 17th. 

To the impetuous Hooker McClellan confided the 
initiative of the battle, directing him to cross the An- 
tietam with his corps of about twelve thousand five 
hundred and attack the Confederate left, promising 



BATTLE OF ANTIETAM. 415 

him the support of the Twelfth Corps, under Mansfield. 
This crossing was made at the upper or Keedysville 
Bridge about 4 p. m. on the i6th. Neither Hooker or 
IMcClellan knew anything of the enemy's position nor 
of the topography of the ground other than what could 
be learned from a distant view from the east side of 
the Antietam. McClellan rode forward to see Hooker 
shortly after the crossing had been made, and the latter, 
fully realizing his isolation and apprehensive lest he 
should have to fight the whole Confederate army with 
his single corps, sought to impress upon the command- 
ing general the importance of being promptly re-cn- 
forced, as well as the necessity of a simultaneous at- 
tack upon the Confederate right. Shortly before dusk 
Hooker's skirmishers came in contact with those of the 
enemy in the vicinity of the East Woods, in which 
Seymour's brigade of Meade's division found their ad- 
vance opposed by Hood's two brigades. After dark 
the firing ceased, although the opposing lines were 
very near each other, and Hooker dispatched a courier 
to inform McClellan of his progress and at the same 
time assuring him that the battle would be renewed 
at the earliest dawn, and expressing the hope that re- 
enforcements would be ordered forward in season to 
reach him before that moment. 

With this end in view, Sumner was directed to cross 
the Twelfth Corps, then commanded by the aged Gen- 
eral Mansfield, who had reported for duty and had 
been assigned to it but a day before, by the upper bridge 
in support of Hooker, and to hold the Second Corps 
in readiness to cross before daylight. The Twelfth 
Corps crossed at 2.15 a. m., and was placed in bivouac 
somewhat more than a mile in rear of the First Corps. 
Sumner, in command of the Second Corps, was also 
directed to have his command in readiness to cross by 
daybreak, but to await instructions. With his charac- 
teristic soldierly promptness he had his command ready 
to march at the appointed time, and reported himself at 
headquarters at early daylight for orders ; and although 
waiting impatiently for his instructions, with the din of 



41 6 ^^ GENERAL McCLELLAN. 

battle in his ears, it was not until twenty minutes past 
seven that he could gallop off to place himself at the 
head of his waiting troops. This unwarrantable delay 
can only be accounted for by an extraordinary in- 
efficiency of administration at general headquarters, 
which, in consideration of the extremely disastrous re- 
sults that flowed from it, can not be sufBciently con- 
demned. In the development of McClellan's plan of 
attack two other serious defects should be noted : one, 
the neglect to designate a single commander to con- 
duct the operations of the right wing, and the other the 
employment of the cavalry division to develop the ene- 
my's left. To Sumner, by virtue of his rank, the com- 
mand on the right would naturally fall, but McClel- 
lan had designated Hooker to make the attack, and I 
had assured him that he should have control of the 
troops sent to his support. From the foregoing causes 
the results that followed are merely logical conse- 
quences which could readily have been predicted by a 
master of the art of war. 

The battle on the right naturally divides itself into 
three separate phases, namely. Hooker's attack, lasting 
from about half past five till half past seven ; Mans- 
field's attack, from about seven till half past nine ; and 
Sumner's, from half past nine till about noon, when i 
Franklin's corps reached the field. Taking these in 
their order of sequence, our attention is first directed to 
Hooker in the early morning of the 17th. By 3 A. m. 
the opposing pickets began their deadly work, but it 
was- not until about half past five that the battle was 
strongly opened. At this time the three divisions of 
Hooker's corps were thus deployed : Doubleday's on 
the right, on and near the Hagerstown pike ; Meade's 
in the center, on the edge of the East Woods ; and 
Ricketts's on the left, somewhat south of the convex 
portion of the Confederate line. In Doubleday's divi- 
sion Gibbon's brigade was in advance, supported by 
those of Patrick and Phelps, with Hofmann's still far- 
ther to the rear, acting as a support to some batteries 
of artillery. In Meade's division Seymour was in ad- 



BATTLE OF ANTIETAM. 41^ 

vance in front of the East Woods, with Magilton and 
Gallagher in support, though in a short time the latter's 
brigade was sent to the right to aid Doubleday. Dur- 
yea of Ricketts's division was nearest to Seymour, then 
came Hartsuff and Christian. To oppose this line the 
disposition of the Confederates was as follows : Gen- 
eral Lee had been informed early in the afternoon of 
the 1 6th of McClellan's evident intention to attack his 
left, and to prepare for it Jackson was sent with the 
two divisions of J. R. Jones and Ewell to continue the 
Confederate line to the left of Hood, and with the lat- 
ter's two brigades oppose Hooker's advance. By six 
o'clock in the afternoon of the i6th these troops were 
in position, and the Confederate left was formed, first 
of Stuart, with Fitzhugh Lee's brigade of cavalry and 
Early's brigade of infantry supporting Stuart's horse 
and several other batteries of artillery, fourteen guns 
in all, on Nicodemus's Hill, and having Hays's brigade 
within close reach to the right and rear ; then Jones's 
division, with Jones's and Winder's brigades in the 
first line in advance of the West Woods, and Talia- 
ferro's and Starke's in the second line, under cover of 
the woods ; then next on the right came Hood's two 
brigades, which joined the brigades of Ripley, Colquitt, 
Garland, and G. B. Anderson of D. H. Hill's division. 
During the night Hood's two brigades were withdrawn 
and their places taken by Lawton's and Trimble's bri- 
gades of Ewell's division, which had been posted in 
the woods near the Dunker Church. This was for the 
purpose of enabling Hood's troops to get some rest 
and food, and was accomplished by 11 p. m. 

Hidden in the East and West Woods and in the in- 
tervening cornfield were thus emplaced ten brigades of 
the best and bravest troops of the Confederate army, 
against whom Hooker opened a direct frontal attack. 
For nearly three hours the struggle was continued, at- 
tended with terrible losses on both sides, but by that 
time Hooker's repulse had been accomplished. On the 
Union right Doubleday's division drove back Jones's 
division to his second line, but was himself afterward 
27 



4i8 



GENERAL McCLELLAN. 



compelled to fall back. Meade, in the center, drove 
Lawton's and Trimble's brigades, which had been re-en- 
forced by Hays's, out oi the cornfield, while Ricketts's, 
on the left, pushing forw^ard Hartsuff wdth Duryea's and 
Christian's brigades in support, met in conflict the bri- 
gades of Ripley, Colquitt, and Garland. Lawton, also 
in the cornfield, had been obliged to call for the speedy 
help of Hood's two brigades from the Dunker Church, 
while Early was ordered to bring his brigade from the 
extreme left to aid Lawton's division and to take com- 
mand of it, Lawton having been severely wounded. 
The timely arrival of Hood's brigade and the assist- 
ance that D. H. Hill's brigades on his right afforded, 
compelled Meade and Ricketts to retire, the former to 
the northward and the latter to the eastern edge of the 
East Woods. 

No sooner did Mansfield hear the opening of the 
battle at daylight on the 17th than orders were issued 
for the forward movement of his corps by battalions 
closed in mass. But so hastily was the movement made 
that sufficient distance had not been preserved for 
prompt deployment, and there was some delay, espe- 
cially on the part of the five new regiments of the first 
division, before his line of battle could be formed. 
While the deployment was being made Mansfield was 
mortally wounded, and the command of the corps de- 
volved upon General Williams, who, getting such hasty 
information of the situation as he could, learned that 
the whole of Hooker's corps was engaged and in des- 
perate need of assistance. He sent Crawford's brigade 
to the right, its right to rest on the Hagerstown pike, 
keeping Gordon's brigade in the center, while Greene's 
division of three brigades was directed to extend the 
line from the left of Gordon. In response to the ear- 
nest call for support from Gibbon, Goodrich's brigade 
was detached from Greene and ordered to the right to 
support Doubleday. This strengthening of Hooker's 
harassed line was accomplished between half past seven 
and eight o'clock, and for a time stopped the onset of 
the Confederates on their left, and both of the contest- 



BATTLE OF ANTIETAM. 419 

ants on this part of the field were content to hold their 
own, as neither was in a condition to advance. East 
of the turnpike from Miller's house around to Mumc's, 
the latter being then in flames, a part of Crawford's bri- 
gade, supported by Gordon's, brought timely assistance 
to the remnants of Meade's division and Duryea's bri- 
gade, which were resisting the furious onslaught of 
Hood, who by reason of this assistance was finally 
driven back from the East Woods across the already 
bloody cornfield, until his troops found shelter in the 
woods near the Dunker Church. 

Greene, with his two remaining brigades, passing 
through the southern portion of the East Woods, came 
in contact with Ripley and Colquitt, who had followed 
Ricketts into these woods. Pressing them steadily 
back and driving in disorder Garland's brigade that 
had been sent to their assistance, Greene, handling his 
weakened division with skill and great gallantry, made 
a lodgment in the West Woods just north of the 
church, where he remained until after twelve o'clock, 
despite the efforts of the enemy to drive him back. At 
the end of this phase of the battle the opposing forces 
were thus positioned : Stuart, on the extreme Confed- 
erate left, had withdrawn a short distance from his first 
position without yielding the advantage of his posi- 
tion, but Early, after assigning a single regiment for 
his support, was hastening to support Lawton's divi- 
sion. Jackson had suffered great losses and had been 
forced back to the western border of the West Woods, 
occupying the strong defensive position behind the 
rocky ledges that ran parallel to the turnpike, where 
his troops were amply covered from infantry and artil- 
lery fire ; Hood's weakened brigades were also in the 
woods near the church, and the only troops that had 
been unengaged on the Confederate left was Early's 
brigade, then hastening from Stuart's position to aid 
Jones and Lawton. The Union troops held posses- 
sion of everything east of the pike, from Miller's farm 
on the north to the Dunker Church, but the aggres- 
siveness of the two corps that had been engaged was 



420 



GENERAL McCLELLAN. 



entirely gone and only their fragments were holding 
on, eagerly awaiting the arrival of Sumner's corps, then 
near at hand ; while, on the other hand, Lee was hasten- 
ing to his endangered left the commands of Walker 
and McLaws. 

We have seen that Sumner's advance was unfor- 
tunately delayed until he received his orders at head- 
quarters at twenty minutes past seven o'clock, and it 
was therefore not until nine o'clock that his leading 
division advanced to the attack from the East Woods. 
This was Sedgwick's, and, led by Sumner, it moved 
forward in three lines in close formation with brigade 
front, both flanks practically in the air and unprotected. 
As it moved forward most of Hooker's and Williams's 
corps that held on to the Union lines drifted away, 
except Greene's two brigades on the left and a small 
fragment of Crawford's brigade on the right. Before 
being able to deploy in line of battle or to make pro- 
vision for the protection of his flanks, Sumner, con- 
fident in his ability to sweep the enemy from his 
front, and entirely unacquainted with the difficulties 
that confronted him, first met resistance from Jones's 
and Elwell's divisions in his front, while his exposed 
left flank was assailed by the fresh troops brought 
up by McLaws and Walker. With his brigades too 
close to each other to allow of deployment or to enable 
him to meet this attack on his left flank, which attack 
soon enveloped his rear, a short time only was neces- 
sary to send this splendid division, defeated, to the 
rear without its having been able to exact a fair ex- 
change from its antagonist. Thus, thanks to Sumner's 
impetuosity, faulfy tactical arrangement, and the very 
opportune arrival of the Confederate re-enforcements, 
this veteran division of the Sixth Corps suffered a 
most disastrous repulse. French's division of Sum- 
ner's corps, which should have been on Sedgwick's left 
flank, had been diverged too far to the left, and came 
into action after Sedgwick had been defeated; while 
Richardson's division, detained by headquarters' orders 
to await the arrival of Morell's division, was an hour 



Mi 



BATTLE OF ANTIETAM. 



421 



later In starting, and it also was moved to the left of 
French. The important success of the Confederate 
left, under Jackson's command, had thus put hors dc 
combat two entire corps and one division of the Army 
of the Potomac before the mid-forenoon, and although 
it had suffered fearfully in killed and wounded, it had 
experienced no loss of morale. On the other hand, 
the organization of the Union troops for any continu- 
ance of offensive operations was for the time being 
completely destroyed and the losses greatly In excess 
of those of their antagonist, and had not their artillery 
been so admirably served and courageously handled 
the whole Union right would most likely have been 
forced from the field in panic and rout. Fortunately, 
however, for the Union side, Smith's division of the 
Sixth Corps had reached Keedysvllle by ten o'clock 
and was shortly afterward ordered to the right to sup- 
port Sedgwick, just at the time when the latter's divi- 
sion was being driven from the field and the Confed- 
erate advance was on the point of seizing two of Sum- 
ner's batteries. Deploying Hancock's brigade and 
placing three batteries In Its front. Smith, with the as- 
sistance of the Twentieth Massachusetts of Sumner's 
command, succeeded in checking the Confederate ad- 
vance. Irwin's brigade, coming up later, formed on 
the left of Hancock, and Brooks's brigade, first sent 
to Sumner's right, but without the knowledge of the 
division commander, was very soon sent to French's 
support, taking position to the left of Irwin. 

The next phase of the battle, which, however, in 
part overlapped the contest against the Confederate 
left, Is that which occurred at the " Bloody Lane." 
French's division of Sumner's corps had followed 
Sedgwick's, but, as has been stated, diverged too much 
to the left to afford any support to Sedgwick, after the 
latter had advanced westward from the East Woods. 
Coming into contact with the Confederate pickets in 
the vicinity of Roulette's house, French formed his divi- 
sion with brigade front Into three lines of battle, Weber 
in advance followed by Morris, and then Kimball. 



422 



GENERAL McCLELLAN. 



Weber's right was soon struck by Manning's brigade, 
which had come from the south end of the West Woods, 
in a direction perpenditular to the Hagerstown pike, 
and was thrown into confusion, suffering great loss. 
Strengthening his line with his other two brigades, 
Manning was driven back on the right, but G. B. An- 
derson's and Rodes's brigades, in a measure protected 
by the cover of the sunken road, held French in check, 
and a stubborn but ineffectual contest was carried on 
for over three hours, during which time French suf- 
fered severely. Richardson's division of Sumner's 
corps, detained an hour after French's crossing, fol- 
lowed French's route and came up on his left, coming 
in conflict with D. H. Hill's division of five brigades, 
now re-enforced by R. H. Anderson's division with 
five additional brigades. The contest that ensued was 
long continued, considering the losses suffered by both 
sides, with a result more favorable to the Union forces 
than to the Confederates, and had McClellan put in 
his reserves across the Boonsborough Bridge at the 
time when McLaws was pushing Sedgwick back, there 
is every reason to suppose that he would have achieved 
a great victory. Serious fighting, so far as the infantry 
was concerned, ended on this part of the field by one 
o'clock. The fighting had been marked by successive 
attacks, first by French, then by Richardson, followed 
by that of Irwin's brigade of Smith's division, and 
while the losses experienced by the Confederates were 
enormous, the integrity of Lee's line was maintained. 
With regard to Burnside's attack there has been 
much controversy. The well-established facts arc, 
however, these : On the advance from Washington and 
until after the battle of South Mountain at Turner's 
Gap on the 14th, Burnside was in command of the right 
wing, comprising the First and Ninth Corps. So slow 
was he in taking up the advance on the 15th that Mc- 
Clellan expressed his dissatisfaction, and asked for an 
explanation of his delay. Whatever may have been 
the real cause, Hooker was practically detached frorn 
Burnside's immediate control and his corps was placed 



BATTLE OF ANTIETAM. 



423 



on the right of the army, while Burnside, with the 
Ninth Corps, commanded by Cox, was sent to the left 
of the army. During the operations of the 17th Burn- 
side, although present, took no active personal direc- 
tion of the movements of the Ninth Corps, contenting 
himself with transmitting such orders as he received 
to General Cox, who had succeeded General Reno in 
command. McClellan had himself visited the position 
occupied by Burnside's troops on the afternoon of the 
1 6th, and had indicated the changes he desired to have 
made in order that no unnecessary delay should occur 
the next morning in case a passage of the creek was 
ordered. The Ninth Corps comprised four divisions, 
aggregating about eleven thousand effectives, which 
certainly, if vigorously handled, would have been able 
to make a prompt crossing whatever the difficulties 
may have been that confronted it. 

There are great discrepancies as to the hour Burn- 
side was ordered to attack. Cox reports that at about 
seven o'clock he received orders from Burnside " to 
move forward the corps to the ridge nearest the An- 
tietam, and hold it, in readiness to cross the stream, 
carrying the bridge and the heights above it by as- 
sault." He also states in his official report, " About 
nine o'clock the order was received to cross the 
stream," but Burnside in his report puts the time of 
receiving this order an hour later; and Cox, in a 
very able review of the battle written years afterward, 
finds ample reason to concur with Burnside, and ad- 
duces as confirming evidence the fact that McClellan 
in his first preliminary report, dated October 15th, 
states that the order to Burnside to attack was com- 
municated to him at ten o'clock a. m. The order 
written by McClellan's aid. Colonel Ruggles, at 9.10 
A. M., bears the evident marks of a first order to attack, 
and it may be either that borne by Colonel Sackett, 
reaching Burnside about ten o'clock, or a similar one. 
It is : '' General Franklin's command is within one mile 
and a half of here. General McClellan desires you to 
open your attack. As soon as you shall have uncov- 



424 



GENERAL McCLELLAN. 



ered the upper Stone Bridge you will be supported, 
and, if necessary, on your own line of attack. So far 
all is going well." On the other hand, the diary of 
the officer, Lieutenant John M. Wilson, of the Topo- 
graphical Engineers, who carried the first order, marks 
the hour when he received it as 8 a. m., and he carried 
it immediately to Burnside within fifteen minutes. 

Certainly even at the latest time when active efforts 
were first inaugurated to carry the crossing, the force 
of the enemy defending the passage had been so re- 
duced by the withdrawal of Walker's division that 
Toombs had not more than four hundred and three 
infantrymen to resist the crossing, and, as was after- 
ward ascertained, a passable ford existed a short dis- 
tance above the bridge, which was crossed by five 
companies of Crook's brigade. Repeated and urgent 
orders followed in rapid succession for Burnside to 
carry the crossing at all hazards, for by this time Mc- 
Clellan was aware of the serious check that his right 
had experienced, but the passage was not effected until 
one o'clock. Two hours then elapsed before the Ninth 
Corps was moved forward to attack the Confederate 
right, which, though at first successful, was finally 
checked and driven back to the vicinity of the bridge 
by the arrival of A. P. Hill's five brigades, coming 
opportunely from Harper's Ferry by way of Shep- 
herdstown, to aid D. R. Jones's and Toombs's com- 
mands at a critical time. 

About the middle of the afternoon McClellan went 
to the right to confer with his commanders on that 
part of the field and determine upon a course, of action. 
He found the aspect of affairs exceedingly unpromis- 
ing, and was informed that the losses of the three corps 
that had been engaged there were very serious, so that 
he felt obliged to detach two of Porter's brigades 
from the center to re-enforce the right, which, how- 
ever, were ordered back before reaching their destina- 
tion, their assistance being afterward found not to be 
necessary. Porter's reserve furnished also six bat- 
talions of Sykes's regulars, who were pushed across 



BATTLE OF ANTIETAM. 



42s 



Bridge No. 2 to cover Pleasanton's horse batteries, 
and Warren's small brigade was sent to the right 
and rear of Burnside to support the latter. This de- 
pletion of the reserve left but about four thousand 
troops to cover the supply and ammunition trains of 
the army, and its employment as an aggressive force to 
attack the enemy's center was never contemplated after 
Hooker's defeat in the morning. While Franklin was 
in favor of again attacking after the arrival of his corps, 
Sumner was strongly opposed to it, and McClellau 
finally decided to hold the position his troops had 
gained on the right, and no further attack was made on 
this part of the field. Burnside's fight was then going 
on, and after he was driven back to the banks of the 
Antietam this sanguinary battle ended with the com- 
ing darkness. 

The night of the 17th was spent by McClellan in 
anxious deliberation as to what should be done on 
the morrow, with the result that he came to the con- 
clusion that, should he attack, success was not certain. 
By waiting till the 19th Humphreys's division of four- 
teen thousand men, mainly new troops, would be up, 
and he hoped for accessions from Pennsylvania ; his 
army could in the meantime be refreshed and recuper- 
ated, his long-ranged batteries supplied with ammuni- 
tion, and his infantry recover their morale, supposed at 
that time to be seriously affected. Doubtless he was 
also still under the conviction that Lee had a strength 
equal to his own, and he feared, should the battle go 
against him, the enemy would have a free path to in- 
vade Pennsylvania or make Baltimore or Washington 
an easily acquired objective. The i8th was' therefore 
spent by both contestants in recuperation, and by the 
tacit consent of both parties in a sort of informal 
truce while the dead were buried and the wounded 
cared for. 

During the night of the i8th Lee retreated across 
the Potomac without loss or pressure from McClellan, 
and his invasion of Maryland was brought to a close. 
His campaign had been marked by more than ordi- 



426 GENERAL McCLELLAN 

nary boldness, and although he had inflicted greater 
losses upon his enemy than he himself had suffered, 
it is nevertheless true 'that the Confederate cause had 
lost in all save prestige, valor, and endurance of its 
troops more than it gained. In the campaign Lee's 
army had lost nearly fourteen thousand men in killed, 
wounded, and missing, according to the somewhat 
unsatisfactory Confederate accounts, of which over 
eleven thousand occurred at the battle of Antietam. 
Its endurance had been severely taxed, and although 
some of its indomitable leaders, notably Jackson, be- 
lieved that it could even yet be subjected to more ex- 
traordinary efforts, Lee very wisely withdrew to the 
Shenandoah Valley for recuperation and reorganiza- 
tion, and to strengthen his army by gathering in the 
stragglers and recruits that were on their way to join. 

It is now quite well established that the strength 
of Lee's army at Antietam was about forty thousand 
men, while McClellan's numbered eighty-seven thou- 
sand one hundred and sixty-four, or more than double 
Lee's. With such disproportional numbers it would 
have seemed the height of folly for Lee to determine : 
to accept battle at Sharpsburg, and more especially 
when his determination was made on the afternoon 
of the 15th, when the greater portion of his army was 
not up and the greater Army of the Potomac was ■ 
within a day's march of his position. Upon such an 
unqualified statement of relative strength and position 
it seems almost inconceivable that McClellan should 
not have captured or destroyed Lee's army, the latter 
having its back against a river unfordable except at 
one point. But now that the existing conditions are 
well known the results that followed from them can 1 
be logically accounted for. 

In the first place, McClellan greatly overestimated I 
the strength of his enemy, having expressed his belief, 
in his communications with Halleck, that Lee had over 
one hundred and twenty thousand men. This will, in : 
a measure, account for his cautious forward move- 
ments in pursuit. But when Order No. 191 came into : 



BATTLE OF ANTIETAM. 



427 



his possession at noon of the 13th of September, giv- 
ing the organization of Lee's army and its distribution, 
it would seem that a simple study of it by any member 
of his military staff should have disabused his mind of 
this egregious error. Secondly, without again re- 
ferring to the slowness of his concentration before 
and after the battle of the passes in the South Moun- 
tains, it is difficult to account for the mental defects by 
which he gave Lee, on the afternoon of the i6th, posi- 
tive information of his intention to^attack by his right 
hours before the battle could possibly be opened. 
Third, his failure to digest thoroughly a feasible plan 
of attack in the thirty-six hours that elapsed from the 
time he found Lee in position until Hooker opened 
battle is entirely inexplicable ; and so is the fact that he 
could have been content with so indefinite and tentative 
a plan as was afterward evolved, a plan character- 
ized by the absence of any intelligent direction of a 
master mind during its progress. The consequences of 
such misdirection in handling the forces that he had at 
command were, first, to send Hooker's corps against 
an enemy prepared to meet it, whose strength, though 
numerically somewhat less, was more than made equal 
by reason of the defensive character of the position 
which they occupied. It was not until the Twelfth 
Corps had come up that the superiority on the Union 
side, so far as the number of troops engaged is con 
cerned, was established, but to offset this their tactical 
formation was so faulty, due to the haste of their arrival 
and the rawness of a portion of it-s first division, that 
they did not bring the accession of strength which their 
numbers would indicate. Besides, while their orders 
were to support Hooker, the command was really 
lodged in Sumner. Again, the delay of Sumner's attack 
was entirely the fault of some one at headquarters, 
and in addition to the great blunder he committed in 
so openly exposing his left flank, already commented 
upon, he was firmly convinced that there were no 
Union troops on the field when he crossed over to the 
West Woods, and concluded that both Hooker's and 



428 



GENERAL McCLELLAN. 



Williams's corps had been driven, entirely disorgan- 
ized, from the field. It was on account of this belief, 
which he communicated to McClellan, that he was 
so opposed to further aggressive efforts on the Union 
right that day. 

These successive attacks were met with exceptional 
courage and wonderful endurance by Jackson's sturdy 
veterans, assisted by those of D. H. Hill, Walker, and 
McLaws, as their tremendous losses testify, and while 
nearly every brigade in the Confederate army present 
on the field of battle was almost continuously engaged, 
the several Union divisions were expending their 
efforts separately and successively. The fighting at the 
center in front of Roulette's and the '' Bloody Lane " 
was desperate, but could have no adequate result com- 
mensurate with the losses it entailed on the Union side 
unless its fruits were to be gathered by an advance of 
the reserves at an opportune time, but this we know 
was not contemplated at the time. Of Burnside's 
attempt it is impossible to speak without feeling, 
not only because of its dilatory performance but be- 
cause its tactical failure to provide against the disaster 
that came to the exposed left flank. That McClellan 
was conscious of Burnside's limitations as a general 
he makes evident in a home letter, written on the after- 
noon of the 29th, in which he thus characterizes him : 
" I ought to treat Burnside very severely, and probably 
will ; yet I hate to do it. He is very slow ; is not fit to 
command more than a regiment. If I treat him as he 
deserves he will be my mortal enemy hereafter. If I 
do not praise him as he thinks he deserves, and as I 
know he does not, he will be at least a very lukewarm 
friend." 

It is difficult to analyze satisfactorily McClellan's 
mental constitution in accepting the judgment of his 
friends with reg?rd to this battle. " Those in whose 
judgment I rely," says he, ** tell me that I fought tKe 
battle splendidly and that it was a masterpiece of art." 
It does not seem possible to find any other battle ever 
fouofht in the conduct of which more errors were com- 



BATTLE OF ANTIETAM. 429 

mitted than arc clearly attributable to the commander 
of the Army of the Potomac ; and in this, the only 
battle in which throughout the whole of his career as 
a commander it may be said that he exercised personal 
direction, it can not with justice be held that he dis- 
played those rare qualities that belong per sc to the few 
men that are entitled to be called great commanders. 
" Our victory," says he on the 20th, " was complete, 
and the disorganized rebel army has rapidly returned 
to Virginia, its dreams of ' invading Pennsylvania ' dis- 
sipated forever. I feel some little pride in having, with 
a beaten and demoralized army, defeated Lee so utter- 
ly and saved the North so completely." 

If this were the expression of his deliberate judg- 
ment, and not the mere ebullition of his emotional na- 
ture reacting from the intense anxiety he experienced 
on the day of battle, nothing should have prevented 
him from immediately organizing pursuit while the 
" rebel army was disorganized." Couch's division had 
joined him on the morning of the i8th, and Hum- 
phreys's division of new troops, marching from Fred- 
erick at 3.30 p. M. on the 17th, marched all night, and 
was available on the i8th. With these accessions he 
made his dispositions to renew the attack on the 19th, 
but then found that Lee had recrossed the Potomac 
and interposed this river as a barrier between the two 
armies. 

A reconnoissance in force was pushed across the 
river on the 20th, under the direction of General Porter, 
which, achieving at first some success,, was finally with- 
drawn with considerable loss, having come into con- 
tact with A. P. Hill's division. From this time Mc- 
Clellan gave up all intention of measuring his strength 
with his adversary until he could reorganize, re-equip, 
and discipline his army. He apprehended that Lee 
would seek to re-enter Maryland, and by the 23d of 
September so far was he from considering that the 
Confederate army was disorganized, that he telegraphed 
Halleck that the enemy were receiving such accessions 
of strength that, while Harper's Ferry was occupied by 



430 



GENERAL McCLELLAN. 



Sumner with his own and WilHams's corps, he thought 
Sumner would be able to hold the position till re- 
enforcements should arrive. And on the 27th he ex- 
pressed the opinion '' that the army was not then in 
a condition to undertake another campaign nor to 
bring on another battle, unless great advantages are 
offered by some mistake of the enemy, or pressing 
military exigencies render it necessary." He an- 
nounced as his purpose to hold the army in such a 
position that he could watch the various crossings of 
the Potomac, rendering Harper's Ferry secure, intend- 
ing to use it as a dcbottche to move upon Winchester 
when the river rose to such a degree as to make it 
hazardous for Lee to attempt an invasion of Maryland, 
or to move himself upon some other line as circum- 
stances might justify. In the meantime he proposed 
to equip, organize, and discipline his army to prepare 
for the campaign, and asked for all the re-enforcements 
that the Government could supply. 

This cautious policy caused the authorities at 
Washington to apprehend that the good weather favor- 
able for campaigning would pass before McClellan 
would be ready to move, and that there would be a 
repetition of the experiences of the fall of 1861. To 
satisfy himself of the exact conditions Mr. Lincoln de- 
termined to visit the army, and on the ist of October 
he was received with appropriate ceremonies by the 
commander of the Army of the Potomac, and remained 
with the army several days. Shortly after his return 
to Washington Halleck sent McClellan the order of 
October 6th, which evidently embodied the results of 
his observations and the conclusions at which he had 
arrived from all that came under his notice. It was 
as follows : ** The President directs that you cross the 
Potomac and give battle to the enemy or drive him 
south. Your army must move now while the roads 
are good. If you cross the river between the enemy 
and Washington, and cover the latter by your opera- 
tion, you can be re-enforced with thirty thousand men. 
If you move up the Valley of the Shenandoah, not more 



BATTLE OF ANTIETAM. 



43 



than twelve thousand or fifteen thousand can be sent 
to you. The President advises the interior hne between 
Washington and the enemy, but does not order it. He 
is ver}^ desirous that your army move as soon as pos- 
sible. You will immediately report what line you 
adopt and when you intend to cross the river ; also to 
what point the re-enforcements are to be sent. It is 
necessary that the plan of your operations be posi- 
tively determined on before orders are given for build- 
ing bridges and repairing railroads. I am directed 
to add that the Secretary of War and the general 
in chief fully concur with the President in these in- 
structions." 

This order was received by McClellan on the 7th 
and could not be disregarded, nor was there any dis- 
position on his part to do so, but there were indis- 
pensable supplies of clothing and other necessaries 
needed to equip the army for an advance, and upon 
consultation with his chief quartermaster it was ex- 
pected that three days would be sufBcient to supply 
these deficiencies, as well as to remount his cavalry, 
which at the time was in a very sad state of inefficiency. 
Delays in transportation of the supplies asked for in- 
tervened arising from various causes, and it was not 
until about October 226. that these supplies and re- 
mounts began to arrive in sufficient abundance to war- 
rant the issuance of instructions for the contemplated 
movement. But during this delay the impression grew 
in Washington that McClellan was again affiicted with 
the " slows " or that he intended to delay so long that 
the inclement weather would intervene to forbid any ac- 
tive campaign in the fall. As a preliminary to the crys- 
tallization in the mind of Mr. Lincoln of the decision 
to remove McClellan from the command of the Army 
of the Potomac, the answer of the latter to the order 
of October 6th, and Mr. Lincoln's critical response a 
week afterward, have an important bearing. McClel- 
lan, addressing Halleck, says :* " After a full consulta- 

* Official War Records, vol. xix, part i, p. 11. 



432 



GENERAL McCLELLAN. 



tion with the corps commanders in my vicinity, I have 
determined to adopt the Hne of the Shenandoah for 
immediate operations 'against the enemy, now near 
Winchester. On no other Hne north of Washington 
can the army be suppHed, nor can it on any other cover I 
Maryland and Pennsylvania. Were we to cross the 
river below the mouth of the Shenandoah, we would 
leave it in the power of the enemy to recross into 
Maryland, and thus check the movements. In the 
same case w^e would voluntarily give him the advan- 
tage of the strong line of the Shenandoah, no point of 
which could be reached by us in advance of him. I 
see no objective point of strategical value to be gained 
or sought for by a movement between the Shenan- 
doah and Washington. I wish to state distinctly that 
I do not regard the line of the Shenandoah Valley as 
important for ulterior objects. It is important only 
so long as the enemy remains near Winchester, and we 
can not follow that line far beyond that point simply 
because the country is destitute of supplies, and we 
have not sufficient means of transportation to enable us 
to advance more than twenty or twenty-five miles be- 
yond a railway or canal terminus. If the enemy aban- 
don Winchester and fall back upon Staunton, it will 
be impossible for us to pursue him by that route, and 
we must then take a new line of operations, based upon 
water or railway communication. The only possible 
object to be gained by an advance from this vicinity is 
to fight the enemy near Winchester. If they retreat 
we have nothing to gain by pursuing them : in fact, can 
not do so to any great distance. The objects I pro- 
pose to myself are, to fight the enemy if they remain 
near Winchester, or, failing in that, to force them to 
abandon the Valley of the Shenandoah ; then to adopt 
a new and decisive line of operations which shall strike 
at the heart of the rebellion. 

" I have taken all possible measures to insure the 
most prompt equipment of the troops, but from all that 
I can learn it will be at least three days before the 
First, Fifth, and Sixth Corps are in condition to move 



BATTLE OF ANTIETAM. 



433 



from their present camps. They need shoes and other 
indispensable articles of clothing, as well as shelter- 
tents, etc. I beg to assure you that not an hour shall 
be lost in carrying your instructions into effect. Please 
send the re-enforcements to Harper's Ferry. I would 
prefer that the new regiments be sent as regiments, not 
brigaded, unless already done so with old troops. I 
would again ask for Peck's division, and, if possible, 
Heintzelman's corps. If the enemy gives fight near 
Winchester it will be a desperate affair, requiring all 
our resources. I hope that no time will be lost in send- 
ing forward the re-enforcements, that I may get them 
in hand as soon as possible." 

To which Mr. Lincoln replied i"^ " My dear Sir : You 
remember my speaking to you of what I called your 
overcautiousness. Are you not overcautious when 
you assume that you can not do what the enemy is 
constantly doing? Should you not claim to be at 
least his equal in prowess, and act upon the claim ? As 
I understand, you telegraphed General Halleck that 
you can not subsist your army at Winchester unless 
the railroad from Harper's Ferry to that point be put 
in working order. But the enemy does now subsist 
his army at Winchester, at a distance nearly twice as 
great from railroad transportation as you would have 
to do, without the railroad last named. He now 
wagons from Culpeper Court House, which is just 
about twice as far as you would have to do from Har- 
per's Ferry. He is certainly not more than half as 
well provided with wagons as you are. I certainly 
should be pleased for you to have the advantage of 
the railroad from Harper's Ferry to Winchester, but 
it wastes all the remainder of autumn to give it to you, 
and in fact ignores the question of time, which can 
not and must not be ignored. Again, one of the stand- 
ard maxims of war, as you know, is to ' operate upon 
the enemy's communications as much as possible with- 
out exposing your own.' You seem to act as if this 

* Official War Records, vol. xix, part i, p. 13. 
28 



434 



GENERAL McCLELLAN. 



applies against you, but can not apply in your favor. 
Change positions with the enemy, and think you not 
he would break your communication with Richmond 
within the next twenty-four hours? You dread his 
going into Pennsylvania, but if he does so in full force 
he gives up his communications to you absolutely, 
and you have nothing to do but follow and ruin him. 
If he does so with less than full force, fall upon and 
beat what is left behind all the easier. Exclusive of 
the water line you are now nearer Richmond than the 
enemy is by the route that you can and he must take. 
Why can you not reach there before him, unless you 
admit that he is more than your equal on a march? 
His route is the arc of a circle, while yours is the chord. 
The roads are as good on yours as on his. You know 
I desired but did not order you to cross the Potomac 
below instead of above the Shenandoah and Blue 
Ridge. My idea was that this would at once menace 
the enemy's communications, which I would seize if 
he would permit. 

'* If he should move northward I would follow him 
closely, holding his communications. If he should 
prevent our seizing his communications and move 
toward Richmond, I would press closely to him ; fight 
him, if a favorable opportunity should present, and at 
least try to beat him to Richmond on the inside track. 
I say ' try ' ; if we never try we shall never succeed. 
If he makes a stand at Winchester, moving neither 
north nor south, I would fight him there, on the idea 
that if we can not beat him when he bears the wastage 
of coming to us, we never can when we bear the wast- 
age of going to him. This proposition is a simple 
truth, and is too important to be lost sight of for a 
moment. In coming to us he tenders us an advantage 
which we should not waive. We should not so operate 
as to merely drive him away. As we must beat him 
somewhere or fail finally, we can do it, if at all, easier 
near to us than far away. If we can not beat the 
enemy where he now is, we never can, he again being 
within the intrenchments of Richmond. 



li 



BATTLE OF ANTIETAM. 



435 



" Recurring to the idea of going to Richmond on 
the inside track, the faciUty of supplying from the side 
away from the enemy is remarkable — as it were by the 
difYerent spokes of a wheel, extending from the hub 
toward the rim, and this whether you move directly by 
the chord or on the inside arc, hugging the Blue Ridge 
more closely. The chord line, as you see, carries you 
by Aldie, Hay Market, and Fredericksburg; and you 
see how turnpikes, railroads, and finally the Potomac, 
by Aquia Creek, meet you at all points from Washing- 
ton ; the same, only the lines lengthened a little, if you 
press closer to the Blue Ridge part of the way. 

'' The gaps through the Blue Ridge I understand 
to be about the following distances from Harper's 
Ferry, to wit : Vestal's, five miles ; Gregory's, thirteen ; 
Snicker's, eighteen ; Ashby's, twenty-eight ; Manassas, 
thirty-eight ; Chester, forty-five ; and Thornton's, fifty- 
three. I should think it preferable to take the route 
nearest the enemy, disabling him to make an important 
move without your knowledge, and compelling him 
to keep his forces together for dread of you. The 
gaps would enable you to attack if you should wish. 
For a great part of the way you would be practically 
between the enemy and both Washington and Rich- 
mond, enabling us to spare you the greatest number 
of troops from here. When at length running for 
Richmond ahead of him enables him to move this 
way, if he does so, turn and attack him in the rear. 
But I think he should be engaged long before such 
point is reached. It is all easy if our troops march as 
well as the enemy, and it is unmanly to say they can 
not do it. This letter is in no sense an order." 

To understand McClellan's frame of mind at this 
time it is necessary to consider the problem as he 
understood it. During the early part of October the 
Potomac was low and presented no serious obstacle 
for the passage of Lee's army into Maryland, and Mc- 
Clellan constantly had in mind this possibility on the 
part of Lee. He therefore had all the possible cross- 
ings watched, and distributed the principal fractions of 



43^ 



GENERAL McCLELLAN. 



his army for rapid and easy concentration to meet 
such a contingency. Had his army received the sup- 
pHes that "he deemed necessary for an advance by the 
early part of the month, it was his intention to direct 
it against Winchester and endeavor to bring Lee 
to battle. But by the time that his supplies were 
beginning to arrive in sufficient quantities the season 
in which heavy rains would be likely to make the Po- 
tomac a serious obstacle against the invasion of Mary- 
land had arrived, and he determined to adopt the in- 
terior line between the Blue Ridge and the Potomac 
for his advance, which would enable him to supply his 
army from Harper's Ferry and Berlin until he reached 
the Manassas Gap Railroad. He also deemed it neces- 
sary to leave a considerable force to guard the Poto- 
mac and the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad while this 
movement was in progress. This line of operations 
was that suggested by the President, and McClellan's 
change to it, while no doubt gratifying, may possibly 
have also had the effect of strengthening the belief in 
Washington that McClellan's conduct of affairs was 
both irresolute and indecisive. 

This lack of confidence in McClellan's leadership 
was further accentuated by the success which attended 
the raid conducted by that bold and venturesome Con- 
federate cavalry leader, General J. E. B. Stuart, who 
a second time made a complete circuit around the rear 
of the Army of the Potomac and escaped without loss 
or disaster, after causing considerable destruction of 
Government stores at Chambersburg in Pennsylvania. 
All the available cavalry were sent in pursuit or to 
intercept Stuart, and explicit orders were sent to the 
commanding officers of troops near the ^ point where 
Stuart was likely to recross the Potomac in the expecta- 
tion that he would be destroyed. But unfortunately dis- 
ease and overwork had at this time broken down much 
of McClellan's cavalry, and a great portion was distrib- 
uted over a long line on outpost service, while the orders 
for the disposition of the two brigades at the Monocacy 
crossing to intercept Stuart were not carried out. 



I 



McCLELLAN'S FINAL REMOVAL. 437 

The Army of the Potomac began its movement 
south on the 26th of October by the crossing of two 
divisions of the Ninth Corps and Pleasonton's brigade 
of cavalry at BerHn and the occupation of Lovetts- 
ville. By the 2d of November the whole army was 
across and well on its way toward Warrenton, which 
was made the directing point for the advance, seizing 
in succession the several passes of the Blue Ridge as 
it advanced, and its fractions being held within support- 
ing distance so that it could readily be concentrated 
for battle. During this movement Lee separated 
Longstrect and Jackson, the latter remaining in the 
lower Shenandoah Valley, while the former, emerging 
from it at Front Royal, kept his outposts in contact 
with the advance of the Union army, while with his 
main body he covered Culpeper and Gordonsville. By 
this disposition, although Jackson was ultimately sepa- 
rated more than forty miles from Longstreet, he had 
a secure route up the Valley by which he could 
make junction with Longstreet unless McClellan by 
a rapid movement should be able to intercept him, 
and at the same time had a position from which, by 
forcing a gap of the Blue Ridge, he might threaten 
McClellan's communications should the latter advance 
suf^ciently far in pursuit of Longstreet. It was by 
such bold and apparently hazardous dispositions that 
Lee, relying on the resisting power of Longstreet and 
Jackson's celerity of movement and aggressiveness, 
hoped to discomfit his cautious and slow-moving ad- 
versary. 

On the 7th of November the Army of the Potomac 
was thus situated : The First, Second, and Fifth Corps, 
reserve artillery and general headquarters, at Warren- 
ton ; the Ninth Corps on the line of the Rappahan- 
nock in the vicinity of Waterloo ; the Sixth Corps at 
New Baltimore ; the Eleventh Corps (which, under 
Sigel's command, had joined the army from the de- 
fenses of Washington) at New Baltimore, Gainesville, 
a'nd Thoroughfare Gap ; Sickles's division (also from 
Washington) of the Third Corps from Manassas June- 



438 GENERAL McCLELLAN. 

tion to Warrenton Junction on the railroad ; Pleason- 
ton's cavalry command at Amissville, and Jefferson 
with his pickets at Ha^el River, six miles from Cul- 
peper, facing Longstreet ; Bayard, with a brigade of 
cavalry, near Rappahannock Station. The army was 1 
thus massed near Warrenton, and, according to Mc- 
Clellan's own opinion, perfectly in hand, ready to act 
in any required direction, and in admirable condition 
and spirits. 

It would be futile to conjecture what might have 
happened had McClellan been continued in command 
of the Army of the Potomac until the close of the 
campaigning season. Notwithstanding the fact that he 
had a concentrated army in the vicinity of Warrenton, 
his' alert adversary had as yet not yielded to him any 
advantage as to the military situation that he might 
not with boldness more than recover. For though 
the two wings of Lee's army were so far separated 
as to distance, the roads flanking the Massanutten 
Mountains in the upper Shenandoah Valley, with the 
passage through the Blue Ridge at Swift Run Gap, 
would have enabled Jackson to unite with Longstreet, 
while the latter could offer sufhcient resisting power 
in falling back to enable Lee to select his own battle- 
field, where with his combined forces he could offer 
defensive battle with his base at Staunton. This issue 
was, however, not then to be tried, for late in the even- 
ing McClellan received the order relieving him from 
command of the Army of the Potomac, and directing 
him to turn it over to his successor. General Burn- 
side. This act, when completed, terminated his career 
as a military commander.- 

This action on the part of the Administration, 
though unexpected, was not wholly unforeseen by Mc- 
Clellan. He had almost ever since the battle of An- 
tietam felt that he was misjudged and out of sympathy 
with the President and the general in chief ; and as for 
the Secretary, ever since the 2d of September there 
had been no correspondence whatever of a personal 
character, while that of an offtcial nature had been j 



McCLELLAN'S FINAL REMOVAL. 430 

rigidly formal. During the march from the Potomac 
he had taken especial pains to keep Burnside near him 
and to inform him of the daily movements of the corps 
of the army, so that he would be able to continue the 
administration should it become necessary. He had 
also on the morning of the 7th heard of the coming 
of the special train bearing General Buckingham, the 
adjutant general of the Secretary, and suspected his 
mission. He was not, therefore, overmuch surprised 
when the rnessage of his relief was handed to him, 
although it was the severest blow that his arnotir propre 
could possibly receive. However, he accepted it like a 
good and faithful soldier, a loyal patriot, and a Chris- 
tian gentleman, for he was ever all of these ; and while 
possibly many intemperate expressions were indulged 
in by hot-headed partisans, and much sincere grief 
and distress were felt throughout the army, nothing 
happened to bring discredit upon it, or to sully its 
devoted loyalty to the cause for which it had been 
called into being. In bidding farewell to the army he 
thus addressed them : 

Officers and Soldiers of the Army of the Potomac: 

An order of the President devolves upon Major- General 
Burnside the command of this army. In parting from you 
I can not express the love and gratitude I bear to you. As 
an army you have grown up under my care. In you I have 
never found doubt or coldness. The battles you have fought 
under my command will proudly live in our nation's history. 
The glory you have achieved, our mutual perils and fatigues, 
the graves of our comrades fallen in battle and by disease, 
the broken forms of those whom wounds and sickness have 
disabled — the strongest associations which can exist among 
men — unite us still by an indissoluble tie. We shall ever be 
comrades in supporting the Constitution of our country and 
the nationality of its people. 

It was very difficult to understand the causes that 
brought about the relief of McClellan at that particular 
time, when to all appearances he was in the prosecution 
of a campaign that offered more promise than any that 
he had heretofore undertaken, and it was not until long 
afterward that it was found to be the act of the Presi- 



440 ^^^ GENERAL McCLELLAN. 

dent himself, in accord with a determination that he 
had reached and which is expressed in the language 
of his biographers as .follows : *' He began to think, 
before the end of October, that McClellan had no real 
desire to beat the enemy. He set in his own mind the 
limit of his forbearance. He adopted for his guidance 
a test, which he communicated to no one until long 
afterward, on which he determined to base his final 
judgment of McClellan, If he should permit Lee to 
cross the Blue Ridge and place himself between Rich- 
mond and the Army of the Potomac he would remove 
him from command. When it was reported at Wash- 
ington that Lee and Longstreet were at Culpeper 
Court House, the President sent an order, dated the 
5th of November, to General McClellan, which reached 
him at Rectortown on the 7th, directing him to report 
for further orders at Trenton, N. J., and to turn the 
command of the Army of the Potomac over to General 
Burnside." 

An act so important as this, the relief of the com- 
mander of the Army of the Potomac at such a time, 
could scarcely be due alone to an emotional impulse 
on the part of the President, as stated above, but rather 
to a combination of many causes, all tending to cul- 
minate upon an inevitably approaching meridian. And 
it is only in a general way that the trend of these 
causes can be pointed out, so inextricably intermingled 
are the influences that control the leaders of men with 
those of the masses whom they lead and those who 
range themselves in antagonism. Upon Mr. Lin- 
coln's shoulders was laid the heaviest burden ever 
borne by the lawful ruler of any nation, and " with 
charity toward all and malice toward none," he sought 
the help of Divine Providence to execute his mission 
with complete self-sacrifice, even to martyrdom, that 
the nation might be saved and liberty reign triumphant. 
By virtue of his ofiice he was the commander in chief 
of the armed forces of the republic, and in the exercise 
of this function he sought able and efficient instru- 
ments to gain success in the field, so that he might be 



McCLELLAN'S FINAL REMOVAL. 



441 



able to fulfill the requirements of his oath of office as 
President over the whole of the national domain. 

We have seen how fully he gave McClellan his 
confidence and support from the time of the latter's 
assignment to the command of the Army of the Poto- 
mac until the disaster at Ball's Bluff ; then came ad- 
monitions to him in private to do something, while 
publicly he defended him from the criticisms that then 
began to be made ; then during the Peninsular cam- 
paign the letters of friendly advice and gentle admo- 
nition, and even when the general in the bitterness of 
defeat had passionately charged the Administration 
with sacrificing " this army," he had forborne justly to 
rebuke this unwarranted lapse of soldierly conduct on 
the part of his subordinate, but told him that he did 
not expect impossibilities. The failure of the Penin- 
sular campaign segregated the opponents of McClel- 
lan, who then gave voice to hostile criticism, to a de- 
nunciation of his military policy, and to a denial of his 
professional ability. These were followed by others, 
even men in high places, who should have known 
better, who sought to defame him by charging that he 
designedly delayed the withdrawal of his army from 
the Peninsula that his rival, General Pope, might suffer 
defeat ; so that during the last days of August he had 
lost the support of every member of the Cabinet, the 
general in chief, and almost every influential man in 
Washington, and it may be said, even the confidence of 
Mr. Lincoln himself, so widely had the poison of un- 
justified detraction and suspicion been spread. That 
Mr. Lincoln believed that McClellan and some of his 
friends in the Army of the Potomac had failed in their 
duty owing to professional jealousy, is undoubtedly 
true, and it must ever be a sad reflection that he did not 
live to see the injustice of this belief. Though this may 
have had, and doubtless did have, its influence in dis- 
paraging McClellan, yet he desired above all things at 
this time military success. From every point of view 
it was absolutely essential, and believing that its pos- 
sibility lay in McClellan's hands he again gave him 



^^2 ^^ GENERAL McCLELLAN. 

support, but almost at the cost of his own political for- 
tunes. The long and to him inexplicable delay after 
the battle of Antietam,* and the evident purpose as in- 
terpreted by him that this delay was intended to last 
till the winter should come to prevent an advance, had 
full force in weakening his confidence. In addition 
to these things there was the fact that McClellan's ad- 
herents, as well as McClellan himself, were politically 
opposed to him and to the party that was aggressive 
.in carrying on the war ; this was made evident by Mc- 
Clellan's Harrison Bar letter and the tenor of his order 
to the army upon the emancipation proclamation, as 
well as the current rumors of the character and tone of 
what was said at McClellan's headquarters, all of which 
was not made less obnoxioiis in its transmission to the 
partisans of the Administration in Washington. 

* In an important letter, now before the writer, on the strat- 
egy of the approaching spring campaign, Henry W. Halleck, 
general in chief, writes to Grant, then in Nashville, Tenn., in 
February, 1864. "Lee's army is by far the best in the rebel 
service, and I regard him as their ablest general. But little 
progress can be made here till that army is broken or defeated. 
There have been several good opportunities to do this, viz., at 
Antietam, at Chancellorsville, and at Williamsport — in the re- 
treat from Gettysburg. I am also of the opinion that General 
Meade could have succeeded recently at Mine Run, had he per-' 
severed in his attack." — Editor. 



CHAPTER XV. 

CANDIDATE FOR THE PRESIDENCY. GOVERNOR. 

MILITARY AND PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS. 

McClellan remained at the headquarters of the 
army for a few days to give such assistance to Burn- 
side in taking over the command of the army as was 
necessary, conducting himself in this exceedingly deli- 
cate situation with his habitual courtesy and gentle- 
manly consideration toward his successor. In obe- 
dience to his instructions he then proceeded to Trenton 
to await the orders of the Government, and shortly 
afterward established his home at Orange, N. J., where 
for a time he was occupied in preparing his ofilicial 
report of the operations of the Army of the Potomac 
while under his command. As a major general of the 
regular army he was still subject for any military duty 
at the pleasure of the Government, and pending such 
assignment he remained unobtrusively at home, a loyal 
and subordinate soldier. Whatever hope he may have 
cherished in this interim that he would again be called 
upon to command one of the armies of his country, 
must have soon been dispelled by the fact that the 
Administration completely ignored his existence, even 
after the disasters of Fredericksburg and Chancellors- 
ville had demonstrated that his successors had been 
much more unsuccessful than he. 

The gloomiest period of the war now began to over- 
shadow the Administration, and to darken the hopes 
of those who were anxious for the success of the Union 
cause. From every quarter Confederate victories were 
reported, and there seemed to be no end to the re- 
verses attending the Union arms. The Confederate 



443 



I 



444 



GENERAL McCLELLAN. 



ranks appeared to be kept constantly full by their effi- 
cient conscription, and it was inevitable that the Ad- 
ministration must sosn have recourse to the draft to 
repair the wastage of battle and disease, since the num- 
bers volunteering for enlistment became about this 
time so small as to be alarming. Accordingly such 
an act was passed March 3, 1863, and while it accom- 
plished its main purpose, it was accompanied by such 
opposition as to weaken the support of the Adminis- 
tration throughout the country. The results of the 
State elections in the fall of 1862 had indicated a less- 
ened confidence in the Administration, attributable in 
part to the Emancipation Proclamation of Mr. Lin- 
coln, and the same trend of changed public opinion] 
was manifested in the spring elections of 1863 in New 
Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Connecticut. The op- 
position, thus gathering strength in numbers, gained! 
confidence that the people were ready to change the 
Administration at the next presidential election, and its 
leaders began to scan the political horizon to discern 1 
the approach of that leader under whose banner suc- 
cess might be won. 

Among military men, McClellan stood pre-emi- 
nently above all others as an available candidate of the: 
Democratic party, and he was especially championed I 
by those members of the party who advocated the 
prosecution of the war for the restoration of the Unioni 
as it was. Many of these still regarded him as a gen- 
eral of exceptional talent, whose plans would have been 1 
carried to a successful issue had they not been malevo- 
lently interfered with by the Secretary of War, upon 
whose shoulders they cast all the responsibility for 
every failure. They regarded McClellan's Harrison 
Bar letter as an able State paper, approved of the im- 
plied censure of the Administration embodied in the 
language of the order he issued to the army relating 
to Mr. Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation, and of' 
the whole tenor of his conduct while in active com- 
mand in opposition to the radical measures of both ' 
Cabinet and Congress. They believed, and with truth, 



CANDIDATE FOR THE PRESIDENCY. 



445 



that he possessed the strongest affections of the sol- 
diers of his army, but erroneously imagined that this 
bond could safely be counted upon to add the whole 
soldier vote to his strength at the polls. But in the 
ranks of the opposition there were also great numbers 
of '' peace " men, who were antagonistic to the war 
upon every ground. They were in reality Southern 
sympathizers, rejoicing in every Confederate victory 
and cast down with every Union success ; they discour- 
aged enlistments, denounced the draft as unconstitu- 
tional, and seized upon every pretext to belittle and 
misjudge the acts and purposes of the Administration; 
in every possible indirect way they gave aid and com- 
fort to the enemy. The arrest by military authority, 
and the trial and condemnation by a military court, 
of Clement L. Vallandigham, the most pronounced 
exemplar of these ultrapeace men, followed by the Ex- 
ecutive order for his expulsion beyond the Union lines, 
aroused the utmost excitement as being an invasion 
of the right of habeas corpus, and furnished the op- 
position with abundant ammunition to assail the Presi- 
dent and his administration. 

The political canvass for the State election in Penn- 
sylvania in the autumn of 1863 was very active, espe- 
cially with regard to the candidates for the governor- 
ship. The Republican candidate, Andrew G. Curtin, 
was standing for re-election, seeking the suffrage of 
the electors on his record as war Governor. His com- 
petitor. Judge George W. Woodward, the Democratic 
candidate, was one of the justices of the Supreme Court 
of Pennsylvania, who held that the enrolling act was 
unconstitutional, and that the Federal Government had 
no power to recruit its armies otherwise than by volun- 
tary enlistments. Up to this time General McClellan 
had refrained from publicly expressing any opinion 
with regard to State and National party politics, and 
although he probably very well knew that he could not 
much longer continue to maintain such an attitude, it 
was very distressing to many of his personal friends 
that his first public step into political life should have 



446 



GENERAL McCLELLAN. 



been signalized by the letter he wrote October 12, 
1863, to the Hon. Charles J. Biddle, in support of the 
candidacy of Judge Woodward. In it he says : 

Dear Sir: My attention has been called to an article ir 
the Philadelphia Press asserting that I had written to the 
managers of a Democratic meeting at Allentown, disapprov- 
ing the objects of the meeting, and that if I voted or spoke 
it would be in favor of Governor Curtin, and I am informed 
that similar assertions have been made throughout the State. 
It has been my earnest endeavor heretofore to avoid par- 
ticipation in party politics. I had determined to adhere to 
this course, but it is obvious that I can not longer maintain 
silence under such misrepresentations. I therefore request 
you to deny that I have written any such letter or enter- 
tained any such views as those attributed to me in the Phila- 
delphia Press; and I desire to state clearly and distinctly that' 
having some days ago had a full conversation with Judge 
Woodward, I find that our views agree, and I regard his 
election as Governor of Pennsylvania called for by the in- 
terests of the nation. 

I understand Judge Woodward to be in favor of the prose- 
cution of the war with all the means at the command of the 
loyal States, until the military power of the rebellion is de- 
stroyed. I understand him to be of the opinion that, while 
the war is urged with all possible decision and energy, the 
policy directing it should be in consonance with the prin- 
ciples of humanity and civilization, working no injury to 
private rights and property not demanded by military neces- 
sity and recognized by military law among civilized nations. 
And, finally, I understand him to agree with me in the opin- 
ion that the sole great objects of this war are the restoration 
of the unity of the nation, the preservation of the Constitu- 
tion, and the supremacy of the laws of the country. Believing 
our opinions entirely agree upon these points, I would, were 
it in my power, give to Judge Woodward my voice and vote. 

Had McClellan been actuated alone by the very 
natural resentment arising in his mind from having 
erroneous views and intentions publicly attributed to 
him, he might well have been content with the simple 
denial embodied in the first part of his letter, and justi- 
fied himself from proceeding further on the ground 
of his connection with the military service. By adding 
to his denial the remainder of his letter he actually 
placed himself in the political field as a possible presi- 
dential candidate in opposition to Mr. Lincoln, and it 



CANDIDATE FOR THE PRESIDENCY. 



447 



was not long before this posture was distinctly recog- 
nized, not only by the political leaders of all the parties 
but by the people themselves. 

The Union successes at Gettysburg and Vicksburg 
in July, 1863, marked the turn in the tide of battle, and 
justified the hope that the Confederate cause was per- 
ceptibly beginning to wane. But the period of reac- 
tion which set in after the failure of Grant to destroy 
Lee's army and capture Richmond in the summer of 
1864 revived the hopes of the opposition for the com- 
ing political contest. They believed that the people were 
becoming disheartened by the tremendous losses in Vir- 
ginia, which seemed to be attended with no adequate 
compensation. Public sentiment apparently was rapidly 
veering to a serious contemplation of the question 
whether it would not be justifiable to undertake nego- 
tiations for a peace of some kind with the Confederate 
authorities, and various abortive attempts of this kind 
were made. This feeling of general despondency pre- 
vailed about the time when the party conventions were 
due to nominate candidates for the fall election of 
1864, and lasted nearly to the end of the summer. 
The first of these, that of the Radical Democracy, met 
at Cleveland, May 31st, and nominated General John 
C. Fremont as its candidate for the presidency; this 
was followed, June 7th, by the Republican Convention 
nominating Mr. Lincoln for a second term. The 
Democratic Convention, originally called to meet July 
4th, postponed the day of meeting until August 29th, 
in the hope that circumstances might happen in the 
interim to increase the numbers of the disaffected and 
more certainly insure its success at the polls. When 
it met at Chicago at the appointed time its component 
elements were found to comprise many men of ex- 
ceedingly diverse views, whose coalescence was a prob- 
lem of" great difficulty. Among these were peace men 
of the most pronounced type, rabid defamers of the 
actions of the President, strict constructionists of the 
Constitution, and all shades of War Democrats. The 
Committee on Resolutions, whose duty it was to formu- 



, ^ 

448 ^^^ GENERAL McCLELLAN. 

late the platform upon which to wage the political 
battle, was captured by the ultrapeace men, and it was 
apparently their endeavor to construct such a plat- 
form that it would be impossible for any advocate of 
the war to stand upon it. Particularly obnoxious was 
the second resolution adopted by the convention, which 
was as follows : 

" Resolved, That this convention does explicitly de- 
clare, as the sense of the American people, that, after 
four years of failure to restore the Union by the ex- 
periment of war, during: which, under the pretense of 
a military necessity of a war power higher than the 
Constitution, the Constitution itself has been disre- 
garded in every part, and public liberty and private 
right alike trodden down, and the material prosperity 
of the country essentially impaired, justice, humanity, 
liberty, and the public welfare demand that immediate 
efforts be made for a cessation of hostilities, with a; 
view to an ultimate convention of all the States, or 
other peaceable means, to the end that, at the earliest 
practicable moment, peace may be restored on the 
basis of the Federal Union of the States." 

Nevertheless, although the convention had been 
governed by the ultrapeace men in the construction 
of its platform, the War Democrats controlled its nomi- 
nation for the presidency, and accordingly, as had been 
prearranged by them, General George B. McClellan 
was chosen on the first ballot as the nominee of the. 
Democratic party. 

The nomination and platform having thus such an- 
tagonistic sources for their origin seemed impossible 
of adjustment, for, in view of his record during the 
rebellion and his very recent expressions advocating, 
the prosecution of the war, McClellan could not stand 
upon such a platform without the most complete stulti- 
fication. This the ultrapeace men knew quite well, and 
they had hoped to see the prize bestowed upon one of 
themselves, whose views and utterances would be ham- 
pered by no such discrepancy. On the 15th of June, 
less than three months before this convention had 



CANDIDATE FOR THE PRESIDENCY. 449 

enunciated its platform, McClellan had delivered a 
finished oration at West Point before the officers and 
cadets of the Military Academy, at the dedication of 
a site upon which was to be erected a monument in 
memory of the officers and men of the regular army 
who had fallen in battle during- the rebellion. In this 
carefully studied oration he gave expression to senti- 
ments of that steadfast devotion to the Union and 
sturdy loyalty that were fundamentally antagonistic to 
the unpatriotic resolution above quoted. Among other 
things, he said : 

*' Rebellion against a government like ours, which 
contains the means of self-adjustment and a pacific 
remedy for evils, should never be confounded with a 
revolution against despotic power, which refuses re- 
dress of wrongs. Such a rebellion can not be justified 
upon ethical grounds, and the only alternative for our 
choice is its suppression or the destruction of our na- 
tionality. At such a time as this, and in such a struggle, 
political partisanship should be merged in a true and 
brave patriotism, which thinks only of the good of the 
whole country. 

" It was in this cause and with these motives that 
so many of our comrades gave their lives ; and to this 
we are all personally pledged in all honor and fidelity. 
Shall such a devotion as that of our dead comrades be 
of no avail ? Shall it be said in after ages that we lacked 
the vigor to complete the work thus begun? that, 
after all these noble lives freely given, we hesitated, 
and failed to keep straight on until our land was saved ? 
Forbid it, Heaven, and give us truer hearts than that ! " 

With such sentiments, so distinctly at variance with 
the platform of the party that had selected him as its 
standard bearer, it is impossible to of¥er a satisfactory 
explanation of his acceptance of the nomination. Pos- 
sibly, through the influence of personal friends and by 
the urgent solicitation of political counsellors, he 
allowed himself to be forced into a position that was 
alike false to the inmost promptings of his heart and 
the dictates of his better judgment. He may have 
29 



450 ^^ GENERAL McCLELLAN. 

hoped that in the event of success, which then appeared 
exceedingly probable, he would be able so to direct 
affairs with an almost imperial hand as to save the 
country as he thought it ought to be saved, guaran- 
teeing the rights of the States in rebellion under the 
provisions of the Constitution. Though he never sur- 
rendered his conviction as to the necessity of a vigor- 
ous prosecution of the war until the last armed in- 
surgent had surrendered to the constituted national 
authority, he was earnest in his desire that when this 
was accomplished nothing should have occurred in the 
meanwhile to prevent the re-establishment of fraternal 
relations between the two hostile sections of the coun- 
try. Finally, the professional injustice to which he had 
been subjected by the Administration, not only by his 
relief from command but in his continued retirement, 
and which, in the opinion of his friends and himself, 
was due to political grounds alone, disseminated 
throughout his mind a sense of personal grievance 
whose active influence at this time can scarcely be 
ignored. Granting all these possible causes as influ- 
encing his decision toward the acceptance of the nomi- 
nation, his innate convictions would not permit him 
to assent to the unequivocal language of the platform, 
and in his letter of acceptance, written September 8th, 
he endeavored to translate it into language of his own, 
which was, however, manifestly a forced and unnatu- 
ral construction. In this he says : 

" The Union was originally formed by the exercise 
of a spirit of conciliation and compromise. To restore 
and preserve it, the same spirit must prevail in our 
councils and in the hearts of the people. The re-estab- 
lishment of the Union in all its integrity is and must 
continue to be the indispensable condition in any settle- 
ment. So soon as it is clear, or even probable, thatf 
our present adversaries are ready for peace upon the 
basis of the Union, we should exhaust all the resources 
of statesmanship practised by civilized nations and 
taught by the traditions of the American people, con- 
sistent with the honor and interests of the country. 






CANDIDATE FOR THE PRESIDENCY. 



451 



to secure such peace, re-establish the Union, and guar- 
antee for the future the constitutional rights of every 
State. The Union is the one condition of peace. We 
ask no more. 

'' Let me add what I doubt not was, although un- 
expressed, the sentiment of the convention, as it is of 
the people they represent : that, when any one State 
is willing to return to the Union, it should be received 
at once, with a full guarantee of all its constitutional 
rights. If a frank, earnest, and persistent effort to 
obtain these objects should fail, the responsibility for 
ulterior consequences will fall upon those who remain 
in arms against the Union ; but the Union must be pre- 
served at all hazards. I could not look in the face of 
my gallant comrades of the army and navy who have 
survived so many bloody battles, and tell them that 
their labors and the sacrifices of so many of our slain 
and wounded brethren had been in vain — that we had 
abandoned that Union for which we have so often 
periled our lives. A vast majority of our people, 
whether in the army and navy or at home, would, as 
/ would, hail with unbounded joy the permanent resto- 
ration of peace on the basis of the Union under the 
Constitution, without the effusion of another drop of 
blood ; but no peace can he permanent without Union'' 

Sherman's capture of Atlanta, September ist, and 
Sheridan's successful battles of the Opequan, Septem- 
ber 19th, and Cedar Creek, October 19th, in the Shen- 
andoah Valley successively added their powerful stimu- 
lus in bettering the political situation so far as the Ad- 
ministration was concerned, while the strength of the 
opposition, so threatening during the summer, now 
steadily declined. When the election was over it was 
found that McClellan had carried but three States — 
New Jersey, Delaware, and Kentucky — thus giving 
him but twenty-one votes in the Electoral College, 
while the remaining States declared for Mr. Lincoln, 
assuring him of two hundred and twelve electoral 
votes, and therefore of his triumphant election for an- 
other term. 



r 



452 



GENERAL McCLELLAN. 



McClellan resigned his commission as major gen- 
eral, United States Army, November 8, 1864, the day 
of the election. " For* the sake of my country and my 
friends," says he in a personal letter, " I regret the 
result most deeply, yet so far as I am personally con- 
cerned I can not avoid a sense of relief from the knowl- 
edge of the fact that the awful responsibility of the 
fate of the country is not to be committed to me. As 
the result is I accept it as from the hand of God. I 
have sent in my resignation — written, as I had already 
determined, on the day of the election before I could 
know the result. I hope soon to hear that it is ac- 
cepted, and shall then feel that I am once more a free 
man, free to consult my own feelings and no longer 
to be a target for the abuse of partisans. As to my 
own future I have not yet fully determined — that is, 
not further than that I have done with public life. As 
soon as the smoke clears away I shall make up my 
mind what to do. I shall begin life anew with hope 
and energy." 

For a few months after his resignation from the 
army McClellan endeavored to find some employment 
in civil life that would fully occupy his time and be in 
accord with his tastes and talents, but he soon found I 
that there was nothing immediately available that he 
could accept without trespassing upon the generosity 
of personal friendship and wounding his own innate 
delicacy of feeling. He therefore wisely determined 
to take his family abroad, and to remain there untill 
time should moderate the generous efiforts of his friends 
and soften the bitter animosities of his political oppo- 
nents, when he might be able to return as a simple 
citizen, free to engage in whatever occupation might! 
be most agreeable to him. Accordingly he sailed from 
home in January, 1865, and for a little over three years 
remained abroad enjoying the literature, art, and cul- 
ture of Europe, which was all the more satisfactory 
since he knew that his own beloved land had success- 
fully emerged from her long-continued struggle for 
existence, with its flag upheld and its honor unim- 



CANDIDATE FOR THE PRESIDENCY. 



453 



paired. When he returned he found that he had not 
lost his place in the deep affections of his fellow-coun- 
trymen, for they everywhere greeted him with heart- 
felt expressions of joyous welcome and acclaim. He 
experienced with deep emotion the truth that the love 
and affection which he had for his soldiers was by 
reciprocity active and living in their hearts for their 
old commander, while the unnourished animosities 
had passed forever away into the region of forgetful- 
ness. 

Upon his return home in 1868 he was appointed 
engineer in charge of Stevens's battery, a steam war 
vessel- which Mr. Edwin A. Stevens, a public-hearted 
citizen of Hoboken, N. J., had designed, intending to 
present it, when completed, to the State of New Jersey. 
For this purpose this gentleman had left by will one 
million dollars, together with the tools and machinery 
used in its construction, and previous to his decease 
had expressed his desire that McClellan should be 
appointed the engineer to assist in the proper method 
of completing the vessel. A special act of Congress 
was passed authorizing the State of New Jersey to 
accept the gift under the provisions of Mr. Stevens's 
will, and a commission was appointed by the State to 
represent it and to advise with the executors of the 
will during the construction of the vessel. It was the 
intention to make this the most formidable ironclad 
afloat at the tinte of its completion, and to this end 
McClellan and his assistants devoted their best thought 
and labor. But the amount of money appropri^ed 
proved insufThcient to complete the vessel, and aft#-*^-x 
the hull and machinery had been nearly finished the 
further progress of the work had to be abandoned. 
McClellan ceased his connection with this work in 1869, 
and while engaged upon it he had been offered the 
presidency of two institutions of learning — those of 
the University of California in 1868 and of Union Col- 
lege in 1869, both of which he declined. 

In 1870 he was appointed chief engineer of the De- 
partment of Docks in the city of New York, which 



I 



454 



GENERAL McCLELLAN. 



position he filled with great credit to himself and with 
advantage to the city until 1872, when he terminated 
his relations with the. city government, having also 
declined the appointment of Comptroller of the city, 
which had been offered to him September 16, 1871. 

It only remains now to refer briefly to his career as 
Governor of the State of New Jersey, to which posi- 
tion he was elected as the Democratic candidate in the 
fall election of 1877, and which closed his public serv- 
ices in an official capacity. There is scarcely any doubt 
that he was selected as the nominee of the Democratic 
party owing to the great influence his name possessed 
among the people, and possibly without any hope that 
he would achieve any success in the line of what was 
commonly known as practical politics. Probably, so 
far as his own ambition was concerned, he may have 
had in view the natural desire and hope of higher 
political rewards in the future to justify the sacrifices 
he was called upon to make in once more entering the 
field of political warfare. Whatever may have been the 
designs of the political leaders in selecting him, the 
wisdom of their choice was verified by the success that 
attended his election. 

At the time of his election the people throughout 
the country were but just recovering from the disas- 
trous condition of affairs that had followed the panic 
of 1873, ^"d the evidences of this recuperation were 
even then becoming manifest. As a consequence Mc- 
Clellan's attention throughout the whole period of his 
governorship was mainly directed to the advocacy of 
those measures that would advance the material in- 
terests of the people of the State — silent, unobtrusive 
work though it was, it proved to be of the most states- 
manlike quality. In the analysis of the problems that 
seemed to him of pressing importance, as well as in 
the thorough study that his sense of duty impelled him 
to give to them, the innate purity of his character is 
always markedly in evidence. A study of his messages 
and other State papers will show that the vital questions 
he ever held in mind were those connected with the 



GOVERNOR. 



455 



I 



welfare of the people, while those relating to his own 
political future were absolutely non-existent. 

Among these there are three that stand out with 
greater relative prominence than the others ; these re- 
late to taxation and expenditure of public money, pub- 
lic education, and the national guard. With respect 
to the first, he made himself acquainted with the con- 
ditions that affected the people of the State as a whole, 
and then of those in the lesser communities where the 
taxes had become excessive and burdensome through 
faulty legislation. Commending to the Legislature the 
importance of a careful supervision of the expenditure 
of the State Government, he succeeded in lessening the 
State tax and finally in having it abolished. In the 
smaller communities of counties, townships, and cities 
he strongly urged the citizens, the working men as well 
as the men of property, to take an active interest in 
the affairs of their local government, and recommended 
the collection of such full information with regard to 
financial affairs that waste and improvidence might be 
detected and remedied. In all these measures he had 
constantly in view the welfare of the State as affected 
by the welfare of its constituent parts, clearly perceiv- 
ing that reforms to be of lasting value must begin at 
the ultimate sources of political power. 

With every question relating to public education 
he was in active sympathy, and as he had given a 
great deal of study to the subject he had acquired 
positive views, which he embodied in his recom- 
mendations to the Legislature. He was of the opinion 
that it was good political economy to cause the chil- 
dren to be educated along the lines that would ulti- 
mately benefit the commercial and other industries of 
the State, and to foster industrial and technical schools 
by such State aid in their first establishment as 
would be requisite to open those avenues that would 
ultimately lead to an increase in wealth and prosperity 
of the people in their several communities. Thus, in 
an agricultural region, the studies of the youth should 
be turned toward the fundamental principles of agri- 



GENERAL McCLELLAN. 



culture, to the end that the art might be pursued intel- 
Hgently ; while in cities, where manufactures and the 
mechanic arts flourish, the purpose should be to bring 
the educated mind to 'bear upon the work of their 
hands, the result in both cases being to give greater 
satisfaction and contentment to all workers in their 
life pursuits. He pointed out the necessity of technical 
schools to improve the art of glassmaking, a growing 
industry in the southern part of the State, the silk and 
cotton factories at Paterson, and the potteries at Tren- 
ton. Through his own individual efforts he accom- 
plished a great deal with respect to the last industry, 
and the decided advance made in the character of the 
product of the Trenton potteries is in a great meas- 
ure due to his intelligent and active interest in the 
subject. 

" The maintenance of an efficient and well-organ- 
ized national guard," says he in his message to the 
Legislature, session of 1880, " kept within just limits 
as to numbers, is not only in accordance with the spirit 
of our institutions, but it is rendered absolutely neces- 
sary by their very nature. Such a force weighs lightly 
upon the finances and resources of the individual 
States ; keeps alive the military spirit, habits, and 
knowledge of the people ; furnishes the best possible 
means of suppressing internal troubles ; is capable of 
performing admirable service in preventing or resist- 
ing foreign aggression, and is one of the best and most 
indispensable guards of the permanence of our free 
institutions." In consonance with these views he de- 
voted his best efforts to increase the efficiency of the 
force enrolled by the State by improving its discipline 
and marksmanship, and at the end of his term of office 
he could confidently assert that it was in so gratifying 
a condition that it could be relied upon to preserve the 
peace within the borders of the State without calling 
for assistance from the General Government. Ever 
since then the National Guard of New Jersey has en- 
joyed a very high reputation for efficiency, and no 
small portion of the credit is due to McClellan's intelli- 



GOVERNOR. 



457 



gent appreciation of what was necessary to be done and 
to his active efforts in its accomphshment. 

McClellan's career as Governor exempHfied in the 
highest degree that abnegation of self that was to be 
expected on the part of a man who regarded the obh- 
gation of his oath of office as paramount, his personal 
interests and pohtical future a neghgible factor, and the 
interests of the people of the State his most sacred 
charge. Viewed in this light it is impossible to con- 
ceive how any man could have accomplished more than 
he did during the three years of his governorship. His 
messages were admirable, full of the most practical 
suggestions, and were based upon an intelligent com- 
prehension of the immediate necessities requiring legis- 
lative attention. His course as a lawmaker was com- 
mendable, for he signed and vetoed bills actuated by a 
high sense of duty, and not at the demands of party 
politics nor under the temptations of future personal 
political advancement. His conduct merited and re- 
ceived the approbation of the good people of both par- 
ties, and it was universally conceded that his adminis- 
tration was clean, pure, and beyond reproach. '' No 
Executive of this State," says one of his associates in 
the government, " ever made or could have hoped to 
have made a purer or more exalted record as a public 
official than he left behind him. The people loved to 
do him honor, and he was always most worthy of their 
highest favor." 

On the expiration of his term of office as Governor 
he declined a renomination, and never again accepted 
public office, except that of membership in the Board 
of Managers of the National Home for Disabled 
Soldiers, which he held until his death. The re- 
mainder of his life was passed most unobtrusively, 
thenceforth free from the glare of publicity, and in the 
full enjoyment of those responsive pleasures that sur- 
round the happy home of a cultured American citizen. 
Domesticity was a paramount affection in McClellan's 
heart, and nothing could have given him more unal- 
loyed happiness than to supervise the construction of 



458 ^^"^ GENERAL McCLELLAN. 

the dwelling that he had planned in his own mind to be 
the ultimation of a home love, ever cherished in his 
heart. Here, on the. Orange Mountain, with his de- 
voted and charming wife and lovely children, a son 
and daughter, McClellan's home life was delightful 
beyond description. In addition to this he improved 
his opportunities, whenever possible, to travel with 
his family in foreign lands, which, owing to his ac- 
quaintance with modern languages, yielded him full 
returns in the intellectual pleasure he derived in the 
study of literature and art. Spending his summers 
usually at St. Moritz, in the beautiful Engadine Valley 
of Switzerland, he became an enthusiastic lover oi 
mountain climbing, and very early initiated his littlej 
son in this healthful and fascinating pastime. 

Apparently McClellan's physical constitution was 
so excellent that he could reasonably hope to reach 
an advanced age, but in the early autumn of 1885 the 
premonitory symptoms of heart failure caused him tc 
seek medical advice. From this time on recurring 
attacks were frequent, and although they did not give 
him any apprehension of a fatal termination, they die 
induce him, under medical advice, to seek intervals o 
rest from confining literary work in the hope that hi; 
malady would disappear. But about midnight or 
October 28th an attack of unusual severity forced bin 
to rise from his bed to seek relief in a sitting posture 
Nothing that his skillful physician could do, at this 
stage of the disease, could stay its progress towarc 
dissolution, and although suffering the greatest physi 
cal agony, he sought, with extreme self-sacrifice anc 
by the exercise of the utmost self-control, to con 
ceal from his devoted wife and daughter the extent o 
his suffering. At about three o'clock in the mornini 
of the 29th of October, turning with a look of deepes 
affection to his beloved wife, McClellan, in the weak 
ness of utter physical exhaustion, w^hispered to hi 
physician, *' Tell her I am better now," and with thes 
loving words passed peacefully away. 

At the residence of his personal friend, Mr. Willian 



MILITARY AND PERSONAL •CHARACTERISTICS 



459 



C. Prime, in the city of New York, the coffin that in- 
closed his remains was surrounded by those who came 
to pay their last sad offices and tribute to their friend 
and comrade. The funeral services at the Madison 
Square Presbyterian Church in New York city, and 
the interment of his remains in his private plot over- 
looking the beautiful Delaware in the cemetery at Tren- 
ton, N. J., fittingly closed the earthly life of George 
Brinton McClellan. 

In attempting to formulate a satisfactory estimate 
of a man from the noteworthy events of his life we 
are confronted with a problem of the utmost com- 
plexity, for we are generally ignorant of the modifying 
influences of surrounding circumstances, the secret 
springs of action, and the determining conclusions of 
mental operations. If, however, it be granted that 
every one born into the world is endowed with an in- 
herent character hereditarily derived, which educa- 
tion and training can never radically change nor dis- 
possess, but merely modify and direct, we may arrive at 
an approximate estimate by a study of those ever-pres- 
ent characteristics that the experience and activities of 
the maturer life ultimately develop into marked promi- 
nence from the feebler indications of early life. From 
this point of view we may note with satisfaction Mc- 
Clellan's exemplary conduct, scholastic proficiency, de- 
votion to duty, gentlemanly instincts, dignified and re- 
poseful bearing, and tactful and charming manners. 
These qualities, manifested very early in his life, mark- 
edly afifected his relations with every one with whom 
he came in contact, being full of charm to all, and giv- 
ing unalloyed pleasure to the relatively few who en- 
joyed his intimate personal friendship. So exceptional 
a degree of early perfection has, however, its disad- 
vantages, especially during the formative period of life, 
since it often forbids that healthful criticism of thought 
and conduct which so generally attends upon good 
fellowship, and from which he who stands in a meas- 
ure apart from his fellows is often deprived. 

His service throughout the Mexican War merits 



460 



GENERAL McCLELLAN. 



the highest commendation ; every duty assigned to '• 
him was thoroughly well done, and he never sought 
to depart from that strjct subordination which his posi- 
tion as a subaltern exacted of him. While he was 
never rash nor foolhardy, his coolness in danger, per- 
sonal courage, and intrepidity were conspicuous. The ; 
just expectations of his early promise and training 
were amply confirmed not only in this war, but in all 
of his subsequent service as a junior ofhcer. He was 
so indefatigably industrious and conscientiously de- 
voted to his work and duty that he was universally 
regarded as an admirable type of the educated Ameri- 
can subaltern officer. Up to this point in his career 
the strata of results are then strictly conformable to 1 
the theory of expectation, and the problem of analysis > 
of his character is an extremely simple one. 

But in attempting to arrive at a just estimate of 
McClellan's military status as developed during the 
War of the Rebellion, when the safety of the capital 
and the responsibilities of a great army were intrusted 1! 
to him, the problem is a much more difficult one. It 
must not be forgotten that he was advanced almost 
suddenly to a position of high rank and command,, 
when through dire public necessity it became impera- 
tive to select a leader who had the prestige of military 
success ; and although his campaign in West Virginia 
had not then been so thoroughly digested as to give 
him his just rating as a commander, his selection was; 
perfectly legitimate and received universal approval., 
The Government of the United States has ever beeni 
so completely negligent in time of peace of the neces- 
sities of the profession of arms for the exigencies ofi 
war that the competency of its army commanders must 
ever be an unknown factor. It must select them some- 
what haphazardly, and test them by the expensive 
method of experience until a good one is found. M.c- 
Clellan was thus tried for eighteen months, and them 
cast aside by the Administration as a failure. 

Among the great commanders of the war he still 
occupies a unique position, for while their military.' 



MILITARY AND PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS. 461 

reputations are now fairly well established, his has been 
so much entangled with political considerations that it 
is still a subject of controversy. On the one hand, it 
is claimed that his military failures can be shown to be 
due to the interference of the Government after he had 
entered upon his campaigns in the full expectation and 
under the distinct promise that he would be provided 
with all the means that he had counted upon in prepar- 
ing his plans to carry them to a successful issue ; while, 
on the other, it is asserted that his plans involved such 
contradictory elements and were so ill digested that 
it was impossible for the Government to fulfill his 
requisitions, and that his failure must be ascribed to his 
own imperfections as a general. But a more impar- 
tial estimate must lie between these extreme partisan 
views, both of which had their origin at a time when 
the passionate influences of political turmoil and ex- 
citement powerfully affected the judgments of the 
virile men who then controlled the activities of the 
General Government. 

In forming an estimate of his military character it 
is necessary to search for those characteristic traits that 
seem to dominate the salient events connected with his 
command of the Army of the Potomac especially. 
Among these none stand out with more prominence 
than his fondness for that theoretical branch of his pro- 
fession relating to strategy. Even before he became 
general in chief, though anticipating his advancement 
to that position, he occupied his mind with the greater 
problems of a general movement of all the Union 
armies, sacrificing the more pressing necessity of an 
effective consideration of an advance of the army under 
his immediate command. In the science of generalship 
Napoleon was his exemplar, but, unfortunately, in none 
of the three campaigns undertaken by McClellan is 
there any exhibition of that ready adaptation of means 
to the end in view, followed by celerity of movement to 
gain strategical advantage, that were so characteristic 
of Napoleon's operations. The success of such com- 
binations requires not only the possession of a highly 



462 ^^ GENERAL McCLELLAN. 

developed strategic sense, but also that comprehen- 
sive mental grasp and range by which every detail 
essential for success has been antecedently carefully 
studied out and adapted to the general plan in its just 
relation. It was in this latter essential that McClellan 
was constitutionally weak. 

In the early days of the war, when the authorities at ; 
Washington were hoping that the war might be settled 1 
by the employment of modest numbers, McClellan's^ 
conception of the necessities of the case, as exhibited! 
in his memorandum of August 4, 1861, and in his let- 
ters to the Secretary of War in the following October 
and February, were to them more than startling. The; 
central idea in all of his strategical plans was a decisive: 
result to be gained in one great battle, and this he con- 
ceived could best be accomplished by the employment: 
of great armies. But in a new country and among am 
unmilitary people great armies consume time raven-- 
ously for their organization, equipment, instruction,, 
and discipline; exasperating delays ensue even before; 
the strategic march can be undertaken, and when at: 
last the advance is ordered, the disproportionate im-- 
pedimenta with new troops, the resulting encumbered! 
roads, unexpected changes and conditions in the" 
weather and topography, together with the thousand' 
and one other difificulties constantly arising, combine 
to make the actual campaign entirely different from 
that which before seemed theoretically perfect. Very 
early in McClellan's career — indeed, only four days after 
he had been appointed to the command of the Ohio 
Volunteer Militia — this leaning to the creation of great 
armies is shown in the plan he submitted May 27, 
1861, to General Scott, for a movement up the Great 
Kanawha toward Richmond with an army of eighty 
thousand men. It also furnishes an evidence of the 
strategical bent of McClellan's mind, since its pres- 
entation was entirely voluntary upon his part, as well 
as the fact that a " speedy termination of the war " was 
a controlling idea in his mind from the start. 

In his successful West Virginia campaign the main 



MILITARY AND PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS. 463 

strategical elements of his problem were clearly out- 
lined at Grafton before he began his march, but the 
active column under his own command did not move 
with that celerity that he had anticipated, and he felt 
obliged to make apology for the slowness of his ad- 
vance and the delays that he experienced. The notice- 
able points in this campaign are his greatly prepon- 
derating strength compared with that of the enemy, 
the accidental discovery of an unsuspected obscure 
path by which Rosecrans, with less than two thousand 
men, turned the enemy's position at Rich Mountain 
and with insignificant loss ended the campaign, and 
finally the strategical blunder which permitted Gar- 
nett's main body to escape by way of Horse Shoe 
Run. In the tone and composition of McClellan's 
address to his army on the inception of the cam- 
paign, and in his congratulatory orders to the troops 
upon its successful termination, there is a strong 
Napoleonic impress which exhibits the intemperate 
but preponderating influence that this consum- 
mate master exercised upon McClellan's imaginative 
mind. 

But it is with regard to his original Peninsular 
plan of campaign, its subsequent modification, and his 
lack of success in conducting it that his reputation as 
a strategist and a commander will ultimately and mainly 
rest. To assist our judgment in arriving at a con- 
clusion upon these points, a brief recapitulation of the 
salient events connected with this campaign will not 
be out of place here. In the first place, there seems 
to be no doubt that McClellan first conceived this plan 
some time in November, 1861, after he had become 
general in chief, intending it as a part of a more gen- 
eral plan of operations embodying the simultaneous 
movements of all the western armies as well. In its 
general features the plan contemplated the transporta- 
tion by water of the bulk of the Army of the Potomac 
to Urbana on the Rappahannock, from which point 
it was contemplated to move it against Richmond, with 
the expectation that the Confederates would be forced 



464 ^^^ GENERAL McCLELLAN. 

to accept battle in a position of McClellan's selection, 
which, in case of a Union victory, would give such de- 
cisive results as woujd lead to a speedy termination 
of the war. As elements of success, he relied upon: 
secrecy, celerity of movement, the destruction of the 
railroad bridges in rear of the enemy, and a rapid dis- 
embarkation, so that he would have the advantage of 
a two days' march nearer to Richmond over his oppo- 
nent. General Johnston. On December ist he hadj 
about one hundred and seventy thousand men present 
for duty, of which the greater number were in the close 
vicinity of Washington, and he estimated that the 
strength of the enemy was about one hundred and fifty^ 
thousand men. It has been before pointed out that if^ 
McClellan believed the enemy to be as strong as here 
stated his plan was utterly inadmissible, for it would 
have resulted in making a present of the national capi- 
tal to the Confederate army while his own army was; 
in transit to its new base. 

The general features of this plan were first ofificiallyv 
outlined by McClellan in a letter that he was forced 
to write February 3d to the Secretary of War, tOi 
secure, if possible, the revocation of the peremptoryv 
orders of the President directing all the Union armies! 
to begin active operations against the insurgent forcesi 
on the 22d of February. Though strongly opposing.; 
this plan and preferring that of an overland campaigni 
the President finally, but very unwillingly, yielded his 
preference after a council of war composed of twelve 
generals of the army, by a vote of eight to four, gave 
McClellan's plan their approval. If Barnard's state- 
ment be correct, that the plan was voted for offhand,! 
without deliberation or discussion in the council, them 
the approval by this council of war added nothing to 
strengthen its military value, for without discussion 
and deliberation the assumed data upon which it was 
based could not be subjected to the necessary scrutiny 
to determine whether they were real or hypothetical, 
and whether the conclusions were strategically sound. 
Conceding the truth of Barnard's statement, the re- 



MILITARY AND PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS. 



465 



sponsibility for the Urbana plan of campaign was 
wholly McClellan's. 

But within five days he strongly advocates the sub- 
stitution of the Peninsular campaign for that by way 
of Urbana, and a council of war comprising the four 
corps commanders present with the army recommends 
the new plan contingent upon certain specified provi- 
sions being effected, and, if not, that the overland cam- 
paign be at once undertaken. What were the reasons 
that produced this sudden change in McClellan's mind ? 
His statement, published more than twenty-six years 
afterward, has been shown to be entirely in error. Here 
he says that " the fears of the Administration and their 
inability to comprehend the merits of the scheme, or 
else the determination that I should not succeed in the 
approaching campaign, induced them to prohibit me 
from carrying out the Urbana movement. They gave 
me the choice between the direct overland route via 
Manassas and the route with Fort Monroe as a base." 
It is in the highest degree probable that the true reasons 
were these : First, he always had a preference for the 
movement up the Peninsula, because in his opinion the 
base of supply and all the facilities for operations on that 
line were superior, safer, and more reliable than by way 
of Urbana ; second, he did not choose it at first because 
he was afraid of the Confederate navy, but when he 
heard the result of the naval conflict at Hampton Roads 
he decided at once to make the change, assuming that 
the Monitor would be more than a match for the Mer- 
rimac ; he expected by this change to secure the full 
co-operation of the navy, the use and control of the 
James River, and thus hoped to force the evacuation 
of Norfolk. He recognized that the anticipated results 
at Urbana promised greater brilliancy and expedition, 
butthere he could expect but little or no assistance from 
the navy for rapid embarkation ; and the movement fur- 
ther involved large detachments from his force for the 
protection of his depots and for the escort to his supply 
trains. Without compulsion he made his choice freely, 
and in this choice the influence of his emotional faith 
30 



466 



GENERAL McCLELLAN. 



in the Monitor and of his overprudent cautiousness are! 
characteristically combined. 

The campaign last,ed three months and resulted in' 
failure. The main cause of this failure, as asserted by! 
his supporters, was due to the withdrawal of Blenker'si 
division of McDowell's corps from the Army of thai 
Potomac, w^hich prevented the essential flank opera- 
tion of turning the enemy's left at Yorktown from 
being carried out as devised, the campaign having 
been planned for the employment of four full corps of 
the army. This interference of the Administration and 
consequent diminution of his force compelled McClel- 
lan to undertake a siege of Yorktown, which caused 
a month's delay, during which time his army became 
enfeebled by disease and the enemy were able to con- 
centrate in his front a force of at least equal strength.. 
This action was attributed to the unfriendly attitude of] 
an arbitrary and irascible Secretary of War, who had' 
heretofore treated McClellan with contumely and now' 
designed to thwart his operations in every way lesti 
the military success which he might achieve would be 
followed by more important political success. Passion 
and prejudice die out with time, and it is not now neces-j 
sary to combat arguments founded upon them then,i 
for the patriotic self-sacrifice of the great actors of the 
rebellion, whether civil or military, is now well known 
to have been free from the taint of personal interest- 
However probable the success which the assistance oi 
McDowell's corps might have brought to the Army 
of the Potomac, and however important this success: 
might have been in implanting in its commander an 
aggressive spirit at the beginning of an active cam- 
paign, are now fruitless questions, because, under the 
circumstances of the time, it was not possible for thet[ 
Administration to ignore the absolute danger in which 
Washington would have been placed had not Mc- 
Dowell been retained as a covering force. 

McClellan's grave error was unquestionably in his! 
failure to confer freely and frankly with his official 
superiors, the Secretary of War and the President, be- 



MILITARY AND PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS. 



467 



fore he left Washington to ascertain with definiteness 
the actual force which would be entirely satisfactory 
to them for the protection of Washington, for they 
were by law the final arbiters of this question. Be- 
sides, this matter of an adequate protection was a dis- 
tinct provision insisted upon by the council of corps 
commanders, and was not to be left to McClellan's own 
determination. His action can only be accounted for 
in view of the fact that his own self-appreciation had 
been so unduly stimulated that he had come to be- 
lieve that he was the sole critic of the military policy 
to be adopted, and that whenever he was opposed by 
the civil officials it was due to personal jealousy arising 
from his growing popularity among the army and the 
people. His anxiety to get his army away from Wash- 
ington, and bis failure to have a thorough understand- 
ing with the Administration with regard to the loca- 
tion and composition of the force to be left behind, 
were the real causes bringing about the retention of 
McDowell's corps and changing the general plan of 
campaign. 

Having arrived at Fort Monroe he found that he 
could not obtain that assistance of the navy for which 
he had hoped, and within a few days he ascertained 
that his assumptions with regard to the climatic con- 
ditions, character of the roads, topography of the 
country, and the security of his flanks were altogether 
different from what he had assumed them to be in 
devising his plan of campaign. Owing to this startling 
state of afifairs and the news he had just then received 
of McDowell's retention, he was obliged to recast his 
problem under most discouraging circumstances. In- 
fluenced by prudent considerations, and somewhat per- 
haps by a deep sense of personal grievance, he deter- 
mined upon a siege, when a more aggressive com- 
mander would first have tried a spirited assault. The 
month's delay that ensued was not only of the greatest 
advantage to the enemy in permitting them to 
strengthen their defenses and to accumulate their 
forces at the point of attack, but weakened the Army 



I 



468 ^^ GENERAL McCLELLAN. 

of the Potomac in morale, and by the fatahties of an 
unheahhy cHmate and the depressing conditions of in- 
activity. The unfortunate battle of Williamsburg, the 
selection of the White House base instead of one on 
the James, the isolation of Keyes's corps at Seven 
Pines, the unnecessary expedition to Hanover Court 
House, the month's straddle of the Chickahominy, 
were the barren tactical results of the ensuing cam- 
paign, whose early strategical advantages had not been 
utilized. 

Considering, now, the next great qualification of a 
successful commander, the ability to employ to the best 
advantage his forces on the battlefield, we may search 
in vain for a single illustrative example that would 
indicate the possession by McClellan of decided tactical 
ability. In none of the battles fought during his cam- 
paigns was he inferior in strength to the enemy on the 
field of battle, and yet in every instance the enemy at 
the point of attack was more formidable than he. In 
front of Washington, at Yorktown, on the Chicka- 
hominy, at the gaps of the South Mountain, and nota- 
bly at Antietam, proper tactical combinations would 
have enabled him to bring a superior force upon any 
disputed point that would have given him the greater 
chances of victory. In planning his strategical com- 
binations he foresaw the certainty of battle, which, 
though he hoped to make decisive, he also expected 
would be upon a battlefield of his own choice, where 
the enemy would be forced to make the attack. Other 
defects, such as his constant tendency to overestimate 
the strength of the enemy, timidity on the eve of 
battle, and lack of aggressiveness — characteristics of 
the safe and prudent general — added their influence to 
his tactical deficiency in making this campaign so dis- 
appointing in its results. 

He acquired very early the reputation of a non- 
aggressive general from his determination not to risk 
a second Bull Run disaster with an undisciplined army, 
and therefore not to advance until everything was 
ready. But apart from the delays incident to thor- 



MILITARY AND PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS. 



469 



ough preparation, his timidity and extreme prudence 
as a commander are markedly in evidence. Preferring 
the safer advantages of the defensive, he never sought 
the initiative of attack ; thus he did not venture, except 
in one instance, to inform himself with certainty by 
strong reconnoissances of the enemy's strength and 
position in front of Washington, but rather hoped that 
Johnston would attack his intrenched lines ; at Rich 
Mountain he weakened in his determination to attack 
when he heard the sound of Rosecrans's guns, and 
withdrew to his camp to await the morning ; he lacked 
aggressiveness at Yorktown in the early days of April, 
and later, on the i6th, at Garrow's, he might have 
forced the line of the Warwick with Smith's division 
had he possessed more boldness and less prudence. 
His apprehension of failure on the eve of battle is 
exhibited in his dispatches just before Rich Moun- 
tain, and especially at the beginning of the Seven Days' 
fight, and this characteristic was undoubtedly stimu- 
lated by his constant tendency to overestimate greatly 
the strength of the enemy in his front. 

But while his service of information was wretchedly 
inelBcient, the surprising thing is that a commander 
possessing the logical and analytic mind of McClel- 
lan should not have clearly seen how utterly impos- 
sible it w^as for the Confederate Government to arm 
and equip armies of the magnitude he assumed it to 
have, when the United States Government, with all its 
bountiful sources of supply, could do no more. This 
unaccountable w^eakness in McClellan's mental equip- 
ment is always so conspicuously in evidence that its 
influence in the formation of his plans of campaign or 
in his dispositions for battle can never be ignored. 
Reacting against the dictates of sound reason, the 
emotional and imaginative side of his nature unduly 
affected his judgments with vacillating indecision, ac- 
centuated his constitutional timidity as a commander, 
weakened his determination by strengthening his pru- 
dence, and eventually robbed him of the fruits of vic- 
tory at the supreme moment. Contini^lly applying 



470 ^^ GENERAL McCLELLAN. 

for re-enforcements and promising that he would fol- 
low their arrival with positive performance, his failure 
to make good his promise served to make more mani- 
fest his incapacity to handle with success the great 
army committed to his charge. As notable instances, 
and specially illustrative of this particular trait, com- 
pare the promises made with regard to Franklin's divi- 
sion at Yorktown and McCall's division on the Chicka- 
hominy with the delay and change of purpose after 
their arrival. 

These more prominent military deficiencies were 
undoubtedly the principal causes of McClellan's failure 
as a commanding general ; they were inherent in his 
nature, for they exhibited themselves in every position 
where great responsibilities rested upon him. Oppos- 
ing commanders quickly detected their existence and 
took them into consideration in formulating their plans 
of campaigns when operating against him, as is mark- 
edly illustrated by Lee's bold opening of the Seven 
Days' battles and the extra-hazardous chances he as- 
sumed in so widely separating the component parts 
of his army in the beginning of the Maryland cam- 
paign. 

Surrounded by a devoted personal and adminis- 
trative staff, General McClellan's military family formed 
a coterie that was sufficient unto itself, and because 
he seldom consulted his corps commanders the com- 
mander-in-chief idea developed into considerable 
prominence. Unsolicited advice was seldom proffered, 
and the avenues leading to unofficial personal contact 
with subordinate commanders were so much restricted 
that in some degree at least McClellan deprived him- 
self of the means of acquiring that accurate knowl- 
edge of the esprit of the army which was oftentimes 
of the greatest importance. Possibly for this reason 
also he trusted to his subordinate commanders the 
conduct of vitally important battles, relying upon the 
information brought to him by his stafif officers, where 
in several instances he was so far removed from the 
field of battlt that it would have been impossible in 



MILITARY AND PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS. 



471 



case of disaster to assume timely direction and con- 
trol. Never in any battle, with the possible exception 
of Antietam, did he feel it incumbent upon himself to 
make use of his undoubted personal magnetism to 
inspire his troops on the fighting line with increased 
valor and devotion ; and in this respect his conduct is 
in marked contrast with that of his able antagonist, 
General Lee, whose heroic presence and personal ex- 
posure at the critical period of a battle were repeatedly 
more strengthening to his almost yielding line than 
fresh re-enforcements. 

It is certainly within the limits of probability that 
many of these military defects might have been elimi- 
nated had McClellan had the good fortune to enjoy 
the disciplinary advantages of service in a subordinate 
capacity before being advanced to the higher com- 
mand of an army. As it was, however, the influences 
that grew out of the political conditions that existed 
at the beginning of the war, and their modifications 
as it progressed, affected his military reputation unduly 
because of his sudden advancement to a position of 
the highest prominence. The troublesome question of 
slavery would not cease its harassing importunities, 
and in process of time, since no great military success 
had been scored by the Union arms, the plea of mili- 
tary necessity was urged upon the Administration by 
the radical elements of the Republican party to bring 
about the advocacy of the restoration of the Union 
without slavery instead of its restoration as it was. Al- 
though this change of policy was not immediate, its 
drift was clearly perceived, and almost from the very 
first its supporters and opponents began to array them- 
selves against each other in political hostility. Wash- 
ington became the center of the conflict, and McClel- 
lan's attitude was soon well understood to be in accord 
with that of the War Democrats, to restore the Union 
as it was with all the constitutional guarantees sacredly 
unimpaired. Availing themselves of McClellan's high 
position to further their own political aims, the mal- 
contents of every shade of opinion, peace advocates, 



GENERAL McCLELLAN. 



Confederate sympathizers, strict constructionists of the 
Constitution, indeed every one who had any grievance 
against the Government, made use of McClellan's con- 
servatism to laud his patriotism and to defame the 
Administration. Owing to this intrusion of matters 
pohtical into matters mihtary this excessive laudation 
was met with equally intemperate passionate denuncia- 
tion, and his inaction was vigorously assailed and dis- 
paraged not only in the public press but in the halls of 
Congress, But during his period of exaltation his own 
self-appreciation had become so unduly stimulated that 
he had come to believe that he was the destined savior 
of his country, and he was restive under any criticism 
of his military plans and purposes. Misconceiving the 
solidity of his convictions to be indisputable certainties, 
he misjudged the limitations of the patience of the 
people, the practical common sense of the President, 
and even before he had entered upon his campaign had 
antagonized his former strong friend and supporter. 
Secretary Chase, and in succession lost the support of 
nearly every member of the Cabinet ; and finally, in con- 
sequence of his inability to divorce his political convic- 
tions from his professional obligations, and of his inca- 
pacity to perceive the inevitable trend of the public mind 
foreshadowing constitutional changes, he became un- 
consciously the puppet of a heterogeneous party oppos- 
ing the Administration, and thus cut out from under his 
feet at a most inopportune time that firm political sup- 
port which was then so essential for a continuance in 
active military command, and found it replaced by that 
non-cohesive quicksand of antagonism and distrust 
that simply engulfed him at the last. 

But whatever may be the judgment that history 
will ultimately formulate with regard to McClellan's 
qualifications in the domain of strategy and tactics, 
there will be no divided opinion with respect to his 
talents and attainments for the organization of armies, 
and the wonderful power that he possessed of implant- 
ing in the hearts of his soldiers a personal affection 
and devotion that has never been excelled. The almost 



i 



MILITARY AND PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS. 



473 



universal demoralization affecting nearly all the civil 
and military leaders immediately after the disaster of 
Bull Run was speedily quenched when it was known 
that the successful general who had made so brilliant 
a campaign in West V^irginia had been ordered to 
Washington to take command of the troops. In view 
of the trying days that were to come, the redoubtable 
antagonist that must needs be overcome to insure the 
salvation of the Union, and the desperate situation 
which anxiety and apprehension had brought about, 
it does seem to be a most fortunate combination of 
circumstances that resulted in McClellan's assignment 
at this particular juncture. For otherwise it is very 
doubtful whether his undoubted capacity for organiza- 
tion would have been permitted to have the full swing 
that it did have in the creation of the historic Army 
of the Potomac. There is, of course, a question 
whether a sufficiently reliable army might not have 
been evolved by the discipline of actual conflict against 
its equally untried opponent, as was in some degree 
the case with the armies of the West. But, in the light 
of subsequent events, we now see that the issue at stake 
was too vital, the consequences of thorough defeat of 
the protecting army so momentous, and the results of 
its final success so grand and glorious for our beloved 
country, that no one can regret McClellan's patient 
and thorough labor, nor forget the obligations that 
the country owes to him in this respect. He brought 
to his task an inherent love of order, system, and dis- 
cipline, which his training at West Point had fostered 
and his subsequent studies and experience had de- 
veloped into strong characteristics. His service with 
the Military Commission in Europe, enabled him to 
become acquainted with the organization of foreign 
armies, and this knowledge he thoroughly digested and 
mastered in all its details. At the time of his ap- 
pointment no one more clearly understood the proper 
harmonious relations that should exist between the 
several arms of the service in the organization of an 
efficient fighting force than he ; and his systematic 



474 



GENERAL McCLELLAN. 



efforts to develop the artillery, which had heretofore 
been much neglected, and to place it in its true relar 
tion with the infantry^ affords but one example of his 
capacity as an organizer. 

It is generally conceded that the particular individ- 
uality that characterized the Army of the Potomac 
throughout its whole career was due, in the greatest 
measure, to the impress that McClellan was enabled 
to give it during its formative period, and that its sub- 
sequent splendid efficiency was the legitimate fruit of 
the labor he had devoted to its organization, drill, and 
discipline. Never demoralized by defeat nor over- 
elated by victory, this magnificent army formed the 
principal bulwark of defense to insure the safety of 
the nation's capital against the efforts of its formidable: 
rival, the splendidly aggressive Army of Northern Vir- 
ginia. So vital was its trust and so essential its safety 
from utter demoralization or destruction, that for three: 
years it was, with the exception of the Peninsular cam- 
paign, forced to play the role of the defensive-offen-^ 
sive. But finally assuming the aggressive, it held withi 
tenacity to its purpose of compelling the surrender^ 
of its formidable antagonist, which was accomplished! 
at Appomattox. Then, its work being done, its con- 
stituent elements, those magnificent citizen soldiers 
who had become through the discipline of war the 
most famous of veterans, were absorbed in the body* 
politic, ever after to remain the most peaceful citizens^ 
of the republic and the strongest conservers of free- 
dom, law, and order. This result, so astounding to the; 
nations of Europe, reflects the highest credit upon the 
civil and military leaders of the War of the Rebellion, 
and is indicative of the sterling fact that they were 
ever actuated by the purest patriotism, the highest 
personal honor, and the noblest self-sacrifice. 

In republican America there is an order of nobilityi 
whose titles are God-given, and among these there 
are none that stand higher than does George B. Mc- 
Clellan in the thoroughness of his manhood and the 
purity of his personal character. In his walk and con-. 



MILITARY* AND PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS. 475 

'ersation he was ever the pure, clean-minded, Chris- 
ian gentleman; a true patriot, who gave the best and 
11 that was in him unselfishly to his country, will- 
ngly, freely, and unstintingly ; a man of sweet and 
gracious mien and of tender and loving disposition. 
Jnconsciously he drew all hearts in responsive affec- 
ion to his wonderful personality, and there was never 
L commander so universally beloved by his troops ; 
ind when, as he rode the lines of his army at Warren- 
on in loving farewell to his veterans, he saw the un- 
hidden tears spring to the eyes that had never quailed 
n battle, he must have felt how much greater than 
ank and command is the generous and spontaneous 
:omrade-love which, though born amid scenes of 
ianger and death, can never die. 



INDEX 



I 



\lexandria, 93, 99, 100, 121, 215, 
226. 

'All quiet on the Potomac," 155. 

\lleghanies, 80, 82. 

\llen, Major. See Pinkerton, 
Allan. 

\lma, the, 42. 

\mozoc, 17. 

A.naconda plan, 78. 

A.nnapolis, 147. 

A.ntietam, 127, 411-429, 468,471. 

A.queduct Bridge, 99. 

A.quia Creek, 118, 387. 

Aranzas, 27. 

Arkansas, exploration of, 26. 

Arlington Heights, 93. 

Army unprepared at beginning of 
rebellion, 74. 

Army, U. S., recommendations 
for, after study of art of war in 
Europe, 46. 

Army of Northern Virginia, loi. 

Army of the Potomac organized, 
93-113 ; name given, 103 ; Mc- 
Clellan put in command, 113, 
118; numbers, 133, 138, 147, 
229, 230, 250, 255 ; holds fate 
of the country, 146 ; report on 
its condition, 145-150; Lin- 
coln issues war order for it, 
187 ; organization of corps crit- 
icised by McClellan, 282 ; tem- 
porarily broken up, 383, 384 ; 
leaves Peninsula, 437 ; its effi- 
ciency, 474. 

Army of Virginia, 372. 

Art of war in Europe, 35, 51. 

Ashby, Colonel, 225. 



\ 



Atlantic ports to be blocked, 78. 
Augusta, 77. 
Austria, 39. 
Ayotla, 18. 

Babcock, Lieutenant, 201. 
Baker, Colonel, 142-144. 
Balaklava, 38, 39, 42. 
Ball's Bluff affair, 140-144, 152, 

441. 

Baltimore, 113, 132, 13S. 147- 

Baltimore and Ohio R. R., 81-84, 
132, 200, 

Banks, General, 117, 126, 139, 
140 ; against Jackson, 226 ; 
commands in the Shenandoah 
Valley, 224, 227 ; during Jack- 
son's Valley raid, 286-292. 

Barnard, General, 105 ; quota- 
tions from his " Peninsular 
Campaign " and from two mem- 
oranda, 172-175, 200; quoted, 
204, 217, 243 ; report on his 
mission before Gaines's Mill, 

335-339. 464- 
Barry, General, 102. 
Bates, Joshua H., 70. 
Bayonet exercises, manual of, 25. 
Beaufort, 169. 
Beauregard, General, 48, 108, 

116, 117, 122, 124 ; prepares 

advance upon Washington, 94 ; 

at Bull Run, 95. 
Beaver Dam Creek, battle of, 

331-335, 348- 
Belen gate, 20, 21. 
Bellaire, 80. 
Benham, Captain, 89, 91, 

477 



GENERAL McCLELLAN. 



Berlin, 37. 

Berthier, 102. 

Beverly, 83, 84, 86-91. 

Biddle, Chas. J., 446. 

Blackburn's Ford, 95. 

Blair, Postmaster-General, 145, 

179. 

Blenker, 139, 286, 287 ; his corps 
detached, 228, 232, 466. 

Bloody Lane, 421, 428. 

Boonsborough, 413, 414. 

Boston, 37. 

Branch, General, 295-298 ; at 
Beaver Dam Creek, 332, 333. 

Brazos Santiago, 14, 27. 

Bristoe station, 385. 

Buckhannon, 83-86, 90. 

Buckle, 58. 

Buckner, General, 48, 76. 

Budd's Ferry, 139. 

Buell, 119, 139, 153 ; McClellan's 
letter to, 154; ordered for 
campaign in Eastern Tennessee, 
158-163. 

Bull Run, first battle, 52, 94-97, 
loi, 106, 120, 121. 

Burnside, General, 48, 102 ; his 
expedition to North Carolina, 
169, 367 ; before Antietam, 
411-413, 422-425 ; his mis- 
takes, 428 ; relieves McClellan 
from command, 438, 443. 

Butler, General B. F., taking 
New Orleans, 169. 

Cache Creek, 26. 
Cairo, 111., 76. 
Callender, Lieutenant, 19. 
• Camargo, 14. 
Cameron, Secretary of War, 109, 

III, 113, 117, 166. 
Camp Dennison, 76, go. 
Camp Johnston, 27. 
Camp Wenass, 29. 
Campaign plans discussed in 

Washington, 176-184. 
Canby, Colonel E. R. S., 153. 
Caribbean Sea, 35. 
Carrick's Ford, 89. 
Casa Mata, 20. 
Cascade Range, 28, 29, 31-33. 



Casey, General Silas, 102, 13 

at Williamsburg, 270, 272, 27 

on the Chickahominy, y 

304-307. 
Cathcart's Hill, 38. 
Cavalry, U. S., McClellan's : 

port, etc., 40, 41. 
Cedar Run, 223. 
Centreville, 95, 120, 121. 
Cerro Gordo, 15, 16. 
Chain Bridge, 99, 100, 1 2 1. 
Chalco, Lake, 18. 
Chandler, Senator, 145. 
Chapultepec, 19-21, 23. 
Charleston, 60, 77, 135. 
Charlestown, 90. 
Chase at war councils in Was 

ington, 176-184, 394, 395, 47 
Cheat Mountain, 83, 89. 
Cheat River, 82-84, 88. 
Chequos, 29. 
Chesapeake, Lower, plan, 17 

186, 191. 
Chicago, 47-50. 
Chickahominy, 234 ; bridges, 3IJ: 

316 ; dividing army of the H 

tomac, 318, 468. 
Churubusco, 18, 23. 
Cincinnati, 49, 50, 69-71, 81 

McClellan's headquarters, 7 

77- 

Clarke, Colonel H. F., 335. 

Clarksburg, 84. 

Colorado River, 26. 

Columbia, flagship, 34. 

Columbia barracks, 31. 

Columbia River, 28, 31, 32. 

Columbus, Ky., 76. 

Columbus, Ohio, 70, 71. 

Colville, 31. 

Committee on the Conduct of tl 
War, 144, 163-166, 199, 21 
218. 

Conduct of the War. See Cor 
mittee on. 

Confederate army better in bl 
ginning of war than Federa 
67 ; overestimated by McCld 
Ian, 107, 108, 116-IT9, 147, 15 
152 ; its real condition, I2C 
numbers, 121, 127 ; conferen 



INDEX. 



479 



I of generals at Fairfax Court 
House, 122-127 ; size, 221 ; 
condition, 244, 245 ; at and 
after Williamsburg, 274-276. 

Conrad's Ferry, 141, 142. 

Constantinople, 38, 39. 

Contreras, 18. 

Cooke, General, 259 ; at Gaines's 
xMill, 346. 

Corpus Christ i, 27. 

Couch, General, 309-311 ; at Mal- 
vern Hill, 362, 363. 

Council of war of twelve gen- 
erals, 204. 

Council of war at Fairfax Court 
House, 208, 209. 

Cox, General Jacob D., 70, 71, 
86, 90 ; at Antietam, 423. 

Cram, Colonel T. J , 236, 237. 

Crampton's Gap, 407-409. 

Craven, Captain, 157. 

Crimean War, 38, 39. 

Cronstadt, 38. 

Cross Keys, battle of, 322. 

Cuba, 64. 

Cumberland Gap, 154. 

Curtin, Governor, 70, 445, 446. 

Custer, Lieutenant, 336, 337. 

Dalles, 31. 
I Dam No. i, affair of, 248-250. 
Darnestown, 140. 
Davis, Jefferson, Secretary of 

War, 33-37 ; elected President, 

67 ; 122, 221, 222, 245, 254, 255, 

314, 322, 399. 
Declaration of Independence, 55. 
Delafield, Major, 35. 
Dennison, Governor, 70, 79. 
Departments, military, 153, 227, 

286. 
Devens, Colonel, 141-143. 
Division of the Potomac, 98. 
Dix, General, 138, 206. 
Dogwood Ridge, 90. 
Donelson, Lieutenant, 31. 
Douglas, 129. 
Dranesville, 140, 141. 
Dumfries, 121. 
Dumont, Colonel, 81, 
Du Pont, flag officer, 212. 



Edward's Ferry, 141, 143. 
Emory, General, 258,259,271,272. 
England, 37, 39, 41. 
Europe, art of war in, 35-40. 
Evans, August, 120. 
Evanston, 121. 

Fair Oaks, battle of, 303-313. 

Fairfax Court House, 94 ; con- 
vention, 120-127, 208, 209. 

Farnsworth, Colonel, 328. 

Flint Hill, 120. 

Ford, Colonel, 409. 

Forrest, General, 198. 

Fort Arbuckle, 27. 

Fort Baker, 31. 

Fort Belknap, 26, 27. 

Fort Delaware, 25, 113. 

Fort Jackson, 78. 

Fort Magruder, 259-261, 263- 
265, 269. 

Fort Merrill, 27. 

Fort Monroe, 132, 148, 149 ; as 
basis of operations, 207, 208, 
210 ; reached by McClellan, 
232, 235 ; 465, 467. 

Fort Pulaski captured, 169. 

Fort Randall, 148. 

Fort St. Philip, 78. 

Fort Sumter. See Sumter. 

Fort Vancouver, 29. 

Foster, 12, 15. 

Fox, G. v., 207, 208, 218. 

France, 37, 39. 

Franklin, General, 139; helping 
in plans of campaign, 176-182 ; 
his corps sent to McClellan, 
254, 274-275, 284; on Chick- 
ahominy, 318 ; after Glendale, 
357 ; his corps sent too late to 
Pope, 385-391 ; before Antie- 
tam, 411. 

Franklin, Benjamin, 56. 

Frazier's Ferry, battle of, 355. 

Fremont, General John C, 228 ; 
in Jackson's Valley raid, 2S6- 
291, 447. 

Front Royal, 292. 

Gaines's Mill, battle of, 335, 340- 
347. 



48o 



GENERAL McCLELLAN, 



Gallipolis, 77. 
Galveston, 27. 
Garland, General, 302. 
Garnett, General R. S., 82-gi. 
Georgia, Union feeling in, 66. 
Glendale, 353, 354 ; battle, 355- 

357. 
Goldsborough, Admiral, 169, 212, 

217-219, 232, 239-241. 
Gomard, 25. 
Goode, Colonel, 259. 
(rrafton, 81, 83, 84, 90. 
Great Kanawha, 77. 
Great Raft, 26. 
Grififin, General, accused by 

Pope, 397. 
Grover, 263, 264, 266-267. 
Guaymas, 134. 
Gulf ports, to be blockaded, 78. 

Hagerstown Road, 414. 

Halleck, General, 115, 153; re- 
ceives letter from McClellan, 
154, 368; 372; made general 
in chief,. 373-375 ; his char- 
acter, 374 ; meets McClellan, 
374. 375 *. sends him dispatch 
to withdraw from Peninsula, 
376 ; writes about it, 378-381 ; 
orders McClellan to send Frank- 
lin's corps to Pope, 3S7-392 ; 
sends Lincoln's order to Mc- 
Clellan, 430. 

Hammerstein, Major, 391, 392. 

Hancock, General, 262, 263, 267- 
270. 

Hanover Court House, 295-297, 
300, 468. 

Harper's Ferry, 94, 132, 139 ; 
bridge plan a failure, 20 r, 202, 
222 ; its capture, 409-411. 

Harrisburg, 148. 

Harrison's Island, 141, 142. 

Harrison's Landing, 364, 372, 381. 

Harrison's Landing letter, 368- 
370, 441, 444. 

Hart's farm, 86. 

Heintzelman, General, 95, 139, 
311, 313-315 ; at Williamsburg, 
272. 

Hill, General A. P., at Beaver 



Dam Creek, 332-335, 34°; at| 
Gaines's Mill, 342-346. 

Hill, General C. W., 84. 

Hill, General D. H., 67; at 
Seven Pines, 301-303, 305, 307, 
30S, 310-313 ; at Malvern Hill, 

363, 364. 

Hitchcock, General E. A., 231. 

Hodges, Lieutenant, 30, 31. 

Hooker, General, 139 ; his plan 
to destroy Confederate bat- 
teries abandoned, 200 ; before 
Williamsburg, 260-270, 272, 
273 ; at Oak Grove, 330 ; at 
Antietam, 412-417, 423, 425,; 
427. 

Horse Shoe Run, 89. 

Howe, Lieutenant, 142. 

Hungarian saddle, 41. 

Hunter, General, 95, 368. 

Huttonsville, 83, 84, 88-90. 

Illinois, part of Department 0% 

the Ohio, 73. 
Illinois Central Railroad, 47-49. 
Indiana, part of Department oi> 

the Ohio, 73 ; regiments, 81. 
Indianapolis, 81. 
Indianola, 27. 
Information service very badj 

140, 347. 
Inkermann, 43. 

Jackson, " Stonewall," 19 ; super- 
intends Southern academy, 67 ; 
tries to turn Union right, 225, 
226 ; his valley campaign, 286- 
292, 322 ; receives letter fromi 
Lee, 324, 325 ; prepares for 
Seven Days' battle, 325-330; at 
Beaver Dam Creek, 331-335 
at Gaines's Mill, 342, 343 ; in 
retreat to the James, 352, 353, 
355 ; attacks Pope, 382, 383,; 
385 ; at Antietam, 419, 421. 

James River, base taken on the, 

351. 364. 
Jefferson, 55. 
Jenkins, Colonel, 308. 
Johnson, General Edward, 289- 

291. 



INDEX. 



481 



Johnston, Joseph E., 48 ; at Bull 
Run, 94, 95 ; 122, 124, 126, 127; 
withdraws from Manassas, 222- 
225 ; proposes new plans, 254, 
255 ; assumes command in 
Peninsula, 255 ; at Williams- 
burg, 259, 265; 385, 29S-303 ; 
at Seven Pines, 303-309. 

Kamiesch, 42. 

Kanawha, 82, 83, 86, 89, 90. 

Kansas, struggle for, 56. 

Kearny, General, 266, 267, 271. 

Kelly, Colonel B. F., 80, 81. 

Kelton, Colonel, 392. 

Kenly, Colonel, 292. 

Kentucky, 123, 124, 131, 132; 

won for Union, 62, 76. 
Kernstown, 226, 286. 
Ketetas, 30. 
Key, Thomas M., 50. 
Keyes, 201, 214 ; at Lee's Mill, 

237, 238 ; at Williamsburg, 

272, 273 ; on the Chickahominy, 

301, 302. 
Kimball, Colonel, 226. 
Knoxville, Tenn., 108, 154. 

Lancaster gun, 36. 

Langley, 31, 141. 

Laurel Hill, 86, 87. 

Laurel Mountain, 83, 84. 

Lawton, General, at Antietam, 
418, 419. 

Leadsville, 83, 84, 88, 89, 91. 

Lee, Robert E., in charge in 
West Virginia, 82 ; corresponds 
with Johnston and Magruder, 
245 ; objects to Johnston's plan, 
255; 289 ; in command of army, 
312-314 ; his plan after Seven 
Pines, 321-327 ; issues General 
Order No. 75, 326, 327 ; at 
Gaines's Mill, 342, 344 ; waits 
too long after battle, 351 ; at 
Glendale, 354-356 ; at Malvern 
Hill, 359-361 ; 374 ; sends 
Jackson against Pope, 382, 
383. 385 ; invades Maryland, 
398-400 ; issues Special Order 
No. 191, 401, 402 ; his dis- 

31 



patch found by enemy, 404 ; at 
South Mountain, 406-408 ; re- 
treats after Antietam, 425 ; dis- 
turbs retreat from Peninsula, 
437. 438 ; contrasted with Mc- 
Clellan, 470, 471. 

Leesburg, 120, 121, 132, 140-144. 

Letcher, Governor, 80, 82. 

Lewinsville, 140. 

Light Brigade at Balaklava, 42. 

Lincoln, President, comes first in 
touch with McClellan, 49 ; calls 
the people " plain people," 58 ; 
his election, 59, 62 ; waits for 
attack from the South, 62, 65 ; 
not understood at first, 63 ; de- 
cides upon advance toward 
Richmond, June 29, 1861, 94; 
flattering welcome to McClel- 
lan, 97 ; deference to the same, 
107 ; consulting him, 107 ; tries 
to smooth over feelings between 
Scott and McClellan, no ; re- 
ceives letter from McClellan, 
no. III; sends note to McClel- 
lan making him commander in 
chief, 145 ; asks for paper on 
condition and strengthening 
of the army, 145 ; McClellan's 
unintentional discourtesy al- 
leged to have diminished friend- 
ly regard for him, 156 ; but 
supports him against all attacks, 
156 ; communicates with Buell 
on affairs in Tennessee, 160- 
162; tries to induce McClellan 
to action by plan of campaign, 
171 ; calls meetings for cam- 
paign plans, 176-185 ; issues 
war orders, 1S6 ; receives Mc- 
Clellan's criticism and other 
plans, 187-195 ; asks McClel- 
lan about his plans, and unwill- 
ingly accepts them, 196 ; insists 
upon defense of Washington, 
199 ; loses confidence in Mc- 
Clellan, 202 ; asks him about 
his Southern sympathy, 203 ; 
issues War Orders Nos. 2 and 3, 
205 ; not prepared to direct the 
military operations, 227 ; writes 



482 



GENERAL McCLELLAN. 



letter to Fremont, 228 ; to Mc- 
Clellan on re-enforcements, 252, 
253, 279, 280 ; on corps organ- 
ization of the Army of the Po- 
tomac, 282, 283 ; on McDowell's 
corps and proposing some ac- 
tion, 293-295 ; writes to Mc- 
Clellan after Malvern Hill, 367 ; 
visirs army, 368 ; pockets Har- 
rison's Landing letter without 
a word of comment, 371 ; makes 
Halleck general in chief, 373 ; 
opposes McClellan's removal, 
394-397 ; visits camp after An- 
tietam, 430; preparing to re- 
move McClellan, 431 ; replies 
to McClellan's letter, 433-435 ; 
relieves him finally, 438-441 ; 
his Emancipation Proclama- 
tion, 444 ; his second candidacy, 
447 ; misjudged by McClellan, 
472. 

Little Miami Railroad, 73. 

London, 37^ 

Long, Colonel, 26. 

Long Bridge, 93, 99, 100. 

Longstreet, 268; at Seven Pines, 
302, 303, 307, 309-311 ; at 
Gaines's Mill, 344, 346 ; at 
Glendale, 356, 357 ; at Malvern 
Hill, 359-361. 

Louisville, 77, 154. 

McCall, 139-141 ; his division, 
317, 319, 321, 340; at Glen- 
dale, 353-357- 

McClellan, Carswell, 4. 

McClellan, Geo., father of Geo. 
B. McClellan, 4. 

McClellan, Geo. B., born, i ; 
family, 1-7 ; at West Point, 7- 
13 ; in Mexican War as an en- 
gineer officer, 13-23 ; officially 
complimented at the hill Tele- 
grafo, 16 ; distinguishes himself 
before Puebla, 17 ; at Contre- 
ras, 18, 19, 23 ; at Churubusco, 
18, 23 ; at Chapultepec, 20, 21; 
before City of Mexico, 20, 21; 
loss of vigor in Mexican War 
shows itself in 1861, 22 ; bre- 



vetted first lieutenant and cap- 
tain, 23 ; instructs at West 
Point, 23-25 ; bent of his mind 
strategic rather than tactical, 
24 ; delivers essay on Napo- 
leon's campaign of 181 2, 24 ; 
writes manwal of bayonet exer- 
cises, 25 ; assistant in construe- ■ 
tion of Fort Delaware, 25 ; his 
explorations, 25-34 ; takes pai't 
in Marcy's Red River expedi- 
tion, 26, 27 ; chief engineer of i 
General P. F. Smith's staff, 27 ; 
in charge of harbor improve- 
ments in Texas, 27 ; report oni 
the same, 27 ; helps surveying, 
route for railroad from the Mis-- 
sissippi to the Pacific, 28-34 
writes report about it, 33-35 ; : 
investigates Samana harbor ini 
San Domingo, 34, 35 ; is made; 
captain in First Cavalry, 35 ; 
member of commission to re- 
port on art of war in Europe; 
and the Crimean War, 35-47 ; : 
his report, 39-47 ; translates- 
and adapts regulations, etc., fori 
cavalry, 40 ; introduces cavalry, 
sabre and saddle-tree, 41 ; be- 
comes vice president of Illinois: 
Central Railroad, 47-49 ; be- 
comes president of Ohio and: 
Mississippi Railroad Co., 49 ; 
marries, 50 ; review over early) 
life, 51, 52 ; at outbreak of civ- 
il war, Pennsylvania puts him 
in charge of its forces, 69 ; but 
he accepts the same position in 
Ohio, 70 ; and organizes the 
forces, 70-73; placed in com- 
mand of the Department of that 
Ohio, 73 ; great merits of his 
work in this position, 75, 76 ; 
helps saving Kentucky for the. 
Union, 76 ; submits campaign' 
plans to Scott, 77 ; service in; 
Western Virginia, 79-92 ; proc- 
lamation to West Virginians, 
85 ; takes Pegram's command 
after Rich Mountain, 88 ; pur- 
sues Garnett, 8g ; relieved by 



INDEX. 



483 



Rosecrans, 90 ; being over- 
praised hurts him, 90, 97, 9S, 
107 ; his timidity, 91 ; early 
campaign shows his character- 
istics and does not deserve 
much praise, 90, 91 ; sends 
congratulatory order to soldiers 
on campaign, 92 ; selected to 
command Division of the Poto- 
mac, 97, 98 ; thoroughly loyal, 
97 ; his good qualities, 97, gS ; 
organizes future Army of the 
Potomac, 99 ; his talent for the 
work, 100, 103 ; deserves un- 
dying thanks of the nation for 
it, 104 ; appoints chief of staff, 
102 ; overworked and morbid, 
104 ;loverestimates enemy, 107, 
loS, 116-119, 127, 128, 170, 
19S, 229, 279, 320, 328, 346, 
347, 391, 464, 468, 469 ; breaks 
with Scott, 106-115 ; succeeds 
him as commander in chief, 
115 ; expects Beauregard's at- 
tack, 116; Secretary of War 
offers to help him to prepare 
for battle, 117 ; his answer, 
117-119; requests increase of 
army, 117-119, 188 ; political 
convictions opposed to those of 
Administration, 129, 156; opin- 
ion regarding slavery, 129, 
130 ; politically distrusted, 130, 
156 ; his memorandum on mil- 
itary policy and plan of cam- 
paign quoted, 130-136 ; upholds 
this plan later in life, 136 ; de- 
lay of operations, 137, 139 ; 
decides to take the offensive, 
139 ; service of information and 
reconnoissances very bad. 140 ; 
withholds order for Stone's ar- 
rest after Ball's Bluff, 144 ; ap- 
pointed commander in chief, 
145 ; his paper on condition of 
army and increase of its effi- 
ciency quoted, 146-150; im- 
patience with his inactivity, 
151, 155 ; creates new depart- 
ments, 153 ; letter to Buell, 
I53> 154 ; ii"! great state in 



Washington, 155 ; willing to 
help Unionists in Eastern Ten- 
nessee, 158-163; appears be- 
fore Committee on the Conduct 
of the War, 166 ; his bad rela- 
tions to Stanton, 166-168, 186 ; 
directs operations against North 
Carolina, Fort Pulaski, and 
New Orleans, 169 ; continued 
inactivity, 170; answers curily 
President's plan of campaign, 
172 ; suggests Peninsular cam- 
paign, 175, 176; his sickness 
delays plans, 176, 177 ; partici- 
pates in war council, 180-184; 
his narrative of it, 182-184 ; 
gains enemies by his behavior 
during the council, 1S4, 1S5 ; 
submits objections to Lincoln's 
war order, 187 ; Urbana plan 
of campaign and plans of 
Peninsular campaign, 187-195 ; 
has his plan accepted, but at 
great cost to his credit, 197- 
199 ; unjustly accused as a trai- 
tor, 203 ; his plans adopted by 
council of war of twelve gen- 
erals, 204 ; prefers Fort Mon- 
roe as basis, 207 ; holds coun- 
cil of war with four corps com- 
manders, 208, 209 ; relieved 
from conimandership in chief, 
210 ; submits outline of cam- 
paign, 215, 2t6 ; asks for sup- 
port of navy, 216, 217 ; makes 
army move toward Manassas 
and back, 223 ; asks for re-en- 
forcements, 229 ; deprived of 
part of his army, 232, 239 ; 
reaches Fort Monroe, 232, 235 ; 
partly unacquainted with to- 
pography of Peninsula, 236 ; 
discouraged before Yorktown 
and inactive, 241-243 ; misses 
a golden opportunity, 245 ; en- 
joys great confidence, 246 ; asks 
persistently for re-enforce- 
ments, 251-253, 279, 321, 365, 
366, 381 ; surprised by evacua- 
tion of Yorktown, 256 ; at Wil- 
liamsburg, 272, 273 ; chooses 



484 



GENERAL McCLELLAN. 



base after battle, 277, 278 ; 
sends dispatches to Stanton, 
278, 281 ; asks authority to re- 
lieve corps commanders, "282, 
2S3 ; neglects consulting them, 
283 ; falls sick at Hanover 
Court House, 297 ; responsible 
for disasters on the Chickahom- 
iny, 301 ; issues order at Seven 
Pines, 309 ; his influence in 
battle very meagre, 311-313; 
his conduct after the battle, 
314, 317-320 ; his generalship 
at this time criticised, 320, 321; 
his ignorance about the ene- 
my's position, and his inferiority 
to Lee, 328 ; sends desponding 
message to War Department, 

329 ; takes decisive step which 
leads to affair of Oak Grove, 

330 ; disconcerted by Jackson's 
presence near Hanover Court 
House, 330, 331 : gives direc- 
tions to Porter at Beaver Dam 
Creek, 333, 334 ; intends to 
abandon his base at White 
House Landing, 335 ; sends 
Barnard to reconnoiter, 335- 
339 ; supports Porter insuffi- 
ciently at Gaines's Mill, 346 ; 
shows his distorted view on the 
battle in letter to Stanton, 348, 
349 ; orders retreat, 349 ; has 
his headquarters too far from 
battlefields, 352, 354 ; indefens- 
ible separation from army at 
Malvem Hill, 361 ; writes let- 
ter to Stanton, 365, and the ad- 
jutant general, 366 ; writes his 
Harrison's Landing letter, 368- 
370 ; almost universally con- 
demned, 371 ; his meeting with 
Halleck, 377, 378 ; tries to in- 
duce Halleck to delay with- 
drawal from Peninsula, 376- 
378 ; receives Halleck's refusal, 
381 ; unjustly accused of re- 
tiring too slowly, 381, 382 ; 
transports army back and goes 
to Alexandria, 383 ; tempora- 
rily ignored, 384 ; excused for 



not sending Franklin's corps to 
Pope, 385-391 ; directed to 
take charge ot Washington and 
restored to command, 392, 398 ; 
his removal demanded, 393- 
396 ; is characterized by Lin- 
coln, 395-397 ; asks Porter to 
support Pope, 397 ; restores 
army and protects capital, 398, 
402 ; is uncertain about Lee's 
designs, 403 ; his slow progress, 
404, and neglect of his advan- 
tages, 406, 407, 411 ; his plan 
for Antietam, 412 ; his mistakes 
at Antietam, 412, 416, 426- 
429 ; order for Burnside's at- 
tack, 423, 424 ; in no battle, 
" more errors were committed " 
by the commander than here, 

428, 429 ; does not intend to 
attack again for some time, 

429, 430 ; suspected of delay to 
obey orders, 431 ; sends letter 
to Halleck, 431-433 ; his plan 
and removal of the army, 435- 
437 ; finally relieved from com- 
mand, he ends his military 
career, 438-441 ; his farewell 
to the army, 439 ; settles at 
Orange, N. J-, 443 ; Democrat- 
ic candidate for the presidency, 
444-451 ; first interferes in pol- 
litics by his letter to Biddle, 
445, 446 ; his West Point ora- 
tion shows his false position in 
his candidacy, 449 ; his letter 
of acceptance, 450, 451 ; his 
defeat, 451 ; resigns his com- 
mission, 452 ; goes abroad for 
over three years (1865-1868), 
452, 453 ; put in charge of 
Stevens battery, 453 ; appointed 
chief engineer of New York 
Dock Department, 453 ; be- 
comes Governor of New Jersey, 
454-457 ; member of Board 
of Managers of the National 
Plome for Disabled Soldiers, 
457 ; his domesticity, 457, 458; 
more foreign travels, 458 ; his 
death, 458 ; his burial, 459 ; 



INDEX. 



485 



his character, 459 ; review of 
his behavior during the Re- 
bellion and defects as a gen- 
eral, 460-471 ; his talent for or- 
ganization, and the devotion of 
his sohliers, 472-474 ; his high 
personal character, 474, 475. 

McClellan, Henry Brainerd, 4. 

McClellan, John Hill Brinton, 
6, 7. 

McClellan Creek, 27. 

McCook, General, 85. 

McDowell, General Irwin, 217, 
285-293, 295, 298, 317, 318 ; at 
Bull Run, 94-99 ; in war coun- 
cils in Washington, 176-182 ; 
his corps detached, 232, 239, 
240, 466. 

Madison, 55. 

Magruder, General J. B., 19 ; 
prepares Peninsula for defense, 
234-236, 244, 263 ; 346, 347, 
349-352 ; at Malvern Hill, 363, 

364. 
Mahan, Professor D. H., 24. 
Malakoff, 42, 43. 
Malvern Hill, 354, 355, 357 ; 

battle, 360-364 ; occupied by 

McClellan, 375. 
Manassas, 83, 120, 122, 131, 143, 

150 ; evacuation of, 221-223 I 

second battle, 383. 
Manassas Junction, 94, 121, 

224. 
Mansfield, General, 98 ; mortally 

wounded, 418. 
Marcy, Ellen Mary (Mrs. Mc- 
Clellan), 50. 
Marcy, Captain R. B., 26, 27, 50 ; 

McClellan's chief of staff, 102. 
Marietta, 80. 
Maryland doubtful, 93 ; invaded 

by Lee, 399. 
Mason's Hill, 120, 121. 
Matagorda Bay, 27. 
Matamoras, 14. 
Mathias Point, 118, 156, 157. 
Mechanicsville, 298, 299, 334. 
Meigs, General, in war councils, 

176-184. 
Memphis, 76, 79, 131, 136. 



Merrimac, 206-209, 211, 213, 219, 
232, 235, 277, 278. 

Methow River, 31. 

Mexicalcingo, 18. 

Mexican War, 13-23, 51, 97, 243, 
459- 

Mexico, 64, 112; alliance with, 
suggested by McClellan, 134, 
135- 

Mexico, City of, 18, 21, 23. 

Miles, Colonel D. S., 400, 409. 

Military academies in the South, 
67. 

Milroy, General, 291, 292. 

Mississippi, 154; blockade plan- 
ned, 77, 78 ; strong movement 
advised by McClellan, 131, 
134, 137. 

Missouri, 131, 132; compromise, 
56 ; won for Union, 62, 76. 

Missroom, Commander, 240, 241. 

Mobile, 77, 135. 

Molino del Rey, 20, 23. 

Mona Passage, 35. 

Monitor, 207, 208, 218. 

Monocacy, 126. 

Monongahela, 82. 

Monterey, 83, 89. 

Montgomery, 77, 135. 

Mordecai, Major Alfred, 35. 

Morris, General, 81, 84, 86, 88, 89. 

Moscow campaign, 46. 

Mount Adams, 29. 

Munson's Hill, 120, 121. 

Nachess Pass, 29, 30. 
Napoleon, 102, 461. 
Napoleon Club at West Point, 24. 
Nashville, 132, 154. 
Natchitoches, 26. 
National Home for Disabled Sol- 
diers, 457. 
Navy better prepared than army, 

75- 
Nelson's Farm, battle of, 355. 
Newbern, 169. 
New Jersey, McClellan governor, 

454- 
New Mexico, 134. 
New Orleans, 77, 79, 124, 135, 

169. 



486 



GENERAL McCLELLAN. 



Newton, Commodore, 34. 

New York offers McClellan posi- 
tion at beginning of Rebellion, 
69. 

Norfolk, 124. 

North Carolina, Union feeling in, 
66. 

Noyes, Lieutenant, 249. 

Oak Grove, affair of, 330. 

Occoquan River, 94, 118, 121, 197. 

Ohio, Department of the, Mc- 
Clellan in charge of, 73 ; Mc- 
Clellan's service in Ohio, 69-92. 

Ohio and Mississippi Railroad 
Co., 49, 50, 71. 

Ohio River, 77, 80, 81. 

Okinakane, 31. 

Old Fort, 42. 

Olympia, 32. 

Orange, N. J., McClellan's later 
home, 443". 

Own story quoted, 207, 277, 278. 

Pacific Railroad, 28-34. 

Pamunkey, 278, 279, 281. 

Panuco, 134. 

Paris, 37. 

Paris, Comte de, 198. 

Parkersburg, 80, 81, 83, 84. 

Paso Cavallo, 27. 

Patterson, 14 ; blamed for Bull 

Run, 94, 95. 
Pegram's surrender, 85-8S. 
Peninsular campaign plans, 175- 

176; 187-195; McClellan's 

plan, 191-192, 204 ; faulty plan 

finally adopted, 211, 213-2T5 ; 

description of Peninsula, 233 ; 

withdrawal from, '375-383; 463. 
Pensacola, 34, 77, 124, 135. 
Pennsylvania offers McClellan 

command over its forces, 69, 70. 
Perote, 17. 
Philadelphia, Congress of 1774, 

54- 
Philippi, 81, 83, 84, 86. 
Pierce, General, 17. 
Pierce, President, 67. 
Pike (expedition), 26. 
Pillow, General, 16, 17. 



Pinkerton, Allan, 49, 127, 128, 
198, 320, 347. 

Pisquoise River^ 30. 

Plan del Rio, 15. 

Plans of campaign, 120; of Mc- 
Clellan and Scott, 77, 78. See 
also Peninsular campaign. 

Poe, Captain, 86. 

Point of Rocks, 118. 

Poolesville, 141. 

Pope, General, 371 ; put in com- 
mand of army of Virginia, 372 ; 
his character, 372-373, 384 ; 
375> 378-380, 382 ; his unfor- 
tunate campaign, 385-391 ; ac- 
cuses generals, 397. 

Port Republic, battle of, 322. 

Porter, Colonel Andrew, 100. 

Porter, Fitz-John, 69, 102, 139 ; 
forms new levies of infantry 
into brigades, 102 ; before 
Yorktovvn, 23S ; directs siege 
of Yorktown, 248 ; admired by 
McClellan, 284 ; at Hanover 
Court House, 295-297 ; on 
Chickahominy, 319 ; at Beaver 
Dam Creek, 331-335 ; before 
and at Gaines's Mill, 337-346 ; 
at Malvern Hill, 362-364 ; ac- 
cused by Pope, 397 ; promises 
to support him, 397, 398 ; be- 
fore Antietam, 412. 

Porterfield, 81. 

Potomac. See also Army of the 
Potomac, Division of the Po- 
tomac. 

President as head of the army, 
105, 227. 

Presidential elections of 1864, 

447-451. 
Prime, William C, 459. 
Prussia, 38. 
Puebla, 17, 18. 

Railroad from the Mississippi to 
the Pacific Ocean, 28-33. 

Rappahannock, 121 

Rebellion, opening of, 53-68. 

Red House, 8g. 

Red River expedition, 26, 27, 50, 
102. 



INDEX. 



4S7 



Redan, 43. 

Reynolds, General J. F., iig. 
Rian, Charles, 32S. 
Richardson, General, 310-312. 
Richmond, 108, 128, 132, 135 ; 

attack planned, 94, 95 ; Mc- 

Clellan's plan upon, 191, 192 ; 

surroundings of, 299. 
Rich Mountain, 16, 83, 86-91, 

463, 469. 
Rio Frio Mountains, 18. 
Rio Grande, 26, 27, 135. 
Roanoke Island, 169. 
Roaring Creek, 88. 
Roaring Fork, 86, 87. 
Rocky Mountains, 29, 31. 
Rolla, 154. 
Roper's Church, 278. 
Rosecrans, 50 ; at Rich Mountain, 

85, 87, 91 ; relieves McClellan 

in West Virginia, 90. 
Rowlesburg, 83. 
Royall, Captain, 324. 
Ruggles, Colonel, 423. 
Russia, 37, 38. 
Russian army, 39, 42, 43. 

Saber, new, introduced by Mc- 
Clellan, 41. 

Saddle, McClellan's, 41. 

St. George, 88. 

St. Joseph, 27. 

St. Louis arsenal, 72. 

St. Petersburg, 38. 

Samana, 34, 35. 

San Antonio, 18, 27. 

San Augustin, 18. 

San Cosme gate, 20, 21. 

San Domingo, 34, 35. 

San Juan d'Ulloa, 15. 

San Pablo, 18. 

Santa Anna, General, 15. 

Saunders, Major John, 25. 

Savage Station, 350. 

Schleich, General N. J., 70, 85. 

Scott, General, in Mexican War. 
14, 15, 17-22 ; wants to keep 
regular army intact, 68 ; Mc- 
Clellan consults him, 70, 74, 
77 ; his "Anaconda plan," 78, 
79, 94 ; asks McClellan to pre- 



serve Virginia for the Union, 
81 ; objects to use of militia, 
94 ; breaks with McClellan 
and retires, 106-116; 136, 140, 
145.. 

Scutari, 39. 

Sea-coast defenses, 46, 47. 

Seattle, 32. 

Sebastopol, 38, 42-46, 242, 248. 

Secret service bureau established, 
127. 

Secretary of War superior to gen- 
eral in chief, 105, 106. 

Sedalia, 154. 

Seneca Mills, 118. 

Seven Days' battles, 330-364, 469. 

Seven Pines, battle of, 303-313, 
46S. 

Seward, candidate for nomina- 
tion for President, 61, 62 ; in 
meetings to discuss campaign 
plans, 1 80-1 84. 

Sharpsburg, battle of (other 
name for Antietam), 410-429. 

Shenandoah Valley, 82, 83, 89, 
94, 106, 113, 121; Jackson's 
raid, 286-292, 322. 

Sherman, General T. W., 67, 148 ; 
taking Fort Pulaski, 169. 

Shields, General, 287, 288. 

Shumard, Surgeon, 26. 

Sickles, General, 126. 

Simpson, General, 38. 

Sinahomish, 32. 

Sitliugton Hill, battle of, 291. 

Slavery, 54, 64 ; McClellan's 
opinion in Harrison's Landing 
letter, 369, 370. 

Smart's Mill, 142. 

Smead, 148. 

Smith, General G. W., 14, 19, 21, 
48 ; his recollections of Confed- 
erate convention at Fairfax 
Court House, 122-127 I ^^ com- 
mand at Seven Pines, 309-312. 

Smith, General Persifor, 19, 27. 

Smith, W. F. (Baldy), 139, 248, 
249, 260. 

Snoqualme Pass, 30, 32. 

South Mountain, battle of, 406- 
408, 427. 



488 



GENERAL McCLELLAN. 



Sparks (expedition), 26. 

Spokane River, 32. 

Staked Plains, 27. 

Stampede Pass, 30. . 

Stanton, made Secretary of War, 
166, 186 ; his character, 167, 
168 ; replies to McClellan, 209, 
210; practically made general 
in chief, 210 ; sends telegram 
to Halleck, 211 ; his intem- 
perate haste, 213 ; not able to 
direct military operations, 227 ; 
loses confidence in McClellan, 
250 ; writes letter to him, 280 ; 
asks for his removal, 393-396 ; 
blamed for all failures by Mc- 
Clellan's friends, 444, 466. 

State sovereignty, 54. 

Steilacoom, 30, 32. 

Stevens battery, 453. 

Stevens, Isaac I., 28, 29, 31, 32. 

Stone, General, 117 ; at Ball's 
Bluff, 139-144 ; arrested, 144. 

Stone Bridge, 95. 

Stoneman, General, 102, 257, 
258. 

Stuart, General J. E. B., 120, 221, 
258, 259 ; his raid, 323, 324, 
436. 

Sudley Spring Ford, 95. 

Summerville, 90. 

Sumner, 139, 209 ; his testimony 
on campaign plans, 214 ; di- 
rects pursuit after evacuation 
of Yorktovvn, 257, 260, 261, 
268 ; at Williamsburg, 270, 272, 
273 ; at Seven Pines and after, 
309, 311-315 ; in retreat to the 
James, 352-354 ; at Antietara, 
415, 416, 420, 421, 425, 427. 

Sumter, Fort, 60, 63, 65, 69. 

Swift, A. J., 14. 

Tampico, 14. 

Tchernaya, 43. 

Telegrafo, 16. 

Tennessee, Union feeling, 66 ; 
77, 123, 124, 131, 132 ; relief of 
the Unionists planned, 158-163. 

Texas, 27 ; Union feeling, 134. 

Texcoco Lake, 18. 



Thomas, Adjutant-General Lo- j 
renzo, 231. 

Tinkham, Mr., 32, 33. 

Todleben, General, 43, 44. 

Totten, Colonel, 15, 27. 

Tower, 16, 

Townsend, E. D., 114. 

Transportation of army to Penin- 
sula, 236. 

Trenton potteries, 456. 

Trinity River, 26. 

Trumbull, Senator, 145. 

Tucker, John, 196, 197, 212, 235. 

Turkish army, 39. 

Turner's Gap, 407-409. 

Twiggs, General, 19. 

Tygart Valley River, 83. 

Tyler, General, 95. 

Union City, 76, 
Union Mills, 95, 120, I2I. 
Updegraff, Lieutenant, 26. 
Upton's Hill, 120. 
Urbana plan, 193-195, 198, 205- 
209, 213, 214, 223, 463, 465. 

Vallandigham, C. L., 445. 

Van Vliet, General, 335. 

Vera Cruz, 14, 17,' 23. 

Vienna, 39. 

Virginia and Kentucky Resolu- 
tions, 55 ; Union feeling in Vir- 
ginia, 62, 66, 76 ; McClellan's 
service in West Virginia, 79— 
92, 460, 473 ; Virginia forced 
into secession, 79-S2, 93 ; Vir- 
ginia and East Tennessee Rail- 
road, 83. 

Virginia Bluff, 141. 

Von Hoist, 54. 

Wade, Senator, 145, 164, 166. 

Wadsworth, 225, 230. 

Walker's Gap, 154, 

Walla Walla, 31, 32. 

War orders. President's, 187,205, 

210, 
Warrenton, 95, 121. 
Warsaw, 38. 

Warwick River, 248, 251. 
Washington, Lieutenant J. B., 304. 



INDEX. 



489 



Washington, D. C, at beginning 
of war, 65 ; its unfavorable po- 
sition, 93, 94 ; Union army flies 
toward Washington, 95, 96 ; 
necessity of its defense, 104, 
105 ; troops for defense, 132, 
210 ; nearly like a besieged 
city, 199, 200 ; exposed to Jack- 
son's raid, 225 ; protection in- 
sufficient, 228, 231 ; threatened, 
386, 388, 390, 391 ; McClellan 
placed in command, 398. 

Webb, General A. S., 341. 

Welles, Secretary, 212, 394-397. 

Wenachee River, 30. 

West Indies, 34, 35, 51. 

West Point, N. Y., 41, 51, 97 ; 
course at, 7-13 ; Scott praises 
work of West Pointers in Mexi- 
can War, 22 ; McClellan in- 
structor, 23-25 ; West Pointers 
as Confederates, 67 ; McClel- 
lan's oration, 449, 473. 

West Point, Va., 215, 216. 

West Union, 88. 



Wheeling, 80, 81. 

White House, meeting in the, 

176-178, 180-184. 
White House, Va., as McClellan's 

base, 278, 279. 
White Oak Bridge, 350, 354. 
Whiting, General, at Seven Pines, 

309, 310, 313 ; 322, 323. 
Wickham, Colonel, 258. 
Wilcox, General, 265, 312. 
Williamsburg, battle of, 263-273, 

275, 276, 468. 
Wilson, Lieutenant John M., 424. 
Winchester, 94, 95, 200, 201. 
Wise, General H. A., 82, 90. 
Woodward, Judge Geo. W., 445, 

446. 
Wool, General, 250. 
Wormley's Creek, 247. 
Worth, General, 16, 18, 21. 

Yakima River, 30, 31. 
York River plan, 178. 
Yorktown, 124 ; siege of, 237- 
256 ; evacuated, 256, 466, 469. 



THE END. 



THE LIVES OF ROYALTIES. 



The Private Life of King Edward VII. 

By a Member of the Royal Household. One volume. Illus- 
trated. i2mo. Cloth, $1.50. 

"There are many anecdotes of the prince in this volume that throw a 
most pleasing light on his character, and at the same time show that he 
possesses many noble and kingly qualities. It is an exceedingly interesting 
volume.''^— C/iicago yournal, 

" While the book gives a narrative that is intimate and personal in char- 
acter, it does not descend to vulgar narrative. It is a book which will be 
found of unusual interest." — Brooklyn Eagle. 

The Private Life of the Queen. 

By a Member of the Royal Household. Illustrated. izmo. 

Cloth, $1. 50. 

"A singularly attractive picture of Queen Victoria. . . . The interests 
and occupations that make up the Queen's day, and the functions of many 
of the members of her household, are described in a manner calculated to 
gratify the natural desire to know what goes on behind closed doors that 
very few of the world's dignitaries are privileged to pass." — Bostoti Herald. 

The Life of his Royal Highness the Prince 
Consort. 

By Sir Theodore Martin. In five volumes. Each v^^ith Por- 
trait. I 2mo. Cloth, ^10.00. 

" A full and impartial biography of a noble and enlightened prince. . , . 
Mr. Martin's work is not gossipy, not light, nor yet dull, guarded in its details 
of the domestic lives of Albert and Victoria, but sufficiently full and familiar 
to contribute much interesting information. . . .Will well repay a careful 
and earnest reading." — Chicago Tribujie. 

The Sovereigns and Courts of Europe. 

The Home and Court Life and Characteristics of the Reigning 

FamiHes. By ** Politikos." With many Portraits. i2mo. 

Cloth, $1.50. 

"The anonymous author of these sketches of the reigning sovereigns of 
Europe appears to have gathered a good deal of curious information about 
their private lives, manners, and customs, and has certainly in several in- 
stances had access to unusual sources. The result is a volume which furnishes 
views of the kings and queens concerned, far fuller and more intimate than 
can be found elsewhere." — New York Tribune. 

D. APPLETON AND COMPANY, NEW YORK. 



A 



D. APPLETON & CO.'S PUBLICATIONS. 



FRIEND OF THE QUEEN. (Marie Antoinette 
— Count de Fersen.), By Paul Gaulot. With Two Por- 
traits. i2mo. Cloth, $2.00. 

"M. Gaulot deserves thanks for presenting the personal history of Count Ferserj 
jn a manner so evidently candid and unbiased." — Philadelphia Bulletin. 

*' There are some characters in history of whom we never seem to grow tired. O 
no one is this so much the case as of the beautiful Marie Antoinette, and of that lift 
which is at once so eventful and so tragic. ... In this work we have much that \x\ 
to the present time has been only vaguely known." — Philadelphia Press. 

" A historical volume that will be eagerly read." — New York Observer. 

" One of those captivating recitals of the romance of truth which are the gilding o: 
the pill of history." — London Daily News. 

" It tells with new and authentic details the romantic story of Count Fersen's (th« 
friend of the Queen) devotion to Marie Antoinette, of his share in the celebrated fliiih 
to Varennes, and in many other well-known episodes of the unhappy Queen's life."- 
London Times. 

"If the book had no more recommendation than the mere fact that Marie Antoinette 
and Count Fersen are rescued at last from the voluminous and contradictory repre 
sentations with which the literature of that period abounds, it would be enough comi 
pensation to any reader to become acquainted with the true delineations of two of tht 
most romantically tragic personalities." — Boston Globe. 

"One of the most interesting volumes of recent publication, and sure to find its place 
among the most noteworthy of historical novels."— ^^.r.'^w Times. 

^HE ROMANCE OF AN EMPRESS. Calherint. 

■*■ II, of Russia. By K. Waliszewski. With Portrait. i2mo^ 

Cloth, $2.00. 

" Of Catharine's marvelous career we have in this volume a sympathetic, learned 
and picturesque narrative. No royal career, not even of some of the Roman or papa, 
ones, has better shown us how truth can be stranger than fiction." — New York Times 

" A striking and able work, deserving of the highest praise." — Philadelphia Ledger: 

" The book is well called a romance, for, although no legends are admitted in it. 
and the author has been at pains to present nothing but verified facts, the actual careei 
of the subject was so abnormal and sensational as to seem to belong to fiction." — New. 
York Sun. 

"A dignified, handsome, indeed superb volume, and well worth careful reading.'' 
— Chicago Herald. 

" It is a most wonderful story, charmingly told, with new material to siistain it, anc 
a breadth and temperance and consideration that go far to soften one's estimate of om 
of the most extraordinary women of history." — New York Commercial .Advertiser. 

" A romance in which fiction finds no place ; a charming narrative wherein th? 
author fearlessly presents the results of what has been obviously a thorough and im- 
partial investigation." — Philadelphia Press. 

" The book makes the best of reading, because it is written without fear or favor. 
. . . The volume is exceedingly suggestive, and gives to the general reader a plain, 
blunt, strong, and somewhat prejudiced but still healthy view of one of the greatest 
women of whom history bears record."— A^^w York Herald. 

" The perusal of such a book can not fail to add to that breadth of view which is 
so essential to the student of universal history. "—Philadelphia Bulletin. 



New York : D. APPLETON & CO.. 72 Fifth Avenue. 



T 



D. APPLETON & CO.'S PUBLICATIONS. 



HE RISE AND GROWTH OE THE ENG- 
LISH NATION. With Special Reference to Epochs and 
Crises. A History of and for the People. By W. H. S. 
Aubrey, LL. D. In Three Volumes. i2mo. Cloth, $4.50. 

The merit of this work is intrinsic. It rests on the broad intelligence and true 
philosophy of the method employed, and the coherency and accuracy of the results 
reached. The scope of the work is marvelous. Never was there more crowded into 
three small volumes. But the saving of space is not by the sacrifice of substance or 
of style. The broadest view of the facts and forces embraced by the subject is exhibited 
ith a clearness of arrangement and a definrteness of application that render it per- 
ceptible to the simplest apprehension." — A^w York Mail and Express. 

A useful and thorough piece of work. One of the best treatises which the 
general reader can use." — London Daily Chronicle. 

Conceived in a popular spirit, yet with strict regard to the modem standards. 
The title is fully borne out. No want of color in the descriptions." — London Daily 
News. 

"The plan laid down results in an admirable English \\\story."— London Morning 
Post. 

"Dr. Aubrey has supplied a want. His method is undoubtedly the right one." — 

Pall Mall Gazette. 

" It is a distinct step forward in history writing; as far ahead of Green as he was of 
Macaulay, though on a different line. Green gives the picture of England at different 
times — Aubrey goes deeper, showing the causes which led to the changes." — New 

York World. 

" A work that will commend itself to the student of history, and as a comprehen- 
sive and convenient reference book." — The Argonaut. 

"Contains much that the ordinary reader can with difificulty find elsewhere unless 
he has access to a library of special works." — Chicago Dial. 

" Up to date in its narration of fact, and in its elucidation of those great principles 
that underlie all vital and worthy history. . . . The painstaking division, along with 
the admirably complete index, will make it easy work for any student to get definite 
views of any era, or any particular feature of it. . . . The work strikes one as being 
more comprehensive than many that cover far more space." — The Christian In- 
telligencer. 

" One of the most elaborate and noteworthy of recent contributions to historical 
literature." — iVew Haven Register. 

" As a popular history it possesses great merits, and in many particulars is excelled 
by none. It is full, careful as to dates, maintains a generally praiseworthy impartiality, 
and it is interesting to read." — Buffalo Express. 

" These volumes are a surprise and in their way a marvel. . . . They constitute an 
almost encylopsedia of English history, condensing in a marvelous manner the facts 
and principles developed in the history of the English nation. . . . The work is one oi 
unsurpassed value to the historical student or even the general reader, and when more 
widely known will no doubt be appreciated as one of the remarkable contributions to 
English history published in the century." — Chicago Universalist. 

"In every page Dr. Aubrey writes with the far-reaching relation of contemporary 
incidents to the whole subject. The amount of matter these three volumes contain is 
marvelous. The style in which they are written is more than satisfactory. . . . The 
work is one of unusual importance."— //ar^rrf' Post. 



New York : D. APPLETON & CO., 72 Fifth Avenue. 



THE ROMANCE OF HISTORY. 



Peter the Great. 

By K. Waliszewski. Translated by Lady Mary Loyd. With 
Portrait. Small 8vo. Cloth, ^2.00. 

The Romance of an Empress. Catharine 11 of 

Russia. 

By K. Waliszewski. Uniform with ** Peter the Great." With 
Portrait. Small 8vo. Cloth, ^2.00. 

New Letters of Napoleon I. 

Omitted from the Collection published under the auspices of 
Napoleon III. Edited by M. Leon Lecestre, Curator of thee 
French Archives. Translated by Lady Mary Loyd. With Por- 
trait. Small 8vo. Cloth, ^2.00. 

Uniform with the *' New Letters." 

Memoirs illustrating the History of Napoleon I, 

from 1802 to 181 5. By Baron Claude pRANgois de Meneval, 
Private Secretary of Napoleon. Edited by his Grandson, Baron; 
Napoleon Joseph de Meneval. With Portraits and Autograph; 
Letters. In three volumes. Small 8vo. Cloth, ^6.00. 

An Aide-de-Camp of Napoleon. 

Memoirs of General Count de Sdgur, of the French Academy, 
1800— 181 2. Revised by his Grandson, Count Louis de S^gur. 
With Portrait. Small 8vo. Cloth, ^2.00. 

Memoirs of Marshal Oudinot, 

Due de Reggio. Compiled from the Hitherto Unpublished 
Souvenirs of the Duchesse de Reggio, by Gaston Stiegler, and 
now first translated into English by Alexander Teixeira de Mattos. 
With Two Portraits. Small 8vo. Cloth, ^2.00. 

A Friend of the Queen. 

(Marie Antoinette — Count de Fersen.) By Paul Gaulot. 
With Two Portraits. i 2mo. Cloth, ^2.00. 

D. APPLETON AND COMPANY, NEW YORK. 



STANDARD HISTORICAL WORKS. 



The American Revolution, 1763-1783. 

Being the Chapters and Passages relating to America, from the 
Author's ** History of England in the Eighteenth Century." 
By William Edward Hartpole Lecky, M. P. Arranged and 
edited, with Historical and Biographical Notes, by James Albert 
Woodburn, Professor of American History and PoHtics in Indiana 
University, i zmo. Cloth, $1.25. 

A French Volunteer of the War of Independence. 

By the Chevalier de Pontgibaud. Translated and edited by 
Robert B, Douglas. With Introduction and Frontispiece. 
I zmo. Cloth, $1. 50. 

Germany and the Germans. 

By William Harbutt Dawson, author of ** German Socialism 
and Ferdinand Lassalle," ** Prince Bismarck and State Social- 
ism," etc. 2 vols., 8vo. Cloth, ^6.00. 

'* This excellent work — a literary monument of intelligent and conscientious 
labor — deals with every phase and aspect of state and political activity, public 
and private, in the Fatherland. . . . Teems with entertaining anecdotes and 
introspective apercus of character." — London Telegraph. 

"Mr. Dawson has made a remarkably close and discriminating study of 
German life and institutions at the present day, and the results of his observa- 
tions are set forth in a most interesting manner." — Brooklyn Times. 

A History of Germany, from the Earliest Times 
to the Present Day. 

By Bayard Taylor. With an Additional Chapter by Marie 
Hansen-Taylor. With Portrait and Maps. 1 2mo. Cloth, 

$1.50. 

"When one considers the confused, complicated, and sporadic elements of 
German history, it seems scarcely possible to present a clear, continuous narra- 
tive. Yet this is what Bayard Taylor did. He omitted no episode of impor- 
tance, and yet managed to preserve a main line of connection from century to 
century throughout the narrative." — Philadelphia Ledger. 

D. APPLETON AND COMPANY, NEW YORK. 



YOUNG HEROES OF OUR NAVY^ 

Uniform Edition, Each, t2mo, cloth, $I.CO. 

» — 

Reuben James. 

A Hero of the Forecastle. By Cyrus Townsend Brady, author 
of ** Paul Jones." Illustrated by George Gibbs and others. 

"Nothing could be more absorbing than Mr. Brady's graphic tale, which 
forms an eloquent tribute to the heroes of the forecastle, the predecessors of thei 
men who did such gallant work at Manila and Santiago." — Cle-veland World. 

The Hero of Manila. 

Dewey on the Mississippi and the Pacific. By Rossiter Johnson. 
Illustrated by B. West Clinedinst and others. 

"There is nothing sensational or bombastic in the story from beginning tc 
end. It is, however, picturesque and vivid, as well as dignified, modest, and 
decidedly interesting." — Boston Budget. 

The Hero of Erie (^Commodore Perry). 
By James Barnes, author of '* Midshipman Farragut," ** Comn 
modore Bainbridge," etc. With lo full-page Illustrations. 

Commodore Bainbridge. 

From the Gunroom to the Quarter-deck. By James BarneSw 
Illustrated by George Gibbs and others. 

Midshipman Farragut. 

By James Barnes. Illustrated by Carlton F. Chapman. 

Decatur and Somers. 

By Molly Elliot Seawell. With 6 full-page Illustrations by 
J. O. Davidson and others. 

Paul Jones. 

By Molly Elliot Seawell. With 8 full-page Illustrations. 

Midshipman Paulding. 

A True Story of the War of i 8 i 2. By Molly Elliot Sea-^ 
WELL. With 6 full-page Illustrations. 

Little Jarvis. 

The Story of the Heroic Midshipman of the Frigate Constellation. 
By Molly Elliot Seawell. With 6 full-page Illustrations. 

D. APPLETON AND COMPANY, NEW YORK 



X20 9- 4 



■^ ^ 












•s^''^-^- 



<!5 -n... 



'A 










vOO, 






0° 






"o 0^ 






'"* % 



"-V.--X 



'*A V* 



.<'^-.^-,;'>. 



.^0 















.0^ 






.0 0. 










